



## Taliban and Da'esh: A Growing Challenge to Afghan Security

On September 28, 2015, Taliban forces launched a multi-front attack on the city of Kunduz, forcing the retreat of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and displacing thousands of residents. The Taliban held much of Kunduz for two weeks until a joint military effort by ANDSF, U.S., and coalition forces dislodged the remaining fighters.<sup>1</sup> In nearby Badakhshan province, the Taliban had already expanded its territory through its conquest of Wurduj district.<sup>2</sup>



At the same time, Kabulis queued at passport and visa offices in an attempt to escape the Taliban's violent summer offensive that saw multiple bombing attacks in the capital targeting civilians, police, and remaining U.N. and international troop contingents. In the north, Vice President Dostum's August campaign in Faryab to rout foreign fighters unraveled necessitating his return to the region<sup>3</sup> in October to lead the military campaign against insurgents.<sup>4</sup> In the south, the Taliban's conquest of Musa Qala and Sangin districts in Helmand province prompted the redeployment of British special forces and engendered the announcement of plans to extend the duration of British presence in Afghanistan.<sup>5,6</sup>

News reports now suggest that the fighting has reached Helmand's provincial capital, Lashkar Gah<sup>7</sup>, where a Taliban victory would effectuate control of Helmand province. In the east, the rise of Da'esh has led to internecine conflict amongst the Taliban, Da'esh, local militias, and government forces putting civilians in the middle of the conflict and leading to the mass

<sup>1</sup> Goldstein, Joseph. "Taliban Overrun Remote District in Northeastern Afghanistan." *The New York Times*, June 6, 2015. Accessed November 2, 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/world/asia/taliban-overrun-remote-district-in-northeastern-afghanistan.html>.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Hashemi, Mohamed Reza. "Dostum Motivates Troops in Jawzjan." TOLO News. October 20, 2015. Accessed October 20, 2015. <http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/21969-dostum-motivates-troops-in-jawzjan>.

<sup>4</sup> Ibrahimkhail, Shakila. "Dostum Arrives at Faryab Frontline." TOLO News. August 21, 2015. Accessed August 21, 2015. <http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/21013-dostum-arrives-at-faryab-frontline>.

<sup>5</sup> Stanekzai, Mohammed. "U.S. Soldiers Killed in Afghanistan, Taliban Grab District." Reuters. August 26, 2015. Accessed August 26, 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/26/us-afghanistan-attack-idUSKCN0QV13E20150826>.


<sup>6</sup> Brown, Larisa. "Back to Hel: British Special Forces Are Set to Return to Helmand in Desperate Bid to Defeat Resurgent Taliban." Daily Mail, October 15, 2015. Accessed October 15, 2015. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3274531/British-special-forces-set-return-Helmand-desperate-bid-defeat-resurgent-Taliban.html>.

<sup>7</sup> Rasmussen, Sune. "Taliban Threaten Southern Afghan City of Lashkar Gah." The Guardian. October 20, 2015. Accessed October 20, 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/20/taliban-threaten-southern-afghan-city-of-lashkar-gah>.

displacement of residents.<sup>8,9</sup> In response to these developments, the Obama administration announced that nearly ten thousand U.S. military troops would remain in Afghanistan until the end of his term.<sup>10</sup>

While a continued international military presence may improve security in the short-term, the Ghani administration has an uphill battle to win back the confidence of the Afghan population. The 2015 Afghan Futures Survey reveals growing dissatisfaction with the security situation in Afghanistan and provides insight into the presence of and opinions towards Da'esh in Afghanistan. The interviews were conducted in September 2015, prior to the fall of Kunduz, and it is likely that since that time perceptions of security and the government have further deteriorated. The recapture of Kunduz may improve some perceptions of ANDSF capability, but overall confidence that the government will be able to win a protracted conflict or force the Taliban to the negotiating table have likely been harmed.

## The Taliban's 2014 offensive began a **momentum shift** that has continued through to the 2015 fighting season



<sup>8</sup> Ibrahimkhail, Shakila. "Nangarhar Residents Consider Taking Up Arms To Fight Insurgents." TOLO News. September 18, 2015. Accessed September 18, 2015. <http://mobile.toloneews.com/en/afghanistan/21454-nangarhar-residents-consider-taking-up-arms-to-fight-insurgents>.


<sup>9</sup> "Hundreds of Families Displaced After Taliban and Daesh Clash in Nangarhar." TOLO News. June 15, 2015. Accessed June 15, 2015. <http://www.toloneews.com/en/afghanistan/20021-hundreds-of-families-displaced-after-taliban-and-daesh-clash-in-nangarhar>.

<sup>10</sup> Rosenberg, Matthew. "In Reversal, Obama Says U.S. Soldiers Will Stay in Afghanistan to 2017." *The New York Times*, October 15, 2015. Accessed October 15, 2015. [http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/16/world/asia/obama-troop-withdrawal-afghanistan.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/16/world/asia/obama-troop-withdrawal-afghanistan.html?_r=0).

## The Taliban's Public Relations Victory

The drawdown of international troops in 2015 was accompanied by a rise in Taliban and anti-government activity throughout the country. However, the scale and the success of the offensive seems to have been stronger than anticipated. According to the *Long War Journal*, the Taliban now controls or contests 70 districts within Afghanistan.<sup>11</sup> These areas of control mirror D3 subsidiary ACSOR-Surveys' qualitative monthly district accessibility assessments but,<sup>12</sup> as of October 2015, ACSOR's reports indicate that the Taliban actually is present in or controls approximately 90 of the 409<sup>13</sup> districts in Afghanistan. The expansion of territory under Taliban influence is not localized to a particular region of the country although the south and central regions have seen the largest increases in Taliban and Da'esh presence.

Since the 2015 security handover, the Taliban has gained ground in ALL regions of Afghanistan



<sup>11</sup> Roggio, Bill, and Caleb Weiss. "Taliban Controls or Contests Scores of Districts in Afghanistan." *The Long War Journal*. October 5, 2015. Accessed October 5, 2015. <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/10/taliban-controls-or-contests-scores-of-districts-in-afghanistan.php>.

<sup>12</sup> To protect the safety of ACSOR interviewers and supervisors, ACSOR conducts a monthly security assessment for each district of Afghanistan to determine which districts should be avoided due to concerns for interviewer safety and security. ACSOR managers speak with supervisors for each province and discuss the security situation within each district and reasons for insecurity.

<sup>13</sup> The number of districts is taken from the CSO 2015-2016 results. Urban Kabul districts are aggregated into one district.

This shift in momentum has been a massive propaganda victory for the Taliban. Results from the 2015 Afghan Futures Survey reveal that only 23 percent of Afghans now believe the country is headed in the right direction. This is down from 61 percent in November 2014, which reflected increased optimism following the presidential election. This decrease is fueled by a confluence of factors including poor perceptions of the current administration, worsening security, and a loss of jobs caused by declining donor spending.<sup>14</sup>



*Photo Credit: Nazir Ekhlash of ACSOR*

From a security perspective, the increasingly pessimistic views of the direction of the country are driven in part by Afghan's perceptions of a lack of rule of law, a resurgent Taliban, and public perceptions that security forces suffer from a lack of training, insufficient access to equipment, and corruption. When asked about security from crime and violence in their village or neighborhood, 46 percent state that security is "good", down from 60 percent in 2014. The diminished security situation is being felt mostly by rural Afghans outside the capital, with 42 percent of those living outside of Kabul stating that security from crime and violence is good compared to 68 percent of those living in Kabul province.

Similarly, the proportion believing security from the Taliban and other armed groups is "good" is down from 62 percent in 2014 to 45 percent in 2015. Again, those living outside the capital are feeling the impact of a Taliban push, with 41 percent of those living outside Kabul stating that

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<sup>14</sup> Robertson, Nic. "Failing Afghan Economy Helping Taliban Return to Power - CNN.com." CNN. October 9, 2015. Accessed October 9, 2015. <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/09/asia/afghanistan-kabul-taliban-robertson/>.

security from the Taliban and other armed groups is “good” compared to 66 percent of those living in Kabul.

In addition to pessimism about the country’s current security situation, Afghans are not optimistic about the ANDSF’s ability to provide security in the coming year. The survey results show that 24 percent of Afghans believe that a year from now their security from the Taliban and other armed groups will be better, while 26 percent believe security from crime and violence will be better. These figures are down from 53 percent and 58 percent, respectively, in the 2014 survey.




*Photo Credit: Nazir Ekhlasi of ACSOR*

This rapid degeneration of the security situation has shifted perspectives on the strength of the Taliban. Currently, slightly more than half of Afghans (52%) believe that the Taliban has grown stronger over the last 12 months, up from 33 percent in November 2014. This shift in perception is not confined to one area of the country, with no region of the country having less than 40 percent of the population believing the Taliban has grown stronger. Additionally, there is no difference in perceptions of the increased Taliban strength between men and women, or urban and rural respondents.

The rapid increase in terrain controlled by the Taliban has shaken confidence in the ability of the ANDSF. Prior to the 2015 security transition, nearly three out of four Afghans believed that the ANDSF had the training necessary to protect Afghanistan. With the reduction in forces and assistance, only 56 percent of Afghans now believe the ANDSF have the training necessary to protect the country. Afghans believe that international forces should be involved in training Afghan security forces past 2016. Survey results indicate that 57 percent of Afghans believe that international forces should have a “major role” in training and 30 percent believe that international forces should have a “minor role”. Furthermore, 64 percent believe that international forces should provide equipment to security forces. This desire for international support for the ANDSF translates into support for U.S. military forces and other coalition forces in the country. In fact, 68 percent of Afghans support the presence of U.S. military forces in their country and only 14 percent of Afghans believe that there should be no U.S. forces in Afghanistan. However, it must be noted that the Southwest region, only half (51%) of the residents support the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and 64 percent of residents want to see a reduction or total withdrawal of U.S. troops.

A plurality of Afghans would like to see an increase U.S. forces and an increased role in training and support for counter-insurgancy in Afghanistan.



In addition to the belief that the ANDSF needs more training, Afghans are concerned about rampant corruption within the security forces. The 2015 Afghan Futures data shows that 73 percent of Afghans believe that corruption in the police force in their area is a large or moderate problem, a finding that is consistent with previous iterations of the Afghan Futures Survey. These views of corruption are supported by recent reports of commanding officers creating “ghost soldiers” as a means to collect additional money.<sup>15</sup> Morale within the security forces is also low as new payment schemes make it difficult to collect salaries and threats against ANDSF members’ families has led to mass desertion, particularly amongst the Afghan police force.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Hicks, Josh. "U.S. Might Be Paying 'ghost Workers' in Afghanistan." *Washington Post*, March 20, 2014. Accessed March 20, 2014. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2014/03/20/u-s-might-be-paying-ghost-workers-in-afghanistan-security-forces/>.

<sup>16</sup> Smith, Josh. "Tide of Desertions — among Highest in Recent History — Strains Afghan Forces." *Stars and Stripes*, September 3, 2015. Accessed September 3, 2015. <http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/tide-of-desertions-among-highest-in-recent-history-strains-afghan-forces-1.366071>.

## Reports of Da'esh Presence May Be Exaggerated, But Should Not Be Ignored

Soon after the handover of responsibility for security to the ANDSF in January, Afghan media outlets reported beheadings, kidnappings, and sightings of Da'esh flags almost weekly. The group rapidly established a presence in Zabul and Nangarhar provinces. To date, Da'esh is reported to have killed an estimated 600 or more civilians and displaced several hundred more in Nangarhar province alone.<sup>17</sup> The most brazen of these attacks was a suicide bombing in Jalalabad that killed 34 and injured more than 100 civilians.<sup>18</sup> In Zabul province, Da'esh reportedly abducted and executed 30 ethnic Hazaras on the Kabul-Kandahar road. These high profile attacks have established Da'esh as a destabilizing force in these two provinces.

Of the three quarters of Afghans who have heard of Da'esh, less than 3% state that people in their community have a positive view of the group.

The emergence of Da'esh in Afghanistan has led to an intricate web of allies and enemies. In response to the security threat Da'esh poses and fearing a rapid unfettered military advance like the one seen by Da'esh in Iraq, the ANDSF and the U.S. launched large scale offensives in Nangarhar and Zabul. In addition to support for the ANDSF, the U.S. has launched drone strikes targeting Da'esh strongholds and key leaders.<sup>19</sup> Fearing a challenge to their power in the region, especially after news was revealed of the death of Mullah Omar, the Taliban launched its own offensive against Da'esh forces in the areas of their historic power base. Other groups such as Hezb-i-Islami and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan have attempted to ride the coattails of Da'esh and have pledged allegiances and provide fighters, resources, and safe-havens.

As in Iraq, Da'esh has launched a media campaign to demonstrate its strength and instill fear in the population. Since first emerging in Afghanistan in 2015, Da'esh followed this strategy by posting videos showing its fighters beheading civilians and members of the Taliban.<sup>20</sup> In the most grisly of these videos, Da'esh planted explosives in the ground and made victims sit on them before detonating them.<sup>21</sup> Survey data show that this messaging campaign is reaching the general population as 74 percent of Afghans report that they have heard of Da'esh. Of Afghans aware of Da'esh (n=1,536), one quarter have watched Da'esh videos via mobile phone or the Internet.

Da'esh's fear campaign appears to be working and Da'esh has become a particular concern to the Afghan population. Of the 74 percent of Afghans that have heard of Da'esh, 72 percent are

<sup>17</sup> Sahil, Mirwais. "Daesh Kills 600 Afghans, Operate Prisons in Nangarhar." TOLO News. September 10, 2015. Accessed September 10, 2015. <http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/21326-daesh-kills-600-afghans-operate-prisons-in-nangarhar>.

<sup>18</sup> TOLO News. "Daesh Claims Responsibility For Deadly Jalalabad Attack." TOLO News. April 18, 2015. Accessed April 18, 2015. <http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/19114-daesh-claims-responsibility-for-deadly-jalalabad-attack->

<sup>19</sup> Khan, Ismail. "ISIS Leaders Reported Killed in Drone Strike in Afghanistan." *The New York Times*, July 9, 2015. Accessed July 9, 2015. [http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/world/asia/us-drone-strike-said-to-kill-gul-zaman-and-shahidullah-shahid-of-islamic-state.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/world/asia/us-drone-strike-said-to-kill-gul-zaman-and-shahidullah-shahid-of-islamic-state.html?_r=0).

<sup>20</sup> United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). "Afghanistan Midyear Report 2015 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict." United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. August 1, 2015. Accessed August 28, 2015.

<sup>21</sup> "PressTV. "ISIL Releases Gruesome Execution Video." Press TV. August 10, 2015. Accessed November 3, 2015. <http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2015/08/10/424096/ISIL-Afghanistan-Taliban-Pakistan-terrorist-group->

concerned that Da'esh will successfully take control of territory in their area. This concern is not concentrated in one area with a majority of Afghans in almost all regions of the country fearing Da'esh capturing territory in their area. This concern was felt firsthand during the fieldwork in which ACSOR data collection staff were reported by villagers and arrested under suspicion of conducting work for Da'esh. All data collection staff were later released without incident.

While Afghans fear Da'esh, they do not support the group. To elicit Afghans' views of Da'esh, respondents were asked an indirect question about the general opinion of their community towards Da'esh. Results indicate that, of Afghans who have heard of Da'esh, just 4 percent state that people in their community generally have a positive opinion of Da'esh. When those who reported negative opinions of Da'esh were asked the reason for these opinions, the top two responses are that Da'esh is killing innocent people (50%) and that members of Da'esh are not real Muslims (15%). Conversely, of those who report that people in their community have a positive opinion of Da'esh (n=60), a plurality (28%) state that it is because Da'esh implements Islamic rules properly.

In addition to showing the violent tactics of the group, the Da'esh media campaign has attempted to demonstrate a formidable countrywide presence. A recent United Nations report stated that Da'esh has an established presence in 25 of 34 provinces. However, the actual number of Da'esh contingents is unknown and current estimates suggest that there are 2,000 to 3,000 Da'esh militants in the country.<sup>22</sup>

In an effort to understand the extent of Da'esh presence in Afghanistan, the 2015 Afghan Futures Survey asked respondents a series of yes/no questions about whether they had seen common propaganda items in their area in the past six months. Propaganda items included sermons supporting Da'esh, Da'esh black flags, Da'esh graffiti, Da'esh media (DVDs, pamphlets, audio/video cassettes, radio broadcasts), night letters, and members of Da'esh (fighters, recruiters, etc.).<sup>23</sup> The total number of items to which respondents stated "yes" were summed.<sup>24</sup> If the respondent had not heard of Da'esh, he/she was given a score of 0 items seen or heard. Results from this analysis were averaged at the provincial level.

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
<sup>22</sup> Zahid, Noor. "IS Website Highlights Increased Militant Presence in Afghanistan." Voice of America. October 28, 2015. Accessed October 28, 2015. <http://m.voanews.com/a/is-website-highlights-increased-militant-presence-in-afghanistan/3026845.html>.

<sup>23</sup> The propaganda items selected for this question were based on previous ACSOR research.

<sup>24</sup> As internet videos are not indicative of a physical presence in the province, this item was left out of the final count analysis.

An argument can be made that these results will be distorted since data collectors' access to some districts is limited. However, results from this analysis are reflective of news reporting and ANDSF military operations, with residents of Nangarhar seeing an average of just over three Da'esh propaganda materials and residents of Zabul being exposed to an average of two items. As such, these results can be interpreted to some extent as indicators of a concentrated Da'esh presence and operations in particular provinces.

### Indicators of Da'esh are highest in Nangarhar and Zabul but there are indications of a western front forming



Viewing other provinces in this light, the provinces of Faryab, Farah, and Ghor in the western region of the country show signs of increased Da'esh activity. This phenomenon may be driven in part by an influx of foreign fighters from Uzbekistan and the recent allegiance between Da'esh and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.<sup>25</sup> While other provinces saw at least some level of Da'esh presence, it does not seem to indicate a level that would currently be a threat to Afghan security. For example, residents of Kabul have been exposed to Da'esh graffiti<sup>26</sup> but this has not translated into a Da'esh power base in the province. Only in the provinces of Badakhshan, Bamyán, and Panjshir have no respondents reported seeing indicators of Da'esh.

<sup>25</sup> Cahall, Bailey, and Neeli Shah. "IMU Members Pledge Support to ISIS; Pakistani Delegation Heads to Saudi Arabia; Gujarat Passes Contentious Anti-Terror Bill." *Foreign Policy*. March 31, 2015. Accessed March 31, 2015. [http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/31/imu-members-pledge-support-to-isis-pakistani-delegation-heads-to-saudi-arabia-gujarat-passes-contentious-anti-terror-bill/?wp\\_login\\_redirect=0](http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/31/imu-members-pledge-support-to-isis-pakistani-delegation-heads-to-saudi-arabia-gujarat-passes-contentious-anti-terror-bill/?wp_login_redirect=0).

<sup>26</sup> Rahimi, Sangar (SangarRahimi) ""@euamiri: ISIS graffiti on Kabul university wall? It says "long live Daesh". #Kabul #Afghanistan #ISIS " October 20, 2014, 5:18 AM, Tweet

**Table 1: Indicators of Da'esh**

	Have seen	Have Not Seen Item	Have Not Heard of Da'esh
Physical Da'esh Media (DVDs, pamphlets, audio/video cassettes, radio broadcasts)	17%	56%	
Black Da'esh Flags	16%	58%	
Da'esh Graffiti	7%	66%	26%
Sermons Supporting Da'esh	7%	66%	
Night Letters	6%	67%	
Members of Da'esh	5%	68%	

\*Figures will not sum to 100% due to exclusion of non-response and rounding

In addition to using reported exposure to Da'esh propaganda as a proxy for relative presence of Da'esh in provinces, it can also be used to understand whom these campaigns are targeting. An exploratory regression analysis was conducted with the count of Da'esh activities used as the dependent variable. Independent variables that were significant would help reveal any segments of the population that are predicted to receive more or less Da'esh propaganda. Afghans receiving more Da'esh materials might be targets of Da'esh's media campaign and recruitment wing.

**Da'esh propaganda is reaching poorly educated, low income Pashtun youth living in insecure border provinces in the east.**

Results from exploratory regression analysis indicate that the Da'esh propaganda campaign is reaching its intended targets. Those who are predicted to have greater exposure to Da'esh propaganda items are poorly educated, low-income Pashtun youths living in the border regions in eastern Afghanistan. Furthermore, these target audiences are living in insecure areas who see the national government as corrupt and are willing to cede certain provinces to the Taliban if negotiations require such conditions for a peace settlement to be reached. Needless to say, these results are troubling as many of these residents may see Da'esh as a means of securing an income or as a way to mount an offensive against a central government perceived as being corrupt.

## Conclusion

The Afghan government would suffer greatly from another year like 2015, which saw the highest level of Taliban control since ACSOR began district-level accessibility tracking in 2010. In the coming months, the 2015 fighting season will come to an end. This will give the Afghan government and ANDSF time to reassess their strategy and potentially reverse some of the Taliban's gains. While reports suggest that Da'esh is a growing problem, its presence is primarily

confined to Nangarhar and Zabul. However, its growth in the western provinces should be addressed to prevent Da'esh from gaining strength on multiple fronts.

The bigger threat to Afghan security is the resurgence of the Taliban in the south and southeast portions of the country. More than 90 percent of the Afghans surveyed do not want to return to Taliban rule, but they are caught between a government stating that they will punish any that assist the anti-government elements and the Taliban stating they will kill those who do not provide assistance. Which side one supports is not simply about a preference for either side's views or form of government, but is potentially a calculated decision of how to reduce risk to oneself, and one's family and community. Unlike the Taliban, the authority of the central government is built upon a mandate from the population. If perceptions that the government is collapsing increase, then the legitimacy of the central government may come into question prompting portions of the population to join or support the side they believe is destined to win the battle. In order for this fragile government to survive, it must turn the tide in the public relations battle and buttress the public perception of its legitimacy.

## Methodology

Afghan Futures is self-funded by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR-Surveys), a D3 Systems, Inc. subsidiary. Results are based on in-person interviews conducted in Dari and Pashto among a random national sample of 2,066 Afghan adults from September 15-20, 2015. For more information please see the full methodology report at [www.d3systems.com](http://www.d3systems.com).

## Appendix: Regression Analysis

Survey: Linear regression

Number of strata	=	65	Number of obs	=	2,029
Number of PSUs	=	146	Population size	=	2,027.7479
			Design df	=	81
			F( 17, 65)	=	6.85
			Prob > F	=	0.0000
			R-squared	=	0.2215

summdaesh	Linearized					[95% Conf. Interval]	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t			
pashdum	.2028367	.0614974	3.30	0.001	.0804762	.3251972	
income	-.0680959	.0244468	-2.79	0.007	-.1167373	-.0194545	
region							
2. Eastern	1.361154	.2799248	4.86	0.000	.8041918	1.918117	
3. South Central	-.0822048	.1093117	-0.75	0.454	-.2997007	.1352912	
4. South Western	-.0995015	.1998698	-0.50	0.620	-.4971798	.2981768	
5. Western	.0868946	.1257758	0.69	0.492	-.1633598	.3371489	
6. Northern	.126602	.1095531	1.16	0.251	-.0913742	.3445783	
7. Central/Hazarjat	.2699904	.1321232	2.04	0.044	.0071066	.5328741	
cede	.2806975	.1124133	2.50	0.015	.0570303	.5043647	
security	-.2840388	.0654493	-4.34	0.000	-.4142623	-.1538153	
crplcl	-.1466472	.0856073	-1.71	0.091	-.3169788	.0236845	
crppol	-.114572	.0807912	-1.42	0.160	-.2753212	.0461772	
crpnat	.208925	.1008356	2.07	0.041	.0082939	.4095562	
quallife	.0160485	.0061085	2.63	0.010	.0038945	.0282025	
educdum	-.1772205	.0677145	-2.62	0.011	-.3119513	-.0424898	
age	-.0039072	.0019013	-2.05	0.043	-.0076902	-.0001241	
urbrur	-.1593698	.1114419	-1.43	0.157	-.3811041	.0623646	
_cons	.4439061	.1983481	2.24	0.028	.0492556	.8385566	

Note: Strata with single sampling unit centered at overall mean.

## **Variable Description:**

**Pashdum:** A binary indicator variable, where Tajik and all other ethnicities are set as the reference category. Pashtun is set as the other category.

**Income:** This categorical variable of respondent's monthly household income was assumed to be a continuous variable.

**Region:** A categorical indicator variable for regional area, where Kabul is the reference category.

**Cede:** A binary indicator variable, where unwillingness to cede provinces as a condition of negotiations is set as the reference category. Pashtun is set as the other category.

**Security:** A binary indicator variable for levels of perceived security from crime and violence of the police in the area, where "somewhat bad" or "very bad" security is the reference category.

**Crplcl:** A binary indicator variable for perceived government corruption in the area, where corruption is a "small problem or no problem at all" is the reference category.

**CrpPol:** A binary indicator variable for levels of perceived corruption of the police in the area, where corruption is a "small problem or no problem at all" is the reference category.

**Crpnat:** A binary indicator variable for levels of perceived corruption in the national government, where corruption is a "small problem or no problem at all" is the reference category.

**Quallife:** An index of the Q2 battery list (excluding security from crime and violence). High scores equate to a better quality of life.

**Educ dum:** A binary indicator variable for educational attainment, where no education is the reference category.

**Age:** Respondent's reported or estimated age.

**UrbRur:** A binary indicator variable for urban/rural status, where urban is a reference category.