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**MISTI STABILIZATION TRENDS AND IMPACT EVALUATION SURVEY
ANALYTICAL REPORT, WAVE 5: SEP 28 – NOV 3, 2014**

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ANALYTICAL REPORT, WAVE 5: SEP 28 – NOV 3, 2014



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Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI)

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ACRONYMS

AAPOR	American Association of Public Opinion Researchers
ACSOR	Afghan Center for Socioeconomic and Opinion Research
ADS	Automated Directives System
AECOM	Architecture, Engineering, Construction, Operations and Management
Afs	Afghanis, local currency
AGE	Anti - Government Element
AIC	Akaike information criterion
ALP	Afghan Local Police
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
AOG	Armed Opposition Group
AYC	Afghan Youth Consulting
CC	Community Cohesion
CCI-Creative	Community Cohesion Initiative implemented in the North and West by Creative
CCI –IOM	Community Cohesion Initiative implemented in the South and East by IOM
CCI	Community Cohesion Initiatives
CDC	Community Development Council
CDP	Community Development Program
CEM	Coarsened Exact Matching
DDA	District Development Assembly
DDP	District Development Plan
DFID	British Department for International Development
DGP	District Government Performance
DGS	District Government Satisfaction
DID	Difference in differences

DSC	District Stability Committee
FOGs	Fixed Obligation Grants
GC	Government Capacity
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
IDLG	Independent Directorate of Local Governane
IEC	Independent Election Commission
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IQ	Intelligence Quotient
ISAF	International Security Assistance Forces
KFZ	Kandahar Food Zone
LG	Local Governance
LLP	Local Leaders' Performance
LLS	Local Leader Satisfaction
MCIT	Ministry of Communications and Information Technology
MISTI	Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives
MOE	Margin of Error
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
MSI	Management Systems International
NABDP	National Area-Based Development Program
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NSP	National Solidarity Program
PG	Provincial Governor
PGP	Provincial Government Performance
QoL	Quality of Life
RI	Resilience Index
SAM	Stability Assessment Method
SATT	Sample Average Effect on the Treated
SC	Social Capital

SI	Stability Index
SIKA - E	Stability in Key Areas East
SIKA - N	Stability in Key Areas North
SIKA - S	Stability in Key Areas South
SIKA- W	Stability in Key Areas West
SIKA	Stability in Key Areas
SOI	Sources of Instability
SRS	Simple Random Sampling
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

With this report, USAID/Afghanistan’s Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives project (MISTI) completes the largest and most comprehensive trends analysis and impact evaluation of stabilization interventions that the U.S. Government has ever undertaken. MISTI was created to determine whether USAID project activities caused changes in stability and resilience at the district and village levels. To achieve that goal, key indicators were measured over five semi-annual iterations or “waves” of the MISTI Survey. Over 27 months a total of 190,264 individual interviews were completed in 5,093 different villages across 130 districts in 23 provinces of Afghanistan where stabilization programming was being implemented or considered.

Data was collected for the baseline round of the MISTI Survey (Wave 1) in September-December 2012. Four successor survey waves were completed biannually through the Wave 5 end-line survey in September-November 2014.¹ Villages were surveyed to measure stability indicators before and after the implementation of stabilization project activities, which MISTI closely tracked and verified. This largely quantitative body of data was contextualized by observation, and supplemented with qualitative data derived from a series of performance evaluations conducted by MISTI for all USAID stabilization projects, a special evaluation of the Stability Assessment Method (SAM) used by communities to identify Sources of Instability (SOI) in their areas and prioritize project activities to counter them, and a special series of depth interviews conducted specifically to provide context for this report. This time-series of survey and project data enabled the tracking of trends in stability and resilience at the district level. The same set of data also allowed for a quasi-experimental evaluation of project impacts by quantifying changes in stability between survey waves in intervention villages compared to equivalent non-intervention villages.

Data collection for the Wave 5 survey was conducted in 107 districts between September 28, 2014 and November 23, 2014 and builds upon the previous survey waves. The intent of MISTI is to provide USAID and implementing partner managers with information for evidence-based decision making about how, where, and when to invest increasingly scarce resources to promote stability and set the stage for transition to Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) led sustainable development.

The following pages summarize the findings, conclusions and recommendations of this report. MISTI urges users to read the substantive chapters that follow and provide a more in-depth treatment.

¹Wave 2 data collection took place in May – August 2013, Wave 3 took place in November 2013 – January 2014, Wave 4 took place in April – June 2014, and Wave 5 took place in September – November 2014.


Findings

Trends Analysis

Methodology


Trends findings were derived using indices to measure various aspects of the social and political environment. Stability and resilience are high level constructs that may be disaggregated into various interrelated indicators of local conditions. Stability is organized according to three component measures, two of which consist of five additional sub-indices (see Figure 1.1).

FIGURE 1.1: STABILITY INDEX COMPONENTS



Resilience also consists of three component measures, two of which consist of four additional sub-indices (see Figure 1.2).

FIGURE 1.2: RESILIENCE INDEX COMPONENTS



The Stability Index is an omnibus measure with 75% of the index value composed of 30 public perception indicators from the MISTI Survey data, and the remaining 25% composed of observational measures. These include the degree to which government security forces control territory in the vicinity of a survey village (10%), the degree to which the Taliban and other armed opposition groups (AOGs) deny access to the area (10%), and the frequency of violent incidents in the vicinity of the village (5%). The Resilience Index is composed of 21 public perception indicators from the MISTI Survey data. Both measures were subjected to factor analyses to test whether the posited relationships could be validated statistically. The indices are relational metrics that situate each district surveyed on a continuous scale where “1” is the lowest possible score and “5” is the maximum possible score.


The aggregate measures of stability and resilience are the average of their respective component scores, and the component scores are the average of their respective sub-index scores. Generally speaking, stability is an aggregate measure of whether participatory local development projects succeed in strengthening perceptions of good governance and effective service delivery, thereby improving citizens’ lives and addressing local grievances that might otherwise contribute to support for AOGs. Resilience measures how well local leaders are able to mobilize their communities to solve local problems with or without government support.

Trends in stability and resilience are measured by the change in index scores over the five waves of the MISTI Survey.

Findings


Between Wave 1 and Wave 5 of the MISTI Survey, the overall stability trend across the 55 districts surveyed in all five waves was largely flat. The average change in stability from one wave to the next was slightly less than 0.05 points, or one percent of the five point Stability Index scale. Both stability and resilience varied in parallel, reaching a low point in Wave 2, and a high point in Wave 3. By Fall 2014 the overall stability situation in USAID programming districts was slightly worse than in Fall 2012. Resilience results showed that the overall situation in Fall 2014 was only marginally better than in Fall 2012 (see Figure 1.3). Within these trends results, a general pattern emerged that showed both overall stability and resilience improving between Waves 1 and 3 but worsening between Waves 3 and 5, especially stability, which continued to worsen during the Summer months of 2014 between Waves 4 and 5.

FIGURE I.3: OVERALL STABILITY AND RESILIENCE TRENDS, WAVES 1-5



When one looks at the components of stability and resilience across all five survey waves, one finds that Local Governance is perceived as most stable, followed by Community Cohesion (see Figure 1.4). Government Capacity and Quality of Life (QoL) track closely together at the lowest level. QoL shows a slight rebound in Wave 5, while the other sub-indices are flat. These differences in the levels of stability and resilience measures highlight the gap between formal government and informal local governance that continues to complicate the GIRA state-building enterprise.

FIGURE I.4: COMPONENTS OF STABILITY AND RESILIENCE, WAVES 1-5



In Chapter 7, each of these components is disaggregated and explored in depth, with each of its constituent sub-indices and variables analysed for further insights. Some of the key insights include:

- **Government Capacity:** While scores in District Government Performance and District Government Satisfaction improved between Waves 4 and 5, the score in Provincial Government Performance declined, keeping the overall Government Capacity score relatively flat. Rural Afghans appear to have serious issues with Government at the provincial level, which is also the level at which most line ministry officials operate.
- **Local Governance:** The Local Leader Performance sub-index is significantly higher than the District Development Assembly (DDA) and Community Development Council (CDC) Performance sub-indices.² Indeed, Local Leader Performance is the highest scoring value among all MISTI indicators tracking stability and resilience. DDAs and CDCs are both government sanctioned, semi-formal institutions. This finding illustrates how Afghans typically perceive local leaders as more legitimate than government actors and highlights the need for development programming to both strengthen government structures and engage local leaders and institutions.

² CDCs are government-sanctioned bodies that serve as the focus for village-level rural development in Afghanistan. All village-level project activities are funded and implemented through them. The DDAs are also government-sanctioned bodies, consisting of elective representatives of clustered CDCs. They create District Development Plans (DDPs) that connect community priorities to the government's agricultural and rural development strategy.

- Quality of Life: The QoL component is unique in that it is a component of both stability and resilience, but does not consist of any sub-indices. Instead, it is the average of six survey questions. The first asks whether the district is moving in the right direction as a barometer of optimism for the future. Two questions measure perceptions of security – one rates the current security situation while the other measures change in security over the past year. Measures of overall life satisfaction, the ability to meet basic needs, and the state of household finances make up the other sub-index items. QoL scores fell and rose over the five survey waves in line with “fighting season”³ effects. The change in score between Waves 1 and 5 is relatively flat, and is a balance between improvements in people’s perceptions of the country’s direction and reported state of household finances, and declines in the security measures, overall life satisfaction, and peoples’ ability to meet basic needs.
- Community Cohesion: This component of the Resilience Index is the average of the Social Capital and the Local Leader Satisfaction sub-indices. Social Capital measures the extent citizens and communities work together to solve common problems, while Local Leader Satisfaction gauges whether local leaders represent citizen interests and have influence with local government actors. While Local Leader Satisfaction scores have fluctuated based on the effects of seasonal violence, Social Capital scores have not. Social Capital is a more steady community trait that is not as tied to external factors such as security that affect perceptions of Local Government, impacting perceptions of Local Leader Satisfaction.

Impact Evaluation

Methodology

MISTI implemented a quasi-experimental impact evaluation to measure the effect of stabilization programming using a rigorously defined counterfactual. The Wave 5 end-line survey measured stability indicators using 41,013 interviews with individual Afghans living in a total of 2,578 different rural villages. At least one USAID stabilization activity took place between 2012 and 2014 in 860 of the villages surveyed in Wave 5. In impact evaluation terminology, a total of 860 villages that were “treated” by stabilization programming were captured by the survey for impact evaluation. The other 1,718 villages surveyed in Wave 5 were “controls” where no USAID stabilization activities took place. A leading-edge statistical technique called “Coarsened Exact Matching” (CEM) was used to determine the best matches between treatment and control villages.⁴ Treatment and control villages were excluded from the impact evaluation where no match could be identified.

Stabilization activities are designed for implementation over 3-6 months, though in practice the duration of some activities is extended by several more months. Given this programming cycle, MISTI’s focus is on evaluating impacts over six-months and one-year time periods (e.g., Waves 4-5 and Waves 3-5). Impact evaluations over longer time periods, for example Waves 1-5 and Waves 2-5, are less valid because of

³ Afghanistan’s fighting season is generally considered to be during the warmer months and last from April to October. Survey Waves 2 and 4 were conducted during this period while Waves 1, 3 and 5 were conducted during the off-season.

⁴ MISTI applied the Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) routine in the STATA statistical package to identify comparable groups of treatment and control villages.


attrition in the treatment and control groups due to the substitution of different programming districts by USAID in subsequent survey waves. Further, the risk of diverging trends between the treatment and control groups grows as more time elapses between baseline and end-line measurements because the methodology cannot control statistically for all events on longer timelines that could create divergences within and between treatment and control groups.

The Waves 4-5 treatment group is a subset of the 860 village total, consisting of 149 villages where interventions took place after baseline stability indicators were measured in Wave 4. This half-year measurement is complemented by the full-year evaluation of impacts in 297 treated villages where Wave 3 was the baseline and Wave 5 was the end-line. The findings presented here and in the full report are the result of analysing changes in 55 stability indicators over Waves 4-5 and 3-5.

Findings

Stabilization activities decreased stability in villages between Waves 4-5: Findings show that between Waves 4-5 – a period marked by deep political uncertainty and unseasonal violence⁵ – stabilization activities had a negative impact on Stability Index scores. Figure 1.5 shows that while overall stability decreased in both the treatment and counterfactual control groups, it decreased more among villages in the treatment group as a result of stability interventions (see Figure 1.5). It should be noted that the Wave 4 stability score of 3.78 in this impact measurement was substantially higher than the average score of 3.3 for all villages (see Figure 1.3). Likewise, the Wave 5 score of 3.5 for the treatment group was higher than the average score for all villages, despite the negative impact of stabilization programming. These findings suggest that relatively stable villages were selected for interventions and the local people had high expectations for programming that were frustrated between Waves 4-5.

FIGURE 1.5: TREATMENT IMPACT ON OVERALL STABILITY, WAVES 4-5



⁵The Wave 4 survey took place during and after the presidential run-off election and data collection for Wave 5 coincided with the deep uncertainty surrounding the composition of the Ghani government and start of the Ghani Presidency. Moreover, the Taliban exploited this uncertainty to extend the 2014 fighting season into the Fall months, further eroding the Afghan peoples' confidence in their government. Thus, the Waves 4-5 period was marked by insecurity and political instability at all levels from the presidency to the provincial and district levels.

Negative impacts were observed across the Stability Index components of Government Capacity, District Government Performance, Provincial Government Performance, and Local Governance. The negative impact on the latter was driven by a perceived decrease in the performance of CDCs and DDAs, which are the key government-supported local partners for the Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) program. These negative impacts are the reverse of the positive impacts that were observed in Waves 3-4 and 2-4 for the Government Capacity and Local Governance components of the Stability Index (see the Wave 4 Report).

SIKA service delivery programming did not result in perceptions of good formal governance but did contribute to increased community cohesion: While SIKA project activities had a negative impact on overall stability between Waves 4-5, no significant impact on the Resilience Index was observed. Stabilization programming did have an overall positive impact on the Community Cohesion component of the Resilience Index and its Social Capital and Local Leader Satisfaction sub-indices. This effect was however offset by negative impacts on the Local Governance and Quality of Life components. These negative impacts coupled with negative impacts on Government Capacity suggest that between Waves 4-5 local traditional leaders were credited for project benefits instead of formal government institutions including DDAs and CDCs. Stabilization interventions appeared to contribute to increased community cohesion in the context of an apparently failing state and emboldened insurgency.

This contrast between negative impacts on stability and positive impacts on community cohesion also demonstrates how divisions between traditional leadership and formal government institutions remain substantial in Afghanistan. Indeed the zero-sum relationship between the two sides of governance – a loss for one is a gain for the other – shows the need for redoubled effort to bridge the gap that undermines confidence and cooperation between traditional governance and formal government.

External factors beyond the control of stabilization programming negatively affected impact evaluation results between Waves 3-5 and, in particular, Waves 4-5: The protracted uncertainty surrounding the presidency and formulation of the Ghani government imperiled the solvency of the state and resulted in an erosion of confidence, responsiveness, and perceived ability to get things done across the Afghan government from national, to provincial, and district levels. To substantiate this hypothesis, MISTI obtained programming data from the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) that allowed for a separate impact evaluation of the Afghan government’s community-level program, the National Solidarity Program (NSP).⁶ This evaluation used the same methodology that was used to evaluate USAID stabilization programming in the same districts. Comparing the findings from the USAID and NSP evaluations showed many of the same negative impacts on Government Capacity indicators in the Stability Index. This leads MISTI to conclude that the 2014 political crisis is the best explanation for the negative impacts of both NSP and stability programming on the government indicators. This political

⁶The key objective of NSP is to build, strengthen and maintain Community Development Councils (CDCs) as effective institutions for local governance that can meet basic development needs. Each CDC represents the interests of a cluster of communities from a defined local area. Their membership comprises people from the local area, elected by community members of the constituent communities through a transparent and democratic process. CDCs prioritize the community’s needs and make decisions about how to tackle them. These state-supported decision-making bodies offer a viable alternative to the traditional local governance structure.

instability also emboldened the insurgency, which extended its fighting season into the Fall 2014 months. This protracted period of violence coupled with the withdrawal of ISAF troops also negatively impacted security indicators and, by extension, stability.

Internal factors negatively affected stabilization programming impacts between Waves 3-5 and, in particular, Waves 4-5: While the political crisis was an external factor beyond the control of USAID stability (and NSP) programming, it is not a sufficient explanation for all of the negative impacts measured in Waves 3-5 and 4-5. Findings from the ongoing final performance evaluation of the four SIKA regional projects indicate that changes in SIKA programming in 2014 also contributed to the negative impact of stabilization interventions. SIKA programming had negative impact on indicators of Quality of Life and CDC-DDA performance in Waves 4-5 and 3-5, in contrast to the positive impact of NSP on the same indicators. Further, the effect of NSP was consistently positive across 2013 and 2014, while SIKA's impacts changed from positive in 2013, to negative in 2014.

MISTI's final performance evaluation of the four regional SIKA projects (underway at the time of this writing) has determined that errors and process changes frustrated the local beneficiaries of SIKA programming. Indeed SIKA programming departed significantly in 2014 from the theory of change that guides the process of stability interventions: Work with local leaders to first identify SOIs, prioritize these SOIs for remediation through project interventions, and then plan and implement these interventions to achieve quick impacts in the six-months to one-year time frames. Negative impacts were created when SIKA programming did not fully adhere to this model. The performance factors that contributed to negative impacts are listed below:

- After SIKA's stability workshops raised expectations by selecting priority projects in consultation with CDCs and DDAs, substantial delays in the implementation of these projects resulted from new external vetting requirements from USAID. Delays in project implementation undermined confidence in the DDAs and CDCs that worked with SIKA, which contributed to negative impacts on indicators of DDA-CDC performance.
- SIKA East, in particular, had the majority of their infrastructure grants stuck at vetting for so many months that approval came with barely enough time for construction before winter in 2014. Local beneficiaries thus had to wait the entire summer for the CDC-DDA to deliver, which happened in most cases after October 2014.
- The delays created by vetting led SIKA to prioritize interventions that were exempt from vetting because their budgets totalled less than \$25,000. In many cases this led SIKA to implement projects that were not prioritized as the best means to remediate SOIs, which directly contradicted the stabilization theory of change. Negative impact would result because of the heightened risk of violence from the Taliban and/or other AOGs (see below on the relationship between violence and stabilization activities). The risk of violence increases the likelihood that more harm than good will result from implementing low-priority activities.
- The push to program in as many CDC as possible within a selected district combined with limited district budgets set by USAID forced SIKAs to focus on small infrastructure grants spread out among numerous CDCs. This led to low cost interventions that were not always prioritized as the

best means to remediate SOIs. Communities often chose interventions to receive some form of programming, even if the programming didn't adequately address an identified SOI.

- Worryingly, stabilization programming actually had the perverse effect of increasing support for the Taliban in Taliban controlled villages. Vetting was intended to prevent U.S. Government funds from going to the Taliban and other anti-government elements, but did not prevent some stabilization activities from taking place in villages under Taliban control. No evidence of direct payments to the Taliban has been found, but the implementation of stabilization programming in Taliban-controlled villages has had the perverse effect of increasing popular support for the Taliban among locals and decreasing support for GIROA (see the Endorsement Experiment section below for more detail).
- Negative CDC/DDA perceptions can be tied to internal anti-fraud mechanisms. To defend against fraud, the completion of internal monitoring reports was required before the disbursement of milestone payments to CDCs receiving fixed obligation grants (FOGs). Poor execution of monitoring led to delayed payments for local project beneficiaries, which created perceptions that CDCs and DDAs were corrupt, and negatively impacted household income and other quality of life indicators.
- There was a lack of focused programming. The focus on hard infrastructure over soft projects was a missed opportunity to cluster activities of different types in time and space in order to increase impact. Soft activities in particular would have been beneficial for women. The scattering of hard activities across districts is indicative of a lack of focused programming.

Learning Agenda

The Performance Management Plan (PMP) update completed in mid-2014 for the USAID/Afghanistan Stabilization Unit, established an initial set of questions to be answered through analysis of the MISTI data to inform program planning and performance. Chapter 8 of this report reviews a selection of those questions, as well as other learning questions that have developed over the course of MISTI. The following summarizes these findings:

SIKA and CCI programming have different stabilization impacts: SIKA works with the MRRD CDCs and the National Area-Based Development Program (NABDP) DDAs⁷ to address local SOIs through its programming. SOIs are identified and activities to counter them prioritized at the community level, then implemented in coordination with district and provincial government institutions. CCI, meanwhile, has no official government partner, but works with government entities at the district level where cooperation is necessary to address local sources of instability. CCI follows a community development process that places more emphasis on identifying local sources of resilience, which may include

⁷ NABDP is a joint initiative of the MRRD and United Nations Development Program (UNDP). It was developed to reduce poverty and improve livelihoods in rural Afghanistan by investing in social organization, infrastructure, local economic development and sub-national governance initiatives. NABDP works closely with rural communities to develop and strengthen governance at the district level and is designed to represent the voice of all rural Afghans, including women. It also promotes engagement with the central government by incorporating district priorities into provincial development plans. The key mechanism for the NABDP's work is the DDA, the members of which are elected by local residents to three-year terms. There are currently 338 DDAs active across all 34 provinces of Afghanistan.

traditional governance actors and government officials, and assisting these actors to solve local problems.


Nearly all programming implemented in Waves 3-5 and 4-5 was from one of the four regional SIKA projects. As described above, SIKA activities had negative effects on all stability indicators with the exception of Local Leader Performance (also a component of the Resilience Index). In contrast, SIKA had a positive impact on Resilience and its sub-indices of Community Cohesion and Social Capital. The Waves 3-5 impact evaluation findings for SIKA are aligned with the Waves 4-5 findings with a few important differences. In contrast to the negative impact on Provincial Government Performance in Waves 4-5, SIKA had a positive impact on this indicator on the one-year impact evaluation from Waves 3-5. This finding, together with a positive but statistically insignificant effect on District Government Satisfaction in Waves 3-5, suggests that SIKA has had a longer-term positive impact on government performance that may outlast the negative effects of the 2014 Presidential election crisis. Waves 3-5 findings also revealed that SIKA interventions had positive impacts on several underlying indicators of satisfaction with district governments, including understanding local problems, officials visiting local areas, and honesty. In combination these findings suggest that SIKA could be instrumental in rebuilding popular confidence and legitimacy for local government institutions after the political crisis of 2014.

The research period coincided with the close-out of CCI programming in the South and East, limiting the number of treatment villages that could be included in the W4-5 analysis. Bearing in mind the limitations this small sample size placed on findings, MISTI found that between W3-5 treatment effects for CCI programming were generally negative, though most did not reach statistical significance because of the small size of the treatment group. The two exceptions were a positive impact on District Government Performance, and a negative impact on Local Leader Satisfaction.

When conducted together, NSP and USAID stabilization programming had positive impacts: To further contextualize its findings, MISTI compared findings from a separate impact evaluation of NSP programming. This was described above in the Impact Evaluation findings regarding the negative effects of external factors such as the 2015 political crisis on stability. This comparison showed that while NSP programming had many of the same negative impacts on Government Capacity indicators in as USAID programming, NSP had positive impacts on QoL indicators such as a household's ability to meet basic needs and household income, as well as the performance of CDCs and DDAs. In contrast, SIKA interventions – the vast majority of all stabilization programming in Waves 3-5 and 4-5 – had negative impacts on QoL and perceptions of CDCs and DDAs.

MISTI then addressed NSP and USAID activities together, finding that the combination of NSP and USAID stabilization programming in the same villages had a positive impact on change in the overall Stability Index in Waves 3-5 (see Figure 1.6).

FIGURE I.6: COMBINED USAID-NSP PROGRAMMING IMPACT ON STABILITY, WAVES 3-5



In addition to this positive impact on overall stability, the interaction of USAID and NSP programming positively impacted the perceived ability of district governments to get things done. Positive impact on the Local Governance component was also observed, including increased confidence in DDAs and improved CDC performance, as well as improved outlook for the future of the district and improvement in the ability of local leaders to secure funding. All Waves 3-5 impacts were positive, *including a statistically significant decrease in support for the Taliban compared to the counterfactual control group*. The largest impacts were observed in cases where both NSP and USAID stabilization activities were ongoing at the time of the Wave 5 survey. Completed projects did not show the same impacts as ongoing ones, suggesting that effects may be relatively short term.

Similar effects were observed in Waves 4-5, though the smaller sample size makes the findings less generalizable. Positive impacts were observed on the Government Capacity, District Government Satisfaction, Local Government Performance, and Community Cohesion components and sub-indices. Positive impacts thus stretched across nearly the full range of stability and resilience indicators in a significant and positive departure from the other Waves 4-5 findings. The Local Leader Satisfaction sub-index was the singular finding of negative impact. This finding falls into the pattern seen in Waves 2-4 (see Wave 4 Report) where DDAs/CDCs and state institutions are credited for project benefits to the detriment of local traditional leaders.

Implementing multiple projects in one village leads to statistically significant shifts in positive and negative results: MISTI performed a dosage-response estimation to measure the impact of multiple USAID stabilization activities implemented in a community. The results showed that impact on Government Satisfaction increased 1.8% with each additional activity, and an additional activity after the first one increased Community Cohesion by 1.1%. Smaller, but still statistically significant effects were observed on a total of 21 survey and index indicators. None of these marginal effects showed a reversal of direction from the main set of effects reported above – no positive impacts became negative or vice versa. In some cases however, a statistically insignificant effect from only one project activity became significant with the implementation of additional projects.


These findings on the strengthening of impacts with a higher dosage of activities suggest that the magnitude and durability of impacts are increased with the clustering of multiple interventions together in time and space. These impacts however cut both ways – negative impacts grow more negative with additional interventions just as positive impacts grow more positive. For example in Waves 4-5 District Government Performance decreased with each additional activity across the range of survey indicators that make up the sub-index.

Combined soft and hard interventions had the most positive impacts: Next MISTI explored the different effects of hard vs. soft activities and found that the combination of at least one hard and one soft activity in a community achieved the maximum positive impact. The evaluation of soft activities in Waves 3-5 found positive impacts on Stability, District Government Performance, including the survey indicators of responsiveness and getting things done, and district government understanding of local problems. The Waves 4-5 treatment group also showed positive impact on the survey indicator of district government responsiveness, as well as impacts on several indicators of DDA and CDC performance, the Resilience Index, the QoL component, and the Social Capital sub-index.

Soft interventions can reverse negative perceptions after hard interventions: The implementation of soft interventions in a community after the implementation of hard activities created positive impacts. In many cases this represented a reversal of the negative impacts observed in the evaluation of overall programmatic effects which were driven by hard activities. The impact of soft activities on reversing negative impacts on the overall Stability, District Government Performance, and DDA and CDC Performance indicators is particularly encouraging, as is the Waves 4-5 effect on strengthening the impacts on Resilience Indicators that were observed in the evaluation of stability programming as a whole.

Violence increased in the short term after stabilization interventions: MISTI explored the relationship between stabilization activities and the level of violence in treatment communities, finding that the frequency of violent incidents increases in treatment communities as a result of stabilization activities. Figure 1.7 shows the increase in enemy attacks in the treatment group compared to the counterfactual control group in Waves 2-4. This treatment effect was calculated using a Poisson regression on the count of enemy actions in the 30 days after the Wave 4 survey in villages where stabilization interventions were ongoing compared to the counterfactual control group.

FIGURE 1.7: INCREASE IN VIOLENT ENEMY ACTIONS PER VILLAGE; 1KM PROXIMITY TO ONGOING PROJECT ACTIVITIES, WAVES 2-4



Violence increased in government controlled areas after stabilization interventions: Villages where stabilization interventions were ongoing in Wave 4 experienced a significantly higher rate of enemy actions (attacks) than the counterfactual control group. The treatment group showed a lower rate of attacks than the control group before the start of activities. *This finding provides clear evidence that the Taliban and other AOGs target villages because of stabilization interventions.*

Endorsement Experiment⁸

The endorsement experiment provides an examination of relative support for the Taliban (versus GIRoA) and how four different variables⁹ affect relative support for the Taliban (versus GIRoA). It draws on data from Waves 1-5 to estimate effect of stabilization programming on levels of support for the Taliban relative to support for GIRoA. The analysis also examines individual characteristics that influence relative support for the Taliban. The following summarizes these findings:

Communities which received USAID programming are still on the fence when it comes to supporting the government: Figure 1.8 shows how support for the Taliban has been consistently weaker than support for GIRoA across all survey waves.¹⁰ Yet despite this finding, Figure 1.8 also illustrates how the largest groups of surveyed villagers in Wave 5 are “on the fence” between support for the Taliban and GIRoA such that they have approximately equal support for, or indifference to both sides. Relative support has not shifted significantly towards one side or the other over the five survey waves. Indeed, the relative


⁸ In a survey endorsement experiment, selected respondents are assigned to a treatment group and asked to express their opinion toward a policy endorsed by specific actors whose support levels we wish to measure (here, the Taliban). These responses are then contrasted with those from a control group of respondents from the same sampling point that answered an identical question with a different endorsement (that of GIRoA). Higher levels of enthusiasm for a policy with an endorsement relative to those without it are viewed as evidence of support for the endorsing actor. Half of the sample thus receives questions with the Taliban “treatment;” the other half, with a GIRoA endorsement (the “control”) embedded in the questions. The robustness of MISTI’s estimates is increased by the use of four different questions to measure support. These four questions are then pooled together to produce a single estimate for relative support.

⁹ Gender, age, literacy, and income.

¹⁰ The districts that show relatively more support for the Taliban than GIRoA in Wave 5 include all of the districts surveyed in Helmand Province (with the exception of Lashkar Gah), along with Shindand District in Farah Province, and Zurmat district in Paktiya Province.

support metric shows that the average Afghan survey respondent is somewhat supportive of both GIROA and the Taliban – support for one party does not necessarily preclude support for the other.¹¹

FIGURE I.8: TALIBAN-GIROA RELATIVE SUPPORT, WAVES 1-5



USAID programming in Taliban controlled villages increased support for the Taliban: Programming in villages that were controlled by the Taliban increased local support for the Taliban between Waves 4-5. A total of 72 of the 607 treated villages within 250 meters of infrastructure projects surveyed in Wave 5 were counted as Taliban controlled with no presence of government or international security forces. The endorsement experiment found that project impact on increased Taliban support was driven by a subset of 13 villages within 250 meters of linear infrastructure projects, such as roads and canals, where the Taliban were counted as having territorial control in the Wave 4 survey.

The Taliban substantially boosted its local popularity by allowing programming to take place in these villages.¹² It should be noted that this increase in Taliban support is highly compatible with the Wave 5

¹¹ Caution should be exercised about drawing direct comparisons across separate survey waves. The sample populations at the individual, village, and district levels are all different owing to changing USAID priorities and the impracticality of collecting individual panel data in Afghanistan.

¹² These 13 Taliban controlled villages were located in the following districts and provinces: Musa Qal’ah District in Helmand Province (CCI-Creative), Arghandab (SIKA-South) and Dand (CCI-Creative) Districts in Kandahar Province, Archi District in Kunduz Province (SIKA-North), Baraki Barak and Muhammad Aghah in Logar Province, Yosuf Khel District in Paktika Province, Ahmanadabad District in Paktiya Province, Chak-e Wardak District in Wardak Province (SIKA-East), and Tarin Kot District in Uruzgan Province.

negative impact on Government Capacity, and positive impact on Local Leader Performance and Social Capital. Increased resilience may result from project activities where the Taliban provides security instead of the government.

Support for the Taliban decreases among females and literate Afghans: Further, analysis of individual level data found that Taliban support tends to decrease among relatively literate respondents, and that female respondents also tend to be less supportive of the Taliban than the population as a whole. Income and age have no significant effect on Taliban support, though certain higher income groups may be slightly more supportive of the Taliban than average.

Recommendations

- Stabilization programming should adhere to its theory of change based on addressing SOIs and not shift programming to low-priority interventions that are not effective countermeasures for SOIs. Such unfocused interventions should cease because they carry a heightened risk of doing more harm than good.
- Vetting procedures should not undermine the ability to effectively program against SOIs. External vetting should be rapid enough not to impede programming as designed. To help ensure that vetting does not impede programming, it should be internalized by stabilization programs as an auditable part of the programming cycle. The risk of misallocating funds to improperly vetted actors should be borne by the implementer.
- Following the COIN theory of territorial control, interventions should not be implemented in areas that are controlled by the Taliban because doing so helps the Taliban win hearts and minds.
- Interventions should only be implemented in areas where the ASF have enough local resources to provide intervention villages with protection from Taliban and other AOG reprisals.
- Stabilization programming should implement a modified version of the ink-spot model where stability programming is used in tandem with security operations to consolidate government support in areas of limited government support and expand government control to neighboring areas that are contested by the Taliban and other AOGs.
- Greater coordination with NSP should be pursued because stabilization programming is more successful when implemented along with NSP. The lesson learned from findings on NSP is that stabilization programming will be most successful when it is designed to not only address identified sources of instability in an area, but to also organize communities to meet basic developmental needs – the primary goal of NSP.
- Rather than one-off interventions, multiple activities should be implemented in the same area over time because doing so increases the magnitude of project impacts and improves prospects for sustaining gains in stability and consolidating support for GIRoA over the Taliban and other anti-government elements.
- Soft and hard projects should be implemented in tandem with each other in the same areas to

maximize impact. Findings reveal that stability impacts are improved and in some cases the negative impacts of hard interventions reversed when soft activities are implemented in tandem with hard activities.

- Programming should undertake the coordinated implementation of soft and hard activities that are designed explicitly to improve both stability and resilience at the same time by bridging the divide between local government and traditional entities of community governance.
- Soft stabilization programming should include literacy and empower women (e.g. vocational training) because these types of activities have the greatest impact on reducing support for the Taliban and other anti-government elements.
- Hard activities implemented in tandem with soft projects should benefit entire communities and, when possible, the surrounding area.
- Programming focused solely on boosting incomes in the short term, such as cash for work activities, should not be implemented because of the risk of increasing support for the Taliban. In particular, efforts to improve per capita income via development projects without prior assessment of territorial control by the Taliban or GIRoA may have detrimental effects.
- Lastly, USAID and its Afghan government counterparts, notably the MRRD and IDLG, should move quickly and with the appropriate resources to build on the enthusiasm that has accompanied the ascension to the presidency of President Ashraf Ghani. This enthusiasm provides a foundation to rebuild confidence through better governance and greater focus on the stabilization and development of rural communities, starting in districts where the association with President Ghani has boosted the popularity of district governors. These efforts should be supported with a coordinated and comprehensive communications strategy that provides a positive national vision for Afghanistan's rural communities and consigns the Taliban and other anti-government elements to the margins once and for all.

2. INTRODUCTION

Since 2012, the USAID/Afghanistan Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI) project has conducted biannual surveys to measure and map stabilization trends and stabilization programming impacts in key districts across Afghanistan. MISTI has four primary goals:

- Provide independent monitoring, evaluation and impact assessment of USAID stabilization projects;
- Collect, synthesize and analyze data at the district, provincial and regional levels to track higher-order stabilization trends and inform USG and GIRA policy and practice related to transition;
- Verify the completion of stabilization project activities; and,
- Contribute to the larger body of knowledge on best practices and lessons learned related to the design, implementation and assessment of stabilization activities within a counterinsurgency context.

The MISTI Wave 5 report contributes to these goals by tracking trends in stabilization indicators and highlighting differences across key districts. It also provides the data needed to conduct the trends analysis and impact evaluation in Chapters 7 and 8 respectively of this report. The purpose of the overall report is to inform leaders of USAID stabilization programming including project planners and implementers by identifying improvements and declines in stabilization within their areas of responsibility.

Data collection for Wave 5 occurred between September 28th and November 23rd, 2014. The Wave 5 sample consists of 41,013 male and female respondents, ages 18 and above, living in districts served by at least one of seven USAID stabilization projects, as well as districts where future stabilization programming may be conducted. Projects include: the four Stabilization in Key Areas (SIKA) projects covering the North (SIKA-N), South (SIKA-S), East (SIKA-E) and West (SIKA-W); the Community Cohesion Initiative implemented in the North and West by IOM (CCI - IOM) and in the South and East by Creative (CCI - Creative); and lastly, the Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) implemented in 7 districts of Kandahar Province.

This report covers the following waves of data collection:

TABLE 2.1: WAVES 1-5 FIELD SCHEDULE

WAVE	FIELD DATES	TOTAL SAMPLE SIZE
Wave 1	September – December 2012	N=34,972
Wave 2	May – August 2013	N=36,475
Wave 3	November 2013 – January 2014	N=40,405
Wave 4	April – June 2014	N=37,399
Wave 5	September – December 2014	N=41,013

The Report is organized into 8 chapters beginning with the Executive Summary (Chapter 1) and this Introduction (Chapter 2). Chapter 3 provides a summary of the sample design, field implementation, quality control, questionnaire design, and overall field experience of the Wave 5 Survey. A full description of the Wave 5 survey methodology is provided in a comprehensive Methodology Report, attached to this report as Appendix 9.

Chapter 4 provides an overview of the Wave 5 findings, summarizing findings from the 55 districts that were included in all five waves of data collection (See Appendix 1.1 at the end of Chapter 4 for a listing of the 55 districts). Topics such as governance, service provision and development, community cohesion and resilience, quality of life, rule of law, and security and crime are discussed at the project level in order to investigate differences and trends among project regions.

In chapter 5, each project's area of operation is analyzed in separate sections. In each project section, all districts surveyed in Wave 5 are included in the analysis. Each section is formatted so that it can be removed from the full report and read as a self-contained project-level report.

In each chapter, a variety of statistical techniques are used including correlations, regression analysis (logistic), district comparisons, tests for difference in proportions, and trend analysis. Correlations are useful for looking at whether variables are related to each other and provide information about the strength and direction of the relationship. District level analysis uses chi-square testing to highlight responses in districts that are significantly different from each other. Trend analysis is used to look at shifts in opinion since the baseline survey.

Regression analysis is also used to identify key factors that predict an outcome variable (for example, perception of local security), while controlling for other related variables (such as presence of security forces). In all regression models, the response variable is binary, and Likert scale variables are collapsed to positive and negative nets where positive responses were coded as 0 and neutral/negative responses as 1. The independent variables in all models include a set of control variables: ethnicity, gender and education. Wald tests for significance are used to test independent variables, which test if the variable's coefficient is significantly different than zero. Hierarchical modeling is used in all cases where district-level project data are analyzed in tandem with survey data. Significance is determined through a likelihood ratio test of a model with the district variable and one without, coupled with an analysis of Akaike information criterion (AIC). Tests on the regression models are conducted with $\alpha = 0.05$ for significance testing. These models are presented in annexes following each chapter. In all models, non-response including "Don't Know" and "Refused" were omitted from the sample prior to testing.

In Chapter 6, MISTI reports the results of a separate KFZ Agricultural Alternative Livelihoods Survey that was fielded in seven districts of Kandahar Province, in the same sampling points as the main trends survey, but to a different, smaller group of respondents. One-hundred-and-five heads of household farmers in each of the seven KFZ districts were asked a series of questions about their farming activities, as well as the activities of other farmers in their area, prices of agricultural goods, and other related topics.

Chapter 7 uses the MISTI Stability and Resilience indices to explore trends across the five survey waves. Each component, sub-index, and individual variable is also explored to reveal trends at these levels. These include trends in areas such as quality of life, government capacity, district government performance and satisfaction, provincial government performance, local governance, Community Development Council (CDC) and District Development Assembly (DDA) performance, local leader performance and satisfaction, social capital, and community cohesion.

Lastly, in Chapter 8, MISTI conducts a quasi-experimental impact evaluation of USAID stabilization programming based on the 860 treatment villages captured by the W5 Survey and using the remaining 1,718 villages as controls. Impacts are measured over two periods: a 6-month period between Waves 4 and 5, the sample for which consists of 149 villages where interventions took place after Wave 4; and, a 12-month period between Waves 3 and 5 which includes 297 treated villages where interventions took place after Wave 3. The findings presented are the result of analyzing changes in 55 stability indicators derived from the MISTI Survey. When appropriate, and for comparison purposes, the findings from Waves 3-4 and 2-4 that were presented previously in the Wave 4 Report are also referenced.

Chapter 8 then goes on to explore a number of Learning Agenda items. These include:

- Do SIKa and CCI programming have different stabilization impacts?
- How do the effects of NSP community development programming compare to USAID stabilization programming?
- What is the effect when NSP and USAID activities are implemented together?
- Do stabilization impacts increase with the number of projects implemented in a community?
- Do “hard” infrastructure activities have different effects than “soft” activities such as capacity building and communications?
- Do project activities reduce violence?

The chapter then continues with an endorsement experiment that provides an examination of relative support for the Taliban (versus GIRoA) and how eight different variables¹³ affect relative support for the Taliban (versus GIRoA).

Chapter 8 and the report concludes with suggestions as to how the MISTI data could be further used to extend the Learning Agenda and mined extensively for additional insights on the situation in Afghanistan and on the effects of interventions in complex and conflict-affected environments elsewhere.

¹³ Gender, age, literacy, per capita income, harm by the Taliban, harm by ISAF, village population, and village elevation.

3. METHODOLOGY SUMMARY

Introduction

The Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI) Wave 5 survey was a public opinion study that sought to identify trends in stabilization indicators throughout Afghanistan. The Wave 5 survey built upon the Wave 1 survey, conducted between September 13 and December 23, 2012, the Wave 2 survey, conducted between May 18 and August 7, 2013, the Wave 3 survey, conducted between November 16, 2013 and January 30, 2014 and the Wave 4 survey, conducted between April 28 and June 12, 2014. The intent of the project was to inform leaders from six stabilization programs being run across Afghanistan and help identify improvements and declines in stabilization in their areas of responsibility.

There were six stabilization programs included in both the Wave 1 and Wave 2 projects: Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI), Community Development Program (CDP) and four Stabilization in Key Areas (SIKA) programs covering the North (SIKA-N), South (SIKA-S), East (SIKA-E) and West (SIKA-W) regions of Afghanistan.

For both Waves 3 and 4, the CDP program was dropped and the Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) program was added, so there remain six programs being measured in Waves 3, 4 and 5. For waves 3 and 4, the KFZ program acted as a module within the larger questionnaire

It should be noted that districts included in CCI-C varied by wave and settlements sampled in Wave 4 were purposefully excluded from selection in Wave 5. This is particularly important to keep in mind when considering wave to wave analysis as changes in the composition of program districts can have a significant impact on trend analysis. The addition or removal of particular districts can shift the overall results within any particular wave of research, so changes from wave to wave may not, in fact, be changes in the trend but may be a factor of which districts were included or excluded from the analysis.

Methodology Highlights

The sample design, field implementation, quality control, questionnaire design, and overall field experience are summarized in this methodology report. Some highlights are presented below.

- The target population was Afghan citizens, 18 years of age or older, living in 107 pre-selected districts throughout 21 provinces in Afghanistan. All 107 districts were selected because at least one of the six USAID stabilization programs are in the process of planning or implementation in the district.
- The target N size for the project was 41,849 interviews. The achieved N size was 41,013 interviews after all quality control measures were employed and unacceptable interviews were rejected. The target n size for each district ranged between 240 and 560 interviews with the average size per district being 370 interviews. However, the sample size for the KFZ section was smaller with 105 interviews conducted with farmers in the KFZ districts.

- Following the Wave 4 survey, a full validation report was provided to ACSOR Surveys. Based on these results, ACSORS procedures, trainings and protocols were updated to better ensure data quality and fidelity. During field, one interviewer in Kunduz selected respondents using the prescribed methods and invited all respondents to a central location for the interview. As this broke protocol, this interviewer was removed from conducting additional interviews for the Wave 5 study. His interviews were not included in the final data set.
- Sampling was conducted across 107 districts specified by MISTI. These districts were located in the following 21 provinces: Parwan, Wardak, Logar, Ghazni, Paktiya, Khost, Kunar, Baghlan, Kunduz, Balkh, Samangan, Jawzjan, Badghis, Herat, Farah, Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzghan and Ghor. Nineteen of these provinces were included in the Wave 1 and Wave 2 surveys; in Waves 3, 4, 5 districts in Balkh and Jawzjan were added.
- Primary sampling units were villages within each district. Each of the villages (also referred to as settlements), like the districts, were selected by MISTI. In some instances, villages were determined to be inaccessible to interviewing teams due to security concerns, travel restrictions (imposed by either insurgent groups, ANSF or NATO forces) or weather. In these instances, a replacement village was selected by MISTI. All replacements are notated in the Achieved Sample Plans for each of the 107 districts surveyed and are summarized in Appendix 1 of this report.
- The sampling methodology has evolved throughout the lifespan of the project. This was done purposefully because the primary analytical goal of MISTI is to understand the opinions of people living in USAID program intervention areas, but keeping in mind that the budget for sample size has remained relatively consistent overall, there were limitations in purposefully selecting all accessible treatment villages sampled in all waves. As a result, treatment villages previously drawn in Waves 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 were sampled from to retain longitudinal analysis.
- Furthermore, this report presents aggregated data results and analysis at the district and program level. This requires the assumption that the data collected within each district or program is representative of the population of a district or a program. The reader should keep in mind that:
 - Accessibility of villages differs at the time of each survey. Therefore, target treatment villages sampled in previous waves which were intended to be resampled in W5 may not have had a probability of inclusion.
 - There are no accurate measures of size associated with villages. The assumption that is made is that all villages are of approximately equal size, as any random selection was done by way of simple random sampling.
 - The AYC household level selection is not random; instead it was done through a snowball sampling technique.
- Assuming a simple random sample with $P=0.5$ and a 95% confidence interval, the margin of sampling error for the main aggregated data set of 41,013 interviews would be $\pm 0.48\%$ and $\pm 3.61\%$ for the KFZ dataset. Although this statistic is presented for reference, we do not

recommend analysis of these data at an aggregate level with all cases being analyzed simultaneously as the definition of the target population is difficult to interpret from the 107 districts with USAID activity (which we refer to as treatment areas). The sample was designed to facilitate longitudinal analysis at the district level and longitudinal analysis of aggregated districts comprising the stabilization program areas.

- Complex margin of error was estimated for each question within each of the stabilization programs. These sampling errors are estimated assuming that a probability-based sample took place at both these levels.
- The MISTI Wave 5 survey was conducted face-to-face by 913 ACSOR interviewers and 184 AYC interviewers. Some districts are inaccessible to ACSOR interviewers because it is difficult to enter and exit certain areas without attracting the attention of insurgent elements and endangering the safety of the ACSOR interviewers. Certain districts are also accessible only to male interviewers due to cultural and security concerns. ACSOR maintains an accessibility tracker to monitor each district in Afghanistan. This tracker is updated monthly as the security situation in Afghanistan changes frequently. As a result of ACSOR's inaccessibility assessment, the interviews in 16 districts were conducted completely by AYC and another 12 districts were interviewed using both ACSOR and AYC interviewers during the Wave 5 field work.
- The ACSOR interviewing teams consisted of male and female interviewers who were local residents of the areas where the interviews were conducted. ACSOR interviewers utilized a random walk methodology to select households and a Kish grid to randomize respondent selection within households. These interviewers were all from the province where they conducted interviews and in most instances they were from the districts where the interviews were conducted. The ACSOR interviewing teams were overseen by a supervisory team from their province. The supervisory team consisted of 20 lead supervisors (one for each province) and one or two assistant supervisors in each province that helped with back checks, field monitoring, and general field logistics throughout the field period. ACSOR's field work began on September 28, 2014 and concluded on November 23, 2014.
- The AYC interviewing teams consisted of small groups of male interviewers who are from the districts where the interviews were conducted. Due to the poor security situation in the districts where they conducted field work, the AYC interviewing teams selected households through convenience sampling using their local knowledge of the villages and contacts they have within those villages so as to lessen the possibility of encountering insurgent elements that would result from employing a random walk. Since the AYC interviewers were only male and they selected households through convenience sampling, respondents were selected by either asking for the male head of household or interviewing another male member of the household who was available at the time. The AYC interviewers were overseen by a team of 23 supervisors who were responsible for back checking, direct observations and all field logistics. AYC began field work on October 25, 2014 and concluded on November 18, 2014.

- Contact sheets were completed by both ACSOR and AYC interviewers throughout the field period. ACSOR used standard AAPOR calculation standards to derive the following field performance and disposition rates:
 - Response Rate 3 = 87.29%
 - Cooperation Rate 3 = 94.70%
 - Refusal Rate 2 = 4.12%
 - Contact Rate 2 = 95.56%
- AAPOR offers a variety of formulas to calculate disposition rates depending on the circumstances for which they are being used. ACSOR typically uses the rates reported above as they most logically fit the face-to-face field methodology used in Afghanistan.
- The master questionnaire consisted of 36 management and quality control variables, 91 2/3 substantive questions and 19 demographic questions. The KFZ questionnaire consisted of 98 2/3 substantial questions, 6 demographic questions and 36 management and quality control questions. For the purposes of this count, each item in a battery of questions was counted as 1/3 of a variable.
- The average length of time it took for an interview to be conducted was 35 minutes with the shortest interview taking 20 minutes and the longest interview taking one hour and 13 minutes.

4. WAVE 5 OVERVIEW

Introduction

The MISTI Survey Wave 5 marks the final survey wave in USAID’s signature effort to measure the stabilizing effect of its activities in support of good governance and improved service delivery at the local level. This overview chapter summarizes findings from the 55 districts that have been included in all five waves of data collection¹⁴. Data collected from districts that were not surveyed in all five waves of research were excluded, but are analyzed in-depth at the district level in the individual project chapters.

TABLE 4.1: OVERVIEW SUB-SAMPLES OF W1-5 DISTRICTS

WAVE	SAMPLE SIZE OF DISTRICTS INCLUDED IN WAVES 1-5
Wave 1	N= 26,342
Wave 2	N= 24,839
Wave 3	N= 24,354
Wave 4	N= 22,829
Wave 5	N= 25,260

In this chapter, topics such as governance, service provision and development, community cohesion and resilience, quality of life, rule of law, and security and crime are discussed at the project level in order to investigate differences and trends among project regions.

Project Descriptions

The Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) is comprised of four regional projects designed to promote good governance and service delivery in targeted districts, with intended effects of reducing the impact of the insurgency, increasing confidence in the Afghan government, and paving the way for a peaceful transition to Afghan government and security lead. SIKA delivers assistance in two ways: 1) building the capacity of sub-national government structures, and 2) delivering community grants for small scale, community and government-endorsed projects.

The Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) is a project of USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). Its goal is to increase the resilience of residents and communities in areas of Afghanistan that are susceptible to insurgency and other sources of instability. CCI has two primary objectives: 1) strengthening ties between local actors, customary governance structures, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), and 2) increasing cohesion among and between communities by bringing communities together through projects to address common needs.

The Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) project intends to strengthen and diversify legal rural livelihoods in targeted districts by identifying and addressing the root causes and sources of instability that lead to

¹⁴ See Annex at the end of this chapter for a listing of all 55 districts.

opium poppy cultivation. KFZ project activities seek to: 1) assist farmers, laborers, and rural communities through a package of comprehensive, practical, and sustainable interventions in an equitable manner, and 2) prevent the spread of opium poppy cultivation and reduce it where it has already taken root.

While the four SIKA projects are comprised of districts that are mutually exclusive to each other, the districts which comprise the CCI and KFZ project areas sometimes overlap with each other and with the SIKA districts. For example, all Kandahar Food Zone districts are also CCI districts. SIKA and CCI overlap in four districts in East region, six districts in South region, and one district in West region. Finally, within the same provinces as the regional SIKAs, CCI operates in nine districts not covered by SIKA East, eight districts not covered by SIKA South, and one district not covered by each of the SIKA North and SIKA West projects. Detailed lists of project compositions by district can be found in the methodology report under Section II: Sample Design.

Governance


The improvement of local governance is the top priority of USAID stabilization projects in Afghanistan. SIKA projects aim to improve local governance through district level capacity building, while CCI seeks to increase cohesion among communities and strengthen communication between local government bodies and constituents. Project activities are presented as Afghan government-led activities, with the theory that infrastructure development projects will improve perceptions of the government and establish lasting legitimacy.

Overall opinion of the Afghan government has improved since the baseline. At the local level, however, confidence in provincial, district, and village leaders varies across regions. Respondents living in the northern and western provinces of Afghanistan, targeted by SIKA-N, SIKA-W, and CCI-IOM, report the highest levels of confidence in their district governor compared to respondents in other regions. Meanwhile, those in the southern and eastern regions, targeted by SIKA-S, SIKA-E, and CCI-Creative tend to have more confidence in their local village leaders than district governor or the district government. Given that USAID stabilization efforts prioritized governance activities at the village and district level, respondents are least likely to report confidence in their provincial governors.¹⁵

¹⁵ Q9a & Q9d. SIKA-N W5 n=3,893 | SIKA-S W5 n= 4,938 | SIKA-E W5 n=6,398 | SIKA-W W5 n=3,175 | CCI-Creative W5 n=8,876 | CCI-IOM W5 n=781 | KFZ W5 n=2,149. This figure includes net values of “very confident” and “somewhat confident.”

FIGURE 4.1: CONFIDENCE IN DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

Across all projects, respondents are more confident in their **district governor** over their **provincial governor**.



USAID’s stabilization strategy is to assist district entities in better understanding their operating environment and identifying the challenges to stability they face, and then to enable district governments to implement community-level activities aimed at addressing these sources of instability (SOI). Effective avenues for bottom-up communication are essential for communities to express their concerns to local leaders and bridge the gap between local governments and the communities they serve. Since the implementation of USAID stabilization activities, respondents believe their district governors and local leaders have become noticeably more responsive. However, perceptions of the district government and provincial governor’s responsiveness to local needs have not changed since the baseline. Respondents living in the south and southeast regions of the country, served by SIKA-S and CCI-Creative projects, were the least likely to say their district government officials are responsive to local needs. Respondents in SIKA-W districts are most positive about their district, provincial, and local leaders’ responsiveness to their local needs.


Since 2012, MISTI surveys have found an increasingly positive impact of the Community Development Councils (CDCs) and District Development Assemblies (DDAs). CDCs serve as the focus for village-level rural development in Afghanistan, and all SIKA project activities are funded and implemented through them. The DDAs, consisting of elective representatives of clustered CDCs, create District Development Plans that connect community priorities to the government’s agricultural and rural development strategy. As per the MRRD’s strategy, DDAs and CDCs work together to create strategies tailored to local communities’ needs. In the 55 districts included in all five survey waves, about seven of ten respondents have heard of the DDA and CDC in their area. Respondents served by SIKA-N and SIKA-S projects are most likely to be aware of them, while those served by CCI projects (Creative and IOM) are

least likely. Of those who have heard of these citizen committees, three-fourths of respondents have confidence in their local DDA and CDC.¹⁶

Although most respondents believe their district government officials are from their district, they are divided in whether or not their district government officials understand the problems of their area or care about the people in their area. More than half of respondents in SIK-A-N, SIK-A-E, and KFZ districts say district government officials in their district abuse their authority to make money for themselves. Respondents were generally divided when asked if it is acceptable to publicly criticize the Afghan government, however, a clear majority of those surveyed in CCI-IOM districts believe it is acceptable. Those in CCI-IOM districts are also most likely to say their district government officials are not doing their job honestly.

What determines whether Afghans hold their government in high regard? Simple predictive modeling suggests that district officials who are local (originally from the district they serve) are held in high regard, and that personal visits to villages will also raise their standing. General security and economic factors also contribute to a higher regard for government, while levels of crime lower Afghans' regard for government.

FIGURE 4.2: CHANGE IN PROBABILITY OF REPORTING THAT THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT WAS WELL REGARDED IN THE AREA



¹⁶ This response is filtered for respondents who have heard of the DDA and CDC in their area (DDA n=17,543 | CDC n=17,854)

Service Provision & Development

In addition to capacity building and governance projects, USAID stabilization activities were implemented to improve the provision of basic services in response to SOIs. SOIs were developed around three main categories: lack of basic services, limited access to essential services, and economic issues associated with a lack of water for agriculture. SIKA Mid Term Performance Evaluations found that the SOI mitigation activities helped decrease conflict between villagers, increased confidence in local government's ability to provide services, improved communication between relevant stakeholders, provided job opportunities, and attempted to improve agricultural productivity. SIKA and CCI infrastructure activities focused on building flood retaining walls, refurbishing schools, developing irrigation systems, and repairing roads and bridges. KFZ projects focused mainly on improving irrigation and water systems, providing agricultural assistance, and providing vocational trainings.¹⁷

Since 2012, the majority of respondents remain satisfied with the district government's provision of clean drinking water and schooling for boys. However, despite SIKA, CCI, and KFZ mitigation activities, satisfaction with all other basic services has either stayed the same or decreased. Majorities say they are dissatisfied with the district government's provision of irrigation water, agricultural assistance, retaining and flood walls, roads and bridges, medical care, schooling for girls, and electricity. Respondents express the least satisfaction with electricity services. Those living in CCI-IOM districts in northern and western provinces of Afghanistan are most likely to say government services have improved in the past year, while those in KFZ districts are least likely.

Respondents in SIKA-W districts are significantly less likely to have seen or heard about development projects in their area compared to those living in all other districts with stabilization projects.¹⁸ Survey results indicate that the most observable achievement of SIKA-W projects is the increased trust between the district government and communities. The Mid-Term Performance Evaluation notes that most SIKA-W activities did not require project funding, which may explain why respondents in the western provinces of Afghanistan were least likely to be aware of development projects. Awareness of development projects in SIKA-E, SIKA-N, and KFZ districts has increased since the baseline, while awareness in CCI-C, CCI-IOM, and SIKA-W has decreased. It should be noted that the baseline for the four SIKA projects and the CCI-Creative project is Wave 1, while the baseline for KFZ is Wave 3, and for the purpose of this overview chapter, the baseline for CCI-IOM is Wave 4.¹⁹


¹⁷ All KFZ services aim to address the root cause of opium poppy cultivation and steer farmers towards licit crops.

¹⁸ Figure 4.3: Q17. SIKA-N W1 n=4,439, W5 n=3,893 | SIKA-S W1 n=4,474, W5 n= 4,938 | SIKA-E W1 n=3,409, W5 n=6,398 | SIKA-W W1 n=3,652, W5 n=3,175 | CCI-Creative W1 n=9,294, W5 n=8,876 | CCI-IOM W4 n=240, W5 n=781 | KFZ W3 n=2,401, W5 n=2149

¹⁹ The baseline for CCI-IOM was fielded in Wave 3. However, since this overview chapter only includes the 55 districts that were included in all five waves of data collection, this chapter only includes CCI-IOM data from Waves 4-5. Complete CCI-IOM data from Waves 3-5 are analyzed in the CCI-IOM project chapter.

FIGURE 4.3: AWARENESS OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS


Respondents from SIKAW districts are least likely to be aware of development projects in their area, and SIKAW has the largest discrepancy since the baseline.



When respondents were asked what type of development projects were most needed in their area, they most frequently mentioned projects to improve road construction, electricity, and education.

Does general awareness of development projects in the area translate to better assessments of government services? There is a clear relationship between awareness of a development project and perceptions of government service delivery. An Afghan who reports being aware of development projects in his or her area reports a 7.4% higher assessment of government service delivery. This dynamic is also region-specific, with South region having lower assessment of services but more sensitivity between awareness and positive perception of services. Figure 4.4 illustrates, with horizontal lines showing the assessment score of Afghans who report not knowing of any development projects in the area.

FIGURE 4.4: AWARENESS OF PROJECTS AND ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES



Community Cohesion and Resilience

One of CCI's primary objectives is to increase cohesion among and between communities in order to increase their ability to collectively respond to shocks and stresses that can lead to instability and crisis. Participants in the CCI Mid-Term Performance Evaluations reported that this objective was conceptually and practically more difficult to implement than the first objective, which is targeted at increasing ties between local actors and their district and provincial governments. Means of achieving the second objective varied by implementer but centered on "having different tribes come together, having people with different political views work together, and linking communities within the district together." While cohesion was not a critical objective of SIKA projects, SIKA Mid-Term Performance Evaluations note that governance projects aimed at improving bottom-up communication strengthened community cohesion and resilience as constituents shared their problems with one another.

Since the baseline study, respondents have become less likely to say things from outside their village/neighborhood create problems in their area to disrupt normal life. Of those who mention that external interferences arise in their area, respondents most frequently mention that road-side bombs/suicide attacks, disputes over water, and the existence/presence of the Taliban cause problems in their area.²⁰ Consistent with the baseline, the majority of respondents also say things from inside their village/neighborhood never create problems in their area. However, of those who mention internal interferences, respondents tend to mention land disputes, disputes over water, and family disputes.²¹

Perceptions of resilience are strongest in southern districts targeted by SIKA-S, where respondents are most likely to say their community is able to work together to solve problems that come from outside their village. Respondents in SIKA-S districts are also most likely to believe the interests of ordinary people and the interests of women are considered when local leaders make decisions that affect their village/neighborhood. Although KFZ districts are also in the south, those living in KFZ districts perceive the lowest levels of community resilience and cohesion. As KFZ districts were selected for inclusion in USAID stabilization programming because of high rates of poppy cultivation, the corrosive effects of the drug trade may explain some of the lack of community resilience and cohesion. It should also be noted that three of the seven KFZ districts had fieldwork conducted by Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC) using a non-random sample, which may attribute to the relatively wide variation in the data from wave to wave.

²⁰ These responses are filtered for respondents who mention that things from outside their village/neighborhood "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" create problems to disrupt their normal life (44%, n=11,184).


²¹ These responses are filtered for respondents who mention that things from inside their village/neighborhood "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" create problems to disrupt their normal life (45%, n=11,359).

Quality of Life

All things considered, quality of life has declined since the baseline study. The graph below illustrates the decline in satisfaction with life as whole since the first survey for each project.²² Wave 5 respondents served by SIKA projects and the CCI-Creative project are less likely to say they are satisfied with their life than those surveyed in the Wave 1 baseline. Respondents in KFZ and CCI-IOM are less likely to report satisfaction than those in Wave 3 and Wave 4, respectively, which served as the baseline for those projects.²³

FIGURE 4.5 QUALITY OF LIFE

Quality of life has declined since the baseline. Although, satisfaction remains highest in CCI-IOM districts.



Respondents as a whole are increasingly positive about their household’s financial situation; however, they are less likely to believe their ability to meet basic needs has improved in the past year. Most respondents admit they are at least a little worried or very worried about their ability to meet basic needs in the coming year. Respondents living in CCI-IOM districts are most positive about their household’s financial situation.

Since 2012, targeted districts are perceived as being more stable than they used to be—as respondents are more likely to say the situation in their area is “certain enough” to make future plans. However, perceptions of stability vary across regions. Those living in SIKA-N districts feel less sure about their future and have become more likely to say their area is “too uncertain” to make plans. Meanwhile, the percentage of those who say KFZ districts are certain enough to make future plans has nearly doubled since the first KFZ survey. It is unclear whether these changes were due to the bumper crop for poppy in 2014, positive effects of the KFZ program, or a combination of the two, in which some farmers benefit

²² Figure 4.5: Q26. This figure includes net values of “very satisfied” and “somewhat satisfied.” SIKA-N W1 n=4,439, W5 n=3,893 | SIKA-S W1 n=4,474, W5 n=4,938 | SIKA-E W1 n=3,409, W5 n=6,398 | SIKA-W W1 n=3,652, W5 n=3,175 | CCI-Creative W1 n=9,294, W5 n=8,876 | CCI-IOM W4 n=240, W5 n=781 | KFZ W3 n=2,401, W5 n=2149

²³ The baseline for CCI-IOM was fielded in Wave 3. However, since this overview chapter only includes the 55 districts that were included in all five waves of data collection, this chapter only includes CCI-IOM data from Waves 4-5. Complete CCI-IOM data from Waves 3-5 are analyzed in the CCI-IOM project chapter.


from project activities promoting licit livelihoods, while others continue to grow poppy. According to a report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), opium eradication fell sharply in 2014, production rose noticeably, and prices remained high.²⁴

Rule of Law

Respect for the rule of law and establishing effective means of dispute resolution are two key components of building a community’s adaptive capacity for dealing with internal conflict. Three major authorities that community members could turn to for dispute resolution are local or tribal elders, government courts, or armed opposition groups. Across all stabilization districts, respondents are most likely to turn to local or tribal elders for non-violent disputes, such as disputes concerning land, water, or theft. Only in cases of assault, murder, or kidnapping do respondents prefer government courts. Formal justice systems are most trusted in CCI-IOM districts, where nine of every ten respondents say they have confidence in government courts to fairly resolve disputes. Despite high confidence in government courts, respondents are more likely to believe people respect decisions made by local or tribal elders more than decisions made by government courts. For all districts, confidence in armed opposition groups to fairly resolve disputes has continued to decline with each wave.²⁵

FIGURE 4.6: DISPUTE RESOLUTION PREFERENCE

Respondents are more likely to depend on tribal elders to resolve less serious disputes and government courts to resolve more serious disputes.




What factors help determine whether an Afghan will bring her or her dispute to a given forum? The following graphic illustrates a number of variables and whether they are positively or negatively associated with a given forum.

²⁴ *Afghanistan Opium Survey: November 2014*. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counternarcotics. Online: <http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan-opium-survey-2014.pdf>.

²⁵ Figure 4.6: Q20a-c. Overall W5 n=25260

FIGURE 4.7: DISPUTE RESOLUTION VARIABLES



Security

Local security has deteriorated for all project regions, except for SIKa-W, where perceptions of local security have improved since the baseline. Respondents remain most positive about their security situation in CCI-IOM districts, while most negative in SIKa-E districts. The majority of respondents overall perceive security on their local roads as good, yet perceptions remain unchanged since the baseline. Despite positive perceptions of road security, respondents report feeling insecure when traveling any distance, e.g., to the district or provincial capital.


Perceptions of crime remain steady since the baseline. Respondents are more likely to say there are “a lot” of petty crime and offenses in their area and say there are “a little” serious violent and serious non-violent crimes.

The perceived presence of ISAF and Afghan Local Police has decreased since the baseline, while the presence of armed opposition groups and Afghan National Police has increased. Respondents believe the presence of the Afghan National Army and Arbaki has stayed the same. Those living in SIKa-E and KFZ -- regions that perceive the lowest levels of security -- also report the strongest presence of armed opposition groups in their areas.

What determines Afghans’ perceptions of security? While the district or region of residence and local force presence are obvious candidates, simple predictive modeling suggests that filling district

government posts with officials who are originally from the district they serve is related to perceptions of security. Whether local staffing of government posts taps into some dynamic with a direct stabilizing influence on communities or merely reflects the central government’s ability to staff posts in more secure areas, or both, cannot be determined. Corruption, employment status, and how an Afghan self-identifies are also correlates of security perceptions, where corruption, unemployment, and identification with ethnicity or religion associate with lower probabilities of reporting that the local area was secure. Presence of national army and ISAF forces are most strongly associated with security, followed by police. Local police force presence does not strongly predict security. Figure 4.8 illustrates the effect of each variable on the probability of reporting that the local area was secure.

FIGURE 4.8: CHANGE IN PROBABILITY OF REPORTING THAT THE AREA WAS SECURE²⁶



²⁶ The outcome is an indicator variable adapted from question 2a. Afghans reporting that security was good or very good were coded as 1, and all other responses coded as 0.

Annex

TABLE 4.2: OVERVIEW DISTRICTS BY PROJECT

PROVINCE	DISTRICT	PROJECT
Badghis	Muqur	SIKA-W
Badghis	Qadis	SIKA-W
Baghlan	Baghlani Jadid	SIKA-N
Baghlan	Pul-e Khumri	SIKA-N
Farah	Bala Boluk	SIKA-W
Farah	Pusht-e Rod	SIKA-W
Ghazni	Andar	SIKA-E
Ghazni	Deh Yak	SIKA-E
Ghazni	Gelan	CCI-C
Ghazni	Khwajah Omari	SIKA-E
Ghazni	Muqer	CCI-C, SIKA-E
Ghazni	Qarah Bagh (1)	CCI-C, SIKA-E
Helmand	Garmser	SIKA-S
Helmand	Kajaki	CCI-C
Helmand	Lashkar Gah	SIKA-S, CCI-C
Helmand	Musa Qal'ah	CCI-C
Helmand	Nad 'Ali	SIKA-S
Helmand	Nahr-e Saraj	CCI-C, SIKA-S
Helmand	Sangin	CCI-C
Herat	Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	SIKA-W
Herat	Shindand	SIKA-W
Kandahar	Arghandab (1)	SIKA-S
Kandahar	Daman	SIKA-S
Kandahar	Dand	CCI-C, KFZ
Kandahar	Maiwand	KFZ, CCI-C
Kandahar	Panjwa'i	CCI-C, KFZ
Kandahar	Shah Wali Kot	KFZ, CCI
Kandahar	Spin Boldak	CCI-C
Kandahar	Zharay	CCI-C, KFZ

PROVINCE	DISTRICT	PROJECT
Khost	Bak	CCI-C
Khost	Gurbuz	SIKA-E, CCI
Khost	Shamul (Dzadran)	CCI-C
Khost	Tanai	SIKA-E, CCI
Khost	Terayzai ('Ali Sher)	CCI-C
Kunar	Khas Kunar	CCI-C
Kunar	Marawarah	CCI-C
Kunar	Sar Kani	CCI-C
Kunduz	Aliabad	SIKA-N
Kunduz	Chahar Darah	SIKA-N
Kunduz	Imam Sahib	SIKA-N
Kunduz	Khanabad	SIKA-N
Kunduz	Kunduz	SIKA-N
Logar	Baraki Barak	SIKA-E
Logar	Muhammad Aghah	SIKA-E
Paktiya	Dzadran	SIKA-E
Paktiya	Lajah-Ahmad Khel	SIKA-E
Paktiya	Lajah-Mangal	SIKA-E
Paktiya	Zurmat	SIKA-E
Samangan	Aybak	CCI-I
Wardak	Chak-e Wardak	SIKA-E
Wardak	Nerkh	SIKA-E
Wardak	Sayyidabad	SIKA-E
Zabul	Qalat	SIKA-S, CCI-C
Zabul	Shah Joy	SIKA-S, CCI-C
Zabul	Tarnak wa Jaldak	SIKA-S, CCI

5. WAVE 5: ANALYSIS BY PROJECT

Introduction

In the following chapter the Wave 5 Survey data from the each project's area of operation is analyzed. Each chapter is formatted so that it can be removed from the full report and read as a self-contained project-level report.

In each chapter, a variety of statistical techniques are used including correlations, regression analysis (logistic), district comparisons, tests for difference in proportions and trend analysis. Correlations are useful for looking at whether variables are related to each other and they provide information about the strength and direction of the relationship. District level analysis uses chi-square testing to highlight responses in districts that are significantly different from each other. Trend analysis is used to look at shifts in opinion since the baseline survey.

Regression analysis is used to identify key factors that predict an outcome variable (for example, perception of local security), while controlling for other related variables (such as presence of security forces). In all regression models, the response variable is binary, Likert scale variables are collapsed to positive and negative nets where positive responses were coded as 0 and neutral/negative response as 1. The independent variables in all models include a set of control variables. They are ethnicity, gender and education. Wald tests for significance are used to test independent variables, which test if the variable's coefficient is significantly different than zero. Hierarchical modeling is used in all cases where district-level project data are analyzed in tandem with survey data. Significance is determined through a likelihood ratio test of a model with the district variable and one without, coupled with an analysis of Akaike information criterion (AIC). Tests on the regression models were conducted with alpha = 0.05 for significance testing. These models are presented in appendices following each chapter. In all models, non-responses including "Don't Know" and "Refused" were omitted from the sample prior to testing.

Stability in Key Areas - North (SIKA-N)

Introduction

As explained in the Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, Stability in Key Areas-North (SIKA-N) aims to improve governance and provision of basic services, thereby promoting stability. SIKA-N activities focus on capacity building and infrastructure development in order to build confidence in local governance and improve the provision of basic services. SIKA-N seeks to establish the legitimacy of local governance and encourage community-led development through small-scale stabilization projects. SIKA-N works closely with the Afghan National Government through the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), and with local governments through Community Development Councils (CDCs) and District Development Assemblies (DDAs). The Mid-Term Performance Evaluation used multi-level qualitative methods, including observation, interviews, and desk review of project documents, to evaluate SIKA-N performance through January 2014. Conclusions from the Mid-Term Performance Evaluation are used throughout this chapter to provide context for the quantitative analysis.

The following sections provide summary and detailed information about the attitudes and opinions of respondents living in districts targeted by the SIKA-N project. The report compares findings across five waves of research to examine trends in stabilization and shifts in development indicators on the following topics: governance, service provision and development, community cohesion and resilience, quality of life, rule of law, security, corruption, economic activity, grievances, and media.

SIKA-N targets nine districts in the provinces of Baghlan and Kunduz in northern Afghanistan:

TABLE 5.1: SIKA-N PROVINCES AND DISTRICTS

PROVINCE	DISTRICT	SAMPLE SIZE
Baghlan	Pul-e Khumri	550
Baghlan	Baghlani Jadid	559
Kunduz	Imam Sahib	552
Kunduz	Kunduz	556
Kunduz	Khanabad	560
Kunduz	Archi	318
Kunduz	Chahar Darah	558
Kunduz	Qal'ah-ye Zal	238
Kunduz	Aliabad	558

It should be noted that interviews in Baghlani Jadid, Imam Sahib, Kunduz, Khanabad, and Chahar Darah were conducted in part by a field team from Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC), and in part by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic Research (ACSOR). Field work in Archi was conducted entirely by AYC, while field work in Qal'ah-ye Zal, Pul-e Khumri, and Aliabad was conducted entirely by ACSOR. Differences exist in the field implementation and quality control measures used for the AYC interviews, which may

impact some survey results. For detailed descriptions of these differences, refer to the full Methodology Report for MISTI Wave 5.

ACSOR regularly updates its accessibility tracker. This tracker indicates accessibility of districts for the field staff and the reasons for inaccessibility, whether it be insecurity or transportation. Additionally, the accessibility tracker indicates which districts are inaccessible to ACSOR's female staff. Archi and Baghlani Jadid were inaccessible to women due to Taliban presence in most parts of those districts, and only included men in the sample.

Unless otherwise noted, district-level analysis and wave-to-wave comparisons are provided with significance testing at the 99% confidence level.

OVERVIEW

Stability in Key Areas-North (SIKA-N) aims to improve governance and provision of basic services, thereby promoting stability. SIKA-N activities focus on capacity building and infrastructure development in order to build confidence in local governance and improve the provision of basic services. SIKA-N seeks to establish the legitimacy of local governance and encourage community-led development through small-scale stabilization projects. SIKA-N targets nine districts in the provinces of Baghlan and Kunduz in northern Afghanistan.

GOVERNANCE

Local governance is a priority of SIKA-N stabilization projects. As explained in the Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, one of the key aims of the project is to expand and improve the legitimacy of the Afghan Government at the district level, especially in unstable communities. The project assists local communities in better understanding their operating environment and identifying the challenges they face, and then enabling district governments to implement activities aimed at addressing these sources of instability.

Opinions of the Afghan Government have improved over time, with increasing majorities saying that the Afghan Government is well-regarded in their area.

The percentage of respondents who say the Afghan government is well regarded in their area has been slowly increasing from Wave 1 to Wave 5.



Since Wave 3, confidence in local leaders has increased, while confidence in the district governor, district government, and provincial governor has fallen. It should


be mentioned here that the security situation in Kunduz has seen a particularly sharp deterioration over the past year, with large portions of several districts now under Taliban control. This is very likely to have damaged perceptions of local government performance, and indeed statistical testing found that perception of security is significantly correlated with confidence in district government, district governor, and provincial government.

However, despite the difficulties witnessed in the past year, majorities in all SIKA-N districts except Archi continue to hold positive views of their district government.

SERVICE PROVISION & DEVELOPMENT

USAID stabilization programs in SIKA-N districts have focused mainly on improving roads, water systems, retaining and flood walls, and education. A key objective of the SIKA program is to assist district governments in providing better basic services to constituents. Despite these efforts, the percentage of respondents who believe services are improving has been in decline since Wave 3, and more respondents feel that services are worsening.

Feelings that services are improving have been in decline of late.




When asked about individual services, respondents' satisfaction with most of the items in the survey, particularly roads/bridges and electricity, have seen notable improvements since the baseline.

Awareness of local development projects has consistently risen since Wave 2. Sixty percent of respondents in Wave 5 say they have seen or heard about development projects in their local area, compared to 35% in Wave 1, and more than double the low found in Wave 2. Predictive modeling suggests that there is a relationship between service delivery and regard for the Afghan government, and that improved service delivery is correlated with a well-regarded government. In addition, unemployment, corruption and income are also significant drivers.

COMMUNITY COHESION & RESILIENCE

Stabilization Initiatives in Afghanistan rely on weakening drivers of insurgency by increasing the legitimacy, reach, and capacity of the Afghan Government while at the same time working to bolster the resilience of local communities to resist external threats and resolve internal problems. Survey results indicate that resilience is strongest in Pul-e Khumri, where respondents are most likely to believe people are able to solve problems that originate from outside (72%) and inside (77%) their village/neighborhood. It is weakest in Archi, where only 36% believe that people are able to solve problems that come from outside the village, and 46% believe that they are able to solve problems from inside the village.

Respondents in Pul-e Khumri are most likely to believe that they can solve problems from the outside (72%) and the inside (77%) of their village.




QUALITY OF LIFE

Respondents remain satisfied with their overall quality of life, with 69% saying that they are “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied.” Respondents in Qal’ah-ye Zal report the highest satisfaction (85%), while those in Chahar Darah report the lowest (57%). Respondents are slightly less satisfied with their household’s current financial situation, with 66% saying that they are “somewhat” or “very” satisfied. Those in Qal’ah-ye Zal are also most satisfied with their household’s financial situation (80%), while those in Chahar Darah and Baghlani Jadid are least satisfied (57% in each).

SECURITY

About half of respondents living in SIKA-N districts rate their local security situation as “somewhat” or “very” good (52%), similar to the levels found in Wave 4. However, perceptions of security vary widely across districts. Respondents in Qal’ah-ye Zal are most likely to say that the security situation is good (88%), while those in Archi are least likely to say so (8%).



Most respondents feel secure in their homes during the day and in their homes during the night. Fewer feel secure traveling to a neighboring village or to the district or provincial capital. Since Wave 1, the reported prevalence of petty crime and serious non-violent crime have seen little overall change despite some shifts from wave to wave, while the perceived level of serious violent crime has fallen sharply.

Governance


Local governance is a priority of SIKA-N stabilization projects. As explained in the Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, one of the key aims of the project is to expand and improve the legitimacy of the Afghan Government at the district level, especially in unstable communities. The project's strategy is to first assist district entities in better understanding their operating environment and identifying the challenges to stability they face, and then to enable district governments to implement activities aimed at addressing these sources of instability. Feedback from local stakeholders and beneficiaries is essential for this approach to succeed.

SIKA-N activities seek to empower communities and thereby bring them closer to the government in order to better address key sources of instability and mitigate the impact of the insurgency. These are presented as Afghan Government-led activities, with the theory that infrastructure and other development projects will improve perceptions of the government. Capacity building will both improve the quality of governance at the local level and strengthen community cohesion by strengthening bonds between local people and their district governments in Kunduz and Baghlan Provinces.

Opinions of the Afghan Government have improved over time, with increasing majorities saying that the Afghan Government is well-regarded in their area (78%, similar to the 77% found in Wave 4, and up from 68% in Wave 1).²⁷

FIGURE 5.1: PERCEPTION OF AFGHAN GOVERNMENT

The proportion of respondents who say the Afghan government is well regarded in their area has been slowly increasing since the baseline.




Those living in Qal'ah-ye Zal have the most positive perceptions of the Afghan Government, with more than 9 out of 10 respondents (93%) saying that the government is well-regarded in their area. Respondents in Kunduz are least likely to say the same (66%, compared to 78% of total SIKA-N respondents).

²⁷ Figure 5.1: (Q8) W1 n=5,598 | W2 n=3,746 | W3 n= 3,451 | W4 n=3,828 | W5 n=4,449

Since Wave 3, confidence in local leaders has increased, while confidence in the district governor, district government, and provincial governor has fallen.²⁸ It should be mentioned here that the security situation in Kunduz has seen a particularly sharp deterioration over the past year, with large portions of several districts now under Taliban control.²⁹ This is very likely to have damaged perceptions of local government performance, and indeed predictive modeling suggests that this relationship exists. The perception of security by Afghans proves to be significantly correlated with confidence in district government, district governor, and provincial government.³⁰ Interestingly, various measures of crime do not have the same impact in confidence of these entities as does the security situation.

FIGURE 5.2: CONFIDENCE IN LOCAL LEADERS, DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

Respondents express the highest confidence in local leaders, and the lowest confidence in their provincial governor.



Prior to this latest development, attitudes saw notable seasonal fluctuations; attitudes towards governance would deteriorate in the warmer months due to increased insurgent activity during the so-called ‘fighting season,’ followed by improvements during the colder months, when insurgent groups are less active. The fact that the survey fielded in late 2014 showed continued deterioration in these and other governance indicators is not an encouraging sign.

However, despite the difficulties witnessed in the past year, majorities in all SIKa-N districts except Archi continue to hold positive views of their district government. Respondents in Qal'ah-ye Zal expressed the most confidence in their district government (87% “a lot” or “some confidence”). As indicated, those in Archi have the least confidence in their district government (37% “a lot” or “some confidence”). Respondents in Archi also take the most negative view of their provincial governor, with only 29% expressing “a lot” or “some confidence” in him.

²⁸ Figure 5.2: (Q9) W1 n=5,598 | W2 n=3,746 | W3 n= 3,451 | W4 n=3,828 | W5 n=4,449


²⁹ Ahmed, Azam. "Taliban Are Rising Again in Afghanistan's North." The New York Times. 22 Oct. 2014. Online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/world/asia/taliban-rise-again-in-afghanistans-north.html>.

³⁰ Predictive logistic regression Models 1-4 included in Annex to this chapter.

One of the main objectives of the SIKa-N project is to build connections between district governments and local people by improving the government’s responsiveness, and thereby enabling them to better respond to peoples’ problems and address causes of instability. While it is promising that SIKa-N respondents in Wave 5 are more likely to believe that local leaders and their district governor are responsive, perceptions of their provincial governor and district government’s responsiveness have seen slight deterioration since the baseline.³¹

FIGURE 5.3: PERCEPTIONS OF LOCAL LEADERS, DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS


Perceptions of the **district governor's** and **local leaders'** responsiveness have improved since the baseline, while the **provincial governor's** and **district government's** has not.



In a more ominous development, the perceived ability of respondent’s district governor, district government, and provincial governor to get things done has dropped sharply from Wave 4 to Wave 5, quite possibly due to Taliban advances and weakening governance structures throughout much of the project’s target region.³² However, the ability of local leaders to get things done has seen little change in recent waves, after a decline from Wave 1 to Wave 2.

FIGURE 5.4: CONFIDENCE OF LOCAL LEADERS, DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT TO GET THINGS DONE

Confidence in the ability of **district governors**, **district governments**, and the **provincial governor** to get things done has been falling.



³¹ Figure 5.3: (Q10) W1 n=5,598 | W2 n=3,746 | W3 n= 3,451 | W4 n=3,828 | W5 n=4,449


³² Figure 5.4: (Q11) W1 n=5,598 | W2 n=3,746 | W3 n= 3,451 | W4 n=3,828 | W5 n=4,449

CDCs serve as the focus for village-level rural development in Afghanistan, and all project activities are funded and implemented through them. The DDAs, consisting of elective representatives of clustered CDCs, create District Development Plans that connect community priorities to the government’s agricultural and rural development strategy. As per the MRRD’s strategy, DDAs and CDCs work together to create strategies tailored to local communities’ needs. The DDA is known as the “primary conduit for stabilization initiatives as well as social and economic development planning at the district level.”³³ The Mid-Term Performance Evaluation notes that SIKa-N has generally been successful in presenting its activities as Afghan Government-led.³⁴

Awareness of the DDA has remained high, with 73% knowing about a DDA in their area, compared with 75% in Wave 4. Slightly more respondents are aware of a CDC.³⁵ Awareness of the DDA is highest in Pul-e Khumri (84%), while awareness of the CDC is highest in Kudnuz and Archi (83% in each).

FIGURE 5.5: AWARENESS OF DDA AND CDC

Most respondents have heard of the DDA and CDC in their district, but awareness has not improved noticeably between waves 4 and 5.



Confidence in respondents’ local DDAs and CDCs remain high. In a finding which has changed relatively little since the baseline, the vast majority of respondents who have heard of the DDA have confidence in it (84%, n=3,244), while seven out of ten respondents (70%, n=3,244) believe it is responsive to the needs of local people. Respondents in Qal’ah-ye Zal are most likely to rate their DDA as responsive (84%), while those in Aliabad are least likely to rate it as such. After seeing relatively little change between Waves 1 and 4, confidence in the CDC has increased by 5 percentage points, increasing from 75% in Wave 4 to 80% in Wave 5. Perceptions of the CDC’s responsiveness have held steady at 76%.

³³ Mid-Term Performance Evaluation prepared by MSI in August 2014.

³⁴ Mid-Term Performance Evaluation prepared by MSI in August 2014.


³⁵ Figure 5.5: (Q12-13) W1 n=5,598 | W2 n=3,746 | W3 n= 3,451 | W4 n=3,828 | W5 n=4,449

These results are encouraging, especially in light of the deterioration of security in Kunduz and the loss of government control in some areas.

Positive perceptions of district government officials are critical to building confidence and trust in local governance. The survey asks a series of questions to gauge respondents' views of their district government. Consistent with previous waves, more than three-quarters of respondents (78%) say district government officials are from their district. However, more than half believe that their district officials abuse their power for financial gain. Less than half say that district government officials care about people in their area, visit the area, or do their jobs honestly.³⁶ Respondents in Archi are most skeptical of the behavior of district government officials, being most likely to say that officials do not care about people in the area, abuse their positions to make money for themselves, and do not visit the area. Those in Kunduz are most likely to say that district government officials are not doing their jobs honestly (66%). Respondents in Qal'ah-ye Zal hold the most positive views overall, being most likely to say that district government officials visit the area, do not abuse their authority to make money for themselves, do their jobs honestly, and deliver basic services in a fair manner.

FIGURE 5.6: PERCEPTIONS OF DISTRICT GOVERNMENT ABUSE OF AUTHORITY

More than half of respondents believe that district government officials abuse their authority to make money.



Continued capacity-building efforts are necessary to ensure that constituents believe their district government officials represent their interests and work for the well-being of the community. Positive perceptions of the district government will help maintain legitimacy and depress instability. However, this will be difficult in light of the increasingly challenging security environment.

Service Provision and Development

USAID stabilization programs in SIKa-N districts have focused mainly on improving roads, water systems, retaining and flood walls, and education. A key objective of the SIKa program is to assist district governments in providing better basic services to constituents. The Mid-Term Performance Evaluation


³⁶ Figure 5.6: (Q14) W5 n=4,449

reported that hard projects, such as road improvement, flood protection walls, water dividers, and culverts, were among the most valued project activities, as were efforts to improve the education system.³⁷

Despite these efforts, the percentage of respondents who believe services are improving has been in decline since Wave 3, and more respondents feel that services are worsening.³⁸

FIGURE 5.7: PERCEPTIONS OF SERVICE PROVISION


Feelings that **services are improving** have been in decline of late.



When asked about individual services, respondents' satisfaction with most of the items in the survey, particularly roads/bridges and electricity, have seen notable improvements since the baseline. However, satisfaction with the provision of agricultural assistance has deteriorated, and satisfaction with the provision of water for irrigation and retaining and flood walls have seen only slight improvement, despite the fact that these services have been key points of focus for SIKa-N programming.³⁹

FIGURE 5.8: SATISFACTION WITH DISTRICT GOVERNMENT SERVICES

Satisfaction has improved since the baseline for all district government services except **electricity**.



³⁷ Mid-Term Performance Evaluation prepared by MSI in August 2014.

³⁸ Figure 5.7: (Q15) W1 n=5,598 | W2 n=3,746 | W3 n= 3,451 | W4 n=3,828 | W5 n=4,449

³⁹ Figure 5.8: (Q16) W1 n=5,598 | W5 n=4,449

Satisfaction of public services varies across district. The following table lists the districts with the highest and lowest levels of satisfaction for each district government provision.⁴⁰

TABLE 5.2: SATISFACTION WITH SERVICES BY DISTRICT

SERVICE	DISTRICT WITH HIGHEST SATISFACTION	SATISFACTION IN HIGHEST DISTRICT	DISTRICT WITH LOWEST SATISFACTION	SATISFACTION IN LOWEST DISTRICT	TOTAL SIKA-N SATISFACTION
Clean Drinking Water	Archi	92%	Baghlani Jadid	45%	68%
Water for irrigation	Archi	82%	Aliabad	31%	48%
Agricultural assistance	Kunduz	24%	Pul-e Khumri	8%	16%
Retaining and flood walls	Kunduz	30%	Archi	2%	15%
Roads and bridges	Archi	80%	Baghlani Jadid	29%	54%
Medical care	Archi	83%	Baghlani Jadid	27%	48%
Schooling for girls	Pul-e Khumri	69%	Archi	40%	54%
Schooling for boys	Archi	95%	Baghlani Jadid	58%	67%
Electricity	Kunduz	53%	Qal'ah-ye Zal	5%	29%

Awareness of local development projects has consistently risen since Wave 2. Sixty percent of respondents in Wave 5 say they have seen or heard about development projects in their local area, compared to 35% in Wave 1, and more than double the low found in Wave 2. Respondents in Archi are most likely to have heard about development projects in their local area (88%), while those in Pul-e Khumri are least likely to have heard of them (24%). This is not surprising in view of Archi respondents' relatively high satisfaction with district government services.

Those who are aware of development projects in their area (n=2,678) are most likely to be aware of projects related to drinking water (86%) and schools (84%). Respondents identify electricity (42%) and road construction (33%) as the most-needed types of development projects in their area.⁴¹

Since Wave 2, respondents in SIKA-N have been asked about obstacles preventing them from obtaining health care or medicine. Most frequently mentioned were lack of clinics and hospitals (42%) and lack of medicines (31%).⁴²

The SIKA-N Mid Term Performance Evaluation concludes that improved service delivery has been a major achievement of the program, though this has not translated into correspondingly improved perceptions of local governance. Predicative modeling suggests that there is a relationship between

⁴⁰ Table 5.2: (Q16) W5 n=4,449

⁴¹ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

⁴² Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

service delivery and regard for the Afghan government, and that improved service delivery is correlated with a better-regarded government. In addition, unemployment, corruption and income are also significant drivers.⁴³ It should be remembered that the program is being implemented against the backdrop of a less-than-ideal security situation, as well as political disagreements between USAID and MRRD as to the best approach to programming. The most notable example of this mentioned in the Mid-Term Evaluation Report is the use of in-kind grants for SIKAN programming in violation of MRRD policy.⁴⁴

Community Cohesion and Resilience

Stabilization Initiatives in Afghanistan rely on weakening drivers of insurgency by increasing the legitimacy, reach, and capacity of the Afghan Government, while at the same time working to bolster the resilience of local communities to resist external threats and resolve internal problems.⁴⁵ Building community cohesion and resilience is key to resolving governance and stabilization challenges. Since the baseline, respondents have become slightly less likely to believe that things from outside their village or neighborhood create problems to disrupt their normal life. Fifty-seven percent say outside interferences “never” create problems in their area, compared to 47% in Wave 1. Respondents who say that things from outside the village ever create problems in their area (n=1,794) most frequently mention insecurity (21%), disputes over water (17%), armed people (16%), small crimes & theft (15%), and ethnic disputes (15%).⁴⁶

Just over half of respondents surveyed in Wave 5 (57%) also believe things originating from inside their village/neighborhood “never” create problems to disrupt normal life. Among those who believe internal interferences “sometimes”, “often”, or “rarely” create problems (n=1,812), land disputes (26%), disputes over water (26%), ethnic disputes (17%), and family problems (14%) were most commonly mentioned.⁴⁷ Respondents living in Imam Sahib (40%), Archi (35%), and Baghlani Jadid (34%) were most likely to mention land disputes, and those in Archi were most likely to mention disputes over water (40%). Those in Aliabad are most likely to mention ethnic disputes (27%).

⁴³ Predictive logistic regression Model 5 included in Annex to this chapter.

⁴⁴ Mid-Term Performance Evaluation prepared by MSI in August 2014.


⁴⁵ Mid-Term Performance Evaluation prepared by MSI in August 2014.

⁴⁶ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

⁴⁷ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

FIGURE 5.9: SIKA-N DISTRICTS' ABILITY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS

Wave 5: (SIKA-N Districts) Able to solve problems that come from outside village (Q34c)



Survey results indicate that resilience is strongest in Pul-e Khumri, where respondents are most likely to believe people are able to solve problems that originate from outside (72%) and inside (77%) their village/neighborhood. It is weakest in Archi, where only 36% believe that people are able to solve problems that come from outside the village, and 46% believe that they are able to solve problems from inside the village. Majorities in all districts say that villages and neighborhoods in their area work together to resolve problems when they occur. Consistent with the previous results, it is not surprising that those in Pul-e Khumri are most likely to say that communities work together to resolve problems (78%).

Just under one-fifth of SIKA-N respondents (19%, down from 24% in Wave 4) say that local leaders “often” consider the interests of ordinary people when making decisions, while 46% say they “sometimes” do. Fourteen percent say that local leaders “often” take the interests of women into account when making decisions, while 48% say that they “rarely” or “never” do. The Mid-Term Performance Evaluation notes that efforts to include gender programming in SIKA-N activities have so far met with little success.⁴⁸

Seven in ten respondents believe that local leaders are “very” or “somewhat” effective in securing funds (70%, down slightly from 72% in Wave 4). Respondents in Qal’ah-ye Zal are most likely to say that their local leaders are effective in securing funds (80% “very” or “somewhat” effective), while those in Baghlani Jadid are least likely to think so (61%).

While membership in groups where people get together to discuss issues of common interest or to do certain activities together remains relatively uncommon (23%), it has nevertheless risen since the Wave 1 baseline. Those who do belong to such groups (n=1,014) are most likely to be members of farmers unions (33%), development councils (15%), and welfare foundations (14%).

Quality of Life


Respondents remain satisfied with their overall quality of life, with 69% saying that they are “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied.” Respondents in Qal’ah-ye Zal report the highest satisfaction (85%), while those in Chahar Darah report the lowest (57%). Respondents are slightly less satisfied with their

⁴⁸ Mid-Term Performance Evaluation prepared by MSI in August 2014.

household's current financial situation, with 66% saying that they are "somewhat" or "very" satisfied. Those in Qal'ah-ye Zal are also most satisfied with their household's financial situation (80%), while those in Chahar Darah and Baghlani Jadid are least satisfied (57% in each).⁴⁹

FIGURE 5.10: SATISFACTION WITH QUALITY OF LIFE VS. FINANCIAL STATUS


Respondents have consistently been more satisfied with their overall quality of life than with their household's financial status.



Respondents are split as to their ability to meet basic needs: about a third say it has increased (34%), a plurality say that it has stayed the same (40%), and about a quarter say it has decreased (24%). Those living in Khanabad are most likely to say that it has improved (54%), while those in Baghlani Jadid are most likely to say it has worsened (48%).⁵⁰

FIGURE 5.11: ABILITY TO MEET BASIC NEEDS

Respondents in Khanabad are most likely to say that their ability to meet basic needs has improved, while those in Baghlani Jadid are most likely to say it has worsened.



⁴⁹ Figure 5.10: (Q26-27) W1 n=5,598 | W2 n=3,746 | W3 n= 3,451 | W4 n=3,828 | W5 n=4,449

⁵⁰ Figure 5.11: (Q28) W5 n=4,449


A slight majority of respondents say that the situation in their area is too uncertain for them to plan for the future (56%), a finding consistent with previous waves. Another 43% say that the situation is certain enough for them to plan for the future. Those in Qal’ah-ye Zal are most likely to say that the situation is certain enough to plan for the future (71%), while those in Archi (26%) are least likely to say so. A majority of SIKA-N respondents (60%) say that they are “a little worried” about being able to meet their basic needs over the next year. Respondents in Aliabad are most likely to be “very worried” (29%), while those in Khanabad are most likely to not be worried (26%).

Rule of Law

In general, as disputes get more serious, respondents become more inclined to turn to government courts for resolution. A majority of respondents prefer to refer to local leaders or tribal elders in cases involving land and water disputes (54%), and a plurality would turn to them in cases of theft (42%). However, a majority would turn to government courts to resolve cases of violent crime (51%). In addition, there has been a small but perceptible rise in the percentage of respondents who say they would seek justice from armed opposition groups, particularly in cases of theft (14%, up from 10% in Wave 4).⁵¹

FIGURE 5.12: DISPUTE RESOLUTION

SIKA-N respondents continue to prefer to seek resolution in theft cases through local/tribal elders rather than government courts. The proportion who prefer to seek resolution of such cases through armed opposition groups has been rising.



When faced with a dispute concerning assault, murder, or kidnapping, the share of respondents who would turn to government courts rose from 45% in Wave 4 to 51% in Wave 5. The percentage who would turn to armed opposition groups also rose from 4% to 6% in the same time frame.

Respondents continue to express high levels of confidence in local and tribal leaders to resolve disputes fairly: 94% express “a lot of confidence” or “some confidence” in their ability to fairly resolve disputes, similar to the levels found in previous waves. While fewer respondents are confident in the ability of government courts to fairly resolve disputes (78%, a figure that has fallen since Wave 4, when it was


⁵¹ Figure 5.12: (Q20C) W1 n=5,598 | W2 n=3,746 | W3 n= 3,451 | W4 n=3,828 | W5 n=4,449

84%), it is still apparent that most SIKA-N respondents continue to have confidence in the court’s ability to resolve disputes. Only 22% express confidence in armed opposition groups to resolve disputes fairly, similar to the 23% found in Wave 4. This suggests that the slightly increased recourse to armed opposition groups to resolve disputes may reflect the fact that they simply control more territory in the SIKA-N program area than they did before, rather than an actual preference for their methods of dispute resolution. Indeed, respondents in Archi, where presence of armed opposition groups is perceived to be among the strongest, are the most likely to seek resolution from armed opposition groups in cases of murder, assault, and kidnapping (23%), as well as in cases of theft (41%).

Decisions made by local and tribal leaders are most likely to be respected, while those made by armed opposition groups are least likely to be.⁵² Those in Archi are most likely to say that decisions by armed opposition groups are always respected (22%), while those in Pul-e Khumri are most likely to say that decisions by government courts are always respected (56%).

FIGURE 5.13: DECISIONS MADE BY LOCAL TRIBAL LEADERS VS. THOSE MADE BY LOCAL ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS

Respondents in SIKA-N districts are most likely to respect decisions by local and tribal leaders, and least likely to respect decisions made by armed opposition groups.




⁵² Figure 5.13: (Q22A-C) W5 n=4,449

Security

About half of respondents living in SIKA-N districts rate their local security situation as “somewhat” or “very” good (52%), similar to the levels found in Wave 4. However, perceptions of security vary widely across districts. Respondents in Qal’ah-ye Zal are most likely to say that the security situation is good (88%), while those in Archi are least likely to say so (8%).

Respondents in Qal’ah-ye Zal are also most likely to say that security has improved in the past year (80% “much more secure” or “somewhat more secure,” compared with 40% overall). Those in Archi are most likely to say that their local area has become less secure (62% “much less secure” or “somewhat less secure,” compared with 23% overall).

FIGURE 5.14: PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN SIKA-N DISTRICTS



Most respondents feel secure in their homes during the day (92% “very” or “somewhat” secure) and in their homes during the night (79%). Fewer feel secure traveling to a neighboring village (69%) or to the district or provincial capital (59%).⁵³ In particular, the percentage that feels secure traveling to the district or provincial capital dropped from 70% in Wave 4 to 59% in Wave 5. Respondents in Qal’ah-ye Zal feel most secure traveling to a neighboring village (89% “very” or “somewhat” secure) or the district or provincial center (83%), while those in Archi feel least secure when undertaking such journeys (58% and 26%, respectively).

FIGURE 5.15: FEELINGS OF SECURITY AT HOME AND WHILE TRAVELING

Respondents feel most secure in their homes during the day, and least secure traveling




⁵³ Figure 5.15: (Q4) W5 n=4,449

Since Wave 1, the reported prevalence of petty crime and serious non-violent crime have seen little overall change despite some shifts from wave to wave, while the perceived level of serious violent crime has fallen sharply.⁵⁴ Respondents in Baghlani Jadid report the most violent crime (15% “a lot”), while those in Qal’ah-ye Zal report the least (0% “a lot,” 88% “none at all”).

FIGURE 5.16: REPORTS OF CRIME

The percentage of respondents reporting a lot of serious violent crime has fallen sharply since the baseline. The prevalence of other types of crime has seen little change.



A slight majority of respondents living in SIKA-N districts say that there is less petty crime than last year (53% “much less” or “a little less”). Respondents living in Aliabad are most likely to say there is less petty crime (69%), while those in Archi are least likely to say so (18%). Forty-five percent of respondents say that there is less serious non-violent crime, while 14% say there is more. Similarly, 43% say that there is less serious violent crime compared with last year. Respondents in Qal’ah-ye Zal are most likely to say that the level of serious violent crime in their area has declined in the past year (63%), while those in Archi are least likely to say so (16%). Compared with Wave 4, the proportion of respondents who say that the amount of each type of crime has stayed the same over the past year has increased for all three types tested.

The presence of government security forces has fallen noticeably since the Wave 1 baseline, and particularly since Wave 4. The percentage of respondents who say that there are “a lot” of ANA troops has fallen from 33% in Wave 4 to 18% in Wave 5.⁵⁵ This is commensurate with a rise in the presence of armed opposition groups, also known as anti-government elements (AGEs).

⁵⁴ Figure 5.16: (Q5_2) W1 n=5,598 | W5 n=4,449

⁵⁵ Figure 5.17: (Q6_1) W1 n=5,598 | W2 n=3,746 | W3 n= 3,451 | W4 n=3,828 | W5 n=4,449

FIGURE 5.17: PRESENCE OF AOGS AND GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES

The presence of **armed opposition groups (AOGs)** has been rising, as more respondents say there are a lot of them in their area. Meanwhile, the presence of government security forces has been waning.





FIGURE 5.18: PRESENCE OF ARMED OPPOSITION IN SIKI-N DISTRICTS

Wave 5: (SIKI-N Districts) Presence of Armed Opposition (Q6_1d)




The presence of armed opposition groups is felt most strongly in Archi and Chahar Darah, where 59% and 51% respectively say that there are “a lot” of AGEs. Their presence is weakest in Qal’ah-ye Zal (0% “a lot”), Pul-e Khumri (2%), and Baghlani Jadid (3%). As of Wave 5, there is very little reported presence of ISAF forces in SIKI-N districts, with only very small numbers in Pul-e Khumri, Kunduz, Khanabad, and Chahar Darah saying that “a lot” are present.

In another concerning development, respondents’ confidence in the ANA and ANP to keep their area safe has fallen sharply in the past year.⁵⁶ Despite this, most respondents continue to feel that the ability of the ANA and ANP to provide security has improved “a lot” or “a little” in the past year (62% and 52% respectively).

⁵⁶ Figure 5.19: (Q6_2) W1 n=5,598 | W2 n=3,746 | W3 n= 3,451 | W4 n=3,828 | W5 n=4,449

FIGURE 5.19: CONFIDENCE IN THE ANA AND ANP

Confidence in both the ANA and ANP to provide security has fallen from Wave 4 to Wave 5.



Corruption

As is the case throughout Afghanistan, corruption continues to be a major problem in the SIKa-N project area. As of Wave 5, 82% of respondents say that corruption is a problem in their area, a figure which has seen a slight increase from the 76% found in the Wave 1 baseline; otherwise, little change has been observed across the remaining waves of the survey. Majorities of respondents in all districts say that corruption is a problem, but such feelings are most prevalent in Archi (92%), and least common in Qal’ah-ye Zal (69%). Corruption is also perceived to be increasing over time: 47% say that the level of corruption has increased in the past year, while 13% say it has decreased, and 37% say it has stayed the same.

Respondents were also asked to name the department or sector of local government which people most complain about being corrupt. Most frequently named was the Ministry of Education (18%), followed by the courts (10%), the municipality (6%), and the Directorate of Electricity (6%).

Economic activity

While access to local markets is seen as either staying the same (36%) or improving (45%), the prices in those markets are perceived to be increasing, with 60% saying that prices have increased “a lot” or “a little” over the past year.

Respondents are seeing fewer paid jobs available: 40% report that there are “a lot” or “a little” less paid jobs available compared to a year ago, and only 29% feel that there are more paid jobs. Archi has seen the greatest decline in the availability of paid jobs, with 67% of respondents saying that there are fewer available now compared with one year ago.

Grievances

Grievances vary when respondents are asked to identify the biggest problems that create stress or tension in their area. The most common responses include unemployment (41%), insecurity (32%), lack of electricity (25%), lack of paved roads (14%), and lack of clinics (11%).⁵⁷

Unemployment was most frequently mentioned in Baghlani Jadid, where 51% said it was a major cause of stress or tension. Insecurity was most often cited in Archi, where 77% said that it was a major source of tension.

Media

Respondents most often use friends and family (89%), elders (87%), radio (85%), and the Mosque/Mullah (74%) to communicate with others and/or get news and information. Many also use cell phones (50%) and television (50%). Far fewer respondents mention using posters/billboards (7%) and newspapers (5%). Only 4% use the Internet or e-mail for communication.

Respondents get most of their information about government services from the radio (64%), friends/family (39%), television (31%), elders (29%), and the Mosque/Mullah (19%).⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

⁵⁸ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Annex

SIKA-N Governance Model 1

Response: Q9a. How much confidence do you have in your District Governor? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all? (A lot of confidence)

Response District
Governor

$$q9at \sim q5_1at + q5_1bt + q6_1at + q6_1ct + q6_1dt + q6_1et + q23t + d9 + q2at$$

	B	SE	Sig	95% CI for odds ratio		
				Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-0.6	0.09	*	0.55	0.46	0.66
Petty Crime	0.52	0.09	*	1.69	1.4	2.03
Serious Crime	-0.45	0.11	*	0.64	0.51	0.79
Violent Crime	0.3	0.09	*	1.35	1.12	1.63
Presence of ANA	0.4	0.08	*	1.49	1.29	1.73
Presence of Arbaki	-1.64	0.13	*	0.19	0.15	0.25
Presence of AOG	0.24	0.09	*	1.27	1.07	1.5
Local Police	-0.46	0.09	*	0.63	0.53	0.75
Income	-0.02	0	*	0.98	0.98	0.99
Perception of Security	0.47	0.09	*	1.59	1.33	1.9

SIKA-N Governance Model 2

Response: Q9b. How much confidence do you have in your District Government? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all? (A lot of confidence)

Response District
Government

$$q9bt \sim q6_1ct + q6_1dt + q6_1et + q14at + q23t + d9 + q2at$$

	B	SE	Sig	95% CI for odds ratio		
				Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-1.36	0.13	*	0.26	0.2	0.33
Presence of Arbaki	0.64	0.08	*	1.89	1.61	2.21
Presence of AOG	-1.32	0.14	*	0.27	0.2	0.35
Local Police	0.6	0.09	*	1.82	1.53	2.18
District Officials from this district	0.21	0.1	*	1.24	1.01	1.52
Corruption	-0.65	0.1	*	0.52	0.43	0.63
Income	-0.01	0	*	0.99	0.98	0.99
Perception of Security	0.85	0.09	*	2.34	1.95	2.82

SIKA-N Governance Model 3

Response: Q9c. How much confidence do you have in your local/village neighborhood leaders? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all? (A lot of confidence)

Response Confidence
in Local Leaders

$$q9ct \sim q6_1ct + q6_1dt + q6_1et + q23t + d9 + q2at$$

	B	SE	Sig	95% CI for odds ratio		
				Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-0.54	0.09	*	0.58	0.49	0.69
Presence of ANP	0.21	0.07	*	1.23	1.08	1.41
Presence of AOG	-0.44	0.08	*	0.65	0.55	0.76
Local Police	0.6	0.08	*	1.82	1.56	2.11
Corruption	-0.33	0.08	*	0.72	0.61	0.85
Income	-0.01	0	*	0.99	0.99	0.99
Perception of Security	0.83	0.09	*	2.3	1.94	2.72

SIKA-N Governance Model 4

Response: Q9d. How much confidence do you have in your provincial governor? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all? (A lot of confidence)

Response Provincial
Governor

$$q9dt \sim q5_1at + q6_1ct + q6_1dt + q6_1et + q23t + d9 + q2at$$

	B	SE	Sig	95% CI for odds ratio		
				Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-1.97	0.12	*	0.14	0.11	0.18
Petty Crime	-0.22	0.12		0.81	0.64	1.01
Presence of ANP	0.88	0.09	*	2.42	2.01	2.9
Presence of AOG	-0.83	0.15	*	0.44	0.32	0.58
Local Police	0.33	0.1	*	1.39	1.14	1.7
Corruption	-0.27	0.11	*	0.77	0.61	0.96
Income	-0.01	0	*	0.99	0.98	0.99
Perception of Security	0.53	0.11	*	1.69	1.36	2.09

SIKA-N Governance Model 5

Response: Q8. [INTERVIEWER: Please read the following introduction followed by the statement pair] I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion. (The Afghan government is well regarded in this area)

Response View of the Government

q8 ~ q15NETt + q23t + Unemployed + d9

	B	SE	Sig	95% CI for odds ratio		
				Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	1.12	0.1	*	3.08	2.56	3.72
Improved Services	0.43	0.08	*	1.54	1.32	1.79
Corruption	0.34	0.09	*	1.4	1.17	1.69
Unemployed	-0.76	0.13	*	0.47	0.36	0.61
Income	-0.02	0	*	0.98	0.98	0.98

Confidence Level: p=0.5

Stability in Key Areas - South (SIKA-S)

Introduction

Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) is a USAID program designed to promote good governance and service delivery at the local level in targeted districts, with the intended effect of reducing the impact of the insurgency, increasing confidence in the Afghan government, and paving the way for a peaceful security transition. SIKA thereby seeks to expand and improve the legitimacy of the Afghan government at the sub-national level. This chapter focuses on SIKA-South, which is active in 14 districts in the provinces of Zabul, Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Nimroz in the south of Afghanistan. It is implemented by Architecture, Engineering, Construction, Operations and Management (AECOM). SIKA-S works closely with the Government of Afghanistan's Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD).

SIKA-South's strategic objective is to give Afghans increased confidence in their district government, thereby leading to the expansion of authority and legitimacy of Afghan provincial governments to the districts, and especially to unstable communities. Since the Afghan government has been unable to meet the challenges of addressing its population's various needs, SIKA-South's strategy is to assist district entities in understanding their operating environment and the challenges to stability with which they are faced. SIKA-S enables district and provincial governments to develop a localized methodology aimed at addressing sources of instability by implement activities that address them. The Mid-Term Performance Evaluation used multi-level qualitative methods, including observation, interviews, and desk review of project documents, to evaluate SIKA-S performance up through March 2014. Conclusions from the Mid-Term Performance Evaluation are used throughout this chapter to provide context for the quantitative analysis.

SIKA-S targets a core group of districts in five provinces of southern Afghanistan:

TABLE 5.3: SIKA-S PROVINCES AND DISTRICTS

PROVINCE	DISTRICT	SAMPLE SIZE	PROVINCE	DISTRICT	SAMPLE SIZE
Helmand	Garmser	549	Nimroz	Zaranj	544
Helmand	Lashkar Gah (Bost)	497	Uruzgan	Chorah	560
Helmand	Nad 'Ali	555	Uruzgan	Deh Rawud	556
Helmand	Nahr-e Saraj	559	Uruzgan	Tarin Kot	548
Kandahar	Arghandab	547	Zabul	Qalat	560
Kandahar	Daman	560	Zabul	Shah Joy	552
Nimroz	Kang	397	Zabul	Tamek wa Jaldak	559

It should be noted that interviews in Tamek wa Jaldak were conducted by a field team from Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC) using a non-random sampling procedure. Fieldwork in the other districts was conducted entirely by ACSOR. Differences exist in the field implementation and quality control measures

used for the AYC interviews, which may impact some survey results. For detailed descriptions of these differences, refer to the full Methodology Report for MISTI Wave 5.

ACSOR regularly updates its accessibility tracker, and interviewer safety is always a key priority. This tracker indicates accessibility of districts for the field staff and the reasons for inaccessibility, whether it be insecurity or transportation. Additionally, the accessibility tracker indicates which districts are inaccessible to ACSOR's female staff. The districts of Shah Joy in Zabul and Chorah and Deh Rawud in Uruzgan were inaccessible to women because the distance of those districts was judged too far for women to travel. Thus, only men are included in the sample. The AYC sample from Tamek wa Jaldak is also all-male.

Unless otherwise noted, district-level analysis and wave-to-wave comparisons are provided with significance testing at the 99% confidence level.

OVERVIEW

SIKA-S seeks to promote good governance and service delivery at the local level in targeted districts, with the intended effect of reducing the impact of the insurgency, increasing confidence in the Afghan government, and paving the way for a peaceful security transition. Since the Afghan government is often unable to meet the challenges of addressing its population’s various needs, SIKa-South’s strategy is to assist district entities in understanding their operating environment and the challenges to stability with which they are faced.


SIKA-S targets a core group of 14 districts in the provinces of Nimroz, Helmand, Uruzgan, Zabul, and Kandahar in southern Afghanistan.

GOVERNANCE

SIKA-S seeks to expand and improve the legitimacy of the Afghan government at the sub-national level. Overall, positive perceptions of the Afghan government have been improving since Wave 2, with more respondents saying that the Afghan government is well-regarded in their area. Since the Wave 1 Baseline, confidence in local leaders, the district government, and the provincial governor has increased, while confidence in the district governor has fallen.

A more worrying finding, which also reflects problems mentioned in the Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, is that the perceived ability of respondent’s district governor and district government to get things done have been dropping since the baseline, while the ability for local leaders and provincial governors to get things done has seen little overall change, despite some fluctuations from wave to wave.

Confidence in the ability of **district governors** and **district governments** to get things done has slowly been falling.




SIKA-S activities are presented as Afghan government-led activities, and implemented through existing Community Development Councils (CDCs) and District Development Assemblies (DDAs). Awareness of the DDA has remained high, with 72% knowing about a DDA in their area, a figure which has seen very little change since the Wave 1 baseline. A similar percentage of respondents are aware of a CDC. Among those who are aware of the DDA, three-quarters (76%) have confidence in it. A similar percentage expresses confidence in the CDC (72%).

SERVICE PROVISION & DEVELOPMENT

The SIKa-S program seeks to build confidence in local governments by improving the provision of basic services. Therefore, service delivery is an essential component of the program. It is therefore concerning that the percentage of respondents who feel services from the government in their area have improved over the past year has been falling since Wave 3, after initially promising results in the first few waves of the survey.

Feelings that services are improving have been in **decline** of late.



When asked about individual services, respondents’ satisfaction with most of the items in the survey has deteriorated since the baseline. Particularly notable are decreases in satisfaction with agricultural assistance, which fell from 53% “very” or “somewhat” satisfied in Wave 1 to 37% in Wave 5, and medical care, which fell from 51% in Wave 1 to 39% in Wave 5.

Awareness of local development projects has been falling since Wave 3. Fifty-eight percent of respondents in Wave

5 say they have seen or heard about development projects in their local area, compared to 66% in Wave 1 and the high of 68% found in Wave 3.

COMMUNITY COHESION & RESILIENCE

Stabilization Initiatives in Afghanistan seek to weaken the insurgency and improve the legitimacy, reach, and capacity of the Afghan Government, while at the same time working to bolster the resilience of local communities to resist external threats and resolve internal problems. Seventy-two percent say that villages and neighborhoods in their area “often” or “sometimes” work together to resolve problems when they occur. Respondents in Kang (79%), Nahr-e Saraj (78%), and Lashkar Gah (78%) are most likely to say that villages and neighborhoods work together to solve problems.



QUALITY OF LIFE

Respondents remain satisfied with their overall quality of life, with 65% saying that they are “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied.” Respondents are split as to their ability to meet basic needs: roughly the same share say it has increased (39%) as stayed the same (41%), and about a fifth say it has decreased (19%).


RULE OF LAW

When faced with disputes over land and water, respondents are most likely to seek restitution from local or tribal elders (53%). In general, as disputes get more serious, respondents become slightly more likely to turn to government courts. Decisions made by local and tribal leaders are most likely to be respected, while those made by armed opposition groups are least likely to be.

SECURITY

About half of respondents living in SIKa-S districts rate their local security situation as “somewhat” or “very” good (51%), a slight increase from the 47% found in Wave 4, but still down considerably from the 65% found in the baseline. Most respondents (55%) feel that security has improved in the past year, while 27% feel it has stayed the same, findings more or less consistent with previous waves. The presence of ISAF, Arbakai, Afghan Local Police (ALP) and armed opposition groups has fallen noticeably since the Wave 1 baseline. The percentage of respondents who say that there are “a lot” of Afghan National Army (ANA) troops has seen little change, while the presence of the Afghan National Police (ANP) has increased somewhat, from 48% in Wave 1 to 55% in Wave 5.

About half of respondents living in SIKa-S districts rate their local security situation as “somewhat” or “very” good (51%).



CORRUPTION

As is the case throughout Afghanistan, corruption continues to be a major problem in the SIKa-S project area. Eighty-two percent of respondents say that corruption is a problem in their area, a figure which has seen little change since the Wave 1 baseline.


Governance

Along with development, governance is the main priority of SIKAS stabilization programs. One of the key goals of the SIKAS-South project, according to the Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, is to expand and improve the legitimacy of the Afghan government at the sub-national level.⁵⁹ This need is particularly acute in the South, which is among the regions worst-affected by the insurgency. SIKAS-S seeks to increase confidence in district-level government in key districts of the five selected southern provinces, with the aim of building confidence in local government, while at the same time improving the provision of basic services.⁶⁰

Overall, positive perceptions of the Afghan government have been improving since Wave 2, with more respondents saying that the Afghan government is well-regarded in their area.⁶¹

FIGURE 5.20: PERCEPTION OF AFGHAN GOVERNMENT

The proportion of respondents who say the Afghan government is well regarded in their area has been slowly increasing over the last few waves.



Those living in Nad ‘Ali have the most positive perceptions of the Afghan Government, with more than 9 out of 10 respondents (93%) saying that the government is well-regarded in their area. Respondents in Shah Joy are least likely to say the same (44%, compared to 80% of total SIKAS-S respondents).

Since the Wave 1 Baseline, confidence in local leaders, the district government, and the provincial governor has increased, while confidence in the district governor has fallen. Confidence in the district government is highest in Chorah (85% “a lot of confidence” or “some confidence”), and lowest in Shah Joy (44%). Confidence in local and village elders is highest overall, with 84% having “a lot” or “some” confidence in them. Confidence in these leaders is nearly universal in Garmser (98%) and Nahr-e Saraj (97%), but is lowest in Tarin Kot (64%).⁶²

⁵⁹ Stability In Key Areas – South Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, October 2014.


⁶⁰ Stability In Key Areas – South Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, October 2014.

⁶¹ Figure 5.20: (Q8) W1 n=4,809 | W2 n=5,086 | W3 n= 6,412 | W4 n=5,955 | W5 n=7,543

⁶² Figure 5.21: (Q9) W1 n=4,809 | W2 n=5,0861 | W3 n= 6,412 | W4 n=5,955 | W5 n=7,543

FIGURE 5.21: CONFIDENCE IN LOCAL LEADERS AND DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT


Respondents express the highest confidence in local leaders, and the lowest confidence in their provincial governor.



As might be expected, confidence in the provincial governor showed noticeable variation by province. Respondents in Kang and Zaranj, both in Nimroz, reported the highest confidence in their provincial governor (95% and 92% respectively), while those in the three Zabul districts of Qalat, Shah Joy, and Tamek wa Jaldak had the lowest confidence (46%, 42%, and 36% respectively).⁶³

FIGURE 5.22: CONFIDENCE IN PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS BY PROVINCE

Confidence in the provincial governor varies considerably by province. Those in Nimroz




⁶³ Figure 5.22: (Q9D) W5 n=7,543

One of the main objectives of the SIKA-S project is to build connections between district governments and local people by improving the government’s responsiveness, and thereby enabling them to better respond to peoples’ problems and address causes of instability. Slow progress in reaching the goal of quick delivery of services was identified in the Mid-Term Performance Evaluation as a shortcoming in SIKA-S project implementation.⁶⁴ This may account for the relative lack of progress that has been seen in local government institutions’ responsiveness since the Wave 1 baseline – while there has been some improvement, particularly in the responsiveness of the district governor, and satisfaction with responsiveness that has generally remained high, and there has been relatively little change in this metric since the baseline.⁶⁵

FIGURE 5.23: RESPONSIVENESS OF DISTRICT GOVERNORS AND OTHER LOCAL ENTITIES

The perceived responseiveness of the **district governor** has improved since the baseline, but the responsiveness of other local government entities has seen little improvement.



A more worrying finding, which also reflects problems mentioned in the Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, is that the perceived ability of respondent’s district governor and district government to get things done have been dropping since the baseline, while the ability for local leaders and provincial governors to get things done has seen little overall change, despite some fluctuations from wave to wave.⁶⁶ The Mid-Term Evaluation Report cites delays in the SIKA and USAID approval process, which undermined stability programming in target communities. This led to disappointment when communities’ expectations for the program were not met, which undermined their perception of local government, and which may account for the stagnant or declining opinions of local leaders and officials.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Stability In Key Areas – South Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, October 2014.


⁶⁵ Figure 5.23: (Q10) W1 n=4,809 | W2 n=5,086 | W3 n= 6,412 | W4 n=5,955 | W5 n=7,543

⁶⁶ Figure 5.24: (Q11) W1 n=4,809 | W2 n=5,086 | W3 n= 6,412 | W4 n=5,955 | W5 n=7,543

⁶⁷ Stability In Key Areas – South Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, October 2014.

FIGURE 5.24: CONFIDENCE IN DISTRICT GOVERNMENT TO GET THINGS DONE

Confidence in the ability of district governors and district governments to get things done has been slowly falling.



SIKA-S activities are presented as Afghan government-led activities, and implemented through existing Community Development Councils (CDCs) and District Development Assemblies (DDAs). CDCs serve as the focus for village-level rural development in Afghanistan, and all project activities are funded and implemented through them. The DDAs, consisting of elective representatives of clustered CDCs, create District Development Plans that connect community priorities to the government’s agricultural and rural development strategy. As per the MRRD’s strategy, DDAs and CDCs work together to create strategies tailored to local communities’ needs. The DDA is known as the “primary conduit for stabilization initiatives as well as social and economic development planning at the district level.”⁶⁸ The Mid-Term Performance Evaluation notes that SIKA-S has successfully presented its activities as Afghan-led under the local name of the *Subat* (Stabilization) Program.⁶⁹

Awareness of the DDA has remained high, with 72% knowing about a DDA in their area, a figure which has seen very little change since the Wave 1 baseline. A similar percentage of respondents are aware of a CDC.⁷⁰


⁶⁸ Stability In Key Areas – South Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, October 2014.

⁶⁹ Stability In Key Areas – South Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, October 2014.

⁷⁰ Figure 5.25: (Q12-13) W1 n=4,809 | W2 n=5,086 | W3 n= 6,412 | W4 n=5,955 | W5 n=7,543

FIGURE 5.25: DDA AND CDC AWARENESS SINCE BASELINE

Most respondents have heard of the DDA and CDC in their district, but awareness has seen little change since the baseline



Awareness of the DDA is highest in Nad ‘Ali (95%) and lowest in Qalat (42%). Meanwhile, awareness of the CDC is highest in Nad ‘Ali and Garmser (94% in each), and again lowest in Qalat (41%).

Confidence in respondents’ local DDAs and CDCs remain high. Among those who are aware of the DDA (n=5,444), three-quarters (76%) have confidence in it, and 72% believe it is responsive to the needs of local people. Perceptions of the CDC’s responsiveness have held steady at 63% “very responsive” or “somewhat responsive” after a drop from 81% in Wave 3. This, however, had been an improvement from the Wave 1 baseline, when it was found to be 72%. Respondents in Zaranj are most likely to rate their CDC as responsive (84%), while those in Tamek wa Jaldak are least likely to say so (39% “very” or “somewhat” responsive). Confidence in the CDC has been dropping since Wave 3 after holding steady for the first three waves: 72% of respondents in Wave 5 held “a lot of confidence” or “some confidence” in the CDC, down from 80% in Wave 3.

Positive perceptions of district government officials are critical to building confidence and improving trust between local communities and governing bodies. The survey asks a series of questions to gauge respondents’ views of their district government. About three-quarters of respondents (74%) say district government officials are from their district. Encouragingly, majorities of respondents believe that district government officials visit the area (68%, up from 64%), the district government understands the problems of people in the area (66%, up from 59% in Wave 4), that district government delivers basic services in a fair manner (62%), that the district government cares about people in the area (61%), and that district government officials are doing their jobs honestly (57%). Forty percent believe that district government officials abuse their authority to make money for themselves.⁷¹

⁷¹ Figure 5.26: (Q14) W1 n=4,809 | W2 n=5,086 | W3 n= 6,412 | W4 n=5,955 | W5 n=7,543

FIGURE 5.26: ABUSE OF AUTHORITY BY DISTRICT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

While most respondents confirm positive characteristics of the district government and its officials, many believe that district government officials **abuse their authority to make money**.



However, these numbers should be viewed with the knowledge that 54% of respondents disagree that it is publically acceptable to criticize the Afghan government, which may impact respondents' willingness to answer survey questions truthfully. Respondents in Zaranj are most likely to say that it is publically acceptable to criticize the government (68%), while those in Deh Rawud are most likely to feel that it is not (27%).

Service Provision and Development

The SIKAS program seeks to build confidence in local governments by improving the provision of basic services. Therefore, service delivery is an essential component of the program. Hard projects such as road improvement, flood protection walls, and culverts, were the most valued project activities because they provide tangible results and can be implemented with high levels of community participation. The cash-for-work aspect of these projects is particularly appreciated because they provide income to people in the community, reduce unemployment, and help the local economy.⁷²


It is therefore concerning that the percentage of respondents who feel services from the government in their area have improved over the past year has been falling since Wave 3, after initially promising results in the first few waves of the survey.⁷³

⁷² Stability In Key Areas – South Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, October 2014.

⁷³ Figure 5.27: (Q15) W1 n=3,571 | W2 n=3,421 | W3 n= 4,510 | W4 n=5,955 | W5 n=7,543

FIGURE 5.27: FEELINGS THAT GOVERNMENT SERVICES ARE IMPROVING


Feelings that services are improving have been in decline of late.



When asked about individual services, respondents’ satisfaction with most of the items in the survey has deteriorated since the baseline. Particularly notable are decreases in satisfaction (“very” or “somewhat” satisfied) with agricultural assistance, which fell from 53% in Wave 1 to 37% in Wave 5, and medical care, which fell from 51% in Wave 1 to 39% in Wave 5.⁷⁴

FIGURE 5.28: SATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT SERVICES

Satisfaction with government services has been in decline since the baseline.



⁷⁴ Figure 5.28: (Q16) W5 n=7,543

Satisfaction with the provision of services varies very widely across districts. The following table lists districts with the highest and lowest levels of satisfaction for each government provision:⁷⁵

TABLE 5.4: SATISFACTION WITH SERVICES BY DISTRICT

SERVICE	DISTRICT WITH HIGHEST SATISFACTION	SATISFACTION IN HIGHEST DISTRICT	DISTRICT WITH LOWEST SATISFACTION	SATISFACTION IN LOWEST DISTRICT	TOTAL SIKAS-SATISFACTION
Clean Drinking Water	Deh Rawud	96%	Kang	36%	71%
Schooling for boys	Zaranj	87%	Tamek wa Jaldak	18%	51%
Schooling for girls	Zaranj	81%	Deh Rawud	8%	28%
Electricity	Zaranj	77%	Kang	0%	14%
Water for irrigation	Chorah	65%	Shah Joy	32%	51%
Roads and bridges	Shah Joy	62%	Daman	29%	45%
Medical care	Shah Joy	61%	Tamek wa Jaldak	22%	39%
Agricultural assistance	Nahr-e Saraj	53%	Kang	12%	37%
Retaining & flood walls	Deh Rawud	53%	Zaranj	10%	32%

Awareness of local development projects has been falling since Wave 3. Fifty-eight percent of respondents in Wave 5 say they have seen or heard about development projects in their local area, compared to 66% in Wave 1 and the high of 68% found in Wave 3. Respondents in Deh Rawud are most likely to have heard about development projects in their local area (92%), while those in Zaranj are least likely to have heard of them (23%). This is not surprising in view of Zaranj respondents' relatively high satisfaction with district government services. Notably, Zaranj was the only district where a majority of respondents were satisfied with the provision of electricity, a rarity anywhere in Afghanistan.

Those who are aware of development projects in their area (n=4,362) are most likely to be aware of projects related to drinking water (85%), roads and bridges (64%), and schools (61%). They are less likely to be aware of projects related to farm produce processing or storage equipment (27%) and electricity (12%). Respondents identify road construction (38%) and education and school (27%) as the most-needed types of development projects in their area.⁷⁶

Since Wave 2, respondents in SIKAS have been asked about obstacles preventing them from obtaining health care or medicine. Most frequently mentioned were lack of medicines (38%) and lack of professional doctors (33%).⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Table 5.4: (Q16) W5 n=7,543

⁷⁶ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

⁷⁷ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Community Cohesion and Resilience

Stabilization Initiatives in Afghanistan seek to weaken the insurgency and improve the legitimacy, reach, and capacity of the Afghan Government, while at the same time working to bolster the resilience of local communities to resist external threats and resolve internal problems. In order to achieve these goals, stabilization programming needs to directly address local sources of instability. SIKAS seeks to build the infrastructure and institutions that will weaken support for the insurgency and eventually support a normally functioning society.⁷⁸ Building community cohesion and resilience is key to resolving governance and stabilization challenges.

Since the baseline, respondents' views as to whether things from outside their village or neighborhood create problems to disrupt their normal life have seen little change. Fifty-seven percent say outside interferences "rarely" or "never" create problems in their district, compared to 55% in Wave 1. Those who think that external interferences ever cause problems in their village/neighborhood (n=3,633) most frequently mention disputes over water (20%), closing roads (15%), interference from Pakistan (15%), and insecurity (10%).⁷⁹

More than half of respondents surveyed in Wave 5 (59%) also believe things originating from inside their village/neighborhood "rarely" or "never" create problems to disrupt normal life. Among those who believe internal interferences ever create problems (n=3,791), disputes over water (26%), land disputes (18%), ethnic disputes (17%), and family problems (16%) are most commonly mentioned.⁸⁰ Respondents living in Arghandab (35%) were most likely to mention land disputes, and those in Garmser (67%) were most likely to mention disputes over water (40%). Respondents in districts in Helmand and Kandahar frequently mentioned family problems – for example, 39% of respondents in Lashkar Gah and 29% in Arghandab cited this as an internal source of disruption – but this was very rarely mentioned in the other provinces covered by SIKAS.

Survey results indicate that resilience is strongest in Garmser, where respondents are most likely to believe people are able to solve problems that originate from inside (93%) and outside (89%) their village/neighborhood. Respondents in Zaranj are least often able to solve problems originating outside the village (37% "often" or "sometimes"), while those in Kang are least often able to solve problems originating from within the village (47%). This is somewhat puzzling, as these two districts show relatively high satisfaction with service provision and governance. Seventy-two percent say that villages and neighborhoods in their area "often" or "sometimes" work together to resolve problems when they occur. Respondents in Kang (79%), Nahr-e Saraj (78%), and Lashkar Gah (78%) are most likely to say that villages and neighborhoods work together to solve problems.

⁷⁸ Stability In Key Areas – South Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, October 2014.


⁷⁹ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

⁸⁰ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

One-quarter of SIKAS-S respondents (25%) say that local leaders “often” consider the interests of ordinary people when making decisions, while 47% say they “sometimes” do. Nineteen percent say that local leaders “often” take the interests of women into account when making decisions, while 44% say that they “sometimes” do. The Mid-Term Performance Evaluation notes that cultural norms in Afghanistan, as well as the low literacy rate among women, make it difficult for women to participate in decision-making or local governance initiatives.

While the evaluation recognizes the challenges that SIKAS-S has faced in integrating gender into its programming, it concludes that gender was “not thoroughly addressed.”⁸¹

FIGURE 5.29: ABILITY OF COMMUNITIES TO SOLVE PROBLEMS FROM OUTSIDE VILLAGE



About two-thirds of respondents (65%) believe that local leaders are “very” or “somewhat” effective in securing funds. Respondents in Zaranj are most likely to say that their local leaders are effective in securing funds (77% “very” or “somewhat” effective), while those in Shah Joy are least likely to think so (55%).

Membership in groups where people get together to discuss issues of common interest or to do certain activities together is relatively uncommon, at 19%. This is down from the 28% found in Wave 4, but at a similar level to what was found in the baseline (18%). Those who do belong to such groups (n=1,409) are most likely to be members of farmers unions (40%), business companies (32%), development councils (14%), and welfare foundations (13%).

Quality of Life


Respondents remain satisfied with their overall quality of life, with 65% saying that they are “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied.” Respondents in Zaranj report the highest satisfaction (84%), while those in Shah Joy report the lowest (50%). Respondents manifest similar satisfaction with their household’s current financial situation, with 65% saying that they are “somewhat” or “very” satisfied. Those in Daman are most satisfied with their household’s financial situation (80%), while those in Shah Joy are least satisfied (47%).

⁸¹ Stability In Key Areas – South Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, October 2014.

Respondents are split as to their ability to meet basic needs: roughly the same share say it has increased (39%) as stayed the same (41%), and about a fifth say it has decreased (19%). Those living in Chorah are most likely to say that it has improved (48%), while those in Qalat are most likely to say it has worsened (31%).⁸²

FIGURE 5.30: ABILITY TO MEET BASIC NEEDS

Respondents in Chorah are most likely to say that their ability to meet basic needs has



A slight majority of respondents say that the situation in their area is certain enough for them to plan for the future (56%), representing a slight increase from Wave 4 (52%). Another 43% say that the situation is too uncertain. Those in Zaranj are most likely to say that the situation is certain enough to plan for the future (75%), while those in Chorah (39%) are least likely to say so. Respondents have become slightly less worried about the future since Wave 4: 34% of respondents in Wave 5 say they are “not worried”, compared with 30% in Wave 4. Respondents in Qalat are most likely to be “very worried” (33%), while those in Nad ‘Ali are most likely to not be worried (52%).

Rule of Law


When faced with disputes over land and water, respondents are most likely to seek restitution from local or tribal elders (53%). In general, as disputes get more serious, respondents become slightly more likely to turn to government courts. Respondents are evenly split as to whether they would turn to government courts or local and tribal elders in cases of theft (44%) for each, with a small minority

⁸² Figure 5.30: (Q28) W5 n=7,543

preferring to turn to armed opposition groups (9%). For disputes involving assault, murder, or kidnapping, SIKAS respondents are most likely to turn to government courts. The percentage of respondents who would turn to a government court in cases of theft or violent crime has seen an overall rise since the baseline, from 29% to 44% in the former case and from 39% to 52% in the latter. Meanwhile, the percentage of respondents who would turn to government courts to resolve disputes concerning land or water has seen little change since the baseline.⁸³

FIGURE 5.31: WHO IS RESOLVING DISPUTES

Respondents are most likely to refer to local and tribal elders if they have a dispute involving land or water, and most likely to refer to government courts to resolve cases of murder, assault, or kidnapping.



Respondents in Shah Joy and Qalat are most likely to refer all types of disputes to armed opposition groups for resolution, perhaps reflecting the strong presence of such groups in those districts and the relative weakness of government institutions in Zabul.


Respondents continue to express high levels of confidence in local and tribal leaders to resolve disputes fairly: 91% express “a lot of confidence” or “some confidence” in their ability to fairly resolve disputes, down slightly from the 94% found in Wave 4, but similar to the level found in Wave 2 (91%). Just under three-quarters of respondents are confident in the ability of government courts to fairly resolve disputes (72%, a figure that has seen little change since Wave 4, when it was 73%, but an overall rise since the baseline result of 67%). Confidence in armed opposition groups to resolve disputes fairly is currently at 22% “a lot of confidence” or “some confidence”, and has been steadily falling since Wave 1, when it was 46%.⁸⁴

⁸³ Figure 5.31: (Q20A-C) W5 n=7,543

⁸⁴ Figure 5.32: (Q21) W1 n=4,809 | W2 n=5,086 | W3 n= 6,412 | W4 n=5,955 | W5 n=7,543

FIGURE 5.32: CONFIDENCE IN LOCAL LEADERS, GOVERNMENT AND AOGS TO RESOLVE DISPUTES

Confidence in **local/tribal elders** to resolve disputes has remained high since the baseline, while confidence in **government courts** has seen an overall slight rise, and confidence in **armed opposition groups** has fallen.




Confidence in local and tribal leaders/elders to resolve disputes is high in all districts, but nearly universal in Garmser (99% “a lot” or “some” confidence), Lashkar Gah (98%), and Nahr-e Saraj (98%). Confidence in government courts to resolve disputes is highest in Zaranj (92%), Chorah (91%), and Kang (90%), and lowest in Shah Joy (43%). Confidence in armed opposition groups to resolve disputes is highest in Shah Joy (55%). Very few respondents in any of the districts in Nimroz or Helmand have confidence in armed opposition groups to resolve disputes.

Decisions made by local and tribal leaders are most likely to be respected, while those made by armed opposition groups are least likely to be.⁸⁵ Those in Shah Joy are most likely to say that decisions by armed opposition groups are always respected (44%), while those in Zaranj are most likely to say that decisions by government courts are always respected (45%).

FIGURE 5.33: RESPECT OF DECISIONS MADE BY LOCAL LEADERS, GOVERNMENT AND AOGS

Respondents in SIKa-S districts are most likely to respect decisions by local and tribal leaders, and least likely to respect decisions made by armed opposition groups.




⁸⁵ Figure 5.33: (Q22) W1 n=4,809 | W2 n=5,086 | W3 n= 6,412 | W4 n=5,955 | W5 n=7,543

Security

FIGURE 5.34: PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN SIKA-S

Wave 5: (SIKAS) Perceptions of Security (Q2a)



About half of respondents living in SIKA-S districts rate their local security situation as “somewhat” or “very” good (51%), a slight increase from the 47% found in Wave 4, but still down considerably from the 65% found in the baseline. However, perceptions of security vary noticeably across districts. Respondents in Kang are most likely to say that the security situation is “good” or “very good” (69%), while those in Tamek wa Jaldak and Tarin Kot are least likely to say so (41% in each).

Most respondents (55%) feel that security has improved in the past year, while 27% feel it has stayed the same, findings more or less consistent with previous waves. Respondents in Daman are most likely to feel that their area has become more secure (70% “much more secure” or “somewhat more secure”), while those in Shah Joy are least likely to feel this way (42%).


Security on the roads has seen little change over the course of the study: 66% of SIKA-S respondents said that security on the roads in their area was “very good” or “somewhat good”, the same figure that was found in Wave 1. Respondents in Kang (88%) and Zaranj (87%) are most likely to say that security on the roads in their area is good, while those in Shah Joy are least likely to say so (43%). Slightly less than half of SIKA-S respondents feel that security on the roads in their area has improved over the past year. This figure represents an overall decline from the findings of the baseline: 48% of respondents in Wave 5 feel that security on the roads has improved over the past year, compared with 59% who felt this way in Wave 1. Respondents in Arghandab are most likely to feel that security on the roads has improved (59% improved “a lot” or “a little”), while those in Shah Joy and Qalat are most likely to feel it has worsened (36% and 35% respectively worsened “a little” or “a lot”).

Most respondents feel secure in their homes during the day (85% “very” or “somewhat” secure) and in their homes during the night (74%). Fewer feel secure traveling to a neighboring village (64%), or to the district or provincial capital (50%). While the percentage who feel safe in their homes during the day

has fallen since the baseline, when it was 92% “very” or “somewhat” secure, to 85% in Wave 5, while the percentage who feel safe in their homes at night has risen from 54% in Wave 1 to 74% in Wave 5.⁸⁶

FIGURE 5.35: PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN THE HOME AND WHILE TRAVELING


Respondents feel less secure in their homes during the day, but more secure in their homes at night or travelling to a neighboring village.



The perception of crime has seen an overall drop since the baseline, but a slight increase since Wave 4.⁸⁷ Respondents in Nad ‘Ali and Nahr-e Saraj (46% “a lot” in each) report the most petty crime. Those in Najr-e Saraj (35% “a lot”) and Lashkar Gah (34%) have the highest percentage of who say there are a lot of serious non-violent crimes. Respondents in Deh Rawud are most likely to say there is a lot of serious violent crime in their area (51%).

FIGURE 5.36: PERCEPTION OF CRIME

The percentage of respondents who say there is "a lot" of each type of crime has slightly risen since the previous wave.



⁸⁶ Figure 5.35: (Q4) W1 n=4,809 | W5 n=7,543


⁸⁷ Figure 5.36: (Q5_1) W1 n=4,809 | W2 n=5,086 | W3 n= 6,412 | W4 n=5,955 | W5 n=7,543

A majority of respondents living in SIKAS districts say that there is less petty crime than last year (56% “much less” or “a little less”). Respondents living in Chorah are most likely to say there is less petty crime (68%), while those in Kang are least likely to say so (28%). Forty-eight percent of respondents say that there is less serious non-violent crime, while 19% say there is more. Meanwhile, 44% say that there is less serious violent crime compared with last year. Respondents in Shah Joy are most likely to say that the level of serious violent crime in their area has declined in the past year (57%), while those in Deh Rawud are least likely to say so (22%).

The presence of ISAF, Arbakai, Afghan Local Police (ALP) and armed opposition groups has fallen noticeably since the Wave 1 baseline. The percentage of respondents who say that there are “a lot” of Afghan National Army (ANA) troops has seen little change, while the presence of the Afghan National Police (ANP) has increased somewhat, from 48% in Wave 1 to 55% in Wave 5.⁸⁸

FIGURE 5.37: PRESENCE OF ISAF, ARBAKAI, ALP AND AOGS

The presence of armed opposition groups, the ALP, Arbakai, and ISAF has been falling since the baseline.



⁸⁸ Figure 5.37: (Q6_1) | W1 n=4,809 | W2 n=5,086 | W3 n= 6,412 | W4 n=5,955 | W5 n=7,543

The presence of armed opposition groups is felt most strongly in Shah Joy and Qalat, where 53% and 38% respectively say that there are “a lot” of AGEs. Their presence is weakest in Kang and Zaranj (0% “a lot” in both). As of Wave 5, there is very little reported presence of ISAF forces in SIKAS-S districts, with only relatively small numbers in Arghandab (16%) and Daman (14%) saying that “a lot” are present.

In contrast to the first waves of the study, where confidence in the ANA to keep the area safe was notably higher than confidence in the ANP’s ability to do the same, confidence in the two have been converging lately: as confidence in the ANA has fallen, confidence in the ANP has risen.⁸⁹

FIGURE 5.38 PRESENCE OF ARMED OPPOSITION IN SIKAS-S DISTRICTS

Wave 5: (SIKAS) Presence of Armed Opposition (Q6_1d)





FIGURE 5.39: CONFIDENCE IN ANA AND ANP

Confidence in the ANA has been falling, while confidence in the ANP has been rising, albeit by a smaller factor.



Corruption

As is the case throughout Afghanistan, corruption continues to be a major problem in the SIKAS-S project area. Eighty-two percent of respondents say that corruption is a problem in their area, a figure which has seen little change since the Wave 1 baseline, when it was 81%. Majorities of respondents in all districts except Kang say that corruption is a problem. However, relatively few respondents feel that

⁸⁹ Figure 5.39: (Q6_2) W1 n=4,809 | W2 n=5,086 | W3 n= 6,412 | W4 n=5,955 | W5 n=7,543

corruption is increasing (14%, down from 17% in Wave 4). SIKAS respondents are more likely to feel that corruption is decreasing (44% “decreased a little” or “decreased a lot”) or staying the same (40%).

Respondents were also asked to name the department or sector of local government which people most complain about being corrupt. They hold diverse opinions on this topic, and there was little consensus on which governmental department is seen as most corrupt. Most frequently mentioned are the district/office of attorney (10%), the courts (8%), the district office (8%), all government offices (6%), the municipality (6%), and the ministry of education (6%).

Economic Activity

The overall economic situation in SIKAS districts has worsened since the baseline, with respondents describing more difficult access to markets, higher prices, and fewer paid jobs available. The percentage of who say their ability to get to markets has been getting better has fallen from 64% in the baseline to 45% in Wave 5. A majority (54%) say that prices in their local markets have increased compared to a year ago. While this figure is down from a high of 63% in Wave 2, it is still a rise from the baseline level of 46% found in Wave 1.

Only 34% of respondents say that there are more paid jobs available in their area compared with last year, down from 51% in Wave 1. Thirty-six percent say that there are fewer paid jobs, and 30% say there are about the same amount. Tamek wa Jaldak is the only district where a majority (67%) say that there are more paid jobs available. Only 9% of respondents in Zaranj feel this way.

Grievances

Grievances vary when respondents are asked to identify the biggest problems that create stress or tension in their area. The most common responses include unemployment (25%), insecurity (19%), lack of paved roads (13%), illiteracy (13%), and corruption (13%).⁹⁰

Unemployment was most frequently mentioned in Zaranj (62%) and Kang (53%), and least in Shah Joy (12%) and Qalat (13%). Corruption was most frequently mentioned in the Helmand districts of Garmser (31%), Nad ‘Ali (26%), Nahr-e Saraj (26%), and Lashkar Gah (26%).

Media

Respondents most often use radio (88%), friends and family (87%), elders (70%), and the Mosque/Mullah (59%) to communicate with others and/or get news and information. Some also use cell phones (33%) and television (21%). Far fewer respondents mention using posters/billboards (6%) and newspapers (4%). Only 1% use the Internet or e-mail for communication.

Respondents get most of their information about government services from the radio (71%), friends/family (46%), elders (31%), television (14%), and the Mosque/Mullah (12%).⁹¹

⁹⁰ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

⁹¹ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Stability in Key Areas - East (SIKA-E)

Introduction

Stability in Key Areas East (SIKA-E), implemented by Architecture, Engineering, Consulting, Operations and Maintenance International Development (AECOM), is a USAID stabilization project aimed to promote governance and service delivery in targeted districts in Wardak, Logar, Ghazni, Paktia, Paktika, and Khost through small-scale stabilization activities. Since December 2011, SIKA-E has programmed confidence building initiatives, service delivery activities, and grants aimed at addressing community identified sources of instability (SOI). Its strategy is to develop the capacity of district entities to better understand challenges to stability and implement effective activities to address them.

SIKA-E activities focus on capacity building and infrastructure development, in order to build confidence in local governance and increase the provision of basic service. The project seeks to establish legitimacy in local governance and encourage community-led development in order to reduce the impact of the insurgency, increase confidence in the Afghan government, and pave the way for a peaceful security transition. The Mid Term Performance Evaluation used multi-level qualitative methods, including observation, interviews, and desk review of project documents, to evaluate SIKA-E performance up to May 2014. Conclusions from the Mid Term Performance Evaluation are used throughout this chapter to provide context for the quantitative analysis.

The following sections provide summary and detailed information about the attitudes and opinions of respondents living in districts targeted by the SIKA-E project. The report compares findings across all five waves of research to examine trends in stabilization and shifts in development indicators on the following topics: governance, service provision and development, community cohesion and resilience, quality of life, rule of law, security and crime, corruption, economic activity, grievances, and media.

SIKA-E targets a core group of districts in four provinces of western Afghanistan:

TABLE 5.5: SIKA-E DISTRICTS

DISTRICT	SAMPLE SIZE	DISTRICT	SAMPLE SIZE	DISTRICT	SAMPLE SIZE
Ahmadabad	n= 240	Jalrayz	n= 560	Nerkh	n= 560
Andar	n= 318	Khoshi	n= 395	Qarah Bagh	n= 557
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu)	n= 240	Khwajah Omari	n= 320	Sayyid Karam	n= 240
Baraki Barak	n= 560	Lajah-Ahmad Khel	n= 318	Sayyidabad	n= 560
Chak-e Wardak	n= 480	Lajah-Mangal	n= 318	Sayyidabad	n= 239
Deh Yak	n= 338	Maidan Shahr	n= 240	Sharan	n= 240
Dzadran	n= 317	Malistan	n= 240	Shwak (Garda Serai)	n= 231
Gurbuz	n= 319	Manduzai (Isma il Khel)	n= 320	Tanai	n= 320
Jaji	n= 255	Muhammad Aghah	n= 473	Yosuf Khel	n= 238
Jaji Maidan	n= 320	Muqer	n= 320	Zurmat	n= 320
		Nadir Shah Kot	n= 239		

It should be noted that interviews in Baraki Barak, Andar, Zurmat, and Dzadran were conducted by a field team from Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC). Interviews in Khoshi, Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghata), Jaji, and Shwak (Garda Serai) were conducted in part by AYC and in part by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic Research (ACSOR). The remaining districts were conducted entirely by ACSOR. Differences exist in the field implementation and quality control measures used for the AYC interviews which may impact some survey results. For detailed descriptions of these differences, refer to the full Methodology Report for MISTI Wave 5.

ACSOR regularly updates its accessibility tracker. This tracker indicates accessibility of districts for the field staff and the reasons for inaccessibility, whether it be insecurity or transportation. Additionally, the accessibility tracker indicates which districts are inaccessible to ACSOR's female staff. The following districts were inaccessible to women and only included men in the sample:

- Chak-e Wardak (Wardak): Taliban presence in most of the district
- Muqer (Ghazni): Taliban presence in most of the district
- Yosuf Khel (Pakitka): District is too far away for women interviewers to travel to
- Jaji (Pakitya): Taliban presence in most of the district
- Lajah-Ahmad Khel (Pakitya): Taliban presence in most of the district
- Lajah-Mangal (Pakitya): Taliban presence in most of the district

Unless otherwise noted, district level analysis and wave to wave comparisons are provided with significance testing at the 99% confidence level.

OVERVIEW

Stability in Key Areas-East (SIKA-E) targets key districts in six provinces of eastern Afghanistan: Wardak, Logar, Ghazni, Paktia, Paktika, and Khost. Findings here summarize attitudes and perceptions of respondents living in districts targeted by SIKA-E project activities, focused on capacity building and infrastructure development in order to improve local governance and increase the provision of basic services.


GOVERNANCE

Improving local governance is the top priority of the SIKA-E stabilization project. SIKA-E established an inclusive, community-driven development process that exposed residents to a more open and accessible district government. Project activities have been presented as Afghan government-led activities, with the theory that infrastructure development projects will improve perceptions of the government and establish lasting legitimacy.

Overall, perceptions of the Afghan government have improved since the baseline.

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respondents believe the Afghan government is well regarded in their area.




Increased regard towards the Afghan government reflects increased positivity towards local governing entities. Levels of confidence in the district governor, local village leaders, district government, and provincial governor have significantly increased since the baseline. Respondents are also much more likely to say these local leaders and bodies are responsive to the needs of local people in their area.

Despite high confidence and perceptions of responsiveness of sub-national leaders, respondents remain skeptical

about their honesty. Majorities believe district government officials abuse their authority to make money and believe they are not doing their job honestly. Respondents in Zurmat, Nerkh, and Dzadran are most distrustful of their district government, where the vast majority believe district government officials do not do their jobs honestly.

The survey finds positive impacts of the Community Development Council (CDC) and District Development Assembly (DDA).

Both confidence in the DDA and CDC and perceptions of their responsiveness have improved since the baseline.




SERVICE PROVISION AND DEVELOPMENT

Despite the immediate positive effects of mitigation projects outlined in the SIKA-E Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, the majority of respondents are dissatisfied with the district government's provision of medical care (62%), schooling for girls (60%), agricultural assistance (59%), roads and bridges (56%), retaining and flood walls (53%), electricity (52%), and irrigation water (50%). The majority are satisfied with clean drinking water (77%) and schooling for boys (65%).

Since the baseline, respondents have become more satisfied with clean drinking water, retaining and flood walls, roads and bridges, girls’ schooling, and boys’ schooling. However, Wave 5 respondents are less satisfied with the district government’s provision of irrigation water, agricultural assistance, and electricity.

Over the past three years of SIKA-E programming, respondents have become increasingly aware of local development projects in their area. Six in ten respondents in SIKA-E districts say they have seen or heard about development projects in their area, compared to just 36% of those surveyed in the baseline.

Respondents living in **Zurmat and Maidan Shahr** are most likely to have heard about development projects in their area, while respondents in **Muhammad Aghah and Malistan** are least likely.



COMMUNITY COHESION & RESILIENCE

In line with SIKA-E’s focus on governance, project activities aim to strengthen communities’ cohesion and resilience as a path to stabilization. Communities became more aware of shared problems as they worked together during project implementation, which improved overall cohesion among constituents.


When respondents think about outside interferences that cause problems in their village/neighborhood, they most frequently mention road-side bombs/suicide attacks and existence/presence of the Taliban. When thinking about internal interferences that cause problems in their area, they are more likely to say land disputes, water disputes, or family problems.

Survey results indicate that resilience is strongest in Dzadran, where respondents are most likely to say people in their area “often” solve problems that come from outside and inside of their village.

QUALITY OF LIFE

General outlook in SIKA-E districts has improved since the baseline study, with the majority of respondents saying things are going in the right direction. More than six in ten respondents say they are satisfied with their life as a whole.

Increasing percentages say things in their district are going in the **right direction**.



RULE OF LAW

Respondents in SIKA-E districts tend to favor informal justice systems (such as local/tribal elders) over formal justice systems (such as government courts) when it comes to minor cases. For example, when respondents or their family members are involved in dispute over land or water, respondents are twice as likely to turn to local/tribal elders than government courts. However, as disputes get more serious there has been a noticeable shift towards seeking justice from government courts rather than elders. Preference for formal justice systems has significantly increased since the baseline when it comes to cases of assault, murder, or kidnapping.

Governance

Local governance is the top priority of the SIKa-E stabilization project. SIKa-E established an inclusive, community-driven development process that exposed residents to a more open and accessible district government. The project aimed to improve local governance through district and provincial level capacity building, resulting in higher levels of confidence and trust in government. SIKa-E activities have been presented as Afghan government-led activities, with the theory that infrastructure development projects will improve perceptions of the government and establish lasting legitimacy. The Mid Term Evaluation concluded that SIKa-E succeeded in meeting its contractual objectives with particularly good performance on gender, communications, and community-level project management capacity building.

Overall, perceptions of the Afghan government continue to improve since the baseline.⁹²

FIGURE 5.40: PERCEPTIONS OF AFGHAN GOVERNMENT IN SIKa-E DISTRICTS


Eight in ten respondents believe the Afghan government is well regarded in their area.



All of the respondents from Zurmat (100%) believe that the Afghan government is well regarded in their area, and nearly all of those living in Shwak (Garda Serai) and Nerkh agree (95% each). Respondents in Muhammad Aghah are least likely to say the same (55%).

FIGURE 5.41: CONFIDENCE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT ENTITIES IN SIKa-EAST DISTRICTS

Confidence in local governing entities has increased since the baseline study.



⁹² Figure 5.40: (Q8) W1 n=3,409 | W2 n=9,469 | W3 n=8,929 | W4 n=9,663 | W5 n=10,635

Increased regard towards the Afghan government reflects increased positivity towards local governing entities. Majorities in SIKA-E districts say they have confidence in their local/village neighborhood leaders (79%), district governor (70%), district government (65%), and provincial governor (54%).⁹³


Confidence in provincial governors varies the most across SIKA-E districts. While respondents in Nerkh (72%), Chak-e Wardak (67%), and Sayyidabad (66%) are most likely to say they are confident in their provincial governor, only 5% of those in Andar and 4% in Zurmat say the same about their provincial governor.

Overall, respondents are most confident in local village leaders (79%) compared district level and provincial officials. Andar is the only district where the majority of respondents (54%) say they have not much confidence or no confidence at all in their local village leaders.

One of the main objectives of the SIKA-E capacity building activities is to collectively identify the sources of instability that are unique to each district. SIKA-E continuously adjusts programming based on realities on the ground. Therefore, it is promising that SIKA-E respondents in Wave 5 are much more likely to believe that the district governor, district government, and local village/neighborhood leaders are responsive to the needs of local people in their area.⁹⁴

FIGURE 5.42: RESPONSIVENESS OF LOCAL LEADERS AND DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

Responsiveness of local entities has improved substantially since the baseline, after experiencing a decline in Wave 4.



Opinions of responsiveness vary across SIKA-E districts. The following table highlights the district where the district governor, district government, local village leaders, and provincial governor are most responsive to the needs of local people in their area:⁹⁵

⁹³ Figure 5.41: (Q9) W1 n=3,409 | W5 n=10,635. This figure includes net values of “very confident” and “somewhat confident.”

⁹⁴ Figure 5.42: (Q10) W1 n=3,409 | W5 n=10,635. This figure includes net values of “very responsive” and “somewhat responsive.”

⁹⁵ Table 1: (Q10) W5 n=10,635


TABLE 5.6: OUTLIER DISTRICTS (LEVELS OF RESPONSIVENESS)

LEVELS OF RESPONSIVENESS	DISTRICT	% VERY/SOMEWHAT RESPONSIVE	TOTAL SIKA-E % "VERY/SOMEWHAT" RESPONSIVE
District Governor	Malistan	92%	72%
District Government	Baraki Barak	88%	67%
Local village/neighborhood leaders	Baraki Barak	98%	77%
Provincial governor	Jalrayz	78%	55%

Although SIKA-E respondents believe local entities are responsive, they are more skeptical about their ability to get things done. Respondents believe the local village leaders' abilities to get things done has improved in the past year, while they are less likely to believe abilities of the district governor, district government, or provincial governor have improved.⁹⁶

FIGURE 5.43: ABILITIES OF LOCAL LEADERS AND DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS TO GET THINGS DONE

Respondents believe the ability of local village leaders to get things done has improved




Despite concern about whether local groups are improving their ability to get things done, the survey finds positive impacts of the Community Development Council (CDC) and District Development Assembly (DDA). District entities improve basic service delivery by using the CDCs and DDAs to plan, design, implement, and monitor infrastructure or labor-intensive projects. With input from government officials, CDCs/DDAs analyze sources of instability to select the mitigation activities implemented by the community. The SIKA-East Mid Term Evaluation report finds that this inclusive development process achieves a level of local ownership required for stabilization.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Figure 5.43: (Q11) W1 n=3,409 | W5 n=10,635. This figure includes net values of "improved a lot" and "improved a little."

⁹⁷ Mid Term Performance Evaluation, prepared by MSI in November 2014.

FIGURE 5.44: AWARENESS OF CDC AND DDA

Awareness of the CDC and DDA has improved since the baseline.




CDCs serve as the focus for village-level rural development in Afghanistan. All mitigation activities are funded through CDC-linked bank accounts. The DDAs, consisting of elective representatives of clustered CDCs, create District Development Plans that connect community priorities to the government’s agricultural and rural development strategy. Respondents living in SIKA-E districts are much more likely to say they have heard of the CDC and DDA in their area (70% and 65%, respectively).⁹⁸

DDAs and CDCs are most active in Baraki Barak (99% each) and Zurmat (100% each) where nearly all respondents say they have heard of them. While 92% of Andar respondents were aware of the DDA in Wave 4, only 59% have heard of it in Wave 5. Similarly, 96% in Andar said they were aware of the CDC in Wave 4, compared to only 58% in Wave 5.

FIGURE 5.45: CONFIDENCE IN DDA AND CDC RESPONSIVENESS

Both confidence in the DDA and CDC and perceptions of their responsiveness have improved since the baseline.




⁹⁸ Figure 5.44: (Q12a) W1 n=3,652 | W5 n=10,635.

More than three-fourths of SIKA-E respondents say they have confidence in the DDA (78%) and CDC (76%), and majorities believe the DDA (69%) and CDC (64%) are responsive to the needs of local people.⁹⁹ Majorities also believe the DDA (53%) and CDC (56%) have improved over the past year. These results are encouraging given SIKA-E’s emphasis on bridging the gap between constituents and local governance through community-led organizations.

Positive perceptions of the district government’s actions are critical to building confidence and trust in local governance. Although two-thirds confirm that district government officials are from their district (66%), respondents are divided when asked about specific characteristics of their district government. Just under half of respondents believe the district government understands the problems of people in their area, cares about local people, and delivers basic services to this area in a fair manner.¹⁰⁰

FIGURE 5.46: PERCEPTION OF ABUSE OF AUTHORITY BY DISTRICT OFFICIALS

More than half believe district officials **abuse their authority to make money.**



Respondents are most distrustful of their district government in Zurmat (96%), Nerkh (88%), and Dzadran (85%), where the vast majority believe district government officials do not do their jobs honestly. Overall, 62% of SIKA-E respondents believe district government officials do not do their job honestly (up from 55% in Wave 4). There needs to be continuous capacity building efforts to ensure that constituents believe their district government officials represent their interests and work for the well-being of the community, as positive perceptions of the district government will help maintain legitimacy and depress instability.

Predictive logistic regression suggests that if district officials are originally from the district that they serve, visit the area, understand local problems, and care about the people in the district then respondents are more likely to say that it is acceptable to criticize the Afghan government. However, whether or not the district governor is honest is a negative predictor of acceptability—respondents who

⁹⁹ Figure 5.45: (Q12b-c) W1 n=1,458 | W5 n=6,917 (DDA), n=7,466 (CDC). These questions were asked of respondents who have heard of the DDA and CDC. This figure includes net values of “very/somewhat confident” and “very/somewhat responsive.”

¹⁰⁰ Figure 5.46: (Q14a-i) W5 n=10,635

believe their district governor is honest are more likely to say it is unacceptable to criticize the government.¹⁰¹

Service Provision and Development


A multitude of SIKA-E activities were implemented to increase the provision of basic services in response to sources of instability. The SOIs were developed around three main categories: lack of basic services, limited access to essential services, and economic issues associated with a lack of water for agriculture.¹⁰² The SIKA-E Mid Term Performance Evaluation found that the SOI mitigation activities (i.e. kareze extensions or refurbishments, protection walls, school boundary walls, roads, culverts, and water wells) helped decrease conflict between villagers, increase confidence in local government’s ability to provide service, improved communication between relevant stakeholders, provided job opportunities, and attempted to improve agricultural productivity.¹⁰³

Despite the positive effects immediately following the mitigation activities, the majority of respondents are dissatisfied with the district government’s provision of medical care (62%), schooling for girls (60%), agricultural assistance (59%), roads and bridges (56%), retaining and flood walls (53%), electricity (52%), and irrigation water (50%). The majority are satisfied with clean drinking water (77%) and schooling for boys (65%).

Since the baseline, respondents have become more satisfied with clean drinking water, retaining and flood walls, roads and bridges, girls’ schooling, and boys’ schooling. However, Wave 5 respondents are less satisfied with the district government’s provision of irrigation water, agricultural assistance, and electricity. The following graph illustrates the net change in satisfaction from Wave 1 to Wave 5.¹⁰⁴

FIGURE 5.47: SATISFACTION OF SERVICE PROVISION

Satisfaction of boys' schooling has increased the most since the baseline, while satisfaction of electricity has **decreased the most.**



¹⁰¹ Predictive logistic regression Model 1 included in Annex to this chapter.

¹⁰² Mid Term Performance Evaluation, prepared by MSI in November 2014.

¹⁰³ Mid Term Performance Evaluation, prepared by MSI in November 2014.

¹⁰⁴ Figure 8: (Q16) W5 n=10,635. This figure includes net values of “very satisfied” and somewhat satisfied”.

Satisfaction of public services varies across district. The following table lists the districts with the highest level of satisfaction for each district government provision.¹⁰⁵


TABLE 5.7: SERVICES BY DISTRICT

SERVICE	DISTRICT	DISTRICT SATISFACTION	TOTAL SIK-A-E SATISFACTION
Clean Drinking Water	Zurmat	98%	77%
Water for irrigation	Shwak (Garda Serai)	70%	46%
Agricultural assistance	Chak-e Wardak	65%	35%
Retaining and flood walls	Jalrayz	73%	41%
Roads and bridges	Sharan	73%	42%
Medical care	Sharan	83%	36%
Schooling for girls	Nerkh	64%	34%
Schooling for boys	Zurmat	96%	65%
Electricity	Nerkh	51%	13%

Over the past three years of SIK-A-E programming, respondents have become increasingly aware of local development projects in their area. Six in ten respondents in SIK-A-E districts say they have seen or heard about development projects in their area, compared to just 36% of those surveyed in the baseline.¹⁰⁶

FIGURE 5.48: AWARENESS OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN SIK-A-E DISTRICTS

Respondents living in Zurmat and Maidan Shahr are most likely to have heard about development projects in their area, while respondents in Muhammad Aghah and Malistan are least likely.



¹⁰⁵ Table 5.7: (Q16) W5 n=10,635

¹⁰⁶ Figure 9: (Q17) W5 n=10,635.

Across all SIKA-E districts, those who have seen or heard about development projects (n=6,404) are most aware of projects concerning drinking water (89%), schools (63%), retaining and flood walls (53%), and roads and bridges (52%). Majorities who are aware of specific development projects agree that all types of projects improve life for people in their area.

Predictive logistic regression suggests that awareness of development projects is a positive predictor of perceptions of the Afghan government. Respondents who have heard about development projects in their area have a higher probability of saying the Afghan government is well regarded in their area.¹⁰⁷ The SIKA-E Mid Term Evaluation outlines several ways service delivery projects helped increase support for the Afghan government and mitigate SOIs. Irrigation projects increased support by mitigating conflicts among local communities over water disputes, increasing short-term term job opportunities for unemployed during grant implementation, and increasing immigration water for irrigation land. However, irrigation projects may have also decreased support for the government because beneficiaries did not always observe transparent and accountable project implementation processes. Some constituents may have wanted to see less CDC involvement and more government control over implementation.

Protection walls increased support for government by protecting fields, homes, and karezes against seasonal flooding. Communities worked together during implementation, which made them aware of each other's problems and responsibilities, and helped bridge the gap between the community and government. Since the government had promised such projects in the past, constituents credited the government of fulfilling its promises.

School attendance improved as school boundary walls were constructed. However, although the majority of Wave 5 respondents were satisfied with schooling for boys (65%), nearly half as many were satisfied with schooling for girls (34%). The Mid Term Performance Evaluation found that the projects to build school boundary walls were not as successful at increasing government support among constituents. Families did not see school building walls as a necessary project because it did not address the insecurity of going to school. Many parents fear sending their children to school because some rural schools are AGE targets or are located between the government and AGE zones.

Forty-two percent of respondents were satisfied with their district government's provision of roads and bridges. The Mid Term Evaluation in-depth interviews found that beneficiaries were satisfied because projects improved access to the district center and increased access to markets, health services, and agricultural fields.

SIKA-E respondents most frequently mention the need for development projects concerning electricity (38%), road construction (33%), education and school (27%), building bridges (23%) and clinics (19%) in the next year.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Predictive logistic regression Model 2 included in Annex to this chapter.

¹⁰⁸ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Respondents were also asked about the obstacles preventing them from obtaining health care or medicine. The most frequent responses include: lack of professional doctors (32%), lack of clinics/hospitals (31%), distance to facilities, and lack of transportation and/or good roads (25%).¹⁰⁹

Community Cohesion and Resilience

In line with SIKa-E's focus on governance, project activities aim to strengthen communities' cohesion and resilience as a path to stabilization. Communities became more aware of shared problems as they worked together during project implementation, which improved overall cohesion among constituents.

Consistent with previous waves, more than half of respondents (56%) believe things from outside their village or neighborhood "rarely" or "never" create problems to disrupt their normal life, while 43% say it "sometimes" or "often" happens. When asked what types of outside interferences cause problems in their village/neighborhood, respondents most frequently mention road-side bombs/suicide attacks (22%), existence/presence of the Taliban (18%), land disputes (10%), small crimes/theft (10%), and kidnappings (10%).¹¹⁰

Just over half of respondents (52%) say things originating from inside their village/neighborhood "rarely" or "never" create problems to disrupt normal life, while nearly half (47%) believe they "sometimes" or "often" do. Of those who say internal interferences create problems in their area, land disputes (49%), disputes over water (27%), family problems (21%), and ethnic disputes (11%) were commonly mentioned.¹¹¹

Survey results indicate that resilience is strongest in Dzadran, where 48% say people in their area "often" solve problems that come from outside their village and 56% say they "often" solve problems that come from inside their village (compared to 14% and 19% of overall respondents). Nearly all respondents in Zumat are most likely to say people "sometimes" solve these types of external (95%) and internal problems (100%).


¹⁰⁹ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

¹¹⁰ This question was only asked of respondents who answered "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" when asked how often outside factors create problems in their area (n=5,961). Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

¹¹¹ This question was only asked of respondents who answered "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" when asked how often outside factors create problems in their area (n=5,961). Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

FIGURE 5.49: ABILITY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS THAT COME FROM OUTSIDE VILLAGE


Wave 5: (SIKA-E) Able to solve problems that come from outside village (Q34c)



The Mid Term Performance Evaluation concludes that SIKa-E had a particularly effective and adept communications team that conducted highly impactful and well-received communications trainings that helped communities develop agendas and communications strategies and learn how to communicate their concerns with local government authorities. MISTI’s evaluation found that SIKa-E had the best communication team compared to all other SIKa’s. Survey results reflect SIKa-E’s emphasis on bottom-up communication — 67% believe local leaders “sometimes” or “often” consider the interests of ordinary people when making decisions that affect the village/neighborhood. However, despite SIKa-E’s communication programming, these results remain unchanged since the baseline (68%). Fifty-five percent believe interests of women are at least “sometimes” or “often” considered when making decisions that affect their village/neighborhood.¹¹²

FIGURE 5.50: PERCEPTION THAT INTERESTS ARE CONSIDERED WHEN DECISIONS ARE MADE BY LOCAL LEADERS

Respondents living in Zumat, Shwak (Garda Serai), and Andar are most likely to believe their interests are considered when local leaders make decisions, while respondents in Jalrayz, Baraki Barak, and Muhammad Aghah are least likely.



Consistent with previous waves, most respondents in SIKa-E districts do not belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss common interests or do certain activities together (86%). Of those who do belong to such groups (n=1,392), respondents mostly belong to: sports unions (21%), development councils (21%), and farmers unions (20%).


¹¹² Figure 5.50: (Q37) W5 n=10,635.

Quality of Life

General outlook in SIKA-E districts has improved since the baseline study.¹¹³

FIGURE 5.51: PERCEPTION THAT SIKA-E DISTRICTS HAVE IMPROVED

Increasing percentages say things in their district are going in the right direction.



About six in ten respondents (62%) say they are “very” or “somewhat” satisfied with their life as a whole. Those living in Zurmat (99%), Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghathu) (81%), and Jalrayz (79%) are most satisfied with their quality of life, while those in Baraki Barak (29%), Sayyidabad (37%), and Nerkh (40%) are the least satisfied.


Sixty-three percent of respondents overall say they are satisfied (“very” or “somewhat”) with their household’s current financial situation, and 35% say their ability to meet their basic needs has increased (“increased a lot” and “increased a little”) in the past year. Looking forward, nearly half (47%) say they are “a little worried” about meeting their basic needs over the next year, while 29% say they are “not worried,” and another nearly one-fourth say they are “very worried” (23%).

Respondents are divided when asked about whether they are able to plan for their future. Half say the situation in their area is certain enough to make future plans (50%), while another 48% say the situation in their area is too uncertain. Those living in Zurmat (9%) are most confident about their ability to plan ahead.

¹¹³ Figure 5.51: (Q1) W5 n=10,635

FIGURE 5.52: SATISFACTION WITH QUALITY OF LIFE

Wave 5: (SIKA-E) Satisfied with the Quality of Life (Q-26)




Rule of Law

Respondents in SIKA-E districts tend to favor informal justice systems (such as local/tribal elders) over formal justice systems (such as government courts) when it comes to minor cases. For example, when respondents or their family members are involved in dispute over land or water, respondents are twice as likely to turn to local/tribal elders (63%) than government courts (31%). However, as disputes get more serious there has been a noticeable shift towards seeking justice from government courts rather than elders. In Wave 5, more than half (57%) say they would turn to government courts if they were involved in a dispute concerning assault, murder, or kidnapping, compared to just one-third (33%) in the Wave 1 baseline.¹¹⁴ Respondents are also more likely to turn to government courts (45%) instead of local/tribal elders (42%) in cases concerning theft (compared to 29% and 48%, respectively, in the Wave 1 baseline).

FIGURE 5.53: PREFERENCES FOR METHODS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Preference has shifted towards **government courts** to seek



The survey finds there is most reverence for formal rule of law in Khoshi (85%), Malistan (82%), and Bahram-e Shahid (80%) where respondents are most likely to turn to government courts for justice if they were involved in serious disputes concerning assault, murder, or kidnapping.

Since the baseline, respondents in SIKA-E districts have become less likely to seek justice from armed opposition groups when involved in disputes concerning land/water (5%, down from 14% in Wave 1), theft (8%, down from 21% in Wave 1), and assault, murder or kidnapping (9%, down from 16% in Wave 1). Respondents living in Andar district or districts in Wardak province (Sayyidabad, Chak-e Wardak, Nerkh, Jalrayz, and Maidan Shahr) are much more likely to seek justice from armed opposition groups compared to those in other areas.


When respondents discuss how to resolve disputes fairly, 88% of respondents report having confidence in local/tribal elders, and 70% report having confidence in government courts. Respondents are more likely to believe people in their village/neighborhood “always” respect decisions made by local elders

¹¹⁴ Figure 5.53: (Q20b) W1 n=3,652 | W5 n=10,635

(37%) than by government courts (25%, up from 16% in Wave 1). More than half (52%) believe decisions made by armed opposition groups are “never” respected.¹¹⁵

FIGURE 5.54: CONFIDENCE IN DISPUTE RESOLUTIONS BY LOCAL LEADERS, GOVERNMENT COURTS AND AOGS

Respondents **always** or **mostly** respect the decisions made by local elders, while they only **sometimes** or **never** respect decisions made by armed opposition groups.




Security and Crime

Perceptions of local security are relatively stable in SIKa-E districts: 43% rate their local security as good, 37% say it is fair, and 20% say it is poor. Opinions of local security are most critical in Baraki Barak (3%), Khoshi (13%), and Džadran (19%), where respondents are most likely to report poor security and say their area is less secure than it was last year. Meanwhile, 95% of respondents living in Zurmat and 79% of those in Jalrayz rate their local security as good.

¹¹⁵ Figure 5.54: (Q22a-c) W5 n=10,635

FIGURE 5.55: PERCEPTION OF LOCAL SECURITY IN SIKA-E DISTRICTS


Wave 5: (SIKA-E) Local Security (Q-2a)



Perceptions of security on local roads have improved since the baseline. More than half (57%, up from 40% in Wave 1) say security on their local roads is good. Respondents are most positive about road security in Zurmat (88%) and Malistan (73%). Those in Zurmat are also more likely to say security on their local roads has improved in the past year (76%, compared to 36% of respondents overall). Consistent with last wave, road security is most critical in Dzadran and Baraki Barak where respondents are most likely to say security on roads is bad and has worsened in the past year (66% and 53% respectively). When used in a logistic regression, opinions on security while traveling to a neighboring village or the provincial capital are significant predictors of opinions of security on the roads. Female respondents have a higher probability of rating the security of their local roads as good.¹¹⁶

In general, security has improved since the baseline. More respondents report feeling secure at home during the night and while traveling to neighboring villages or the district capital. However, respondents still feel most secure at home during the day (89%).¹¹⁷

FIGURE 5.56: PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY AT HOME AND WHILE TRAVELING IN SIKAE DISTRICTS



Perceptions of crime have remained steady since the baseline survey. About half of those in SIKAE districts say there are “a little” petty crimes and offenses (47%), serious, non-violent crime (50%), and serious violent crime (52%) in their area. Respondents living in Drazdran are most likely to say there are “a lot” of petty crimes and offenses (59%) and serious, non-violent crimes (50%) in their area (compared to 29% and 21% of respondents overall). Those in Chaak-e Wardak report the most serious violent crimes in their area (44% “a lot,” compared to 20% overall). While the vast majority of those in Zurmat report there are no instances of petty crime (96%) or serious non-violent crimes (83%) in their area, nearly all respondents in Zurmat say there is “a little” serious violent crimes (98%).

¹¹⁶ Predictive logistic regression Model 3 included in Annex to this chapter.


¹¹⁷ Figure 5.56: (Q4-d) W1 n=3,652 | W5 n=10,635. This figure includes net values of “very secure” and “somewhat secure.”

Survey results indicate the presence of the Afghan National Army has weakened in the past six months. In Wave 5, 40% say there are “a lot” of ANA in their area, compared to 50% in Wave 4. Nonetheless, the majority of respondents are confident in the ANA and three-fourths believe its ability to provide security has improved in the past year. Nearly half (48%) say they are “a lot” of Afghan National Police in their area, compared to only one-third (33%) in the baseline. While perceptions of the ANP remain largely positive, respondents are less confident in the ANP (59%) than ANA (70%) and they are less likely to believe the ANP has improved in the past year (58%, compared to 75% who say the ANA has improved).

The presence of armed opposition groups, Afghan Local Police, and ISAF has decreased since the baseline.¹¹⁸

FIGURE 5.57: PERCEPTIONS OF AOGS, ALP AND ISAF

Respondents are much less likely to percieve "a lot" of armed opposition groups, ALP, and ISAF in their area.



Although, the presence of armed opposition groups, also known as anti-government elements (AGEs) varies across SIKa-E districts. Majorities in Zurmat (93%), Dzadran (79%), Baraki Barak (79%), and Khoshi (62%) report there are “a lot” of AGEs in their area.

Corruption

Corruption is an ongoing and rampant problem across Afghanistan. Nearly nine in ten respondents (88%) admit corruption is a problem in SIKa-E districts (up from 69% in Wave 1). More than half of respondents (58%) say corruption has increased in their area, and 32% say it has stayed the same.

Respondents were asked to name the department or sector of the local government that people most complain about corruption; in an open-ended format, the top mentions include: courts (17%), the District Office (12%), the District/Office of Attorney (11%), and the Ministry of Education (8%).

Economic Activity

¹¹⁸ Figure 5.57: (Q6d-f) W5 n=10,635.

Four in ten respondents say their ability to get to local markets has gotten better in the past year, 31% say it has stayed the same, and 21% say it has gotten worse. Although respondents believe their accessibility to markets is better or the same, the majority (65%) believe prices for basic goods have increased in the past year.

Although SIKa-E infrastructure projects intend to create jobs in targeted districts, 46% of respondents believe there are less jobs in their area compared to last year. Twenty-five percent say the availability of paid jobs has stayed the same, and 11% say there are more jobs. Respondents living in Wardak province (Sayyidabad, Chak-e Wardak, Nerkh, Jalrayz, and Maidan Shahr) are most likely to say there are more paid jobs in their area.

Grievances

Grievances vary when respondents are asked to identify the biggest problems that create stress or tension in their areas. The most common responses include: insecurity (42%), unemployment (33%), high prices (22%), and poverty (14%).¹¹⁹

“Insecurity” was most frequently mentioned in Zurmat where 94% of respondents mentioned it as the biggest problem.

Media

Respondents tend to rely on the radio (94%), friends and family (86%), elders (79%), and Mosque/Mullah (71%) to communicate with others and/or get news and information. More than half say they communicate and/or receive news through the cell phones (62%, up from 54% in Wave 4). Respondents are less likely to use television (32%), posters/billboards (20%), and newspapers (6%).

Respondents get most of their information about government services from the radio (65%) and through word of mouth from friends/family (36%), elders (30%), the Mosque/Mullah (21%).¹²⁰

¹¹⁹ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

¹²⁰ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Annex

SIKA-E Governance Model 1

Response: Q-14h. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion. (It is acceptable for people to publicly criticize the Afghan government.)

q14ht ~ d3 + pashtun + q14at + as.factor(q14bt) + as.factor(q14ct) +
as.factor(q14dt) + q14et + as.factor(q14ft) + as.factor(q14gt)

	B	SE	Sig	95% CI for odds ratio		
				Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-0.084	0.037	*	0.92	0.86	0.99
Years Education	0.008	0.002	*	1.01	1	1.01
Pashtun	0.129	0.03	*	1.14	1.07	1.21
Dist officials are from area	0.27	0.025	*	1.31	1.25	1.37
Dist Govt understands problems	0.107	0.025	*	1.11	1.06	1.17
Dist Govt Cares	0.209	0.027	*	1.23	1.17	1.3
Dist Govt not Corrupt	-0.386	0.026	*	0.68	0.65	0.71
Dis govt visits area	0.164	0.027	*	1.18	1.12	1.24
Dist govt does job honestly	-0.11	0.027	*	0.9	0.85	0.94
Dis Officials are honest	-0.273	0.026	*	0.76	0.72	0.8

SIKA-E Governance Model 2

Response: Q-8. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion. (The Afghan government is well regarded in this area.)

q8 ~ q17at + q2at + q2bt + q5_1at + q5_1ct + q11at + q11bt + q11ct + q11dt

	B	SE	Sig	95% CI for odds ratio		
				Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	0.564	0.018	*	1.76	1.7	1.82
Have Heard about development Projects	0.683	0.022	*	1.98	1.9	2.07
Security	0.283	0.036	*	1.33	1.24	1.43
More Secure than last year	0.532	0.043	*	1.7	1.57	1.85
Petty Crime	-0.131	0.024	*	0.88	0.84	0.92
Violent Crime	-0.525	0.026	*	0.59	0.56	0.62
Ability: Dist. Governor	-0.068	0.036		0.93	0.87	1
Ability Dist. Govt	0.125	0.042	*	1.13	1.05	1.23
Ability: Local Govt	0.274	0.032	*	1.31	1.24	1.4
Ability: Provincial Govt	0.243	0.042	*	1.27	1.18	1.38

SIKA-E Security Model 3

Response: Q-3a. I would like to know about security on the roads you use in this area. Overall, would you say that security on the roads you use in this area is very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad? (“Very good” or “somewhat good”)

q3at ~ as.factor(d1) + q4ct + q4dt

	B	SE	Sig	95% CI for odds ratio		
				Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-2.262	0.021	*	0.1	0.1	0.11
Female	0.285	0.03	*	1.33	1.25	1.41
Travel to neighboring village	0.76	0.034	*	2.14	2	2.29
Travel to dis/prov capital	0.796	0.038	*	2.22	2.06	2.39

Stability in Key Areas - West (SIKA-W)

Introduction

Stability in Key Areas West (SIKA-W), implemented by Architecture, Engineering, Consulting, Operations and Maintenance International Development (AECOM), is a three-year stabilization project aimed to promote governance and service delivery in targeted districts in Badghis, Farah, Ghor, and Herat through small-scale stabilization activities. Since 2012, SIKA-W has programmed confidence building initiatives, service delivery activities, and grants aimed at addressing community identified sources of instability. Its strategy is to develop the capacity of district entities to better understand challenges to stability and implement effective activities to address them.

SIKA-W activities focus on capacity building and infrastructure development, in order to build confidence in local governance and increase the provision of basic services. The project seeks to establish legitimacy in local governance and encourage community-led development in order to reduce the impact of the insurgency, increase confidence in the Afghan government, and pave the way for a peaceful security transition. The Mid Term Performance Evaluation used multi-level qualitative methods, including observation, interviews, and desk review of project documents, to evaluate SIKA-W performance up to November 31, 2013. Conclusions from the Mid Term Performance Evaluation are used throughout this chapter to provide context for the quantitative analysis.

The following sections provide summary and detailed information about the attitudes and opinions of respondents living in districts targeted by the SIKA-W project. The report compares findings across all five waves of research to examine trends in stabilization and shifts in development indicators on the following topics: governance, service provision and development, community cohesion and resilience, quality of life, rule of law, security and crime, corruption, economic activity, grievances, and media.

SIKA-W targets a core group of districts in four provinces of western Afghanistan:

TABLE 5.8: SIKA-W DISTRICTS

TABLE 5.8: SIKA-W DISTRICTS

DISTRICT	SAMPLE SIZE	DISTRICT	SAMPLE SIZE
Bala Boluk	n= 560	Muqur	n= 545
Chaghcharan	n= 400	Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)	n= 558
Do Lainah	n= 239	Pashtun Zarghun	n= 557
Farah	n= 237	Pusht-e Rod	n= 399
Khak-e-Safayd	n= 240	Qadis	n= 553
Kohsan	n= 239	Qal'ah-ye Now	n= 238
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	n= 559	Shahrak	n= 320
Lash-e Juwayn	n= 230	Shindand	n= 559

It should be noted that interviews in Shindand and Pashtun Zarghun were conducted in part by a field team from Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC) and in part by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic Research

(ACSOR). The other districts were conducted entirely by ACSOR. Differences exist in the field implementation and quality control measures used for the AYC interviews which may impact some survey results. For detailed descriptions of these differences, refer to the full Methodology Report for MISTI Wave 5.

ACSOR regularly updates its accessibility tracker. This tracker indicates accessibility of districts for the field staff and the reasons for inaccessibility, whether it be insecurity or transportation. Additionally, the accessibility tracker indicates which districts are inaccessible to ACSOR's female staff. The following districts were inaccessible to women and only included men in the sample:

- Muqur (Ghanzi) Taliban presence in most parts of the district
- Bala Boluk: (Farah) Taliban presence in most parts of the district
- Khak-e-Safayd: (Farah) Taliban presence in most parts of the district
- Pusht-e Rod: (Farah) Taliban presence in most parts of the district
- Lash-e Juwayn: (Farah) the distance of this district is too far for women to travel
- Shahrak: (Ghor) the distance of this district is too far for women to travel
- Do Lainah: (Ghor) the distance of this district is too far for women to travel

Unless otherwise noted, district level analysis and wave to wave comparisons are provided with significance testing at the 99% confidence level.

Wave 5 : SIKA - W | MISTI Fact Sheet

OVERVIEW


Stability in Key Areas-West (SIKA-W) targets key districts in four provinces of western Afghanistan: Badghis, Herat, Farah, Ghor. Findings here summarize attitudes and perceptions of respondents living in districts targeted by SIKA-W project activities, focused on capacity building and infrastructure development in order to improve local governance and increase the provision of basic services.

GOVERNANCE

Improving local governance is the top priority of the SIKA-W stabilization project. SIKA-W assists district governments to communicate effectively with constituents, identify and understand sources of instability (SOIs), and address SOIs through capacity building and infrastructure development projects.

Perceptions of the Afghan government continue to improve since the baseline, with nearly seven in ten respondents saying the Afghan government is well regarded in their area. When it comes to local governance, SIKA-W respondents are more confident in their district governor and local village leaders, than in their district government and provincial governor.

Perceptions of the district governor's, local leaders', and district government's responsiveness have improved since the baseline, while the provincial governor's has not.




One of the main objectives of SIKA-W capacity building activities is help leaders respond to SOIs that are unique to each district. Since the baseline, respondents have become more likely to believe that their district governor, district government, and local village leaders are responsive to the needs of local people in their area. However, perceptions of their provincial governor's responsiveness have not changed.

Increasing majorities of respondents living in SIKA-W districts say they have heard of the DDA and CDC in their area.

SERVICE PROVISION & DEVELOPMENT

Despite the investment in infrastructure projects throughout Badghis, Herat, Farah, and Ghor, respondents surveyed in Wave 5 report less satisfaction with the provision of drinking water, irrigation water, agricultural assistance, retaining flood walls, roads/bridges, and medical care than those surveyed in the baseline. Wave 5 respondents are more satisfied with girls' schooling, boys' schooling, and electricity.



Awareness of local development projects has consistently declined since the baseline. Thirty-nine percent of respondents in Wave 5 say they have seen or heard about development projects in their local area, compared to 49% in Wave 1.

Wave 5 : SIKA - W | MISTI Fact Sheet


The SIKA-W Mid Term Performance Evaluation suggests that the most observable achievement of SIKA-W is the increased trust between the district government and communities. The district governor has been communicating more effectively with constituents to understand their problems and make use of existing resources to improve community resilience and strength. The Performance Evaluation asserts that most projects to address SOIs do not require project funding, which may explain why respondents in SIKA-W have not noticed development projects in their area over the past three years.

COMMUNITY COHESION & RESILIENCE

In line with SIKA-W's focus on governance, project activities aim to strengthen communities' cohesion and resilience as a path to stabilization. Since the baseline, respondents are less likely to believe that things from outside their village or neighborhood create problems to disrupt their normal life.

Survey results indicate that resilience is strongest in Farah where respondents are most likely to believe people are able to solve problems that originate from outside and inside their village/neighborhood.

Respondents in Farah are most likely to believe that problems originating outside/inside of their village/neighborhood can be solved.




QUALITY OF LIFE

Respondents remain generally satisfied with their quality of life, with two-thirds saying they are "somewhat satisfied" or "very satisfied" with life as a whole. The majority of SIKA-W respondents are also satisfied with their household's current financial situation. Not surprisingly, the districts with the highest levels of financial satisfaction have the highest levels of general satisfaction. Respondents tend to believe that their ability to meet basic needs has either increased or stayed the same in the past year. However, nearly eight of ten respondents are still worried about meeting their basic needs in the coming year.

RULE OF LAW

Respondents in SIKA-W districts continue to favor informal justice systems (such as local/tribal elders) over formal justice systems (such as government courts). Two-thirds of respondents (67%) say they would turn to local/tribal elders if they were involved in a dispute concerning land or water, while less than one-third (28%) say they would turn to the government court. However, as disputes get more serious, respondents become more inclined to turn to government courts.

Respondents are more likely to seek justice from government courts as disputes get more serious, such as cases of **assault, murder, or kidnapping**.



Governance


Improving local governance is the top priority of the SIKa-W stabilization project. The project aims to improve local governance through district and provincial level capacity building, resulting in higher levels of confidence and trust in government. SIKa-W activities have been presented as Afghan government-led activities, with the theory that infrastructure development projects will improve perceptions of the government and establish lasting legitimacy. SIKa-W assists district governments to identify and understand sources of instability (SOIs), communicate effectively with constituents, and provide better services.

Overall, perceptions of the Afghan government have improved since the baseline.¹²¹

Figure 5.58: Perceptions of Afghan Government in SIKa-W Districts

FIGURE 5.58: PERCEPTIONS OF AFGHAN GOVERNMENT IN SIKa-W DISTRICTS

Increasing majorities say the Afghan government is well regarded in their area.



Those living in Farah district have the most positive perceptions of the Afghan government, with more than 9 of 10 respondents (91%) saying that the government is well-regarded in their area. Respondents in Khak-e Safayd are least likely to say the same (57%, compared to 69% of total SIKa-W respondents).


Respondents in SIKa-W districts continue to report high levels of confidence in their district governor, district government, local village/neighborhood leaders, and provincial governor. There was a noticeable decline in confidence in Waves 2 and 4, while Waves 1, 3, and 5 remain steady. This up-and-down trend throughout governance and security indicators may be attributed to the timing of fieldwork, as seasonal differences may influence perceptions during the bi-annual data collection. Perceptions tend to be negatively affected during the warmer months (Waves 2 and 4) due to increased insurgency. Since the baseline, respondents consistently report more confidence in the district governor (72%) and local

¹²¹ Figure 5.58: (Q8) W1 n=3,652 | W2 n=4,764 | W3 n= 4,582 | W4 n=4,302 | W5 n=6,433

village/neighborhood leaders (70%) compared to the district government (65%) and the provincial governor (55%).¹²²

FIGURE 5.59: CONFIDENCE IN LOCAL LEADERS AND DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

Respondents remain most confident in their district governor, and least confident in their provincial governor.



Respondents living in Lash-e Juwayn are most likely to report confidence in the district governor (86%) and district government (83%); however, they are significantly less likely to report confidence in their local village leaders (60%) and provincial governor (34%) compared to SIKA-W respondents as a whole (70% and 55%, respectively). Respondents in Muqur have the highest levels of confidence in local governing entities across the board.


One of the main objectives of the SIKA-W capacity building activities is to collectively identify the sources of instability that are unique to each district. It is promising that SIKA-W respondents in Wave 5 are more likely to believe that the district governor, district government, and local village/neighborhood leaders are responsive to the needs of local people in their area. However, perceptions of the provincial governor’s responsiveness are relatively unchanged since the baseline.¹²³

¹²² Figure 5.59: (Q9) W1 n=3,652 | W2 n=4,764 | W3 n= 4,582 | W4 n=4,302 | W5 n=6,433. This figure includes net values of “very confident” and “somewhat confident.”

¹²³ Figure 5.60: (Q10) W1 n=3,652 | W5 n=6,433. This figure includes net values of “very responsive” and “somewhat responsive.”

FIGURE 5.60: PERCEPTIONS OF LOCAL LEADERS AND DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS

Perceptions of the district governor's, local leaders', and district government's responsiveness have improved since the baseline, while the provincial governor's has not.




More than nine out of ten respondents in Bala Boluk believe their district governor is responsive to their local needs (91%). As a whole, respondents in Muqur are most likely to believe local governance entities are responsive to their needs, while those living in Chaghcharan are the least likely.

Although SIKA-W respondents believe local entities are responsive, respondents are skeptical about their ability to get things done.¹²⁴

FIGURE 5.61: BELIEF IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT ABILITIES TO GET THINGS DONE

SIKA-W respondents are much less likely to believe that the local governing entities' abilities to get things done has improved in the past year.



Despite concern about whether local groups are improving their ability to get things done, the survey finds positive impacts of the Community Development Council (CDC) and District Development


¹²⁴ Figure 5.61: (Q11) W1 n=3,652 | W5 n=6,433. This figure includes net values of "improved a lot" and "improved a little."

Assembly (DDA). CDCs serve as the focus for village-level rural development in Afghanistan. All mitigation activities are funded through CDC-linked bank accounts. The DDAs, consisting of elective representatives of clustered CDCs, create District Development Plans that connect community priorities to the government’s agricultural and rural development strategy. The SIKA-W Mid Term Performance Evaluation found that monthly District Stability Committee (DSC) meetings were effective at attracting the community to the district center, increasing the authority and exposure of district entities to their constituents. The DSC meetings allowed for an effective bottom-up communication process for DDAs, giving them access to the district and provincial planning process. The DDA is known as the “primary conduit for stabilization initiatives as well as social and economic development planning at the district level.”¹²⁵

Increasing majorities of respondents living in SIKA-W districts say they have heard of the DDA and CDC in their area (69% and 70%, respectively).¹²⁶

FIGURE 5.62: AWARENESS OF DDA AND CDC IN SIKA-W DISTRICTS

Seven out every ten respondents say they have heard of the DDA and CDC in their district.



Confidence in respondents’ local DDAs and CDCs remain high. Consistent with the baseline, eight out of every ten respondents who have heard of the DDA have confidence in it (81%, n=4,430), while seven out of ten respondents (72%, n=4,430) believe it is responsive to the needs of local people. Confidence in the CDC has increased 15 percentage points since the last survey (75%, up from 60% in Wave 4), and perceptions of responsiveness increased 10% (77%, up from 67% in Wave 4). These results are encouraging, given SIKA-W’s emphasis on bridging the gap between community-led groups and local governance. The DDA and CDC are most active in Lash-e Juwayn, where nearly nine out of ten respondents have heard of the DDA (90%) and CDC (87%) in their area.

Positive perceptions of the district government’s actions are critical to building confidence and trust in local governance. The survey asks a series of questions to gauge respondents’ views of their district


¹²⁵ Mid Term Performance Evaluation, prepared by MSI in March 2014.

¹²⁶ Figure 5.62: (Q12) W1 n=3,652 | W5 n=6,433; (Q13) W1 n=3,652 | W5 n=6,433

government. Consistent with previous waves, nearly seven of ten respondents say district government officials are from their district. More than half believe officials understand the problems of people in their area, care about people in their area, visit their area, and deliver basic services in a fair manner. However, nearly half accuse their district officials of abusing their power for financial gains.¹²⁷ Another 49% say their district government officials are not doing their jobs honestly. Respondents living in Shindand (64%), Khak-e-Safayd (55%), and Shahrak (55%) are most skeptical about their district government, with majorities believing officials are not doing their jobs honestly.

FIGURE 5.63: ABUSE OF AUTHORITY OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

While majorities confirm positive characteristics of their district government officials,



Although 48% say officials abuse their authority, this percentage has declined from the baseline (55% in Wave 1). There should be continuous capacity building efforts to ensure that constituents believe their district government officials represent their interests and work for the well-being of the community. Positive perceptions of the district government will help maintain legitimacy and depress instability.

Predictive logistic regression suggests that if district officials are originally from the district that they serve and if they regularly visit the area, respondents have a higher probability of having high regard for the Afghan government. Improved abilities of the district governor, district government, local leaders, and provincial governor are also positive predictors of how the Afghan government is regarded.¹²⁸

Service Provision and Development

A multitude of SIKAW activities were implemented to increase the provision of basic services in response to sources of instability. The SIKAW Mid Term Performance Evaluation found that infrastructure activities regarding protection walls, water dividers, the refurbishment of community centers, and culverts were most valued.


¹²⁷ Figure 5.63: (Q14) W5 n=6,433

¹²⁸ Predictive logistic regression Model 1 included in Annex to this chapter.

Despite the investment in infrastructure projects throughout Badghis, Herat, Farah, and Ghor, respondents surveyed in Wave 5 report less satisfaction with the provision of drinking water, irrigation water, agricultural assistance, retaining flood walls, roads/bridges, and medical care than those surveyed in the baseline. Wave 5 respondents are more satisfied with girls' schooling, boys' schooling, and electricity. The following figure illustrates the net change in satisfaction from Wave 1 to Wave 5.¹²⁹

FIGURE 5.64: SATISFACTION WITH SERVICE PROVISIONS

Satisfaction has declined since the baseline for most district government services. Satisfaction has increased for schooling for girls, schooling for boys, and electricity.



Satisfaction of public services varies across district. The following table lists the districts with the highest level of satisfaction for each district government provision.¹³⁰

TABLE 5.9: SERVICES BY DISTRICT

SERVICE	DISTRICT	DISTRICT SATISFACTION	TOTAL SIKAW SATISFACTION
Clean Drinking Water	Lash-e Juwayn	89%	61%
Water for irrigation	Muqur	57%	29%
Agricultural assistance	Qadis	52%	26%
Retaining and flood walls	Muqur	43%	24%
Roads and bridges	Farah	55%	32%
Medical care	Farah	58%	31%
Schooling for girls	Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)	68%	44%
Schooling for boys	Qal'ah-ye Now	87%	54%
Electricity	Kohsan	87%	18%

¹²⁹ Figure 5.64: (Q16) W5 n=6,433. This figure includes net values of "very satisfied" and "somewhat satisfied."

¹³⁰ Table 1: (Q16) W5 n=6,433

Awareness of local development projects has consistently declined since the baseline. Thirty-nine percent of respondents in Wave 5 say they have seen or heard about development projects in their local area, compared to 49% in Wave 1.

The SIKa-W Mid Term Performance Evaluation suggests that the most observable achievement of SIKa-W is the increased trust between the district government and communities. The district governor has been communicating more effectively with constituents to understand their problems and make use of existing resources to improve community resilience and strength. The Performance Evaluation asserts that most projects to address SOIs do not require project funding, which may explain why respondents in SIKa-W have not noticed development projects in their area over the past three years.

Development projects in Lash-e Juwayn are most recognized by respondents (74%), while only 10% of those in Kohsan know of projects in their area. Across all SIKa-W districts, those who have seen or heard about development projects (n=2,485) are most aware of projects concerning drinking water (71%), schools (57%), and roads and bridges (54%). Majorities who are aware of specific development projects agree that all types of projects improve life for people in their area.

SIKa-W respondents most frequently mention the need for development projects concerning road construction (32%), electricity (30%), education and schools (21%), and water (21%) in the next year.¹³¹

Community Cohesion and Resilience

In line with SIKa-W's focus on governance, project activities aim to strengthen communities' cohesion and resilience as a path to stabilization. Since the baseline, respondents are less likely to believe that things from outside their village or neighborhood create problems to disrupt their normal life. Seventy-one percent say outside interferences "rarely" or "never" create problems in their district, compared to 64% in Wave 1. When asked what types of outside interferences cause problems in their village/neighborhood, respondents most frequently mention small crimes/theft (22%), ethnic disputes (20%), and the existence/presence of the Taliban (16%).¹³²

Nearly three-fourths of respondents surveyed in Wave 5 (74%) also believe things originating from inside their village/neighborhood "rarely" or "never" create problems to disrupt normal life. Of the one-fourth who believe internal interferences "sometimes" or "often" create problems (n=2,153), ethnic disputes (29%), small crimes/theft (18%), and disputes over water (15%) were commonly mentioned. Respondents living in Lash-e Juwayn (48%), Chaghcharan (46%), and Shahrak (46%) were most likely to mention ethnic disputes, while those in Farah were much more likely to mention disputes over water (51%).


¹³¹ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

¹³² This question was only asked of respondents who answered "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" when asked how often outside factors create problems in their area (n=2,334). Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Survey results indicate that resilience is strongest in Farah where respondents are most likely to believe people are able to solve problems that originate from outside (80%) and inside (82%) their village/neighborhood.

FIGURE 5.65: ABILITY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS THAT COME FROM OUTSIDE THE VILLAGE

Wave 5: (SIKA-W) Able to solve problems that come from outside the village (Q34c)




The SIKA-W Mid Term Performance Evaluation finds that monthly DSC meetings helped bridge the gap between the district center and the community, resulting in community-led momentum to implement stabilization projects. Respondents in Wave 5 are more likely to believe that local leaders consider the interests of ordinary people (61%, compared to 48% in the baseline). More than half also believe that the interests of women are “sometimes” and “often” considered when making decisions (54%, up from 50%).¹³³

¹³³ Figure 5.66: (Q37) W1 n=3,652 | W2 n=4,764 | W3 n= 4,582 | W4 n=4,302 | W5 n=6,433. This figure includes net values of “sometimes” and “often.”

FIGURE 5.66: INTERESTS CONSIDERED BY LOCAL LEADERS

Respondents believe local leaders are more likely to consider interests of **ordinary people** rather than the interests of **women** when making decisions.



Nearly seven of ten respondents believe their local leaders are effective at securing funds for their village/neighborhood (69%, up from 55% in Wave 1). Respondents living in Muqur (84%) are most likely to believe their local leaders are effective at securing funds, while respondents in Chaghcharan are most likely to believe they are ineffective (39%).


Consistent with previous waves, most respondents in SIKa-W districts do not belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss common interests or do certain activities together (79%). Of those who do belong to such groups (n=1,276), respondents mostly belong to development councils (32%), farmers unions (25%), people’s councils (19%), sports unions (13%), groups for community elders (10%), and women solidarity unions (10%).

Quality of Life

Respondents remain generally satisfied with their quality of life, with 66% saying they are “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied” with life as a whole. Those living in Qal’ah-ye Now (85%), Farah (84%), and Muqur (83%) report the highest levels of satisfaction with their life as a whole. Respondents in Pusht-e Rod are least satisfied with their life as a whole (48%), which is a substantial decline from 82% in Wave 4.

FIGURE 5.67: SATISFACTION WITH QUALITY OF LIFE IN SIKA-W DISTRICTS

Wave 5: (SIKA-W) Satisfied with the Quality of Life (Q-26)



The majority of SIKA-W respondents are satisfied with their household’s current financial situation (62%, up from 45% in Wave 4). Not surprisingly, the districts with the highest levels of general satisfaction also have the highest levels of financial satisfaction (Muqur 81%, Qal’ah-ye Now 78%, and Farah 74%).

Respondents tend to believe that their ability to meet basic needs has either increased (31%) or not changed in the past year (41%). However, nearly eight of ten respondents (79%) are either “very worried” or “a little worried” about meeting their basic needs in the coming year.

Respondents are divided when asked about whether they are able to plan for their future. Forty-nine percent say the situation in their area is certain enough to make future plans, while another 49% say the situation in their area is too uncertain. Those living in Farah (80%) are most confident about their ability to plan ahead.


Rule of Law

Respondents in SIKA-W districts continue to favor informal justice systems (such as local/tribal elders) over formal justice systems (such as government courts). Two-thirds of respondents (67%) say they would turn to local/tribal elders if they were involved in a dispute concerning land or water, while less than one-third (28%) say they would turn to the government court.¹³⁴

¹³⁴ Figure 5.68: (Q20a) W1 n=3,652 | W2 n=4,764 | W3 n= 4,582 | W4 n=4,302 | W5 n=6,433

FIGURE 5.68: CHOICES FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION


When involved in land or water disputes, respondents are increasingly more likely to turn to local elders than the government court.



However, as disputes get more serious, respondents become more inclined to turn to government courts.¹³⁵

FIGURE 5.69: CHOICES FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR SERIOUS INCIDENTS

Respondents are more likely to seek justice from government courts as disputes get more serious, such as cases of assault, murder, or kidnapping.



Respondents living in Muqur are most likely to seek justice from government courts for all types of disputes. In general, respondents in SIKa-W districts are unlikely to turn to armed opposition groups for justice. However, more than one-fourth of those in Shahrak (35%), Pusht-e Rod (28%), and Chaghcharan (26%) would turn to armed opposition groups for disputes concerning assault, murder or kidnapping, and more than one-third of those in Khak-e Safayd (40%) and Bala Boluk (37%) would turn to armed opposition groups in cases of theft.


¹³⁵ Figure 5.69: (Q20a-c) | W5 n=6,433

Afghans living in SIKa-W districts always or mostly respect the decisions made by local elders and government courts, while the majority say they never (64%) respect the decisions made by armed opposition groups.¹³⁶

FIGURE 5.70: RESPECT FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION DECISIONS MADE BY LOCAL LEADERS, GOVERNMENT COURTS AND AOGS

Respondents **always** or **mostly** respect the decisions made by local elders, while they only **sometimes** or **never** respect decisions made by armed opposition groups.

Never **Sometimes** **Mostly** **Always**




Security and Crime

More than half of respondents living in SIKa-W districts say their local security is good (52%, up from 39% in Wave 1), and 43% believe it is more secure than last year. Local security varies across districts. While seven of ten respondents in Kohsan say security is good in their area, only 37% of those living in Pusht-e Rod say the same.

¹³⁶ Figure 5.70: (Q22a-c) | W5 n=6,433

FIGURE 5.71: PERCEPTION OF LOCAL SECURITY IN SIKAW DISTRICTS

Wave 5: (SIKA-W) Local Security (Q-2a)




Predictive modeling suggests that gender and ethnicity are significant predictors of good security. Female respondents and Pashtun respondents are less likely to perceive the security in their local area as “very good.”¹³⁷

Although the majority of SIKAW respondents rate security on their local roads as good (63%), respondents continue to feel insecure while traveling outside their village.¹³⁸

FIGURE 5.72: PERCEPTION OF SECURITY AT HOME AND WHILE TRAVELING

Most respondents feel secure in their home, yet insecure while traveling to a neighboring village and the district capital.



¹³⁷ Predictive logistic regression Model 2 included in Annex to this chapter.

¹³⁸ Figure 5.72: (Q4) W5 n=6,433. This figure includes net values of “very secure/insecure” and “somewhat secure/insecure.”


Respondents living in Farah, Kohsan, Qadis, and Qal’ah-ye Now are the most likely to say security on their local roads is good and has improved in the past year. Respondents living in these districts are also more likely than respondents as a whole to say they feel secure while traveling to a neighboring village or to the district or provincial capital.

Perceptions of crime in SIKA-W districts have improved since the baseline. Although the majority report at least some instances of petty crimes and serious non-violent/violent crimes, increasing percentages of respondents report there are none of these in their area.¹³⁹ Six of ten respondents say there is less petty crime and offenses in their area compared to last year, while less than half say there are less serious, non-violent crimes (46%) and serious, violent crimes (41%).

There has been a sharp decline of security groups in SIKA-W districts since the baseline.¹⁴⁰ When respondents were asked to rate the presence of security groups in their area, they were much more likely to say there are “none” of the following groups: Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Local Police (ALP), Arbaki, and ISAF.

FIGURE 5.73: PERCEPTION OF CRIME IN SIKA-W DISTRICTS

Respondents are more likely to rate the level of **petty crime**, **serious non-violent crime**, and **serious violent crime** as "none at all."



The presence of armed opposition groups remains relatively stable. Half of respondents say there are “none” in their area, while 35% say there are “some” and 14% perceive “a lot” of armed opposition groups. Perceptions of armed opposition groups are strongest in Bala Boluk (31%) and Khak-e Safayd (34%) where about one-third of respondents say there are “a lot” in their area.

Respondents living in Farah district perceive the strongest presence of Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police in their area—66% say there are a lot of ANA in their area and 77% say there are a lot of ANP. Those in Farah also have the highest levels of confidence in the ANA (90%) and ANP (83%)


¹³⁹ Figure 5.73: (Q5) W1 n=3,652 | W5 n=6,433.

¹⁴⁰ Figure 5.74: (Q6) W1 n=3,652 | W5 n=6,433.

to keep their area safe (compared to 47% and 48% of respondents overall), and are most likely to say the abilities of the ANA and ANP have improved in the past year.

FIGURE 5.74: PERCEPTION OF SECURITY GROUPS IN SIKA-W DISTRICTS

Respondents are much less likely to report there are "a lot" of the following security groups in their area.



Although maintaining security is not a direct objective of SIKA-W project activities, predictive logistic regression suggests that security indicators are significant predictors of governance. The presence of ANP and perceptions of local security are positive predictors of how the Afghan government is regarded in their area.¹⁴¹

Corruption

More than three-fourths of respondents (77%, down from 82% in Wave 4) admit corruption is a problem in their area. Respondents in Farah (92%) and Muqur (93%) are most likely to believe corruption is a problem. Nearly half (48%) say corruption has increased in their area, while 36% say it has stayed the same and 13% say it has decreased.

Respondents were asked to name the department or sector of the local government that people most complain about corruption; in an open-ended format, the top mentions include: courts (15%), District/Office of Attorney (13%), municipality (7%), district office (5%), and Ministry of Education (5%).

Economic Activity

Four in ten respondents say their ability to get to local markets has gotten better in the past year, 37% say it has stayed the same, and 22% say it has gotten worse. Predictive logistic regression suggests that the ability to get to local markets is a positive predictor of how the Afghan government is regarded.¹⁴² Although respondents believe their accessibility to markets is better or the same, the majority (57%) believe prices for basic goods have increased in the past year.

¹⁴¹ Predictive logistic regression Model 1 included in Annex to this chapter.

¹⁴² Predictive logistic regression Model 1 included in Annex to this chapter.

Although SIKAW infrastructure projects intend to create jobs in targeted districts, 36% of respondents believe there are fewer jobs in their area compared to last year. Thirty-five percent say the availability of paid jobs has stayed the same, and 29% say there are more jobs. Respondents living in Do Lainah (44%), Shahrak (42%), and Chaghcharan (41%) are most likely to say there are more jobs in their area compared to last year.

Grievances

Grievances vary when respondents are asked to identify the biggest problems that create stress or tension in their areas. The most common responses include: unemployment (36%), insecurity (30%), the lack of electricity (15%), weak economy/poor standards of living (11%), and the lack of paved roads (10%).¹⁴³

“Unemployment” was more frequently mentioned in Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah) (58%) and Kohsan (57%), it was mentioned the least in Muqur (17%).

Media

Respondents usually use friends and family (92%), elders (85%), radio (82%), and the Mosque/Mullah (82%) to communicate with others and/or get news and information. They are less likely to use television (50%) and cell phones (30%). Very few respondents mention using posters/billboards (3%) and newspapers (2%). Nearly all of those surveyed say they do not use the Internet or e-mail to communicate with others and/or get news and information.

Respondents get most of their information about government services from the radio (61%), television (35%), and through word of mouth (friends/family [33%], elders [26%], the Mosque/Mullah [22%]). Since the baseline, respondents have become significantly more likely to depend on television for news about government services (35%, up from 20% in Wave 1).¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

¹⁴⁴ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Annex

SIKA-W Governance Model 1

Response: Q-8. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion. (The Afghan government is well regarded in this area.)

q8 ~ q2at + q2bt + q5_1at + q5_1ct + q6_1ct + q6_1bt + q14at + q14et + q23t + q31t + q32t + d4at + q11at + q11bt + q11ct + q11dt + identify_Nationality

	B	SE	Sig	95% CI for odds ratio		
				Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-0.567	0.04	*	0.57	0.52	0.61
Security	0.605	0.047	*	1.83	1.67	2.01
More Secure than last year	0.349	0.052	*	1.42	1.28	1.57
Less Petty Crime	-0.223	0.035	*	0.8	0.75	0.86
Less Violent Crime	-0.454	0.039	*	0.63	0.59	0.69
Presence - ANP	0.086	0.031	*	1.09	1.03	1.16
Presence - Arbaki	-0.11	0.038	*	0.9	0.83	0.97
District officials from district	0.869	0.031	*	2.38	2.24	2.53
District officials visit area	0.704	0.029	*	2.02	1.91	2.14
Corruption a problem	0.079	0.034	*	1.08	1.01	1.16
Ability to get to local markets	0.242	0.054	*	1.27	1.15	1.42
Local prices since last year	0.148	0.035	*	1.16	1.08	1.24
Literate	0.088	0.034	*	1.09	1.02	1.17
Ability: Dist. Governor	0.198	0.046	*	1.22	1.11	1.33
Ability Dist. Govt	0.204	0.06	*	1.23	1.09	1.38
Ability: Local Govt	0.23	0.044	*	1.26	1.16	1.37
Ability: Provincial Govt	0.109	0.052	*	1.12	1.01	1.24
Identity: Nationality	-0.157	0.033	*	0.85	0.8	0.91

SIKA-W Security Model 2

Response: Q-2a. Would you say security in your local area is good, fair or poor? Is that 'very good/poor'? (Very Good)

q2at ~ as.factor(d1) + pashtun + q6_1ct


	B	SE	Sig	95% CI for odds ratio		
				Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-1.592	0.032	*	0.2	0.19	0.22
Female	-0.266	0.042	*	0.77	0.71	0.83
Pashtun	-0.481	0.038	*	0.62	0.57	0.67
ANP: Present	0.351	0.037	*	1.42	1.32	1.53

Community Cohesion Initiative (Creative)

Introduction

The Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) is a project of USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives. Its goal is to increase the resilience of residents and communities in areas of Afghanistan that are susceptible to insurgency and other sources of instability. CCI utilizes USAID’s definition of resilience to develop and inform its project activities: “the ability of people, households, communities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth.”¹⁴⁵

FIGURE 5.75: USAID CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR RESILIENCE



USAID’s conceptual framework for resilience states that in order to increase resilience, a community must increase its adaptive capacity and its ability to reduce risk. The primary components of adaptive capacity and risk reduction are displayed in the graphic to the left.¹⁴⁶

With the goal of increasing resilience in mind, the CCI project has two primary objectives: 1) strengthening ties between local actors, customary governance structures, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), and 2) increasing cohesion among and between communities by bringing communities together through projects to address common needs.¹⁴⁷

The CCI project is implemented throughout Afghanistan by two separate organizations that target different districts. Creative Associates International is the implementing partner for CCI in southern and eastern provinces in Afghanistan: Ghazni, Khost, Kunar, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, and Uruzgan. For

¹⁴⁵ United States Agency for International Development, *Policy and Program Guidance: Building Resilience to Recurrent Crisis*, Washington, DC, 2012, <http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/USAIDResiliencePolicyGuidanceDocument.pdf> (accessed February 13, 2015).

¹⁴⁶ Figure 5.75: USAID Conceptual Framework for Resilience

¹⁴⁷ United States Agency for International Development, *Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) Mid-Term Performance Evaluation Report: March 2012-December 2013*, Washington, DC, 2014, pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00JW3H.pdf (accessed February 13, 2015).

disambiguation purposes, this project is referred to as “CCI-C” throughout the report. CCI-C targets the following districts in Afghanistan:

- Qarah Bagh
- Gelan
- Muqer
- Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
- Bak
- Shamul (Dzadran)
- Khas Kunar
- Sar Kani
- Marawarah
- Nahr-e Saraj
- Kajaki
- Lashkar Gah
- Sangin
- Musa Qal'ah
- Spin Boldak
- Panjwa'i
- Zharay
- Maiwand
- Qalat
- Khas Uruzgan
- Shahid-e Hasas

This chapter provides summary and detailed information about the attitudes and opinions of respondents living in districts targeted by CCI-C project activities. The report compares findings across five waves of research to examine trends in stabilization and shifts in development indicators on the following topics: governance, service provision and development, community cohesion and resilience, quality of life, rule of law, security, corruption, economic activity, grievances, and media.

Throughout this chapter, special emphasis will be given to survey results that address components of the conceptual framework for resilience and the two stated objectives of the CCI project. Additional context will also be provided by the CCI Mid-Term Performance Evaluation, which evaluates CCI-C project activities from March 2012-December 2013. Multi-level qualitative methods, including observation, interviews, and desk review of project documents, are used in the performance evaluation.

Interviews in Kajaki, Musa Qal'ah, Sangin, and Maiwand were conducted by a field team from Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC) in Wave 5. The other districts were conducted entirely by ACSOR. Differences exist in the field implementation and quality control measures used for the AYC interviews, which may impact some survey results. For detailed descriptions of these differences, refer to the full Methodology Report for MISTI Wave 5.

ACSOR regularly updates its accessibility tracker. This tracker indicates accessibility of districts for the field staff and the reasons for inaccessibility, whether it be insecurity or transportation. Additionally, the accessibility tracker indicates which districts are inaccessible to ACSOR's female staff. The following districts were inaccessible to women and only included men in the sample:

- Gelan
- Muqer
- Sar Kani
- Marawarah
- Kajaki
- Sangin
- Musa Qal'ah
- Maiwand
- Khas Uruzgan
- Shahid-e Hasas

Unless otherwise noted, district-level analysis and wave-to-wave comparisons are provided with significance testing at the 99% confidence level.

OVERVIEW

The goal of the Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) is to increase the resilience of Afghan communities by strengthening ties between local actors and customary government structures and by increasing cohesion between communities. The CCI program is implemented in southeastern Afghanistan by Creative Associates International and serves key districts in Ghazni, Khost, Kunar, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, and Uruzgan.


GOVERNANCE

Given CCI-C's objective of strengthening ties between local actors and customary governance structures, respondents' opinions of government officials are a key indicator of this project's impact.

Nearly three-quarters of respondents believe the Afghan government is well regarded in general. Respondents have the most confidence in their local leaders (over 8 in 10 in Wave 5); though a majority have confidence in the district governor, district government and provincial governor, percentages are lower. Since the baseline, confidence has increased for the provincial governor and local leaders and decreased for the district governor.

Predictive modeling demonstrates that measures of confidence, responsiveness, and ability to get things done are highly related. This strong positive relationship shows that if institutions are able to improve their responsiveness and provision of services, it will have a strongly positive impact on measures of confidence.

While majorities confirm positive characteristics of their district government officials, half believe they **abuse their authority to make money**.




Though a majority of respondents believe positive things about their district government, including that district officials visit their area and understand local problems, half of respondents believe district officials use their positions to make money.

SERVICE PROVISION AND DEVELOPMENT

A plurality of respondents believe services from the government have improved in the past year, though this percentage has decreased since previous waves. Respondents also express decreasing levels of satisfaction over time with several district government services. Of nine services that were asked about, satisfaction has only modestly increased since the baseline for the provision of irrigation water, drinking water, and retaining/flood walls. Satisfaction with girls' schooling has decreased the most since the baseline, along with agricultural assistance and medical care.

Satisfaction with girls' schooling has decreased the most of all district government services since the baseline survey.




COMMUNITY COHESION AND RESILIENCE

One of the CCI project's primary objectives is to increase cohesion among and between communities in order to increase their ability to respond to shocks and stresses that can lead to crisis. Since the baseline, CCI-C respondents are less likely to believe that things from outside their village or neighborhood create problems to disrupt their normal life. More than 6 in 10 say outside interferences "rarely" or "never" create problems in their village.

When asked what types of outside interferences cause problems in their village, respondents most frequently mention road-side bombs or suicide attacks. The incidence of this has increased since the baseline, reflecting the continued activity of anti-government elements in many of the CCI-C districts.

A majority of Wave 5 respondents also believe things originating from inside their village “rarely” or “never” create problems. Results indicate that resilience is strongest in Nahr-e Saraj and Sangin, where respondents are most likely to believe people are able to solve problems that originate from outside and inside their village. Nahr-e Saraj residents are also among the most likely to say that villages in their area work together to solve problems, along with Lashkar Gah residents. Sangin residents, however, agree with this statement in much smaller numbers.

Village Cooperation to Solve Problems.



QUALITY OF LIFE

Though 6 in 10 respondents in Wave 5 report they are satisfied with life as a whole, this represents a substantial decrease since the baseline when nearly three-quarters of respondents agreed. However, a majority of CCI-C respondents are satisfied with their household’s current financial situation and, unlike general satisfaction, this measure has increased since the baseline. Additionally, the percentage of respondents who are not worried


about meeting their basic needs in the coming year has increased, along with the percentage of respondents who agree that the situation in their area is certain enough to make future plans.



SECURITY AND CRIME

Evaluations of security are important to the CCI project because insecurity contributes to the shocks and stresses that lead to a lack of resilience in Afghan communities. Nearly half of respondents in CCI-C districts believe security in their area is good, a proportion that has decreased since the baseline. Most respondents in CCI-C districts report feeling secure at home during the day, although there was a significant increase in those feeling insecure between the baseline and Wave 5. Majorities report feeling secure at home during the night and while traveling to a neighboring village; nearly half of respondents feel secure when traveling to the district or provincial capital.

The perception that there are “a lot” of Afghan National Army troops and Afghan National Police in local areas has increased since the baseline. Reported presence of the Afghan Local Police, Arbaki, and armed opposition groups have remained static, while there is a decreased presence of ISAF troops.



Respondents are more likely to perceive “a lot” of Afghan National Police.


Governance

Given CCI's project objective of strengthening ties between local actors, customary governance structures, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), respondents' opinions of government officials is a key indicator of the impact of CCI-C's project activities. CCI-C has two main methods of achieving this objective: 1) "bringing GIROA officials into processes that connected them with communities in grant development and implementation" and 2) providing "grants that focused on increasing government capacity, communications, and credibility."¹⁴⁸ By these means, CCI-C project activities should have the effect of increasing GIROA presence and visibility within communities and increasing its capacity to address and resolve problems for communities.

Overall, perceptions of the Afghan Government have improved, with the percentage of those reporting that the government is well regarded increasing by 5% since the baseline.¹⁴⁹

FIGURE 5.76: PERCEPTIONS OF AFGHAN GOVERNMENT IN CCI-C DISTRICTS

Increasing majorities say the Afghan government is well regarded in their area.



Those living in Marawarah district in Kunar have the most positive perceptions of the Afghan Government in Wave 5, with 9 of 10 respondents saying that the government is well-regarded in their area. Respondents in Musa Qal'ah (38%) and Sangin (48%) are least likely to say the same, which evidences the impact of ongoing fighting between the Afghan National Army and the Taliban in the northern districts of Helmand province during the summer of 2014.

Though respondents are positive when asked about their regard for the government in general, those ratings decrease when respondents are asked about specific institutions and actors. Respondents' confidence in their district governor has decreased 6% since the baseline to 66%, while confidence in the district government has remained stagnant at 63%. Confidence in the provincial governor is lowest at


¹⁴⁸ United States Agency for International Development, *Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) Mid-Term Performance Evaluation Report: March 2012-December 2013*, Washington, DC, 2014, pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00JW3H.pdf (accessed February 13, 2015).

¹⁴⁹ Figure 5.76: (Q8) W1 n=12,381 | W2 n=13,424 | W3 n= 8,944 | W4 n=8,225 | W5 n=9,354; unless otherwise specified, all graph scales show 0% to 100%.

57%, though this represents a 5% increase since the baseline. Respondents have the most confidence in local leaders by far, with confidence levels increasing by 9% since the baseline survey.¹⁵⁰

FIGURE 5.77: CONFIDENCE IN LOCAL LEADERS AND DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

Respondents remain most confident in their local leaders, and least confident in their provincial governor.



Respondents living in Sar Kani district in Kunar are most likely to report confidence in the district governor (90%) and district government (84%); respondents from Marawah, another Kunar district, are the most likely to report confidence in the provincial governor (91%). Respondents in Sangin and Musa Qal’ah in Helmand are the least likely to express confidence in the district governor, district government, and the provincial governor. Of the three government institutions and actors, the district governor gets the lowest expression of confidence (31% in both districts), while the district government gets the highest (34% in Sangin and 36% in Musa Qal’ah). Confidence in local leaders is quite high in those districts however (91% and 82% respectively), though confidence is highest in another Helmand district, Nahr-e Saraj, where 97% say they have confidence in local leaders. Confidence is lowest in Khas Uruzgan, though at 68% a large majority still express confidence in local leaders.


Respondents’ beliefs about government leaders’ responsiveness mirror their levels of confidence in those same leaders. Perceptions that the district governor and district government were responsive stayed nearly the same between the baseline and Wave 5, while there has been a small increase in the percentage of respondents who believe the provincial governor is responsive (58%, up from 56% in Wave 1). The largest percentage of respondents believed that local leaders were responsive at the baseline (74%), and that percentage has increased the most, to 80% at Wave 5.¹⁵¹

¹⁵⁰ Figure 5.77: (Q9) W1 n=12,381 | W2 n=13,424 | W3 n= 8,944 | W4 n=8,225 | W5 n=9,354. This figure includes net values of “very confident” and “somewhat confident.”

¹⁵¹ Figure 5.78: (Q10) W1 n=12,381 | W5 n=9,354. This figure includes net values of “very responsive” and “somewhat responsive.”

FIGURE 5.78: PERCEPTIONS OF RESPONSIVENESS FOR LOCAL LEADERS AND DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

Perceptions of local leaders' and provincial governor's




Very similar trends are seen for responsiveness on the district level as were shown for confidence. Sangin and Musa Qal’ah respondents are least likely to say the district governor, district government and provincial governor are responsive—ranging from 31% for district governor in Sangin to 37% for the district government in Musa Qal’ah. Khaz Uruzgan residents were again least likely to perceive local leaders as responsive, with 56% rating them as such. There was more variation at the positive end of the spectrum—Sar Kani residents (88%) are most likely to think the district governor is responsive, while Spin Boldak residents (82%) are most likely to believe the district government is responsive. Nahr-e Saraj residents (98%) again are most likely to think local leaders are responsive, while Marawarah residents (90%) are most likely to think the provincial governor is responsive.

Though responses are still most positive for local leaders and least positive for their provincial governor, the trend over time was less clear when respondents were asked if government institutions and actors’ ability to get things done had improved in the past year.¹⁵²

FIGURE 5.79: ABILITY OF LOCAL LEADERS AND DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT TO GET THINGS DONE

Respondents are most likely to believe that local leaders' ability to get things done has improved in the past year.



¹⁵² Figure 5.79: (Q11) W1 n=12,381 | W2 n=13,424 | W3 n= 8,944 | W4 n=8,225 | W5 n=9,354. This figure includes net values of “improved a lot” and “improved a little.”

The largest proportion of respondents (62%) believe the ability of local leaders to get things done has improved in the past year. This represents a 5% decrease from Wave 4, when 67% of respondents said their ability had increased. Similarly, 44% of respondents in both Wave 1 and Wave 5 believe the provincial governor's ability has increased, but this does not capture the high of 52% who responded similarly in Wave 3. The trend for the district governor and district government is clearer; the percentage of respondents stating their ability to get things done has decreased since the baseline—by 8% for the district governor and 4% for the district government. Though in general more people are positive about the district governor than the provincial governor, the trend over five waves indicates that the real problem may be with district government—there have been small positive increases for provincial governor abilities, while for the district government and the district governor, the trajectory of opinion has been almost uniformly downwards.

Predictive modeling demonstrates that measures of confidence, responsiveness, and ability to get things done are highly related. This strong positive relationship shows that if government institutions and actor are able to improve their perceived responsiveness and provision of services, it will have a strongly positive impact on measures of confidence in that entity.¹⁵³

Project shuras are the main mechanism by which communities can become involved in the implementation of CCI-C project activities. However, Community Development Councils (CDC) and District Development Assemblies (DDA) are two other important venues for the implementation of vilclage-level rural development in Afghanistan. The DDAs, consisting of elective representatives of clustered CDCs, create District Development Plans that connect community priorities to the government's development strategy. The percentage of individuals who are aware of these organizations has increased modestly to 66% of respondents for both DDAs and CDCs in Wave 5, up from 63% for DDAs and 64% for CDCs in the baseline. The DDA is most active in Sar Kani and Marawah, where over 9 in 10 respondents (92%) are familiar with the organization; Sar Kani residents are also the most familiar with the CDC—94% of respondents in that district are aware of it.

Of those who are familiar with the DDAs, 67% now have confidence in the organization, down from 71% in Wave 1. Measures of responsiveness are also mixed, with 63% now stating they believe the DDA is responsive, down from 64% in Wave 1 and a high of 71% in Wave 2. Those who state the DDA's ability to get things done has improved in the past year has gone up to 53% from 50% in Wave 1.

The percentage of respondents expressing confidence in the CDCs has dropped 8% since Wave 1 to 64% expressing confidence. The majority of this change is attributable to the increased percentage of respondents expressing "no confidence at all" in the CDCs—7% responded as such in Wave 1, versus 17% in Wave 5. Measures of the CDC's responsiveness have also dropped, from 63% in Wave 1 to 54% in Wave 5, with a 10% increase in those stating the CDC is "very unresponsive" between Waves 1 and 5. Despite these negative findings, the percentage of respondents citing the CDC's improved ability to get things done has increased since Wave 1 from 50% to 55% in Wave 5.

¹⁵³ Predictive logistic regression Model 1 included in Annex to this chapter.


Public perceptions of the district government’s actions are critical to building confidence and trust in local governance. The survey asks a series of questions to gauge respondents’ views of their district government. These measures are even more important given the decreasing levels of confidence in the district government discussed earlier because they may provide clues as to how the district government can improve its image with the local population.

One area where the district government has improved its performance is the frequency with which officials visit local areas—61% of respondents now say district government officials visit their area, up from 55% in the baseline. There is also a modest increase in the percentage of respondents who say the district government understands the problems of people in their area; 56% of respondents in Wave 5 agreed, versus 53% in Wave 1. However, a decreased percentage of respondents now believe the district government cares about people in this area; 52% agree, down by 6% since Wave 1.

Though these findings are important, their significance is dwarfed by the fact that half of respondents now believe district government officials abuse their authority to profit themselves. Furthermore, this perception has gone up by 4% since the baseline.¹⁵⁴

FIGURE 5.80: ABUSE OF AUTHORITY BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

While majorities confirm positive characteristics of their district government officials, half believe they abuse their authority to make money.



Correspondingly, only 46% of respondents currently believe that district government officials are doing their job honestly, a figure that has also dropped by 4% since Wave 1. Respondents living in Maiwand district in Kandahar are most skeptical about their district government, with a vast majority of 97% believing they are not doing their job honestly. Residents of Zharay, also in Kandahar, are next with 76% believing they are not doing their job honestly. Residents of Maiwand in Kandahar and Kajaki in Helmand are the most likely to say that district officials abuse their authority to make money, with 68% in each district agreeing with this statement.

¹⁵⁴ Figure 5.80: (Q14) W5 n=9,354

There should be continuous capacity building efforts to ensure that constituents believe their district government officials are honest and work for the well-being of the community rather than their own self-interest. It is unlikely that serious positive change in the perception of district officials will occur until these issues of corruption and a lack of honesty are viewed as having been resolved.


Service Provision and Development

Many of CCI-C’s project activities deal with training and relationship building, but a large proportion also seek to deliver goods and services to local populations. Infrastructure improvements, such as building flood retaining walls, refurbishing schools, developing irrigation systems, and repairing roads and bridges have all been funded as part of the CCI-C project. A plurality of respondents (42%) believe services from the government have improved in the past year (down from 44% in Waves 1 and 2 and 46% in Waves 3 and 4). The belief that service provision has improved is strongest in Marawarah (68%), while the belief that service provision has worsened is strongest in Maiwand (75%).

In keeping with the falling percentages of respondents who believe services in general have improved, respondents expressed decreasing levels of satisfaction over time with several specific district government services. Since the baseline survey, satisfaction has only increased for the provision of irrigation water, drinking water, and retaining/flood walls, and these increase were very modest. Satisfaction with agricultural assistance and medical care is down 8% since the baseline, and satisfaction with girls’ schooling is down 9%. The following graph illustrates the net change in satisfaction from Wave 1 to Wave 5.¹⁵⁵

FIGURE 5.81: SATISFACTION WITH SERVICE PROVISION

Satisfaction with girls’ schooling has decreased the most of all district government services since the baseline survey.



Though satisfaction with girls’ schooling is low, one positive finding in Wave 5 is that the percentage of respondents that report this service is not provided has decreased. After consistently finding that 7-8% of respondents report girls’ schooling is not provided in Waves 1-3, this rate jumped to 18% in Wave 4.

¹⁵⁵ Figure 5.81: (Q16) W1 n=12,381 | W5 n=9,354. This figure includes net values of “very satisfied” and “somewhat satisfied”.

In Wave 5, the percentage reporting the service is not provided is back down to 9%. This indicates that schools which closed during the 2014 summer fighting season may have now reopened. Seventy-seven percent of respondents from Kajaki in northern Helmand province still report that schooling for girls is not provided, though this is down from 84% in Wave 4. Reports of girls' schooling not being provided in Sangin and Musa Qal'ah, also in northern Helmand, have decreased significantly since Wave 4. Only one percent of respondents in Sangin now report girls' schooling not being provided, down from 68% in Wave 4, and in Musa Qal'ah the rate is now at 9%, down from 50% in Wave 4. Dissatisfaction with girls' schooling in these districts is still very high, however (88% and 74% respectively).

There is also a high percentage of respondents who report that electricity is not provided in their district—28% report this in Wave 5, which is largely unchanged since the baseline survey. The district reporting the highest percentage of 'service not provided' is Khas Kunar, where 66% say electricity is not provided, and those who do have electricity are almost uniformly dissatisfied. Shahid-e-Hasas residents report fairly high access (only 7% reporting electricity is not provided) but the highest percentage of district-level dissatisfaction (86% dissatisfied).

The level of awareness of local development projects within communities has been inconsistent across waves. Just over half of respondents (53%) in both Wave 1 and Wave 5 report awareness of development projects in their area, but that figure bottomed out at 41% in Wave 2 and topped out at 59% in Wave 4. At the district level, awareness is highest in Sar Kani (84%) and lowest in Maiwand (23%).

Across all CCI-C districts, those who have seen or heard about development projects (n=4,929) are most aware of projects concerning drinking water (84%) and irrigation/water maintenance systems (55%). Awareness of all types of projects has stayed the same or gone down since Wave 1, other than retaining and flood wall projects, for which awareness has increased by three percent to 44%. Majorities who are aware of specific development projects agree that all types of projects improve life for people in their area. The largest percentage of respondents (90%) report that drinking water projects improve life for people in the area.

CCI-C respondents most frequently mention the need for development projects concerning road construction (36%), electricity (27%), and education and schools (26%) in the next year.¹⁵⁶ These results are consistent with findings from previous waves of research. Road construction is most frequently expressed as a need in Shahid-e Hasas (52%), Musa Qal'ah (52%), and Kajaki (51%). Electricity is most often expressed as a need in Sar Kani (54%) and schooling is most often expressed as a need in Kajaki (48%). This corresponds with the finding discussed earlier that 77% of Kajaki residents state that schooling for girls is not provided.

Respondents were also asked about the obstacles preventing them from obtaining health care or medicine. The most frequent responses include lack of medicines (36%), lack of professional doctors (31%), and lack of clinics/hospitals (26%).¹⁵⁷ These three items have consistently been the most

¹⁵⁶ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

¹⁵⁷ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

commonly cited obstacles to receiving health care; however, the lack of clinics is being cited by fewer respondents now than it was in Wave 2 (down 9% from 35%), while lack of medicines is being cited by more respondents (up 9% from 27%). Lack of professional doctors is being cited slightly less often (down 3% from 34%).

Community Cohesion and Resilience

One of the CCI project's primary objectives is to increase cohesion among and between communities in order to increase their ability to collectively respond to shocks and stresses that can lead to crisis. Participants in the CCI Mid-Term Performance Evaluation reported that this objective was conceptually and practically more difficult to implement than the first objective, which is targeted at increasing ties between local actors and the district and provincial government. Means of achieving the second objective varied by implementer but centered on "having different tribes come together, having people with different political views work together, and linking communities within the district together." Because of this, the Wave 5 survey data on cohesion and resilience is critical for understanding the current status of connectivity between villages in CCI-C districts and highlighting areas that would benefit from further programming.

Since the baseline survey, CCI-C respondents are less likely to believe that things from outside their village or neighborhood create problems to disrupt their normal life. Sixty-three percent say outside interferences "rarely" or "never" create problems in their village, compared to 57% in Wave 1. Additionally, a majority of respondents say these problems can be solved by people within the village. Sixty percent now agree that this happens, up from 56% in Wave 1. However, this represents a drop from 67% agreement in Wave 4.

When asked what types of outside interferences cause problems in their village/neighborhood, respondents most frequently mention road-side bombs or suicide attacks (25%), disputes over water (17%), closing roads (13%), small crimes/theft (12%), and insecurity (12%).¹⁵⁸ Unfortunately, the incidence of respondents mentioning bombs and suicide attacks has increased by 8% (from 13%) since Wave 1, reflecting the continued activity of anti-government elements in many of the CCI-C districts. These types of bombings were most commonly cited by respondents in Gelan and Muqer districts in Ghazni (72% and 67% respectively).

A majority of respondents surveyed in Wave 5 (64%) also believe things originating from inside their village/neighborhood "rarely" or "never" create problems to disrupt normal life. Of those who believe internal interferences "sometimes" or "often" create problems (n=4,167), disputes over water (32%), land disputes (31%), and family problems (26%) are most commonly mentioned. Thirteen percent of respondents also mention ethnic disputes as a source of problems, but this percentage is down from 19% in Wave 1. Respondents living in Muqer (63%) are most likely to mention land disputes, while Maiwand residents (67%) are most likely to cite water disputes and Marawarah residents (52%) mention

¹⁵⁸ This question was only asked of respondents who answered "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" when asked how often outside factors create problems in their area (n=4,164). Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.


family problems. Nearly seven in ten respondents (69%) say that these problems can be solved within the village, which is an increase of 11% since the baseline.

Survey results indicate that resilience is strongest in Nahr-e Saraj and Sangin, where respondents are most likely to believe people are able to solve problems that originate from outside (86% and 80%, respectively) and inside (87% and 84%, respectively) their village/neighborhood. Predictive logistic regression suggests that if respondents in Helmand have positive views of their local leaders or district officials, they have a higher probability of being able to solve problems originating from outside the village.¹⁵⁹

Nahr-e Saraj residents are also among the most likely to say that villages in their area work together to solve problems, along with Lashkar Gah residents (78% in both districts, in comparison with 65% of CCI-C respondents overall). Interestingly, Sangin residents agree with this statement in much smaller numbers—only 54% agree that villages in their area work together to solve problems.

FIGURE 5.82: VILLAGE COOPERATION TO SOLVE PROBLEMS IN CCI-C DISTRICTS

Wave 5: (CCI Creative) Village Cooperation to Solve Problem (Q36)




¹⁵⁹ Predictive logistic regression Model 2 included in Annex to this chapter.

Respondents in Wave 5 are less likely to believe that local leaders consider the interests of ordinary people (63%, compared to 73% in the baseline). The belief that ordinary people’s opinions are not taken into account is strongest in Maiwand, where 74% believe this “rarely” or “never” happens. However, the overall percentage of respondents who believe leaders consider the interests of women has increased from 51% in the baseline to 55% in Wave 5.¹⁶⁰

FIGURE 5.83: LOCAL LEADERS CONSIDERATION OF INTERESTS WHEN MAKING DECISIONS

Fewer respondents now believe local leaders consider the interests of ordinary people.



A majority of respondents (62%) believe their local leaders are effective at securing funds for their village/neighborhood, though this is a decrease of 7% since Wave 1. Respondents living in Nahr-e Saraj (73%) are most likely to believe their local leaders are effective at securing funds, while respondents in Sangin and Musa Qal’ah are most likely to believe they are ineffective (63% in each district).

Consistent with previous waves, most respondents in CCI-C districts do not belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss common interests or do certain activities together (82%). Of those who do belong to such groups (n=1,624), out of a possible two mentions, respondents are most likely to belong to farmers unions (40%) and business companies (30%).

Quality of Life


Though a majority of respondents (59%) report they are “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied” with life as a whole, this represents a substantial decrease since the baseline when 73% of respondents agreed. The percentage who say they are “very satisfied” decreased from 28% in Wave 1 to 17% in Wave 5.¹⁶¹

¹⁶⁰ Figure 5.83: (Q37) W1 n=12,381 | W2 n=13,424 | W3 n= 8,944 | W4 n=8,225 | W5 n=9,354. This figure includes net values of “sometimes” and “often.”

¹⁶¹ Figure 5.84: (Q26) W1 n=12,381 | W2 n=13,424 | W3 n= 8,944 | W4 n=8,225 | W5 n=9,354.

FIGURE 5.84: QUALITY OF LIFE IN CCI-C DISTRICTS


The percentage of respondents who report they are **satisfied** with their lives has dropped 14% since Wave I.



Those living in Marawarah (85%) and Sar Kani (82%) report the highest levels of satisfaction with their lives as a whole. Respondents in Maiwand are most dissatisfied with their life as a whole (68% dissatisfied), followed by residents of Musa Qal’ah (65%) and Sangin (64%).

FIGURE 5.85: OVERALL SATISFACTION WITH LIFE IN CCI-C DISTRICTS

Wave 5: (CCI Creative) Overall Satisfaction with Life (Q26)



The majority of CCI-C respondents are satisfied with their household’s current financial situation (61%) and unlike general satisfaction, this measure has increased by 5% since the baseline. Respondents in Maiwand have the highest levels of financial satisfaction (75%), while respondents in Musa Qal’ah have the lowest level of financial satisfaction (35%).


Respondents tend to believe that their ability to meet basic needs has either increased (35%) or stayed the same in the past year (42%). However, the percentage who say they have a decreased ability to meet basic needs went up from 17% in Wave 1 to 23% in Wave 5. Even so, CCI-C residents are generally positive when looking into the future. Thirty-four percent of respondents are not worried about meeting their basic needs in the coming year, which is up from 28% in Wave 1. Fifty-seven percent agree that the situation in their area is certain enough to make future plans, a figure that has increased by 14% since Wave 1. Those living in Maiwand (92%) are most confident about their ability to plan ahead, while respondents in Kajaki are the least confident—59% of respondents in that district believe the situation is too uncertain for them to make plans for the future.

Rule of Law

Respect for the rule of law and establishing effective means of dispute resolution are two key components of building a community’s adaptive capacity for dealing with internal conflict. Three major authorities that community members could turn to for dispute resolution are local or tribal elders, government courts, or armed opposition groups. In CCI-C districts, the preferred source of resolution of small disputes is the local or tribal elder. In cases of land or water disputes, 51% say they would go to the local elders; in cases of theft, 48% agree. Only in cases of assault, murder or kidnapping do CCI-C respondents prefer government courts (49%). Though tribal elders are still the preferred arbiter of disputes in most cases, the proportion of respondents who are willing to use government courts has increased substantially since the baseline. The graph below shows the percentage of respondents who would use government courts to resolve each of the listed disputes.¹⁶²

FIGURE 5.86: CHOICES FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION

The proportion of respondents who would use a government court to resolve each of these disputes has increased between Wave 1 and Wave 5.



¹⁶² Figure 5.86: (Q20a-c) W1 n=12,381 | W5 n=9,354.

Respondents living in Maiwand are most likely to seek justice from government courts for all types of disputes. In general, respondents in CCI-C districts are unlikely to turn to armed opposition groups for justice. However, nearly a third of respondents in Qalat would turn to armed opposition groups for all three types of disputes that were asked about. In cases of theft, 29% of respondents in Shahid-e Hasas and 24% in Khas Uruzgan are also willing to use armed opposition groups.

Eighty-nine percent of Wave 5 CCI-C respondents say they have “a lot” or “some” confidence in local leaders to fairly resolve disputes. This percentage has dropped from a high of 95% in Wave 4. Sixty-six percent of respondents have “a lot” or “some” confidence in government courts to fairly resolve disputes, and 24% have “a lot” or “some” confidence in armed opposition groups.

Respondents are more likely to believe decisions made by local/tribal elders are “always” respected than decisions made by government courts (40% compared to 21%). These proportions remain largely unchanged from previous waves. More than half of respondents (59%) believe decisions made by armed opposition groups are “never” respected—this proportion has increased substantially since Wave 1, when only 33% reported AOG decisions were “never” respected.


Security

Evaluations of security are important to the CCI project because insecurity and conflict contribute to the shocks and stresses that lead to crisis and a lack of resilience in Afghan communities. Though environmental disasters can lead to risk as well, undoubtedly a major problem in CCI-C districts is the insurgency and a lack of security. Understanding the drivers of this conflict and how it manifests will enable CCI-C implementers to help communities mitigate the risks associated with these shocks.

Nearly half (45%) of respondents in CCI-C districts believe security in their area is good, a proportion that has decreased by 13% since the baseline survey. One-quarter (25%) of Wave 5 respondents think security in their area is poor.

FIGURE 5.87: PERCEPTION OF SECURITY IN CCI-C DISTRICTS

Wave 5: (CCI Creative) Perception of Security (Q2a)



Though perceptions of current security have dropped since Wave 1, perceptions of current security in comparison to a year ago have remained unchanged. Forty-eight percent of Wave 5 respondents believe their local area is more secure than it was a year ago, which is exactly the same percentage which responded that way in Wave 1. Respondents in Spin Boldak (71%) are most likely to say security has improved in the past year, while respondents in Sangin, Musa Qal’ah, and Kajaki are most likely to say security has deteriorated (54%, 53%, and 52% respectively).

The assessment of road security in CCI-C districts overall has remained largely positive over time. Currently, 58% say road security is good, and there are no major differences from wave to wave. However, majorities in Kajaki (73%), Musa Qal’ah (68%), and Sangin (66%) express significant concern, evaluating security on their roads as either “somewhat” or “very” bad. Respondents in CCI-C districts overall are also twice as likely to say road security has improved (43%) rather than worsened (23%), with 34% saying it stayed the same over the past year. Not surprisingly, respondents in Sangin (54%) and Musa Qal’ah (54%), and Kajaki (42%) are the most likely to say road conditions have worsened in the past year.

Respondents are asked to evaluate their personal security in four different situations. Most respondents in CCI-C districts (81%) report feeling secure at home during the day, although there was a significant increase in those feeling insecure between Wave 1 and Wave 5 (from 9% to 19%). For the remaining scenarios, the trend has remained relatively stable over time. Sixty-six percent of respondents report feeling secure at home during the night, 56% report feeling secure traveling to a neighboring village, and 45% report feeling secure traveling to the district or provincial capital. Respondents in Sangin and Musa Qal’ah are far more negative than respondents in other districts, with more than 6 in 10 respondents saying they feel insecure in their home both during the day and at night. Over 7 in 10 respondents in Kajaki, Sangin, Musa Qal’ah and Maiwand report feeling insecure when traveling to a neighboring village, and 8 in 10 respondents from Shahid-e Hasas report feeling insecure when traveling to the district or provincial capital.

Respondents report modest increases in crime over the past five waves of data collection. Thirty-five percent of CCI-C respondents report “a lot” of petty crime and offenses in their area, up from 28% in Wave 1. Reports of “a lot” of serious non-violent crime has increased by 2% to 24% since Wave 1. There has been a 3% increase in the rate of people reporting “a lot” of serious violent crimes, from 20% in Wave 1 to 23% in Wave 5. When looking at individual districts, 61% of respondents in Sangin say there is “a lot” of petty crime, while 67% of those in Sar Kani say there is “none at all”. For serious, non-violent crime, 53% of respondents in Maiwand say this happens “a lot,” while 67% of those in Sar Kani say there is “none at all”. When considering serious violent crime, 49% of Kajaki respondents say this happens “a lot;” 69% of Sar Kani respondents say there is “none at all”.


A majority (54%) of Wave 5 respondents report that petty crime has decreased in the past year; 32% say rates are the same, and 14% say petty crime has increased. With regard to serious, non-violent crimes, 45% say it has decreased while 33% say it stayed the same. Neither of these findings differ substantially from results collected in the baseline survey. Forty percent of respondents report instances of less serious violent crime, which is smaller than the percentage who said the same in Wave 1 (44%).

Of the various institutions that provide security in Afghan districts, CCI-C respondents most often report “a lot” of the Afghan National Army (ANA) in their area (59%). Fifty-five percent of respondents report “a lot” of Afghan National Police (ANP) in their area. The incidence of respondents reporting “a lot” of ANA and ANP has increased greatly since Wave 1, while the incidence of respondents reporting “a lot” of International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) has dropped by 14%, which corresponds with the drawdown of international forces in Afghanistan over the last few years.¹⁶³

¹⁶³ Figure 5.88: (Q6) W1 n=12,381 | W5 n=9,354. Chart shows the percentage stating there are “a lot” of each entity in their area.

FIGURE 5.88: AMOUNT OF SECURITY ENTITIES IN CCI-C DISTRICTS

The percentage of respondents reporting a lot of ANA and ANP in their area has increased greatly since Wave 1.



Over three-quarters (77%) of Sar Kani residents have the perception that there are “a lot” of ANA forces in their area. Lashkar Gah residents are most likely to perceive “a lot” of ANP forces in their area (71%), and Khas Kunar residents are most likely to report “a lot” of Afghan Local Police (ALP) forces in their area. Fifty percent or more of respondents in Terayzai ('Ali Sher), Shamul (Dzadran), Khas Kunar, Sar Kani, and Maiwand report no presence of Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs) in their area; a majority in all other districts report at least some presence of AOGs. Respondents in Kajaki are most likely to report “a lot” of AOGs in their area, with 49% saying this is the case.

Respondents generally have confidence in the ANA to make their area safe, with 70% saying they have “a lot” or “some” confidence. Confidence levels held steady at about 75% in Waves 1-4, so that rating dropped somewhat in Wave 5. Marawarah residents (97%) are most likely to have confidence in the ANA, while Musa Qal’ah residents are least likely to have confidence (33%). A majority (67%) also believe that the ANA’s ability to provide security has improved in the past year, though the percentage of those who believe the ANA’s capabilities has worsened has gone up since the baseline. Nine percent believed this in Wave 1, versus 17% in Wave 5.

Respondents have slightly less confidence in the ANP than the ANA; only 58% of Wave 5 respondents have confidence in the ANP to make their area safe; this figure has been mostly static since Wave 1. Khas Kunar residents (82%) are most likely to have confidence in the ANP, while Sangin, Musa Qal’ah and Kajaki residents are least likely to have confidence (34%, 35% and 35% respectively). A similar percentage to those who have confidence in the ANP believe the ANP’s ability to provide security has improved in the past year (55%); this remains largely unchanged since Wave 1. As was seen with the ANA, an increasing percentage of respondents believe the ANP’s ability to provide security worsened in the past year; 12% believed this in Wave 1, while 17% feel this way in Wave 5.

Corruption

The majority of respondents in CCI-C districts (88%) admit that corruption is a problem in their area; this figure has been slowly rising since Wave 1, when 81% agreed. Majorities in each district other than Maiwand agree; only 47% of respondents in that district believe corruption is a problem. In 12 out of the 22 CCI-C districts, reports of corruption are 90% or higher, with 100% of respondents in Nahr-e Saraj and Sangin saying corruption is a problem.

Respondents in CCI-C districts have become more likely over time to report that corruption has increased in the past year. Fifty percent in Wave 5 now say the level of corruption has increased, up from 39% in Wave 1. When asked which department or sector of the local government is most corrupt, respondents most frequently mention the district office (11%), courts (10%), the Ministry of Education (8%), and the district attorney's office (8%). Reports of corruption in the police have gone down by 6% since Wave 1; 7% of respondents in Wave 5 now report corruption in the police.

Economic Activity

Measures of economic activity and commerce are important to the CCI project because increasing economic opportunities is one of the mechanisms by which adaptive capacity, and therefore resilience, can be fostered in a community. In CCI-C districts, the economic picture is mixed to negative. When asked about their ability to access markets now compared to last year, 45% of CCI-C respondents (down from 57% in Wave 1) say it has gotten better, 28% say it is about the same, and 26% say it has gotten worse. Respondents in Musa Qal'ah (52%) are most likely to say their ability to access markets has declined, while an additional 19% say access is about the same as last year. Maiwand has the greatest positive change in access, with 85% reporting better access than a year ago.

Respondents are also more likely to report increases in the cost of food at the markets over the past year. In Wave 5, 56% say prices increased either "a little" or "a lot," compared to 45% who said the same in Wave 1. Eighty-four percent of respondents in Maiwand report food price increases; 60% of those report prices have increased "a lot." Respondents are also reporting fewer paid jobs—41% now report fewer jobs, which is a 13% increase over Wave 1. Maiwand respondents (66%) are most likely to report fewer jobs in their area, while Khas Uruzgan respondents (46%) are most likely to report greater availability of jobs.

Grievances

When asked to identify the biggest problems that create stress or tension in their area, the sources of tension vary. At 31%, the most commonly cited grievance is unemployment. This has become an increased concern since Wave 1, when only 23% of CCI-C respondents mentioned this. Just over a quarter of respondents (26%) say that insecurity is a source of tension, a proportion that has remained unchanged since the baseline survey. Corruption is also a major source of tension and is cited by 15% of Wave 5 respondents, up from 10% in Wave 1.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁴ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Respondents in Shahid-e Hasas are most likely to mention unemployment as the biggest problem (64%); Maiwand residents are the most likely to mention insecurity (44%); Kajaki residents are the most likely to mention corruption (48%) as the biggest source of tension in the area.

Media

The most ubiquitous means of getting news and information in CCI-C districts is over the radio, which 96% of respondents listen to. Other popular methods of getting news and information include friends and family (92%), elders (79%), and their Mosque/Mullah (64%). They are less likely to use cell phones (31%), television (21%), posters/billboards (5%), and newspapers (3%). Hardly any respondents use the internet or email (1%). None of these percentages have changed substantially since Wave 1. When asked where they receive information specifically about government services, most respondents report they get it from the radio (82%, up from 71% in Wave 1), friends/family (49%), and elders (29%).¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁵ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Annex

CCI-Creative Governance Model 1

Q10. How responsive do you think your [Insert Item] is/are to the needs of the local people in this area? (Very Responsive)

q10at ~ q9at

	B	SE	Sig	95% CI for odds ratio		
				Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-2.096	0.016	*	0.12	0.12	0.13
q9at	2.43	0.024	*	11.35	10.83	11.9

q10bt ~ q9bt

	B	SE	Sig	95% CI for odds ratio		
				Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-2.051	0.015	*	0.13	0.12	0.13
q9bt	2.156	0.025	*	8.64	8.23	9.07

q10ct ~ q9ct

	B	SE	Sig	95% CI for odds ratio		
				Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-1.673	0.015	*	0.19	0.18	0.19
q9ct	2.285	0.022	*	9.83	9.42	10.25

q10dt ~ q9dt

	B	SE	Sig	95% CI for odds ratio		
				Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-2.252	0.016	*	0.11	0.1	0.11
q9dt	2.573	0.027	*	13.11	12.44	13.81

Q11. Over the past year, has the [Insert Item] ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? (Improved a Lot)

q11at ~ q9at

	B	SE	Sig	95% CI for odds ratio		
				Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-2.221	0.017	*	0.11	0.1	0.11
q9at	2.31	0.024	*	10.07	9.6	10.57

q11bt ~ q9bt

	B	SE	Sig	95% CI for odds ratio		
				Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-2.348	0.017	*	0.1	0.09	0.1
q9bt	2.069	0.026	*	7.92	7.52	8.34

q11ct ~ q9ct

	B	SE	Sig	95% CI for odds ratio		
				Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-2.027	0.017	*	0.13	0.13	0.14
q9ct	2.005	0.023	*	7.43	7.11	7.76

q11dt ~ q9dt

	B	SE	Sig	95% CI for odds ratio		
				Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-2.462	0.018	*	0.09	0.08	0.09
q9dt	2.383	0.027	*	10.84	10.27	11.43

CCI-Creative Resilience Model 2 (Helmand Province Only)

Q34c. How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from outside the village? (Often)

q34c ~ q9at + q9bt + q9ct + q9dt + d2a


	B	SE	Sig	95% CI for odds ratio		
				Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-3.628	0.239	*	0.03	0.02	0.04
Confidence in District Governor	0.636	0.136	*	1.89	1.44	2.46
Confidence in District Government	-0.707	0.165	*	0.49	0.35	0.68
Confidence in Local Officials	0.687	0.119	*	1.99	1.57	2.51
Confidence in Provincial Governor	-0.056	0.142		0.95	0.71	1.24
Age	0.019	0.006	*	1.02	1.01	1.03

Community Cohesion Initiative (IOM)

Introduction

The Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) is a project of USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives. Its goal is to increase the resilience of residents and communities in areas of Afghanistan that are susceptible to insurgency and other sources of instability. CCI utilizes USAID’s definition of resilience to develop and inform its project activities: “the ability of people, households, communities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth.”¹⁶⁶

FIGURE 5.89: USAID CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR RESILIENCE



USAID’s conceptual framework for resilience states that in order to increase resilience, a community must increase its adaptive capacity and its ability to reduce risk. The primary components of adaptive capacity and risk reduction are displayed in the graphic to the left.¹⁶⁷

With the goal of increasing resilience in mind, the CCI project has two primary objectives: 1) strengthening ties between local actors, customary governance structures, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), and 2) increasing cohesion among and between communities by bringing communities together through projects to address common needs.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶ United States Agency for International Development, *Policy and Program Guidance: Building Resilience to Recurrent Crisis*, Washington, DC, 2012, <http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/USAIDResiliencePolicyGuidanceDocument.pdf> (accessed February 13, 2015).

¹⁶⁷ Figure 5.89: USAID Conceptual Framework for Resilience

¹⁶⁸ USAID Community Cohesion Initiative Fact Sheet. <http://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/fact-sheets/community-cohesion-initiative-cci>. Accessed February 17, 2015.

The CCI project is implemented throughout Afghanistan by two separate organizations that target different districts. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is the implementing partner for CCI districts in the northern and western provinces of Afghanistan: Balkh, Samangan, Jawzjan, Badghis, and Herat. For disambiguation purposes, this project is referred to as “IOM” throughout the report. IOM targets the following districts in Afghanistan:

- Aybak
- Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in
- Ruy Do Ab
- Hazrat-e Sultan
- Fayroz Nakhchir
- Mazar-e Sharif
- Balkh
- Sholgarah
- Chimtal
- Chahar Bolak
- Shibirghan
- Faizabad (2)
- Aqcha
- Khwajah Do Koh
- Qush Tepah
- Muqur
- Injil
- Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)
- Adraskan

This chapter provides summary and detailed information about the attitudes and opinions of respondents living in districts targeted by IOM project activities. The report compares findings across five waves of research to examine trends in stabilization and shifts in development indicators on the following topics: governance, service provision and development, community cohesion and resilience, quality of life, rule of law, security, corruption, economic activity, grievances, and media. Throughout this chapter, special emphasis will be given to survey results that address components of the conceptual framework for resilience and the two stated objectives of the CCI project.

In Wave 5, interviews in Qush Tepah were conducted by a field team from Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC), and interviews in Faizabad (2) and Adraskan were partially conducted by AYC and partially conducted by ACSOR. All other IOM districts were conducted entirely by ACSOR. Differences exist in the field implementation and quality control measures used for the AYC interviews, which may impact some survey results. For detailed descriptions of these differences, refer to the full Methodology Report for MISTI Wave 5.


Unless otherwise noted, district-level analysis and wave-to-wave comparisons are provided with significance testing at the 99% confidence level. It should be noted that due to the delayed start of the IOM project, IOM districts were not included in the sample until Wave 3; therefore wave on wave comparisons are made between waves 3, 4, and 5.

OVERVIEW

The goal of the Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) is to increase the resilience of Afghan communities by strengthening ties between local actors and customary government structures and by increasing cohesion between communities. The CCI project is implemented in northwestern Afghanistan by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which serves key districts in Balkh, Samangan, Jawzjan, Badghis and Herat.

GOVERNANCE

Three in four respondents say the Afghan government is well regarded in their area; this percentage has not changed substantially since IOM districts were first sampled in Wave 3. When asked about specific government institutions and actors, perceptions among all IOM respondents are even more positive. Over 8 in 10 respondents have confidence in the district governor and local leaders. Since one of IOM's primary goals is to strengthen ties between local leaders and traditional governing structures, it is a very positive finding that respondents are rating leaders at the local and district levels similarly.



8 in 10
respondents have
confidence in the
local
government

When asked about the district government as a whole, confidence goes down slightly to 3 in 4 expressing confidence. Respondents have the least regard for the provincial governor; fewer than 7 in 10 have confidence. Confidence in each of these public figures has not changed substantially since Wave 3.


Predictive logistic regression suggests that if district officials are originally from the district that they serve

and if they regularly visit the area, respondents have a higher probability of having high regard for the Afghan government. Improved abilities of the district governor, local leaders, and provincial governor are also positive predictors of how the Afghan government is regarded.

SERVICE PROVISION AND DEVELOPMENT

Nearly half of respondents believe services from the government have improved in the past year, which is a slight increase since Wave 3. When asked about specific services, satisfaction is highest with schooling for boys, followed by schooling for girls and clean drinking water. Respondents express increased levels of satisfaction since Wave 3 with all but one district government service that was asked about.

Satisfaction with all services other than **irrigation water** has increased since Wave 3.



Though the greatest increase in satisfaction is with electricity, only a modest 3 in 10 respondents express satisfaction with the service, indicating that this is still a major need in many IOM communities. There have also been substantial increases in satisfaction with medical care, boys' schooling, and girls' schooling.

COMMUNITY COHESION AND RESILIENCE


One of the IOM project's primary objectives is to increase cohesion among and between communities in order to increase their ability to respond to shocks and stresses that can lead to crisis. Eight in 10 IOM respondents say outside interferences "rarely" or "never" create problems in their villages. However, this percentage has decreased slightly since Wave 3. Additionally, of those who say outside interferences create problems, an increasing majority of

respondents say these problems can be solved by people within the village.

When asked what types of outside interferences cause problems in their village, respondents most frequently mention small crimes or theft, ethnic disputes, land disputes, and disputes over water. The incidence of ethnic disputes has decreased since Wave 3, though the incidence of small crimes, land disputes, and disputes over water have all gone up.

Almost three-quarters of respondents believe that when there is a problem in the area, villages in their area work together to solve the problem. This percentage has decreased slightly since Wave 3.

Village Cooperation to Solve Problems



Three-quarters of IOM respondents report they are satisfied with their life as a whole; this is a slight decrease from Wave 3. Seven in 10 IOM respondents are satisfied with their household's current financial situation, a figure that has remained static over time. Respondents tend


to believe their ability to meet basic needs has either increased or stayed the same in the past year. However, most respondents are at least a little worried about their ability to meet basic needs over the next year; nearly 8 in 10 respondents are "a little worried" or "very worried." However, nearly 6 in 10 believe the situation in their area is certain enough to make future plans.

SECURITY AND CRIME

Evaluations of security are important to the IOM project because insecurity contributes to the shocks and stresses that lead to a lack of resilience in Afghan communities. Unlike in other areas of the country, respondents in IOM districts (located in the north and west) enjoy relatively high levels of security. More than six in 10 IOM respondents believe security in their area is good; this is a slight decrease from Wave 3.

Despite a relative lack of change over time on other security measures, respondents in IOM districts do show a distinct decrease in feelings of security when asked about how they feel in certain situations. Almost all respondents feel secure in their homes during the day, but the percentage reporting they feel secure while at home during the night and while traveling has dropped markedly since Wave 3.

Respondents in Wave 5 feel less secure than they did in Wave 3 in all locations other than at home during the day.



Governance

Given CCI's project objective of strengthening ties between local actors, customary governance structures, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), respondents' opinions of government officials is a key indicator of the impact of IOM project activities. By connecting district and provincial officials to local communities via development grant making and participation in local projects, IOM projects should have the effect of increasing GIROA presence and visibility within communities and increasing its capacity to address and resolve problems for communities.

Overall, perceptions of the Afghan Government in IOM districts are positive. When asked if the Afghan Government is well regarded in their area, 74% of IOM respondents answer affirmatively; this percentage has not changed substantially since IOM districts were first sampled in Wave 3. A majority of respondents within all IOM districts other than Qush Tepah say the government is well regarded; Qush Tepah residents are far more negative - only 28% agree that the government is well regarded.

When asked about specific government institutions and actors, perceptions among all IOM respondents are even more positive. Over eight in 10 respondents have confidence in the district governor and local leaders (82% each). Since one of IOM's primary goals is to strengthen ties between local leaders and government leaders, it is a very positive finding to see that respondents are rating leaders at the local level and the district level similarly. When asked about the district government as a whole, confidence goes down slightly to 76% confidence. Respondents have the least regard for the provincial governor; only 68% have confidence in that public figure. Confidence in each of these public figures has not changed substantially since Wave 3.


More than seven in 10 respondents in each IOM district other than Adraskan have confidence in the district governor; only 65% of Adraskan residents have confidence. More than six in 10 respondents in all districts other than Adraskan have confidence in the district government; less than half of Adraskan residents (45%) have confidence. Adraskan residents also have the lowest rating for local leaders (69% confidence) and the provincial governor (44% confidence).

Though overall confidence levels have remained steady since Wave 3, there have been improvements in the perceived responsiveness of different government institutions and actors. Eighty-three percent of IOM respondents now believe the district governor is responsive, up from 76% in Wave 3. Similarly, responsiveness ratings for the district government are up 6% since Wave 3, ratings for local leaders are up 4%, and ratings for the provincial governor are up 7%.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁹ Figure 5.90: (Q10) W3 n=5,951 | W5 n=5,479. This figure includes net values of "very responsive" and "somewhat responsive."

FIGURE 5.90: RESPONSIVENESS OF LOCAL LEADERS AND DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

Perceived responsiveness of all government entities has improved since Wave 3.




Like with confidence, Adraskan residents consistently give the lowest responsiveness rating to government institutions and actors (district governor: 66%; district government: 53%; local leaders: 67%; provincial governor: 45%). Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in residents give the highest responsiveness ratings to various government institutions and actors (district governor: 98%; district government: 92%; local leaders: 96%) other than the provincial governor, which is rated most highly by Mazar-e Sharif residents (87% responsive).

When asked if a government entity's ability to get things done has improved in the past year, responses are more mixed than the uniformly upward trend in rated responsiveness. Only 58% of IOM respondents believe the district governor's ability to get things done has improved, down from 62% in Wave 3. The district government's rated ability to get things done is unchanged from Wave 3 and local leaders' rated ability is down 2%. The provincial governor's rated ability to get things done has gone up slightly to 49%, from 46% in Wave 3.¹⁷⁰

FIGURE 5.91: ABILITY OF LOCAL LEADERS AND DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT TO GET THINGS DONE

Respondents give mixed ratings when asked if leaders' ability to get things done has improved in the past year.



¹⁷⁰ Figure 5.91: (Q11) W3 n=5,951 | W4 n=5,600 | W5 n=5,479. This figure includes net values of "improved a lot" and "improved a little."

Generally, respondents in Chahar Bolak and Adraskan assign these government institutions and actors the lowest rated ability to get things done. Only 31% in Adraskan and 33% in Chahar Bolak believe the district governor's ability to get things done has improved; for the district government, it is 24% in Chahar Bolak and 30% in Adraskan. Thirty-seven percent in Adraskan and 41% in Chahar Bolak believe local leaders' ability has improved. The fewest Aqcha residents say the provincial governor's ability has improved; only one in four respondents agree.

Project shuras are the main mechanism by which communities can become involved in the implementation of IOM project activities. However, Community Development Councils (CDC) and District Development Assemblies (DDA) are two other important venues for the implementation of village-level rural development in Afghanistan. The DDAs, consisting of elective representatives of clustered CDCs, create District Development Plans that connect community priorities to the government's development strategy. The percentage of individuals who are aware of these organizations has increased modestly to 68% of respondents for both DDAs and CDCs in Wave 5, up from 63% for DDAs and 65% for CDCs in Wave 3. The DDA is most active in Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah) and Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in, where over eight in 10 respondents are familiar with the organization; Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah) residents are also the most familiar with the CDC—85% of respondents in that district are aware of it.

Of those who are familiar with the DDAs (n=3704), 85% now have confidence in the organization, up from 83% in Wave 3. Measures of responsiveness have also slightly increased, with 76% now stating they believe the DDA is responsive, up from 73% in Wave 3. However, those who state the DDA's ability to get things done has improved in the past year has gone down to 62% from 65% in Wave 3.

A large majority of respondents who are aware of the CDCs (n=3749), 85% express confidence in them; the CDCs are also seen as responsive—83% believe that they are. Neither of these measures has changed significantly since Wave 3. However, despite these high ratings, the percentage of respondents citing the CDC's improved ability to get things done has decreased slightly, from 71% in Wave 3 to 68% in Wave 5.


Public perceptions of the district government's actions are critical to building confidence and trust in local governance. The survey asks a series of questions to gauge respondents' views of their district government. Though respondents' opinions of the district government are fairly positive, having a clearer understanding of its perceived strengths and weaknesses can help the government improve its overall performance. Officials are generally seen as being from the district they represent (67%), and get high ratings for understanding the problems of local people (65%). A little over half of respondents agree that district government officials visit their area, care about local people, and deliver basic services in a fair manner. In all cases, these percentages do not differ significantly from those collected in Wave 3.

However, almost half of respondent also believe that district government officials abuse their position in order to make money for themselves.¹⁷¹

¹⁷¹ Figure 5.92: (Q14) W3 n=5,951 | W4 n=5,600 | W5 n=5,479.

FIGURE 5.92: ABUSE OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN CCI-IOM DISTRICTS

Almost half of respondents believe government officials **abuse their authority to make money**.



In a strange reversal, respondents from Qush Tepah, who rate their district government most poorly on many of the positive attributes discussed previously, is also the district with the lowest percentage (26%) of people saying officials abuse their authority to make money. However, Qush Tepah does also have the smallest proportion of respondents who say district officials are doing their job honestly (24%).

Predictive logistic regression suggests that if district officials are originally from the district that they serve and if they regularly visit the area, respondents have a higher probability of having high regard for the Afghan government. Improved abilities of the district governor, local leaders, and provincial governor are also positive predictors of how the Afghan government is regarded.¹⁷²

It must be noted that when asked, only 61% of respondents say it is acceptable for people to publicly criticize the Afghan Government. Since nearly 40% of the sample feels it is unacceptable to criticize the government, it should be noted that the other opinions measured in this section may be skewed by respondents' unwillingness to speak their true opinions about the government.

Service Provision and Development

Many of IOM's project activities deal with training and relationship building, but a large proportion also seek to deliver goods and services to local populations. Infrastructure improvements, such as canal and culvert rehabilitation, school refurbishment, irrigation improvements, and road repair have all been funded as part of the IOM project. Nearly half of respondents (49%) believe services from the government have improved in the past year (up from 45% in Wave 3). The belief that service provision has improved is strongest in Fayroz Nakhchir (84%), while the belief that service provision has worsened is strongest in Qush Tepah (33%).


¹⁷² Predictive logistic regression Model 1 included in Annex to this chapter.

Respondents express increasing levels of satisfaction over time with all but one district government service that was asked about. Satisfaction is highest with schooling for boys (70%), followed by schooling for girls (56%), and clean drinking water (54%). Though the greatest increase in satisfaction is with electricity, still only a modest 30% express satisfaction with the service. Indeed, 56% in Adraskan report electricity service is not even provided.

The following figure illustrates the net change in satisfaction from Wave 3 to Wave 5.¹⁷³

FIGURE 5.93: SATISFACTION WITH SERVICE PROVISION IN CCI-IOM DISTRICTS

Satisfaction with with all services other than irrigation water has increased since Wave 3.



Though satisfaction levels are rising, there is still distinct dissatisfaction with some services within certain districts. Over three-quarters (78%) of residents of Faizabad (2) are dissatisfied with the provision of clean drinking water, and 89% are dissatisfied with the provision of water for irrigation. Ninety-two percent of Chintal residents are dissatisfied with agricultural assistance and Chahar Bolak residents are the most dissatisfied with both medical care (80%) and schooling for boys (58%).

The survey data collected on service provision and development can inform decision-making about future IOM infrastructure project activities. However, IOM implementers must keep in mind that increased satisfaction with services does not in itself demonstrate that the overall CCI project objectives are being met. That will only happen if a greater number of infrastructure projects results in greater GIROA presence in communities (thus strengthening ties between communities and their government), or if the project removes a driver of conflict (such as a lack of water resources) and thus establishes greater cohesion between communities.

The level of awareness of local development projects within communities is somewhat low, with only 34% saying they are aware of development projects in their area; furthermore, this percentage has not

¹⁷³ Figure 5.93: (Q16) W3 n=5,951 | W4 n=5,600 | W5 n=5,479. The graph does not display agricultural assistance, for which there was no change between Wave 3 and 5.

increased since Wave 3. At the district level, awareness is highest in Fayroz Nakhchir (66%) and lowest in Faizabad (2) (8%).

Across all IOM districts, those who have seen or heard about development projects (n=1,885) are most aware of projects concerning drinking water (71%), schools (60%), and roads and bridges (58%). Awareness of retaining and flood walls has increased the most of all cited projects, from 17% in Wave 3 to 26% in Wave 5. Majorities who are aware of specific development projects agree that all types of projects improve life for people in their area.

IOM respondents most frequently mention the need for development projects in the next year concerning road construction (34%), electricity (33%), and water (25%).¹⁷⁴ Though still major needs, fewer respondents now cite electricity and water as major needs than in Wave 3; reported need for both is now down by 10%. The decrease in reported need for electricity corresponds with the jump in reported provision of this service that was discussed earlier.

Respondents are also asked about the obstacles preventing them from obtaining health care or medicine. The most frequent responses include lack of clinics/hospitals (41%), lack of medicines (33%), and lack of professional doctors (28%).¹⁷⁵ Lack of clinics/hospitals and lack of medicines have consistently been cited as the top two obstacles preventing health care; however, the percentage citing lack of hospitals has dropped 5% since Wave 3, while the percentage citing lack of medicines has increased by 5% in the same timeframe.

Community Cohesion and Resilience

One of the CCI project's primary objectives is to increase cohesion among and between communities in order to increase their ability to collectively respond to shocks and stresses that can lead to crisis. The Wave 5 survey data on cohesion and resilience is critical for understanding the current status of connectivity between villages in IOM districts and highlight areas that would benefit from further programming.

A large majority of IOM respondents agree that outside interferences do not create problems in their villages. Eighty-one percent say outside interferences "rarely" or "never" create problems, though this percentage has decreased slightly (by 2%) since Wave 3. Additionally, of those who say outside interferences create problems (n=1,194), a majority of respondents say these problems can be solved by people within the village. Sixty percent now agree that this happens, up from 56% in Wave 3.

When asked what types of outside interferences cause problems in their village/neighborhood, respondents most frequently mention small crimes or theft (23%), ethnic disputes (20%), land disputes (18%), and disputes over water (17%).¹⁷⁶ The incidence of ethnic disputes has decreased by 7% since

¹⁷⁴ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

¹⁷⁵ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

¹⁷⁶ This question was only asked of respondents who answered "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" when asked how often outside factors create problems in their area (n=1,194). Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.


Wave 3, though the incidence of small crimes, land disputes, and disputes over water have all gone up. Ethnic disputes are most often cited as a problem in Muqur (38%), while Balkh residents most often cite small crimes (45%). Land disputes and water disputes are most often a problem in Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in (51% and 42% respectively).

A majority of respondents surveyed in Wave 5 (79%) also believe things originating from inside their village/neighborhood “rarely” or “never” create problems to disrupt normal life; this figure has dropped 4% since Wave 3. Of those who say internal issues create problems (n=1,413), a majority of respondents (67%) believe people are able to solve problems from inside the village; this figure has not changed substantially since Wave 3.

Of those who believe internal interferences create problems, ethnic disputes (28%), disputes over water (23%), and land disputes (21%) are most commonly mentioned. The incidence of respondents mentioning ethnic disputes has decreased by 6% since Wave 3, while mentions of water disputes and land disputes have both increased by 8%. Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in residents are most likely to mention ethnic disputes (53%), while water disputes are most often seen as a problem in Balkh and Aqcha (43%) and land disputes are mentioned most in Qush Tepah (46%).

Almost three-quarters (74%) of respondents believe that when there is a problem in the area, villages in their area work together to solve the problem. This percentage has decreased slightly from 77% in Wave 3. Seventy percent or more of respondents in all districts other than Aqcha and Qush Tepah agree; only 61% of Aqcha respondents and 51% of Qush Tepah respondents believe villages in their area work together.


FIGURE 5.94: VILLAGE COOPERATION TO SOLVE PROBLEMS IN CCI-IOM DISTRICTS



Sixty-five percent of IOM respondents believe that the interests of ordinary people are taken into account when decisions are made by local leaders, while 58% believe that the interests of women are taken into account in these situations. Both of these percentages have dropped slightly since Wave 3, by 6% for ordinary people and 3% for women.¹⁷⁷

FIGURE 5.95: INTERESTS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHEN MAKING DECISIONS

When leaders make decisions, respondents are slightly more likely to think the concerns of ordinary people are taken into account than the concerns of women.



A majority of respondents (74%) believe their local leaders are effective at securing funds for their village/neighborhood; this remains unchanged since Wave 3. Respondents living in Aybak and Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in (92% in each district) are most likely to believe their local leaders are effective at securing funds, while respondents in Qush Tepah (50%) are most likely to believe they are ineffective.

Consistent with previous waves, most respondents in IOM districts do not belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss common interests or do certain activities together (81%). Of those who do belong to such groups (n=943) respondents are most likely to belong to farmers unions (37%) and development councils (36%).¹⁷⁸ These were the most popular in previous waves, with similar percentages of respondents reporting that they belonged to these groups.


¹⁷⁷ Figure 5.95: (Q37) W5 n=5,479.

¹⁷⁸ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Quality of Life

FIGURE 5.96: OVERALL SATISFACTION WITH LIFE IN CCI-IOM DISTRICTS

Wave 5: (CCI IOM) Overall Satisfaction with Life (Q26)



Three-quarters of IOM respondents report that they are satisfied with their life as a whole; this is slightly down from 79% responding that way in Wave 3. Respondents in Fayroz Nakhchir (93%) and Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in (92%) are most likely to say they are satisfied, while Qush Tepah (57%) residents are most likely to say they are dissatisfied.

The majority of IOM respondents are satisfied with their household's current financial situation (70%), a figure that has remained unchanged since Wave 3. Respondents in Fayroz Nakhchir (91%) and Hazrat-e Sultan (90%) have the highest levels of financial satisfaction, while respondents in Qush Tepah have the lowest level of financial satisfaction (40%).

Respondents tend to believe that their ability to meet basic needs has either increased (31%) or stayed the same in the past year (44%).

However, the percentage who say they have a decreased ability to meet basic needs has gone up from 20% in Wave 3 to 25% in Wave 5. Looking into the future, most respondents are at least a little worried about their ability to meet basic needs over the next year; a total of 77% of respondents are "a little worried" or "very worried." However, 59% agree that the situation in their area is certain enough to make future plans, a figure that has remained unchanged since Wave 3. Those living in Faizabad (2) (83%) are most confident about their ability to plan ahead, while respondents in Qush Tepah are the least confident—82% of respondents in that district believe the situation is too uncertain for them to make plans for the future.


Rule of Law

Respect for the rule of law and establishing effective means of dispute resolution are two key components of building a community's adaptive capacity for dealing with internal conflict and therefore is important for achieving CCI's project goals. In IOM districts, local/tribal elders are the preferred justice provider for less serious issues, while respondents turn to government courts in the case of more

serious matters. Preferences have not changed greatly since Wave 3.¹⁷⁹ Mazar-e Sharif is the only district where respondents prefer government courts to resolve all types of disputes.

FIGURE 5.97: CHOICES FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Respondents are more likely to use **tribal elders** to resolve less serious disputes and **government courts** to resolve more serious disputes.



Respondents have the most confidence in local/tribal elders to fairly resolve disputes—95% of respondents have “a lot” or “some” confidence. Though a large majority also have confidence in government courts, the proportion (81%) is smaller than those who have confidence in local/tribal elders. Respondents in Fayroz Nakhchir have the most confidence in government courts (95%), while Adraskan residents have the least (41% “not much” or “no” confidence). Only a very small percentage (8%) have confidence in armed opposition groups’ ability to fairly resolve disputes.

The decisions of local/tribal elders are seen as being the most respected (90% reporting “always” or “mostly”), while the decisions of government courts are “always” or “mostly” respected just 71% of the time. Every single district has greater than 80% agreement that local elders’ decisions are respected, while there is less strong agreement about the decisions of government courts. Four districts—Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah), Aqcha, Khwajah Do Koh, and Adraskan—have between 50% and 60% agreement that such decisions are respected. Eighty-six percent of respondents say the decisions of armed opposition groups are “never” respected.


Security

Evaluations of security are important to the IOM project because insecurity and conflict contribute to the shocks and stresses that lead to crisis and a lack of resilience in Afghan communities. Understanding the drivers of this conflict and how it manifests will enable IOM implementers to help communities mitigate the risks associated with these shocks in areas where there are security problems.

¹⁷⁹ Figure 5.97: (Q20) W5 n=5,479. Figure shows percentages of respondents who would prefer the noted justice provider for each type of dispute.

FIGURE 5.98: PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN CCI-IOM DISTRICTS

Wave 5: (CCI IOM) Perceptions of Security (Q2a)



Unlike in other areas of the country, particularly in the south, respondents in IOM districts (located in the north and west) enjoy relatively high levels of security. More than six in 10 (63%) of IOM respondents believe security in their area is good; this is a slight drop from 67% in Wave 3. Another 28% believe security is fair, and only 9% believe it is poor. Mazar-e Sharif residents are most likely to say security is good (85%), while Qush Tepah residents are most likely to say security is poor (31%).

Half of respondents believe their area is more secure now than it was a year ago; this is down 8% from Wave 3. Mazar-e Sharif residents are again most likely to believe security has improved (70%) while a plurality of Qush Tepah residents believe security has worsened (38%).


The assessment of road security in IOM districts overall has remained largely positive over time. Currently, 74% say road security is good; this percentage has declined by 4% since Wave 3. More than 50% of respondents in all districts other than Adraskan and Qush Tepah report good road security; 60% in Adraskan say the road security is bad, as do 55% in Qush Tepah. Respondents in IOM districts overall are also much more likely to say road security has improved (50%) rather than worsened (13%), with 37% saying it stayed the same over the past year. Not surprisingly, respondents in Adraskan (32%) and Qush Tepah (30%) are the most likely to say road conditions worsened in the past year.

Despite the relative lack of change over time on other security measures, respondents in IOM district do show a distinct decrease in feelings of security when asked about how they feel in certain situations. Almost all respondents feel secure in their homes during the day, but the percentage reporting they feel secure while at home during the night and while traveling has dropped markedly since Wave 3.¹⁸⁰

¹⁸⁰ Figure 5.99: (Q4) W3 n=5,951 | W4 n=5,600 | W5 n=5,479. The figure includes the net values for those who feel “very secure” or “somewhat secure.”

FIGURE 5.99: PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY AT HOME AND WHEN TRAVELING

Respondents in Wave 5 feel less secure than they did in Wave 3 in all locations other than at home during the day.



Chimtal residents (51%) feel the most insecure in their homes at night, while Adraskan residents (58%) feel most insecure when traveling to neighboring villages. Residents of Muqur (63%), Adraskan (61%), and Qush Tepah (60%) all report high rates of feeling insecure when traveling to the district or provincial center.

IOM respondents also report increasing levels of different types of crime in their area. Only 45% of the sample in Wave 3 reported “a lot” or “a little” petty crime, but that rate has increased to 64% in Wave 5. Likewise, reports of serious, non-violent crimes have increased from 36% to 54% and reports of serious violent crimes have gone up from 28% to 36%. When looking at individual districts, 37% of respondents in Qush Tepah say there is “a lot” of petty crime, while 66% of those in Khwajah Do Koh say there is “none at all.” For serious, non-violent crime, 24% of respondents in Muqur say they happen “a lot,” while 80% of those in Khwajah Do Koh say there is “none at all.” When considering serious violent crime, 21% of Qush Tepah respondents say this happens “a lot;” 87% of Sholgarah respondents say there is “none at all.”

Despite the increases in rates of reported crime across waves, when asked if the rate of crime has increased in the past year, the percentage of respondents reporting more crime remains very small. Only 4% report more petty crime (up from 2% in Wave 3), 5% report more serious non-violent crime (up from 2%), and 5% report more serious violent crime (up from 3%).

Of the various institutions that provide security in Afghan districts, IOM respondents most often report “a lot” of the Afghan National Police (ANP) in their area (39%). The Afghan Local Police (ALP) and Afghan National Army (ANA) are the next most commonly cited security providers (18% and 17% respectively). The incidence of respondents reporting “a lot” of these security providers has not changed greatly since Wave 3; however, the prevalence of Arbaki has decreased greatly in that time frame. Twenty-seven percent of respondents in Wave 3 reported “a lot” of Arbaki in their area, making it the second most common security provider after the ANP, but only 12% in Wave 5 say there are “a lot,” placing it below both the ANA and ALP.

Predictive modeling suggests that greater presence of ISAF and the ANP in a given location are significant predictors of good security in that area. However, the presence of Arbaki in an area has a negative relationship with reported security, indicating that Arbaki forces may be doing more harm than good when they are present.¹⁸¹ These relationships also bear out across wave.

Respondents from Qush Tepah (52%) and Muqur (50%) are most likely to say there are “a lot” of ANA in their area. Faizabad (2) residents (45%) are most likely to say there are “a lot” of Arbaki, while 83% in Mazar-e Sharif say there are “a lot” of ANP and 61% in Chimtal say there are “a lot” of ALP. Few respondents report “a lot” of armed opposition groups in their area, but of those who do, they are most heavily concentrated in Qush Tepah (19%) and Muqur (18%).

Respondents generally have confidence in the ANA to make their area safe, with 84% of those who report at least some ANA in their area saying they have “a lot” or “some” confidence. Confidence levels have held steady since Wave 3. A majority (62%) of respondents believe that the ANA’s ability to provide security has improved in the past year, up from 58% in Wave 3. This belief is strongest in Shibirghan, where 91% of respondents believe the abilities of the ANA have improved.

Respondents have slightly less confidence in the ANP than the ANA; 82% of Wave 5 respondents who report ANP presence in their area have confidence - this is a slight increase from 80% in Wave 3. As was seen with the ANA, an increasing percentage of respondents believe the ANP’s ability to provide security improved in the past year; 65% believe this in Wave 5, while 61% felt this way in Wave 3. Fayroz Nakhchir residents are most likely to believe the ANP’s abilities are improving; 92% report that this is so in Wave 5.

Corruption

The majority of respondents in IOM districts (69%) admit that corruption is a problem in their area; this is an increase from Wave 3, when 60% agreed. Majorities in each district other than Khwajah Do Koh agree; only 49% of respondents in that district believe corruption is a problem. Reports of corruption are particularly high in Muqur, where 93% of respondents believe corruption is a problem.

Respondents in IOM districts have become less likely over time to report that corruption has increased in the past year. Almost half of respondents (49%) in Wave 5 now say corruption is a problem, up from 40% in Wave 3. When asked which department or sector of the local government is most corrupt, respondents most frequently mention the courts (13%) and the Ministry of Education (10%). Reports of corruption in the courts are up by 2% and reports of corruption in the Ministry of Education are up by 5% since Wave 3.

Economic Activity

Measures of economic activity and commerce are important to the IOM project because increasing economic opportunities is one of the mechanisms by which adaptive capacity, and therefore resilience, can be fostered in a community. In IOM districts, the economic outlook has not changed substantially

¹⁸¹ Predictive logistic regression Model 2 included in Annex to this chapter.

since Wave 3. Forty-two percent of respondents say their ability to get to local markets is better now than it was a year ago; this percentage has decreased by 5% since Wave 3. This percentage is highest in Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in and Fayroz Nakhchir, where 71% and 70% of the sample report that their ability to get to markets is higher than it was a year ago. Aqcha and Adraskan residents (46% and 45%) are most likely to say their ability to get to markets is lower than it was a year ago.

A majority of respondents (65%) report that prices for basic goods have increased in the past year, which is unchanged from Wave 3; one-quarter of respondents report that prices have stayed about the same. Shibirghan residents (81%) are most likely to say prices have increased, while Qush Tepah residents (30%) are most likely to say prices have decreased. Only a quarter of respondents report that there are more paid jobs available now compared to a year ago; almost half of respondents (47%) report less availability and 28% say the availability is about the same. Reported job availability is greatest in Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in (54% "more") and lowest in Faizabad (2) (73% "less").

Grievances

When asked to identify the biggest problems that create stress or tension in their area, the sources of tension vary. The most commonly cited grievance by far is unemployment, with 38% of respondents citing this concern; this is up from 34% in Wave 3. Almost a quarter of respondents (24%) say that lack of electricity is a source of stress and tension. Fewer respondents cite this concern in Wave 5 than was the case in Wave 3, when 30% of respondents noted it. Lack of paved roads and lack of drinking water are also major sources of tension and are cited by 18% and 17% of respondents respectively; both of these percentages are down slightly from Wave 3.¹⁸²

Respondents in Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah) are most likely to mention unemployment as the biggest problem (58%); Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in and Ruy Do Ab residents are the most likely to mention a lack of electricity (58% and 57% respectively) and a lack of paved roads (46% in each district); lack of drinking water is most often mentioned in Khwajah Do Koh (38%).

Media

Respondents in IOM districts use friends and family (95%), elders (84%), radio (77%), their mosque/mullah (70%), television (53%), and their cell phones (39%) to get news and information. Television usage has increased since Wave 3, when only 38% of respondents cited television as a way to get news and information. Radio usage also increased by 5% since Wave 3 and the mosque/mullah has increased by 9%. The relatively high level of television usage in the sample is largely driven by those in Mazar-e Sharif where 98% of respondents say they use television. There are also high rates of television usage in Shibirghan (85%), Khwajah Do Koh (81%), Injil (80%), Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah) (77%), and Balkh (77%).

¹⁸² Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Respondents get most of their information about government services from the radio (51%), friends/family (41%), television (39% overall, 86% in Mazar-e Sharif), and elders (31%).¹⁸³ The greatest area of increase has been in television usage, which increased by 12% from 27% of respondents in Wave 3.

¹⁸³ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percentage of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Annex

CCI-IOM Governance Model 1

Response: Q-8. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion. (The Afghan government is well regarded in this area.)

$q8 \sim q2at + q2bt + q5_1at + q5_1ct + q6_1ct + q6_1bt + q14at + q14et + q23t + q32t + d4at + q11at + q11ct + q11dt$

	B	SE	Sig	Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-0.183	0.044	*	0.83	0.76	0.91
Security	0.464	0.056	*	1.59	1.43	1.77
More Secure than last year	0.3	0.059	*	1.35	1.2	1.51
Petty Crime	-0.149	0.061	*	0.86	0.77	0.97
Violent Crime	-0.504	0.077	*	0.6	0.52	0.7
Presence - ANP	0.203	0.04	*	1.23	1.13	1.33
Presence - Arbaki	0.16	0.049	*	1.17	1.07	1.29
District officials from district	0.738	0.038	*	2.09	1.94	2.25
District officials visit area	0.672	0.038	*	1.96	1.82	2.11
Corruption a problem	-0.11	0.038	*	0.9	0.83	0.97
Local prices since last year	0.13	0.04	*	1.14	1.05	1.23
Literate	0.161	0.044	*	1.18	1.08	1.28
Ability: Dist. Governor	0.14	0.058	*	1.15	1.03	1.29
Ability: Local Leaders	0.37	0.05	*	1.45	1.31	1.6
Ability: Provincial Governor	0.496	0.066	*	1.64	1.45	1.87

CCI-IOM Security Model 2

Response: Q-2a. Would you say security in your local area is good, fair or poor? Is that 'very good/poor'? (Very Good)

q2at ~ q5_1at + q5_1bt + q6_1bt + q6_1ct + q6_1ft + q14at + q23t + d9 + as.factor(m2)

	B	SE	Sig	95% CI for odds ratio		
				Odds Ratio	Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-1.145	0.05	*	0.32	0.29	0.35
Petty Crime	-0.199	0.067	*	0.82	0.72	0.93
Serious Non Violent Crime	-0.167	0.077	*	0.85	0.73	0.98
Presence - Arbaki	-0.381	0.054	*	0.68	0.61	0.76
Presence - ANP	0.738	0.037	*	2.09	1.94	2.25
Presence - ISAF	0.46	0.172	*	1.58	1.13	2.21
District officials from district	0.208	0.04	*	1.23	1.14	1.33
Corruption a problem	-0.268	0.038	*	0.76	0.71	0.82
Income	-0.01	0.001	*	0.99	0.99	0.99
Wave 4	-0.048	0.044		0.95	0.87	1.04
Wave 5	-0.375	0.046	*	0.69	0.63	0.75

Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ)

Introduction

The Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) project targets seven districts in Kandahar province in southern Afghanistan, seeking to strengthen and diversify legal rural livelihoods by identifying and addressing the root causes and sources of instability that lead to opium poppy cultivation.¹⁸⁴ Kandahar Province is a major center of illicit opium poppy cultivation, second only to neighboring Helmand.¹⁸⁵

The KFZ survey was first fielded in Wave 3, which served as the baseline for this study. The sampling for Wave 5 of the KFZ survey was done differently from previous waves: the special KFZ module was administered as a separate questionnaire only to farming households. It was run separately from the main MISTI trends questionnaire. Both questionnaires were fielded in the same sampling points, but to different respondents. Questions in the KFZ survey were asked only to heads of household, as these individuals are most likely to be familiar with the household's farming activities and overall economic situation. The program's target districts in which fieldwork took place are:

TABLE 5.10: KFZ DISTRICTS

PROVINCE	DISTRICT	SAMPLE SIZE
Panjwa'i	554	105
Zharay	560	105
Maiwand	240	105
Shah Wali Kot	237	105
Arghistan	239	105
Dand	558	105
Takhtapol	240	105

It should be noted that fieldwork in Maiwand, Shah Wali Kot, and Arghistan was conducted entirely by Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC), while fieldwork in the other districts was conducted entirely by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR). Differences exist in the field implementation and quality control measures used for the AYC interviews, which may impact some survey results. For detailed descriptions of these differences, refer to the full Methodology Report for MISTI Wave 5. ACSOR regularly updates its accessibility tracker. This tracker indicates accessibility of districts for the field staff and the reasons for inaccessibility, such as insecurity or transportation. Villages in the three aforementioned districts were inaccessible to ACSOR probability sampling due to Taliban presence in most parts of those districts.

¹⁸⁴ USAID Award Letter. Online: <http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/AID-306-A-13-00008-KFZ.pdf>.

¹⁸⁵ *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012: Summary Findings*. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics. Online: http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Summary_Findings_FINAL.pdf.

The sample for the main survey was 64% male and 36% female – this was because interviews with female respondents were impossible in the districts where AYC conducted fieldwork. The samples in the districts where fieldwork was conducted by ACSOR were split evenly between men and women. All respondents for the KFZ survey were male.

The following sections provide summary and detailed information about the attitudes and opinions of respondents living in districts targeted by the KFZ project. The report compares findings across all five waves of research to examine trends in stabilization and shifts in development indicators on the following topics: governance, service provision and development, community cohesion and resilience, quality of life, rule of law, security and crime, corruption, economic activity, grievances, and media. Analysis of the separate survey administered to farming households in the target districts is also included.

OVERVIEW


Kandahar Province is a major center of illicit opium poppy cultivation, second only to neighboring Helmand. The Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) project targets seven districts in Kandahar province in southern Afghanistan, seeking to strengthen and diversify legal rural livelihoods by identifying and addressing the root causes and sources of instability that lead to opium poppy cultivation.

The sampling for Wave 5 of the KFZ survey was done differently from previous waves: the special KFZ module was administered as a separate questionnaire only to farming households. It was run separately from the main MISTI trends questionnaire. Both questionnaires were fielded in the same sampling points, but to different respondents.

GOVERNANCE

Opinions of the Afghan government have improved noticeably since the previous wave: 86% of respondents agree that the Afghan government is well-regarded in their area, up from 76% in Wave 4.

Confidence in the **district governor** and local leaders has seen little change since the previous wave, while confidence in the **district government** has risen and confidence in the **provincial government** has dropped.



Views of the district government have improved since Wave 4, with 76% now expressing confidence in it, compared with 60% in the previous wave. However, opinions of the district governor have not seen commensurate improvement.



Respondents are more likely to say that the district governor and district government are improving their ability to get things done. Majorities agree that their ability to get things done has improved over the last year.

SERVICE PROVISION AND DEVELOPMENT

USAID programs conducted under the auspices of the KFZ program focus mainly on improving irrigation and water systems, providing agricultural assistance, and providing capacity-building and vocational training, with the aim of address the root causes of opium poppy cultivation and steer farmers towards licit crops. However, these efforts seem to have met with mixed success so far, as only about one-third of respondents feel that government services have improved in the past year.



Water and Irrigation



Farming



Vocational Training

Aside from drinking water and water for irrigation, the majority in KFZ districts are dissatisfied with other district government services.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Although respondents' satisfaction with their life as a whole has been falling since Wave 3 when the KFZ survey was first fielded, satisfaction with their household's financial situation has been rising. Respondents are evenly split as to whether their ability to meet basic needs has increased or stayed the same: 38% say that it has increased, and another 38% say it has stayed the same. Twenty-four percent say it has decreased.

SECURITY

Security continues to decline in Wave 5. The percentage of respondents who report good security in their area has **dropped 15%**. Most respondents feel secure in their homes during the day and in their homes during the night. Fewer feel secure traveling to a neighboring village or to the district or provincial capital.



KFZ ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURAL LIVELIHOODS SURVEY

The KFZ Alternative Agricultural Livelihoods Survey was fielded in the same sampling points as the main trends survey, but to a different, smaller group of respondents. Heads of household were asked if their household farmed any land, and if they answered in the affirmative, they were asked a series of questions about their farming activities. Most farmers own at least some of the land they farm, but farm sizes tend to be relatively small.

Farmers are split as to whether people in their area farm crops and rear livestock mainly for their own consumption or for the market, with the former being slightly more


common.

Farmers were also asked how much in Afghani they had earned from selling various crops or types of animals. The survey found that a kilogram of poppy or marijuana can bring in many times more Afghani than the most common licit crops, namely wheat and sweet corn. While Kandahar province is arid, most of the population lives in or near river valleys where water scarcity is less acute. However, the shortage of arable land means that farmers are under pressure to grow the crop that will give them the highest earnings from the smallest amount of land under cultivation, and in many cases this means growing poppy or marijuana.

Wheat is the most commonly reported crop being grown by respondents in all districts (grown by 91% of farmers in KFZ districts). Sheep and onions are the next most common, being farmed by 66% and 50% respectively. In terms of illicit crops, 24% report growing poppy, while 12% say that they grow marijuana. Poppy production is said to be most prevalent in Zharay, where 59% of respondents grow at least some, and least common in Shah Wali Kot, where only 1% report that they grow poppy. Marijuana is also most often grown in Zharay (29%).

Of the respondents that were surveyed, **24% of farmers self-reported growing poppy.**

Legend




Governance

Opinions of the Afghan government have improved noticeably since the previous wave: 86% of respondents agree that the Afghan government is well-regarded in their area, up from 76% in Wave 4. Respondents in Shah Wali Kot take the most positive view of the government, with 97% saying it is well-regarded, while those in Dand feel most negatively towards it (79%).

FIGURE 5.100: CONFIDENCE IN LOCAL LEADERS AND DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

Confidence in the district governor and local leaders has seen little change since the previous wave, while confidence in the district government has risen and confidence in the provincial governor has dropped.



Views of the district government have improved since Wave 4, with 76% now expressing confidence in it, compared with 60% in the previous wave.¹⁸⁶ However, opinions of the district governor have not seen commensurate improvement. The district government is best-regarded in Shah Wali Kot, with virtually all respondents (99%) expressing “a lot of confidence” or “some confidence” in it, a surprising finding given the district’s poor security situation. It is important to remember that fieldwork in Shah Wali Kot was conducted by AYC, which was compelled to use non-random sampling to conduct interviews. Those in Dand and Arghistan have the least confidence in their district government (69% “a lot” or “some” confidence in both).


Since the KFZ survey was first fielded in Wave 3, the district government has been perceived as becoming more responsive to the needs of local people, while the provincial governor is seen as becoming less responsive.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁶ Figure 5.100: (Q9) W4 n=3,015 | W5 n=2,628

¹⁸⁷ Figure 5.101: (Q10) W3 n=3,169 | W4 n=3,015 | W5 n=2,628

FIGURE 5.101: RESPONSIVENESS OF LOCAL LEADERS AND DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

The perceived responsiveness of the district government has been rising, while that of the provincial governor has been falling.



Respondents in Shah Wali Kot are most likely to say that their district governor (94%), district government (92%), and provincial governor (75%) are responsive. They are equally likely as respondents in Arghistan to believe that their local village and neighborhood leaders are responsive (85% in both districts), surpassing all others. Respondents in Maiwand are least likely to feel that their district governor and district government are responsive (43% and 64% respectively). Those in Takhtapol (58%) are least likely to say that local and village leaders are responsive.


Respondents are more likely to say that the district governor and district government are improving their ability to get things done. Majorities agree that their ability to get things done has improved over the last year. Again, respondents in Shah Wali Kot are most likely to believe that their district government and district governor have improved their effectiveness. KFZ respondents are more divided when it comes to the ability of local leaders and the provincial governor to get things done: just under half (49%) say that the effectiveness of local leaders is improving, while 29% say it is staying the same and about one-fifth (21%) say it is getting worse; meanwhile, only about one-third (34%) believe that the provincial governor's ability to get things done is improving, while 26% say it is getting worse. As of Wave 5, respondents are less likely to believe that the ability of district governors, local village and neighborhood leaders, and the provincial governor are improving their ability to get things done than they were in Waves 3 and 4.¹⁸⁸

Figure 5.102: Ability of Local Leaders and District and Provincial Government to Get Things Done

¹⁸⁸ Figure 5.102: (Q11) W3 n=3,169 | W4 n=3,015 | W5 n=2,628

FIGURE 5.102: ABILITY OF LOCAL LEADERS AND DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT TO GET THINGS DONE

Fewer respondents now say that the ability of the **district government, district governor, and provincial governor** to get things done has improved.




Awareness of the District Development Assembly (DDA) in KFZ districts continues to be strong, with just under three-fourths of respondents (73%) saying that they know about one in their area. Respondents in Shah Wali Kot (95%) are most likely to be aware of the DDA, while those in Dand (61%) are least likely. However, awareness of the DDA has not resulted in increased confidence in it: among those aware of the DDA (n=1,931), the percentage who express confidence in the DDA has been falling precipitously since Wave 3, when it was 76%, to just 48% in Wave 5. Confidence in DDAs varies widely by district, ranging from a low of 8% in Maiwand to a high of 87% in Shah Wali Kot. The perceived responsiveness of the DDA fell from Wave 4 to Wave 5, from 61% (“very” or “somewhat” responsive) to 52%. Paradoxically, despite falling confidence and responsiveness, respondents believe that the DDA’s ability to get things done is improving, with the percentage who say that the DDA’s ability to get things done has improved “a lot” or “a little” jumping from 33% in Wave 4 to 50% in Wave 5.

Knowledge of the Community Development Council (CDC) is at similar levels to that of the DDA (74%). Similarly, it suffers from lack of confidence, with only 45% expressing “some” or “a lot” of confidence in it, a finding similar to the Wave 4 results, but down from the 85% found in Wave 3. Although only about a third of respondents (32%) think that their CDC is “very” or “somewhat” responsive, they nevertheless feel that its ability to get things done is improving (61% “improved a lot” or “improved a little”, up from 35% in Wave 4).¹⁸⁹ Although wide gaps among districts existed in the perceived responsiveness of CDCs, ranging from a high of 59% in Shah Wali Kot to a low of 2% in Arghistan, there was less variation in respondents’ assessments of CDCs’ effectiveness.

¹⁸⁹ Figure 5.103: (Q11) W3 n=3,169 | W4 n=3,015 | W5 n=2,628


FIGURE 5.103: RESPONSIVENESS OF DDAS AND CDCS



While most respondents believe that their district government officials are from the district (76%), that district government officials visit the area (74%), that the district government delivers basic services in a fair manner (64%), that the district government understands the problems of people in the area (58%), and that it cares about people in the area (53%). A majority of respondents also believe that district government officials abuse their authority to make money for themselves (57%), and that district government officials are not doing their jobs honestly (26% say that they are). It should be borne in mind that only 47% say it is acceptable to criticize the Afghan government in public, which may impact respondents’ willingness to answer survey questions truthfully.

FIGURE 5.104: ABUSE OF AUTHORITY IN KFZ DISTRICTS

Although most respondents affirm positive characteristics of the district government, More than half of respondents believe that district government officials abuse their authority to make money, and only a minority believe that officials do their jobs honestly.



Service Provision and Development

USAID programs conducted under the auspices of the KFZ program focus mainly on improving irrigation and water systems, providing agricultural assistance, and providing capacity-building and vocational training. All of these services aim to address the root causes of opium poppy cultivation and steer farmers towards licit crops. However, these efforts seem to have met with mixed success so far, as only about one-third of respondents feel that government services have improved in the past year (33%, down from 40% in Wave 4). Meanwhile, another third (35%) feel that services are staying about the same, and yet another third feel they are getting worse (32%). Respondents are more satisfied with the provision of water for irrigation than they were last wave (55% “very” or “somewhat” satisfied, up from 44%), while satisfaction with agricultural assistance has declined from 50% to 44%. Satisfaction with retaining and flood walls has risen from 33% in Wave 4 to 39% in Wave 5, and satisfaction with roads and bridges has seen a similar improvement.

Aside from drinking water and water for irrigation (63% and 55% “very” and “somewhat” satisfied respectively), most respondents in KFZ districts are dissatisfied with other district government services. Fifty-eight percent of respondents in KFZ districts are dissatisfied with the district government’s provision of retaining and flood walls, down from 65% in Wave 4, and another 58% express dissatisfaction with the roads and bridges in their district (down from 64% in Wave 4). Most KFZ respondents are dissatisfied with education for both boys (68%) and girls (67%). Only 15% are satisfied with the district government’s provision of electricity, while 80% are dissatisfied. Five percent report that the service is not provided at all. However, this represents an improvement of sorts from Wave 4, when 12% said no electricity was provided.

A slight majority of respondents (54%) say they have not seen or heard about any development projects in their local area in the past year. Of those who have heard about development projects in their area (n=1,194), 70% have heard about projects related to irrigation and water maintenance systems, and just under two-thirds (64%) have heard about projects related to agricultural assistance. Fifty-six percent have heard about projects related to farm produce processing or storage facilities. Respondents in Panjwa’i are most likely to have heard for projects related to irrigation/water maintenance systems and agricultural assistance (83% and 77% respectively). Those in Maiwand are most likely to have heard about projects related to farm produce processing or storage facilities (84%), and those in Arghistan are most likely to have heard about projects related to retaining and flood walls (81%). Respondents in Shah Wali Kot, are most likely to have heard about development projects in their area (86%).

Respondents in KFZ districts are most likely to believe that projects related to drinking water (69%) and schools (67%) improved life for people in their area. Projects related to roads and bridges and medical facilities were also said to improve life more than project activities prioritized in the KFZ program, namely those relating to agricultural assistance, farm produce processing stations, irrigation, and retaining and flood walls. This raises the question of whether or not the project activities being implemented under the auspices of the KFZ project are the most effective ones to further the project’s objectives. Among the services most relevant to helping rural communities to build licit livelihoods, respondents in Panjwa’i are most likely to say that projects related to irrigation and water management improved life for people in their area (56%), those in Arghistan are most likely to say that agricultural

assistance made peoples' lives better (57%), those in Dand and Zharay are most likely to say that projects to build farm produce and storage facilities (48% in both), and respondents in Maiwand were most prone to state that retaining and flood walls improved the lives of people in their area (71%). Since Wave 3, there has been a noticeable decline in the perception that these types of projects improve the lives of local people.

When asked what projects are most needed in their area, respondents are most likely to mention road construction (30%), clinics (24%), education and school (24%), electricity (20%), and water (13%).¹⁹⁰ This suggests that road construction may be an effective use of USAID resources for future programming in Kandahar province. The need for road construction is felt most acutely in Shah Wali Kot, where nearly half of respondents (49%) say that it is one of the most needed types of development projects. Relatively fewer respondents in KFZ districts named assistance to farmers/agriculture (6%), water for irrigation (6%), cold storage for fruit (2%), or anti-flood walls (1%).

Respondents were also asked about the main impediments to receiving healthcare or medicine. Most commonly cited were lack of clinics and hospitals (34%), lack of professional doctors (31%), lack of medicines (25%), distance to facilities/lack of transportation (22%), and poor security (19%).¹⁹¹ Lack of clinics and hospitals is particularly acute in Arghistan, where half (50%) of respondents cite this as a barrier to receiving healthcare.

Community Cohesion and Resilience

Relatively few respondents say that things from outside the village “often” or “sometimes” cause problems (15%). The vast majority (79%) say that they “never” do. When respondents were asked what types of outside interferences cause problems in their village/neighborhood, the most common responses include:¹⁹²

- Ethnic disputes (18%)
- Disputes over land (14%)
- Existence/presence of Taliban (13%)
- Disputes over water (11%, down from 25%)
- Small crimes/theft (9%)

Very few respondents in any of the three districts sampled by AYC were willing to acknowledge any external interferences as causes of problems: in Maiwand, Shah Wali Kot, and Arghistan, over 90% of

¹⁹⁰ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

¹⁹¹ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

¹⁹² This question was only asked of respondents who answered “often,” “sometimes,” or “rarely” when asked how often outside factors create problems in their area (n=531). Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

respondents said that outside interferences “never” cause problems in their area. Respondents in Panjwa’i were most likely among all those in KFZ districts to cite the presence of Taliban as a cause of problems (29%). Those in Maiwand and Arghistan are most likely to mention disputes over water (75% and 71% respectively, though the very small n-sizes of 12 for Maiwand and 7 for Arghistan in this sub-sample should be borne in mind when interpreting results).

Fifty-five percent of respondents say that people in their area are “often” or “sometimes” able to solve problems that come from outside the village, up from 50% in Wave 4 and 47% in Wave 3. Only 5% say that they are never able to do so.

Most respondents say that things from inside their village or neighborhood “never” create problems which disrupt normal life (79%). Twenty-one percent of respondents say that things from within the village “often”, “sometimes”, or “rarely” cause problems, compared with 79% who “never” do. As with external interferences, very few respondents in Maiwand, Shah Wali Kot, and Arghistan - the districts sampled by AYC – acknowledged internal interferences creating problems. When respondents were asked what types of internal interferences cause problems in their village/neighborhood, the most common responses include:¹⁹³

- Disputes over land (30%)
- Disputes over water (20%)
- Ethnic disputes (17%)
- Family problems (15%)
- Disputes over heritage (13%)

Most respondents (62%) say that people in their area are “often” or “sometimes” able to solve problems that come from within the village, up slightly from the 58% found in Wave 4, but still down from the 68% reported in Wave 3. Only 2% say that they can “never” solve such problems.


Sixty-three percent of respondents say that villages and neighborhoods in their area “often” or “sometimes” come together to resolve problems, a finding similar to previous waves. This ranges from a high of 98% in Shah Wali Kot to a low of 43% in Maiwand.

¹⁹³ This question was only asked of respondents who answered “often,” “sometimes,” or “rarely” when asked how often outside factors create problems in their area (n=553). Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

A slight majority of respondents (52%) say that local leaders “often” or “sometimes” consider the interests of ordinary people when making decisions, down slightly from the 58% found in Wave 4. Respondents in Shah Wali Kot are most likely to say that local leaders consider their interests (86% “often” or “sometimes”), while those in Maiwand are least likely to say so (26%). There was a substantial rise in the percentage of respondents who say that local leaders consider the interests of women when making decisions: 64% say that they “always” or “sometimes” do, up from 51% in Wave 4.¹⁹⁴

FIGURE 5.105: INTERESTS CONSIDERED BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHEN MAKING DECISIONS

Respondents in Shah Wali Kot are most likely to believe that local leaders consider the interests of ordinary people. Those in Dand are most likely to say that local leaders consider the interests of women.



Only 7% of respondents say that they belong to groups where people get together to discuss issues of common interest or do certain activities together. Those who do (n=184) are most likely to be members of business companies (45%), farmers unions (33%), or development councils (24%).

¹⁹⁴ Figure 5.105: (Q37a) W5 n=2,628 , (Q37b) W5 n=1,953

Quality of Life

Although respondents' satisfaction with their life as a whole has been falling since Wave 3 when the KFZ survey was first fielded, satisfaction with their household's financial situation has been rising. Satisfaction with life as a whole was highest in Shah Wali Kot (82% "very" or "somewhat" satisfied) and lowest in Arghistan (28%). Satisfaction with household financial situation showed less variation, from 77% in Arghistan to 65% in Takhtapol. These paradoxical results, especially in Arghistan, may relate to non-financial aspects of well-being, particularly security – Arghistan had the lowest percentage of respondents who said that security in their area was good or very good (10%). The reasons why Arghistan enjoys such relative financial comfort despite a poor security situation require further study.


Respondents are evenly split as to whether their ability to meet basic needs has increased or stayed the same: 38% say that it has increased "a lot" or "a little", and another 38% say it has stayed the same. Twenty-four percent say it has decreased. The percentage of respondents who say that their ability to meet basic needs has increased has been dropping, from 54% ("increased a lot" or "increased a little") in Wave 3 to 38% in Wave 5. Respondents are slightly less worried about their ability to meet basic needs over the next year: 34% say that they are not worried in Wave 5, compared with 28% in Wave 4. There has also been a rise in the share of respondents who feel that the situation in their area is certain enough to make plans for the future: 69% now feel this way, up sharply from 45% in the previous wave.

Rule of Law

Since Wave 4, there has been a sharp increase in the percentage of respondents who would turn to a government court to get justice in cases of disputes involving land and water, theft, and violent crime. Fewer respondents would seek restitution from local or tribal elders, and government courts are now the preferred means of restitution for all types of disputes except theft.¹⁹⁵

FIGURE 5.106: SATISFACTION WITH QUALITY OF LIFE IN KFZ DISTRICTS


Wave 5: (KFZ) Satisfied with Quality of Life (Q6)



¹⁹⁵ Figure 5.107: (Q20A-C) W3 n=3,169 | W4 n=3,015 | W5 n=2,628

FIGURE 5.107: CHOICES FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN KFZ DISTRICTS

More respondents would use a government court to resolve disputes, particularly one relating to land or water or assault, murder, or kidnapping.




Confidence in both government courts and armed opposition groups to resolve disputes has been rising, while confidence in local and tribal elders has been falling. Despite this, respondents continue to have the most confidence in tribal leaders’ ability to resolve disputes fairly. Confidence in government courts rose from 74% “a lot of confidence” or “some confidence” in Wave 4 to 78% in Wave 5. In the same period, confidence in armed opposition groups also rose from 43% to 50%, and confidence in local leaders to resolve disputes fell from 90% to 74%. Confidence in both local leaders and government courts to resolve disputes is highest in Shah Wali Kot (100% and 95% “very” or “somewhat” confident respectively). Confidence in armed opposition groups to resolve disputes fairly is highest in Arghistan (77%), and lowest in Panjwa’i (42%).

Decisions by local and tribal leaders are most likely to be respected, followed by those made by government courts. Decisions by armed opposition groups are least likely to be respected, with 9% saying that they “always” are, and 30% saying that they “sometimes” are. Respect for decisions made by government courts and local elders are highest in Shah Wali Kot, where almost all respondents (97% and 95% respectively) say that these decisions are “always” or “mostly” respected. Respondents in Maiwand are most likely to say that decisions by armed opposition groups are “always” or “mostly” respected (55%).¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁶ Figure 5.108: (Q22A-C) W5 n=2,628

FIGURE 5.108: RESPECT FOR DECISIONS MADE DURING DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Respondents in KFZ districts *always* or *mostly* respect the decisions made by local elders and government courts. They are less likely to respect decisions made by government courts.



Security

Security has continued to decline in Wave 5, albeit at a much slower rate than the drop seen from Wave 3 to Wave 4: the percentage who say that security is “good” or “very good” now sits at 46%, down from the 60% originally found in the Wave 3 baseline. Respondents in Shah Wali Kot rate their security as best (73% “good” or “very good”), a surprising finding considering the district’s poor accessibility, the presence of Taliban fighters in much of the district, and continued fighting between the Taliban and the ANSF.

Farmers appear to be more likely to grow poppy in districts with poor security and weak ANA and ANP presence. Shah Wali Kot has the lowest proportion of farmers who report growing poppy, or at least who acknowledge doing so (1%), and respondents in this district are also most likely to say that there are “a lot” of ANA or ANP. By contrast, farmers in Zharay, which has lower ANA and ANP presence, are most likely (59%).

Despite worsened perceptions of security overall, respondents are more likely to say that their area is more secure than it was one year ago: 49% of respondents in Wave 5 feel this way (“much more secure” or “somewhat more secure”), up from the 43% who held this opinion in Wave 4. Respondents in Dand and Shah Wali Kot are most likely to say that their area has become more secure over the past year (61% in both), while those in Arghistan are most likely to say it has become less secure (41% “somewhat less secure” or “much less secure”).


Sixty-six percent of respondents in KFZ districts say that security on the roads in their area is “good” or “very good”, a figure which has been increasing slowly since the baseline. A plurality say that security on the roads has improved (48% “a lot” or “a little”), while another 37% say it has stayed the same. Only 15% say that security on the roads in their area has worsened.

Most respondents feel secure in their homes during the day (87% “very” or “somewhat” secure) and in their homes during the night (75%). Fewer feel secure traveling to a neighboring village (57%) or to the

district or provincial capital (43%).¹⁹⁷ In particular, the percentage that feels secure traveling to a neighboring village fell from 71% in Wave 4 to 57% in Wave 5. Respondents in Takhtapol feel most secure traveling to the district or provincial capital (51% “very secure” or “somewhat secure”), while those in Arghistan feel least secure when undertaking such journeys (27%).

FIGURE 5.109: PERCEPTION OF SECURITY AT HOME AND WHEN TRAVELING

Respondents feel most secure in their homes during the day, and least secure traveling to the district or provincial capital.



Since Wave 3, the reported prevalence of petty crime and serious non-violent crime has seen little overall change, despite a dip in Wave 4. The perceived level of serious, non-violent crime has risen slightly, from 28% in Wave 3 to 33% in Wave 5, while the level of serious violent crime has fallen sharply: 24% said there was “a lot” of serious violent crime in Wave 3, compared with only 14% who say so in Wave 5. Respondents in Maiwand are most likely to say that there is “a lot” of serious violent crime (18%), while those in Takhtapol are least likely to say so (8%).


Respondents generally feel that the level of non-violent crime has been dropping: 68% of respondents in Wave 5 say that there is less petty crime than there was last year (“much less” or “a little less”), up from 56% who felt this way in Wave 4. More than half of respondents feel that there is less serious non-violent crime than there was one year ago (52%). Respondents are split as to whether the amount of violent crime has decreased (39% “a little less” or “much less”) or stayed the same (37%). Respondents in Dand are most likely to say that violent crime has decreased (54%), while those in Maiwand are most likely to say that it has increased (40% “a little more” or “much more”).

The percentage who say there are “a lot” of Afghan National Army soldiers, Afghan National Police, and armed opposition groups all rose from Wave 4 to Wave 5, while the percentage who say there are “a lot” of Afghan Local Police fell, and the share who say there are “a lot” of Arbakai held steady.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁷ Figure 5.109: (Q4) W5 n=2,628

¹⁹⁸ Figure 5.110: (Q6_1) W3 n=3,169 | W4 n=3,015 | W5 n=2,628

FIGURE 5.110: PRESENCE OF ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN KFZ DISTRICTS



Oddly, the presence of ISAF forces reportedly increased from Wave 4 to Wave 5, even though Wave 5 was conducted during the final stage of the drawdown of international forces in Afghanistan, and although a small number of international forces remain deployed to Kandahar as part of Operation Resolute Support (RS), it is unlikely that rural respondents will have much contact with these forces. This was primarily due to a very high percentage of respondents in Shah Wali Kot (60%) who said that there were a lot of ISAF forces in their area, a somewhat doubtful finding. It should again be remembered that fieldwork in Shah Wali Kot was fielded by AYC to a non-random sample, and the respondents who AYC was able to speak to in light of the district's poor security situation may not have been representative of the population in that district.


Presence of Armed Opposition Groups is highest in Shah Wali Kot (65% "a lot") – which may partly explain the higher-than-expected ISAF presence, if ISAF forces had been deployed due to heightened insurgent activity – and lowest in Dand (16%), which is logical given its proximity to the provincial center.

Confidence in the ANA and ANP to keep the area safe has seen little change: 69% of respondents in Wave 5 say that they have "a lot of confidence" in the ANA's ability to keep their area safe, similar to the 70% found in Wave 4. Confidence in the ANP has also remained at a similar level: 51% of respondents in Wave 5 say that they have "a lot of confidence" or "some confidence" in its ability to maintain security, compared with 54% in Wave 4. Respondents in Shah Wali Kot had the most confidence in both the ANA and ANP to keep their area safe.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁹ Figure 5.112: (Q6_2) W5 n=2,628

FIGURE 5.111: PRESENCE OF SECURITY ENTITIES IN KFZ DISTRICTS

The presence of **ANA**, **ANP**, **armed opposition groups**, and **ISAF** has been rising, as more respondents say there are a lot of them in their area. Meanwhile, the presence of **ALP** has been waning.




However, respondents’ perceived ability of the ANA to keep their area safe has fallen from 67% in Wave 4 to 57% in Wave 5. The ability of the ANP to keep the area safe has held steady (54% in Wave 4 and 53% in Wave 5). Respondents in Shah Wali Kot are most likely to say that the ability of the ANA to keep the area safe has improved (89% “improved a lot” or “improved a little”), while those in Dand are most likely to say that the ANP’s ability to maintain security has improved (65%).


FIGURE 5.112: CONFIDENCE IN ANA AND ANP

Respondents have more confidence in the **ANA** to keep the area safe than they do in the **ANP** to do the same.

Confident ANA can keep the area safe



Confident ANP can keep the area safe



Corruption

As is the case throughout Afghanistan, corruption is a major problem in the Kandahar Food Zone districts. Seventy-one percent of respondents say that corruption is a problem in their area. Although this number is down from the 89% found in Wave 4, it is still cause for concern. Corruption erodes trust in government and weakens government institutions and security forces. This may weaken the

effectiveness of counter-narcotics measures and lead to social acceptance of illegal behaviors such as growing poppy.

Respondents were also asked to name the department or sector of local government which people most complain about being corrupt. Most frequently named were the police (10%), followed by the district office (8%), the courts (6%), and the municipality (6%).


Economic Activity

While access to local markets is seen as either improving (56%) or staying the same (28%), the prices in those markets are perceived to be increasing, with 62% saying that prices have increased “a lot” or “a little” over the past year up from 50% in Wave 4 and 32% in Wave 3. Perceptions that prices have increased are most widespread in Maiwand, where 84% say that they have “increased a lot” or “increased a little”.

Respondents are increasingly feeling that fewer paid jobs are available in their area. Thirty-seven percent of respondents in Wave 5 felt this way, up from 24% in Wave 4.²⁰⁰ Another 32% felt that the number of available paid jobs had stayed about the same. Respondents in Arghistan (75%) are most likely to say that fewer paid jobs are available.

FIGURE 5.113: ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN KFZ DISTRICTS

The perceptions that the prices of basic goods have increased and that the availability of paid jobs have decreased have both been becoming more prevalent.



The declining availability of paid jobs and the rising prices in markets may be impacting respondents’ likelihood of growing poppy due to a lack of other economic alternatives, but more research needs to be done to explore this relationship.

²⁰⁰ Figure 5.113: (Q32-33) W3 n=3,169 | W4 n=3,015 | W5 n=2,628

Grievances

Grievances vary when respondents are asked to identify the biggest problems that create stress or tension in their area. The most common responses include unemployment (30%), insecurity (27%), lack of electricity (15%), corruption (11%), lack of drinking water (10%), and illiteracy (10%).²⁰¹

Unemployment was most frequently mentioned in Arghistan, where 47% said it was a major cause of stress or tension. Insecurity was most often cited in Maiwand, where 44% said that it was a major source of tension. Corruption was most frequently mentioned as a source of tension in Shah Wali Kot (49%).

Media

Respondents most often use radio (98%), friends and family (95%), and elders (82%) to communicate with others and/or get news and information. Many also use the mosque/mullah (63%). Fewer respondents mention using cell phones (32%) or television (16%). Very few get their information from posters/billboards (3%), newspapers (2%) or the Internet or e-mail (1%) for communication.

Respondents get most of their information about government services from the radio (63%). Other sources include friends/family (11%), elders (10%), television (8%), and the Mosque/Mullah (6%).

²⁰¹ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

6. KFZ ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURAL LIVELIHOODS SURVEY

Introduction

The KFZ Alternative Agricultural Livelihoods Survey was fielded in the same sampling points as the main trends survey, but to a different, smaller group of respondents. One-hundred-and-five heads of household farmers in each of the seven KFZ districts were asked a series of questions about their farming activities, as well as the activities of other farmers in their area, prices of agricultural goods, and other related topics.

Farm Ownership and Size

Most farmers own at least some of the land they farm. The survey found that 82% of farmers own land. Many farmers also lease or rent (42%) or sharecrop (26%) land. Sharecropping arrangements are most common in Maiwand (51%) despite near-universal land ownership in that district (99%). The rate of land ownership is lowest in Shah Wali Kot (52%).²⁰²

Farm sizes tend to be relatively small. The average amount of land owned among farmers who own any land (n=604) is 11.31 jeribs. For perspective, 1 Afghan jerib is equal to 0.4942 acres or 0.2 hectares. However, a small number of large landowners skew these results somewhat, as 72% of landowning farmers own 10 jeribs or land or less, and the median amount of land owned is 8 jeribs. The average amount of land leased is 9.43 jeribs, with a median of 6 jeribs. The mean amount of land sharecropped is 11.16 jeribs, with a median of 7 jeribs. The mean total amount of land farmed, including all land owned, leased, and sharecropped, is 14.19 jeribs, with a median of 10.²⁰³ Most respondents who own land inherited it (81%). A smaller fraction purchased it (16%), and fewer still had it given to them by the village (3%). Only a single respondent received his land through a firmam, or decree of kings.

FIGURE 6.1: FARM OWNERSHIP AND SIZE

Most farms in the target districts are relatively small. The average amount of land farmed tends to be slightly higher than the median due to a small number of large landholders.



²⁰² These reported amounts should be taken in context; financial questions posed to farmers are often misunderstood despite efforts by interviewers to clarify such questions. Low levels of education (73% of KFZ respondents say that they cannot read a letter in their native language), lack of accounting or recording keeping, unfamiliarity with mathematical concepts, and infrequency of thinking about financial matters within year spans can all contribute to respondent misunderstanding of such questions.


²⁰³ Figure 6.1: (K3-4) W5 n=735

Among those who lease, rent, or sharecrop land (n=403), the majority (57%) do not make any payments to the owner. However, it should be noted here that a relatively high percentage of these respondents refuse to say how much they paid or claim not to know (12% “refused” or “don’t know”). Among those who make payments and were willing or able to say how much, payments over 20,000 Afs are most common. These respondents were also asked how much of their crop they give to the landowner to use the land for one year. Twelve percent do not share any of their crop with the landowner, while 56% share three-fifths or less.

Most respondents have some form of written or recorded document which gives them land use or ownership rights to the land they farm. Title documents are most common, followed by lease agreements, sharecropping agreements, or sales agreements. Only 7% do not have a written agreement.²⁰⁴

FIGURE 6.2: LAND USE AND OWNERSHIP AGREEMENTS

Most farmers have some form of written agreement, with title documents being most common.



Irrigation

Almost all farmers’ land is irrigated (98%). The most common sources of irrigation are bore-wells (43%), dams (38%), rivers (37%), and rain (33%).

Subsistence vs. Income Farming

Farmers are split as to whether people in their area farm crops and rear livestock mainly for their own consumption (53%) or for the market (47%), with the former being slightly more common. However, the results show wide variation by district, with almost all respondents in Maiwand raising crops for their own consumption (99%), and all of those interviewed in Shah Wali Kot farming their crops for sale in the market (100%).

²⁰⁴ Figure 6.2: (K8) W5 n=735

Crops Grown, Animals Raised, and Prices

Respondents were asked which three crops people most often grown or animals are most often raised in their area, both for their own consumption and for sale in the market. The most frequently-mentioned crops grown for consumption within the household are wheat (73%), feed corn (35%), sheep (32%), vegetables (19%), and grapes (15%).²⁰⁵ Poppy is mentioned as being grown for in-home consumption by 3% of respondents – this is most common in Zharay (8%). Results differ somewhat when respondents are asked about the main crops that people in their area grow for sale in the market. Most commonly mentioned are wheat (47%), sheep (38%), feed corn (24%), grapes (17%), and pomegranates (15%). Six percent of respondents mention poppy as a main crop that people grow in the market. It was most commonly mentioned by respondents in Dand (13%) and Zharay (12%).

Respondents were also asked about what crops their household most frequently grows for its own consumption and for sale in the market. The most common crops grown for household consumption are wheat (54%), sheep (41%), feed corn (23%), cattle (17%), and vegetables (14%).²⁰⁶ Three percent said that they grow poppy for their own consumption, compared with 4% who say that they raise it to sell in the market. Considering the strong taboo against drug usage in Islamic societies, the actual figure for the former may well be much higher. Growing opium poppy often leads to addiction because it must be harvested by hand: workers use a small knife or razor blade to make an incision in the poppy pod to collect its sap, and many, especially child laborers, become addicted by absorbing opium sap through their skin. If a worker has a cut or open wound, direct exposure to the bloodstream is possible. Passive consumption of opium may occur if a farmer simply walks through a field of scored poppies, and prolonged exposure can lead in turn to addiction. Thus opium farmers can become quite literally addicted to their crop, making it even more difficult for them to stop growing it, even if viable alternatives are available.²⁰⁷

There is likely at least a degree of social desirability bias impacting responses to these items: the past decade has seen widespread anti-poppy campaigns, and Mullahs and Imams have publicly declared that growing and using these crops is a sin. Respondents are being asked to openly admit to activity that their society considers both illegal and immoral, and many may not be willing to do so with an interviewer they do not know.

One might reasonably believe that it is poor farmers who feel compelled to grow poppy even if they are aware of its corrosive effects on society and know that doing so violates Afghan and Islamic Law. After all, poppy prices are much higher than those for most licit crops (see Table 2), and enable a farmer to squeeze the most profit out of a small plot of land. However, statistical testing did not bear this out, and no significant relationship between amount of land held and poppy-growing status was found, indicating that other factors are more important in predicting whether or not a farmer will grow poppy.

²⁰⁵ Respondents were allowed to provide up to three responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

²⁰⁶ Respondents were allowed to provide up to three responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

²⁰⁷ Booth, Martin. *Opium: A History*. St Martin's Press, 1996. Online edition, available: <http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/b/booth-opium.html>.

Among the licit crops grown by households to be sold on the market, wheat is most common (53%), followed by sheep (37%), feed corn (22%), grapes (19%), and cattle (13%).²⁰⁸ Cultivation of grapes is most common in Zharay (51%), Panjwa'i (43%), and Dand (23%), but rare in other districts. Cattle are most commonly raised in Maiwand (36%).

Farmers were also asked how much in Afghanis they had earned from selling various crops or types of animals. The results are summarized in Table 2 below.

TABLE 6.1: CROPS AND PRICES²⁰⁹

CROP GROWN	AMOUNT HOUSEHOLD EARNED FROM SELLING ²¹⁰	CURRENT PRICE (AVERAGE PER KILO OR PER ANIMAL)	EXPECTED PRICE NEXT YEAR (AVERAGE PER KILO OR PER ANIMAL)
Wheat	42,968.99	28.06	28.98
Rice	26,337.78	78.15	79.62
Feed Corn	25,481.17	26.01	26.71
Sweet Corn	18,340.91	26.62	27.15
Barley	23,416.77	26.29	26.56
Poppy	86,000.00	8,540.40	8,794.68
Potato	13,666.67	32.61	32.71
Onion	67688.27	21.75	22.79
Cumin	65,766.30	833.31	901.44
Cannabis	48,000.00	5,700.79	5,694.73
Alfalfa	81,200.00	10.53	11.72
Melon	67,533.10	38.78	39.61
Water melon	41,944.83	38.46	38.87
Pomegranates	109,147.98	54.20	55.62
Grapes	66,357.66	47.37	48.55
Cows (Cattle)	72,286.45	55,675.59	55,274.92
Sheep	32,802.64	8,398.29	8,641.10
Goats	20,565.30	6,051.23	6,885.45
Fig	62,250.00	388.94	395.47

As can be seen from the table, a kilogram of poppy or marijuana can bring in many times more Afghanis than the most common licit crops, namely wheat and sweet corn.

The types of animals that can be grazed or that can be grown on a given amount of land varies widely based on altitude, water supply, and climate. While Kandahar province is arid, most of the population

²⁰⁸ Respondents were allowed to provide up to three responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

²⁰⁹ Table 6.1: (K16-18) n=735

²¹⁰ Asked of households which named crop, animal, or product as one of the top three items they have sold on the market in the past year.

lives in or near river valleys where water scarcity is less acute. However, the shortage of arable land means that farmers are under pressure to grow the crop that will give them the highest earnings from the smallest amount of land under cultivation, and in many cases this means growing poppy or marijuana. Despite the high prices that could be gained through animal husbandry, this is not a realistic option for many farmers in Kandahar due to the cost of feed. In addition, land used for growing poppy may not be suitable for other crops or grazing animals.

However, a predictive logistical regression model did not find a significant relationship between reported price of poppy and poppy-growing status. It may be the case that non-poppy growing farmers assume that the price of poppy is higher than it actually is. The low overall education level among KFZ respondents should also be borne in mind here, as many may have trouble thinking in terms of large numbers. It should also be noted here that there was a very large spread in the prices that farmers reported for poppy in their area, ranging from a minimum of 2,000 Afs to a maximum of 50,000 Afs, which creates problems with statistical modeling.²¹¹

A majority of farmers felt they had received a “somewhat good” or “very good” price for their crops (64%). Those in Maiwand were most likely to think that they received a bad price (72% “somewhat bad” or “very bad”).

In addition to the crops that they most frequently grow, respondents were also asked to name which crops they grow and which animals they raise from a list:

TABLE 6.2: CROPS GROWN AND ANIMALS RAISED²¹²

CROPS AND ANIMALS	KFZ TOTAL	PANJWA'I	ZHARAY	MAIWAND	SHAH WALI KOT	ARGHISTAN	DAND	TAKHTAPOL
Wheat	92%	93%	92%	100%	93%	79%	92%	96%
Sheep	66%	56%	47%	95%	86%	57%	71%	50%
Onion	50%	52%	66%	30%	87%	29%	46%	38%
Feed Corn	48%	29%	46%	100%	47%	59%	15%	41%
Sweet Corn	39%	39%	35%	93%	15%	32%	10%	51%
Water melon	35%	52%	51%	3%	36%	17%	50%	34%
Cows (Cattle)	34%	53%	29%	33%	21%	45%	37%	23%
Grapes	33%	62%	47%	9%	7%	44%	50%	15%
Melon	32%	35%	30%	5%	41%	20%	34%	60%
Potato	31%	46%	42%	3%	2%	47%	40%	41%
Pomegranates	31%	39%	34%	1%	30%	37%	54%	19%
Alfalfa	27%	33%	16%	2%	71%	10%	28%	30%
Goats	26%	27%	9%	88%	6%	19%	19%	16%
Poppy	24%	42%	59%	12%	1%	13%	34%	10%


²¹¹ Predictive logistic regression Model 2 included in Annex to this chapter.

²¹² Table 6.2: (K19) n=735

CROPS AND ANIMALS	KFZ TOTAL	PANJWA'I	ZHARAY	MAIWAND	SHAH WALI KOT	ARGHISTAN	DAND	TAKHTAPOL
Cumin	23%	33%	35%	3%	44%	6%	23%	17%
Barley	20%	28%	28%	6%	6%	11%	35%	24%
Marijuana (Chaars)	12%	15%	29%	6%	14%	5%	9%	5%
Fig	7%	9%	-	-	27%	2%	8%	1%
Rice	3%	7%	3%	-	4%	2%	3%	6%
Tomato	2%	-	17%	-	-	-	-	-
Vegetables	0%	-	-	-	2%	-	1%	-
Eggplants	0%	-	2%	-	-	-	-	-
Saffron	0%	-	-	-	-	1%	-	-

FIGURE 6.3: FARMERS SELF-REPORTED POPPY GROWTH IN KFZ DISTRICTS

Wave 5: (KFZ) Farmers Self-Reported Poppy Growth (K19_7)



Wheat is the most commonly reported crop being grown by respondents in all districts (grown by 91% of farmers in KFZ districts). Sheep and onions are the next most common, being farmed by 66% and 50% respectively. In terms of illicit crops, 24% report growing poppy, while 12% say that they grow marijuana. Poppy production is said to be most prevalent in Zharay, where 59% of respondents grow at least some, and least common in Shah Wali Kot, where only 1% report that they grow poppy. Marijuana is also most often grown in Zharay (29%).

Statistical modeling found a significant relationship between level of education and poppy-growing status: as education level increases, probability of growing poppy decreases.

The model also found that farmers who think the price of poppy is higher this year than last year are less likely to grow poppy. This unusual result may be due to non-poppy growers not knowing or having been misled about the actual price of poppy in the market. Unsurprisingly, farmers who expect the price of poppy to rise are significantly more likely to grow poppy.²¹³

²¹³ Predictive logistic regression Model 2 included in Annex to this chapter.

Farmers in KFZ districts identify wheat as the most important crop for the economic status of their household (28%), followed by sheep (11%), feed corn (8%), potato (6%), and onion (6%). Five percent identify poppy as the crop they make the most money from, and 12% identify it as one of the three most important. Respondents in Panjwa'i and Zharay are most likely to name poppy as one of their three main sources of money (28% and 24% respectively). No respondents in Shah Wali Kot named poppy as one of their most important crops.

Crop Storage

A majority of respondents (61%) say that they sell their crops within a few days of harvest, while 39% say they store their crops after harvest and before selling them. Of those who say they store at least some of their crops (n=284), 79% say they use a farm bin, shelter or other type of temporary storage unit on [their] farm, while 36% say they use a cold storage facility.

Markets

Farmers who had sold crops, products, or livestock were then asked where they had sold most of their goods. The most common places to sell agricultural goods are at a market in the provincial center (34%) and local markets in the Howsa or in the district center (16% for both). Fewer sell them at a local market in their village (10%), at the farm (9%), alongside the road (5%), or to a cooperative (2%). Respondents in Shah Wali Kot were most likely to sell their goods in the provincial center (80%). Those in Takhtapol are most likely to sell their goods at a market in the district center (25%). The only two districts in which respondents sell their crops to cooperatives are Arghistan (20%) and Shah Wali Kot (4%).

Transport

The most common means of transport to and from market are: tractor and cart (24%) and rickshaw/zaranj (21%). Less common modes of transport are: passenger car (15%), motorcycle (11%), van (6%), bicycle (5%), and draft animal with cart or baskets (3%). Respondents in Maiwand are most likely to use non-motorized forms of transport, with 23% either using a bicycle or a draft animal with carts or baskets.


Agricultural Inputs

The majority of farmers (65%) say they used seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, feed, or paid labor on their farm in the past year. Of those who pay for or receive these agricultural inputs (n=475), most report those items play a “very large” or “medium” role in their economic success. Overall, respondents say that fertilizers play the largest role in their success (87%), while paid labor plays the smallest role (51%).²¹⁴

²¹⁴ Figure 6.4: (K26) W5 n=735

FIGURE 6.4: AGRICULTURAL INPUTS

Respondents identify fertilizers as the most important agricultural input. They assign paid labor the least importance.



Most farmers have trouble accessing the inputs they need. Fertilizers are the most accessible of the items mentioned, but only 17% say they have access to “all” they need, and 16% report that they have no access at all. Access to paid labor continues to be the largest obstacle with which farmers contend: 71% say they have either insufficient access or no access to paid farm labor, while 1% say they have “all” they need, and 23% have access to “some” of what they need.

Just under half of farmers received assistance from outside their household for farming activities in the past year (43%). Among those who received assistance (n=314), the most common sources were International Organizations/NGOs (50%) and the Afghan Government (43%). Fewer received assistance from friends (7%), neighbors (5%), private companies (2%), or the village elder or Malik (1%). The most common types of assistance received were fertilizers (85%) and seeds (71%).

Credit and Finance

About a third of farmers (32%) had attempted to obtain a loan or credit in the past year. Of those who had attempted to obtain a loan (n=235), the vast majority (86%) were successful. Those who obtained loans or credit were most likely to have received them from friends and family (83%), their landlord (54%), a wealthy lender (28%), or a lending group (21%). Few had obtained loans from a bank (6%), the Afghan government (3%), or an international organization or NGO (1%).


Most loans (66%) were above 20,000 Afs, and the average total amount of credit or loans that respondents had taken out was 57,357.45 Afs. Most loans (56%) did not require collateral. Almost all of those that did (n=86) used either land (90%) or property documents (9%). Among those who did not receive a loan (n=34), the most common reasons were that loans were not being provided to anyone (26%), lack of collateral (24%), and lack of trust (21%). However, the small subsample size should be borne in mind when interpreting these results.

Most Needed Assistance

Farmers were asked, in an open-ended question, what type of assistance would be most useful to them in the coming year. Given a total of three possible mentions, 91% mention seeds, 89% cite fertilizer, 54% would like pesticide, 23% need herbicide, and 13% say feed.²¹⁵ Farmers were also asked to rate the relative helpfulness of a variety of potential types of assistance. They were most likely to say that cold storage facilities and canning and packaging factories would be most helpful (“very” and “somewhat” helpful).²¹⁶

FIGURE 6.5: MOST NEEDED ASSISTANCE

Cold storage facilities are seen as the most helpful type of assistance. Spinning mills and drying facilities are seen as less useful.



Biggest Problems

When asked to name their household’s two biggest problems in terms of learning a livelihood, respondents are most likely to mention bad roads (23%), insecurity (16%), lack of markets (12%), lack of fertilizer (11%), and transportation (11%).²¹⁷ Lack of markets is most likely to be mentioned in Shah Wali Kot (36%), which may explain why so many respondents in that district sell their goods in the provincial center. Transportation is most likely to be mentioned in Arghistan. Poor quality seeds were mentioned by many respondents in Shah Wali Kot (43%), but by few in other districts. Lack of pesticides and cold houses were often mentioned in Maiwand (52% and 44% respectively), but very few respondents in other districts identified these as major barriers to earning a livelihood.

Respondents were also asked what types of agricultural activities, animals, or livestock they thought would most improve the well-being of people in their area. Out of a possible three mentions, respondents most often cited wheat (48%), sheep (31%), feed corn (19%), vegetables (13%), and solar

²¹⁵ Respondents were allowed to provide up to three responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

²¹⁶ Figure 6.5: (K39) W5 n=735

²¹⁷ Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

electricity (12%). They were then asked what they would do to make these activities happen if they had the resources. Aside from respondents who gave tautological responses or repeated or listed the names of crops, common responses were improving solar electricity for agricultural activities (13%), cold storage (11%), dams, karez, and canals (10%), and agricultural equipment (8%).

Annex

KFZ Poppy Growing Model

Response: K-19_7. Please tell me if you grow any of the crops or raise any of the animals on your land from the list I will read out. ... Poppy (Grows poppy)

Poppy production

$k19_7 \sim k17a_7 + d3 + k17b_7 + k18bb_7 + TOTAL_LAND$

	B	SE	Sig	Odds Ratio	95% CI for odds ratio	
					Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-0.989	0.16	*	0.37	0.27	0.51
Poppy Price	0	0		1	1	1
Education	-0.112	0.032	*	0.89	0.84	0.95
Poppy price is higher than last year	-0.447	0.222	*	0.64	0.41	0.98
Expects Poppy Price to Rise	0.432	0.205	*	1.54	1.03	2.3
Total land	-0.001	0.005		1	0.99	1.01

7. STABILITY AND RESILIENCE TRENDS

Introduction

This chapter discusses changes in stability and resilience over time at the district level. The metrics used to measure these changes include overall summary measures of stability and resilience, as well as more detailed measures of government capacity, local governance, quality of life, and community cohesion. Together with observational data on violent incidents, accessibility and degree of government control, these metrics illustrate key factors that drive changes in stability and resilience across Afghanistan's regions, provinces, and districts.

The first section of the chapter discusses the Stability Index (SI) and Resilience Index (RI) and their trends over the course of the MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey (MISTI Survey) waves 1-5, which cover a period of roughly two years from September 2012 – December 2014. The stability and resilience scores are then mapped by district, and ranked by the districts with the highest and lowest levels of stability and resilience. The second section presents the sub-component scores and describes the methodology used to compose the overall stability index from various sub-indices, survey questions, and observational data. Subsequent sections present each sub-index using trend line graphs, maps, and bar charts. This combination of graphics displays each district's level of stability and resilience compared to other districts, presents the level of variation in responses, tracks changes in stability and resilience over time, and shows the geographic distribution of key indicators of resilience and stability across USAID's stabilization programming districts.

The Components of Stability and Resilience

Stability and Resilience Indices are used to measure various aspects of the social and political environment that indicate the degree to which a district is stable enough for sustainable development to take place. Stability and resilience are high level constructs whose constituent parts may be disaggregated to identify specific measures of local conditions. Stability is organized according to three component measures, two of which consist of five additional sub-indices. Resilience also consists of three component measures, two of which consist of four additional sub-indices.

The Stability and Resilience Indices share two component measures and two sub-indices. Both stability and resilience are strongly influenced by local governance and quality of life, but government capacity is not a significant factor for resilience, and community cohesion is not a significant factor for stability. Resilience measures local capacity to withstand external shocks and solve local problems. Such concerns have little relevance to measures of government performance and satisfaction that pertain to formal institutions, and are generally foreign to the village context.

The Stability Index is an omnibus measure with 75% of the index value composed of 30 public perception indicators from the MISTI Survey data, and the remaining 25% composed of observational measures. These observational measures include the degree to which government security forces control territory in the vicinity of a survey village (10%), the degree to which the Taliban and other armed opposition groups deny access to the area (10%), and the frequency of violent incidents in the

vicinity of the village (5%) (See Table 7.1 below for details). The Resilience Index is composed of 21 public perception indicators from the MISTI Survey data (See Table 7.2 below for details). Both indices are relational metrics that situate each district surveyed on a continuous scale where “1” is the lowest possible score and “5” is the maximum possible score.

TABLE 7.1: STABILITY INDEX INDICATORS

INDEX	COMPONENT	SUB-INDEX	SURVEY ITEM
1. Stability	1.1 Government Capacity	1.1.1 District Government Performance	1.1.1.1 Confidence - district governor (q9a)
			1.1.1.2 Confidence - district government (q9b)
			1.1.1.3 Responsive - district governor (q10a)
			1.1.1.4 Responsive - district government (q10b)
			1.1.1.5 Get things done - district governor (q11a)
			1.1.1.6 Get things done - district government (q11b)
	1.1.2 District Government Satisfaction	1.1.2.1 District government understands local problems (q14b)	
		1.1.2.2 District government cares about the people (q14c)	
		1.1.2.3 District officials visit the area (q14e)	
	1.1.3 Provincial Government Performance	1.1.3.1 Confidence - provincial governor (q9d)	
1.1.3.2 Responsive - provincial governor (q10d)			
1.1.3.3 Get things done - provincial governor (q11d)			
1.2 Local Governance	1.2.1 DDA-CDC Performance	1.2.1.1 Confidence - DDA (q12b)	
		1.2.1.2 Responsive - DDA (q12c)	
		1.2.1.3 Get things done - DDA (q12d)	
		1.2.1.4 Confidence - CDC (q13b)	
		1.2.1.5 Responsive - CDC (q13c)	
		1.2.1.6 Get things done - CDC (q13d)	
1.2.2 Local Leader Performance	1.2.2.1 Confidence - local leaders (q9c)		
	1.2.2.2 Responsive - local leaders (q10c)		
	1.2.2.3 Get things done - local leaders (q11c)		
1.3 Quality of Life		1.3.0.1 Direction of district (q1)	
		1.3.0.2 Security in local area (q2a)	
		1.3.0.3 Area more or less secure (q2b)	
		1.3.0.4 Life satisfaction (q26)	
		1.3.0.5 Household finances (q27)	
		1.3.0.6 Ability to meet basic needs (q28)	

TABLE 7.2: RESILIENCE INDEX INDICATORS

INDEX	COMPONENT	SUB-INDEX	SURVEY ITEM
2. Resilience	2.1 Community Cohesion	2.1.1 Social Capital	2.1.1.1 Ability to solve external problems (q34c)
			2.1.1.2 Ability to solve internal problems (q35c)
	2.1.1.3 How often villages work together (q36)		
	2.1.2 Local Leader Satisfaction	2.1.2.1 Local leaders consider citizen interests (q37a)	
		2.1.2.2 Local leaders consider women's interests (q37b)	
		2.1.2.3 Local leaders secure funds (q38)	
	1.2 Local Governance	1.2.1 DDA-CDC Performance	1.2.1.1 Confidence - DDA (q12b)
			1.2.1.2 Responsive - DDA (q12c)
			1.2.1.3 Get things done - DDA (q12d)
			1.2.1.4 Confidence - CDC (q13b)
1.2.1.5 Responsive - CDC (q13c)			
1.2.1.6 Get things done - CDC (q13d)			
1.2.2 Local Leaders' Performance	1.2.2.1 Confidence - local leaders (q9c)		
	1.2.2.2 Responsive - local leaders (q10c)		
	1.2.2.3 Get things done - local leaders (q11c)		
1.3 Quality of Life		1.3.0.1 Direction of district (q1)	
		1.3.0.2 Security in local area (q2a)	
		1.3.0.3 Area more or less secure (q2b)	
		1.3.0.4 Life satisfaction (q26)	
		1.3.0.5 Household finances (q27)	
		Ability to meet basic needs (q28)	

The aggregate measures of stability and resilience are the average of their respective component scores, and the component scores are the average of the components' respective sub-index scores. Generally speaking, stability may be seen as an aggregate measure of whether participatory local development projects succeed in strengthening perceptions of good governance and effective service delivery, thereby improving citizens' lives and reducing the opportunity for local grievances that may contribute to armed opposition or support for armed opposition groups. Resilience measures how well local leaders are able to interface with government officials and collectively mobilize to solve local problems with or without government support. Analysis shows that stability and resilience do not always move in concert, whether in response to development programming, the absence of government or donor support, or in response to violence or the influence of armed opposition groups.

Both MISTI and USAID technical staff collaborated to select the items making up the stability and resilience measures according to existing theory and evidence of how development contributes to government legitimacy and effectiveness while empowering local communities to take collective action


in pursuit of their own development. These measures were later subjected to factor analyses to test whether the posited relationships could be validated statistically. The makeup of the stability and resilience constructs were largely validated by this exercise, although there were some adjustments in the organization of the sub-indices. The most substantive change was to treat stability and resilience as separate constructs, whereas initial analyses had treated resilience as a component of stability.²¹⁸

Trends in the Stability and Resilience Indices

Overall Stability and Resilience Trends

Trends in stability and resilience are measured by the change in index scores over the five waves of the MISTI Survey.

FIGURE 7.1: OVERALL STABILITY AND RESILIENCE TRENDS



The trend line in Figure 7.1 shows the average value of the stability and resilience indices for the 55 districts surveyed in all five waves of the MISTI Survey (Annex 7.5 of this chapter lists the 55 districts sampled in all five survey waves). Note the rise and fall of scores. Data was collected for Wave 1 of the MISTI Survey during the off-season months of Fall/Winter 2012. Thus the first or baseline scores on the overall stability and resilience trend lines (see Figure 7.1) were established during the season when public perceptions were positively influenced by relative security. The measures for Wave 2 were taken during the fighting season in Spring/Summer 2013 when public perceptions were negatively influenced by worsening security. Subsequent waves repeat this seasonal pattern except for Wave 5, when the fighting season extended with somewhat limited intensity through the Fall/Winter months of 2014, albeit with somewhat less intensity, as the Taliban sought to exploit the political instability created by the presidential election crisis and protracted formation of the Ghani government. In assessing the levels of stability over time, it is therefore advisable to compare values at similar points in time: Waves

²¹⁸ See Appendix 1 of this report for a review of the steps and analyses taken to test the factor structure of the stability and resilience constructs.

1, 3 and 5 for measures taken in the Fall/Winter months with relatively less violence, and Waves 2 and 4 for measures taken during the seasonal fighting season.²¹⁹

The overall off-season results show a slight improvement in stability between Waves 1 and 3, and a worsening between Waves 3 and 5 so that by Fall 2014 the overall stability situation is worse than in Fall 2012. The off-season resilience results also show improvement between Waves 1 and 3 with a worsening between Waves 3 and 5, so that the overall situation in Fall 2014 is only marginally better than in Fall 2012.²²⁰ Interestingly, fighting season results show improvements in both stability and resilience between Spring 2012 and Spring 2014.

Wave 5 values are flat and only minimally show the seasonal trend. This is likely due to underlying changes in the context in which the survey was carried out. The period between Waves 4 and 5 witnessed a concerted Taliban effort to undermine the 2014 elections and new presidency of Ashraf Ghani. This resulted in an extension of the 2014 fighting season through the Fall and early Winter – albeit somewhat less intense than in the Summer months. This extension of the fighting season, as well as completion of the ISAF drawdown from a force level peak of approximately 130,000 troops in 2011-2012 to 12,000 in the Fall of 2014, may account for much of the decline in scores between Fall 2013 and Fall 2014. These developments may reflect that the seasonal pattern of violence and insecurity was at least partly influenced by ISAF force presence. While a cyclical pattern of violence in Afghanistan should remain, a greater freedom of movement of insurgent forces could result in more violence and insecurity across seasons, as reflected in the Wave 5 trends reported here.

Degree and Direction of Variance in Overall Stability and Resilience Scores across Survey Waves


In the following two pages hyperbolic charts (Figures 7.2 and 7.3) are used to illustrate changes in the variance of district-level scores measured for the Stability and Resilience Indices. The curves indicate the degree of variance as well as its direction across the three off-season waves of the MISTI Survey, Waves 1, 3 and 5; the wider the base of a curve the greater the variance in district-level scores and vice-versa. Broadening of the base to the right between successive waves indicates that at least some districts have seen significant improvement in their score, whereas movement to the left indicates the opposite.

These charts are also used throughout this chapter for the components and sub-indices of the Stability and Resilience Indices. A summary analysis of Figures 7.2 and 7.3 is provided in the following paragraphs, and serves as an example to readers of how to analyze the charts used later in the chapter to illustrate trends in the degree and variation of district-level scores for the components and sub-indices of stability and resilience.

²¹⁹ Afghanistan's fighting season is generally considered to last from April through October – see [here](#) for a review of the 2014 fighting season. While it is important to note the seasonal trend, neither should such a trend be given too much importance as a driver of stability. See [here](#) for a discussion of the nuances that are obscured by a discussion of general fighting seasons. It is also important to note that stability and resilience impact estimates discussed later in this report are immune to seasonality confounding because they compare changes in trend, not changes in levels.


²²⁰ However, the reader should bear in mind that the MISTI surveys did not take place at exactly regular intervals. Differences in the duration between data collection waves and an extension of the fighting season in Fall and early Winter 2014 – albeit somewhat less intense than during the Spring/Summer months – could partially account for observed seasonal changes across waves, and may also help explain the depressed values for Wave 5 compared with Wave 3.

FIGURE 7.2: OVERALL STABILITY – VARIATION IN RESPONSES



In Figure 7.2, the width of the base increases between Waves 3 and 5, indicating a wider variation in stability scores across districts over the 12 months between Fall 2013 and Fall 2014. The broadening of the base to the left shows that most of the variation occurred towards the lower end of the Index, suggesting that some districts suffered a significant worsening in their stability situation. This finding should direct readers to look at more granular levels of analysis in order to identify the individual districts where stability worsened most (this analysis follows later in the chapter). Once identified, implementers should then focus on these districts to identify the reasons why this deterioration has occurred and adjust programming accordingly.

FIGURE 7.3: OVERALL RESILIENCE – VARIATION IN RESPONSES



In Figure 7.3, the increased width of the base in Wave 3, with most of the base moving to the right, indicates increased variation in scores across districts and that some districts experienced significant improvement in resilience between Fall 2012 and Fall 2013 before worsening in the period between Fall 2013 and 2014. Implementers should use the subsequent district-level analysis to identify these districts then focus on them to understand the reasons why they returned to near-baseline levels between Waves 3 and 5 and adjust programming accordingly.

District-Level Trends in Overall Stability and Resilience

In the following pages, a series of charts and maps (Figures 7.4 – 7.12) are used to illustrate overall stability and resilience trends at the district level between Fall 2012 and Fall 2014. These charts and maps are used throughout this chapter to report trends at the district-level for the components and sub-indices of the Stability and Resilience Indices. A summary analysis of the district-level charts and maps for the Stability and Resilience Indices is provided in the following paragraphs. This summary analysis should serve as an example to readers of how to analyze the charts and maps used later in this chapter to illustrate district-level trends for the components and sub-indices of stability and resilience.

In Figures 7.4 and 7.5, the districts with Wave 5 scores in the highest and lowest quartiles²²¹ are ranked from most stable/resilient to least stable/resilient. The charts show the degree of deviation to the positive or negative side of the mean value, which for stability (Figure 7.4) is 3.33 on a 5-point scale and for resilience (Figure 7.5) is 3.50, also on a 5-point scale. Fayroz Nakhchir and Hazrat-e Sultan (Samangan Province) are the most stable districts while Sangin and Musa Qal'ah districts (Helmand Province) are the least stable. Zurmat (Paktiya Province) is the most resilient district while Maiwand district (Kandahar Province) is the least resilient.

Figure 7.6-7 are maps of all 107 districts surveyed in Wave 5 with each district shaded according to its respective stability or resilience quartile for Wave 5. Areas that record relatively low stability scores are clustered in: Logar and Wardak provinces, Western Paktiya province, and Northwest Ghazni province in the East; most of the southern districts surveyed in Zabul, Kandahar and Helmand provinces: large parts of southern Herat and northern Farah provinces in the West: and, eastern Kunduz province in the North. Relatively secure areas include: most districts surveyed in Samangan and Jawzjan provinces in the North: Badghis province in the West: and, most districts surveyed in Khost province in the East.

Figure 7.11 is a series of line graphs that display the trend in overall stability and resilience in each of the 55 districts covered in all five waves of the MISTI Survey, organized by region.

Figure 7.12-13 are maps of the 64 districts covered in both Waves 1 and 5 of the survey (the baseline and end-line surveys), and display the percentage change in SI and RI scores registered by each district between Waves 1 and 5. Areas with significant decreases include: the Kandahar districts along Route One in the South; Helmand Province, also in the south: Kunduz and Baghlan provinces in the North; and, a cluster of districts in northern Paktiya province in the East. Significant improvement is recorded in: Baghdis province in the West; southern Paktiya and Khost provinces in the East; and, Zabul province in the South. In terms of resilience, notable decreases are indicated in: Kunduz and northern Baghlan provinces in the North; Helmand and western Kandahar provinces in the South; and, northern Paktiya and Ghazni provinces in the East.

²²¹ For purposes of formatting, districts with Wave 5 scores that place them in the two middle quartiles are not shown here. Their stability and resilience scores for Wave 5, as well as their Wave 5 scores for all components and sub-indices, can be derived from the tables in Appendices 4 (Stability) and 5 (Resilience) of this report.

FIGURE 7.4: HIGHEST AND LOWEST STABILITY SCORES, WAVE 5




FIGURE 7.5: HIGHEST AND LOWEST RESILIENCE SCORES, WAVE 5




FIGURE 7.6: STABILITY MAP, WAVE 5




FIGURE 7.7: RESILIENCE MAP, WAVE 5






FIGURE 7.8: EAST REGION – RESILIENCE AND STABILITY TRENDS (WARDAK, LOGAR, GHAZNI, PAKTIYA, KHOST AND KUNAR PROVINCES)



Wardak districts: Sayiddabad, Chak-e Wardak, Nerkh	Logar districts: Baraki Barak, Muhammad Aghah
Ghazni districts: Qarah Bagh, Andar, Gelan, Muqer, Deh Yak, Khwajah Omari	Paktiya districts: Zurmat, Lajah-Ahma, Dzadran, Lajah-Mangal
Khost districts: Tanai, Terayzai, Gurbuz, Bak, Shamul	Kunar districts: Khas Kunar, Sar Kani, Marawarah

FIGURE 7.9: SOUTH REGION – RESILIENCE AND STABILITY TRENDS (HELMAND, KANDAHAR, ZABUL)



Helmand districts: Nad 'Ali, Nahr-e Saraj, Garmser, Kajaki, Lashkar Gah, Sangin, Musa Qal'a	Kandahar districts: Spin Boldak, Panjwa'i, Zharay, Arghandab, Maiwand, Shah Wali Kot, Daman, Dand
Zabul districts: Shah Joy, Qalat, Tarnak wa Jaldak	

FIGURE 7.10: WEST REGION – RESILIENCE AND STABILITY TRENDS (BADGHIS, HERAT, FARAH)




FIGURE 7.11: NORTH REGION – RESILIENCE AND STABILITY TRENDS (BAGHLAN, KUNDUZ, SAMANGAN)




FIGURE 7.12: PERCENT CHANGE IN STABILITY, WAVE I TO WAVE 5






FIGURE 7.13: PERCENT CHANGE IN RESILIENCE, WAVE I TO WAVE 5



Trends in the Components of Stability and Resilience

Figure 7.14 presents the components of stability and resilience across all five survey waves. Local Governance is perceived as most stable, followed by Community Cohesion. Government Capacity and Quality of Life track closely together at the lowest level. Quality of Life shows a slight rebound for Wave 5, while the other sub-indices are flat. These differences in the levels of stability and resilience measures²²² highlight the gap between formal government and informal local governance that continues to complicate the GIRoA state-building enterprise.

FIGURE 7.14: COMPONENTS OF STABILITY AND RESILIENCE



Degree and Direction of Variance in the Components of Stability and Resilience across Survey Waves

The following hyperbolic curve charts (Figures 7.15-18) illustrate the changing degree and direction of variance in overall responses in Waves 1, 3 and 5 for each of the components of the Stability and Resilience Indices. The component charts titled 1.1-1.3 (Figures 7.15-17) comprise the components of the Stability Index. The Resilience Index is comprised of the component charts titled 1.2, 1.3 and 2.1 (Figures 7.16-18).

²²² See Figures 7.52 and 53 for a graphical illustration of the gap between Local Governance sub-indices and Government Capacity sub-indices.

FIGURE 7.15: GOVERNMENT CAPACITY – VARIATION IN RESPONSES




FIGURE 7.16: LOCAL GOVERNANCE – VARIATION IN RESPONSES




FIGURE 7.17: QUALITY OF LIFE – VARIATION IN RESPONSES

1.3. QUALITY OF LIFE

MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: W1 Sept-Dec 2012, W2 May-Sep 2013, W3 Nov 2013 - Jan 2014, W4 Apr-Jun 2014, W5 Sep-Nov 2014





FIGURE 7.18: COMMUNITY COHESION – VARIATION IN RESPONSES

2.1. COMMUNITY COHESION

MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: W1 Sept-Dec 2012, W2 May-Sep 2013, W3 Nov 2013 - Jan 2014, W4 Apr-Jun 2014, W5 Sep-Nov 2014



District-Level Trends in the Components of Stability and Resilience

The following pages provide a series of maps and charts that illustrate results for each of the four components of the Stability Index (SI) and Resilience Index at the district level.

Figures 7.19-22 is a series of maps for each of the four SI and RI components. Each map covers the 107 districts surveyed in Wave 5. The districts in each map are shaded according to quartile based on their component scores in Wave 5.

Figures 7.23-27 is a series of line graphs that display the trends in each component of the SI for each of the 55 districts covered in all five waves of the MISTI Survey.

Figures 7.28-32 is a series of line graphs that display the trends in each component of the RI for each of the 55 districts covered in all five waves of the MISTI Survey.

Figures 7.33-36 is a series of maps of the 64 districts covered in both Waves 1 and 5 of the survey. Each map covers one of the four components of the SI and RI. Districts are shaded according to their percentage change in the sub-index score between Waves 1 and 5.

Annex 7.1 to this chapter ranks the highest and lowest performing districts (top quartile and lowest quartile) for each of the four components of stability and resilience, with each component disaggregated by region.

FIGURE 7.20: LOCAL GOVERNANCE MAP, WAVE 5




FIGURE 7.21: QUALITY OF LIFE MAP, WAVE 5




FIGURE 7.22: COMMUNITY COHESION MAP, WAVE 5




FIGURE 7.23: EAST REGION – TRENDS IN STABILITY COMPONENTS (WARDAK, LOGAR, GHAZNI)




FIGURE 7.24: EAST REGION – TRENDS IN STABILITY COMPONENTS (PAKTIYA, KHOST, KUNAR)




FIGURE 7.25: SOUTH REGION – TRENDS IN STABILITY COMPONENTS (HELMAND, KANDAHAR, ZABUL)





FIGURE 7.26: WEST REGION – TRENDS IN STABILITY COMPONENTS (BADGHIS, HERAT, FARAH)



Badghis districts: Qadis, Muqur

Herat districts: Shindand, Kushk

Farah districts: Bala Boluk, Pusht-e Rod

FIGURE 7.27: NORTH REGION TRENDS IN STABILITY COMPONENTS (BAGHLAN, KUNDUZ, SAMANGAN)




FIGURE 7.28: EAST REGION – TRENDS IN RESILIENCE COMPONENTS (WARDAK, LOGAR, GHAZNI)




FIGURE 7.29: EAST REGION – TRENDS IN RESILIENCE COMPONENTS (PAKTIYA, KHOST, KUNAR)




FIGURE 7.30: SOUTH REGION – TRENDS IN RESILIENCE COMPONENTS (HELMAND, KANDAHAR, ZABUL)




FIGURE 7.31: WEST REGION – TRENDS IN RESILIENCE COMPONENTS (BADGHIS, HERAT, FARAH)




FIGURE 7.32: NORTH REGION – TRENDS IN RESILIENCE COMPONENTS (BAGHLAN, KUNDUZ, SAMANGAN)




FIGURE 7.33: PERCENT CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT CAPACITY, WAVE I TO WAVE 5




FIGURE 7.34: PERCENT CHANGE IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE, WAVE I TO WAVE 5




FIGURE 7.35: PERCENT CHANGE IN QUALITY OF LIFE, WAVE I TO WAVE 5





FIGURE 7.36: PERCENT CHANGE IN COMMUNITY COHESION, WAVE I TO WAVE 5



Trends in the Component Sub-Indices of Stability and Resilience


Government Capacity Component

By working closely with Afghanistan’s local (district) levels of government, stability projects aim to increase the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the population by enhancing service delivery to local communities. SIKA projects in particular focus on sub-national governance by working with officials at the district and provincial levels, and with the provincial departments of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG). By enhancing sub-national government capacity to deliver services, projects attempt to promote stability by increasing popular support for the government in the face of threats from the Taliban and other anti-government elements. This section focuses on the trend in Government Capacity (Component 1.1 of the SI, see Table 7.1) across the 55 districts where data was collected in all five survey waves.

Government Capacity is the largest and primary component of stability. It is the average of three different sub-indices: District Government Performance, District Government Satisfaction, and Provincial Government Performance (see Table 7.1). The government performance sub-indices measure citizen confidence in government actors or institutions, their responsiveness to local needs, and their ability to deliver services in response to those needs. District government satisfaction consists of more probing questions about the sincerity and integrity of local officials in addition to a general question on how citizens regard their government.

Figure 7.37 shows the Government Capacity component disaggregated by its constituent sub-index scores. District government performance is seen as most legitimate. District government satisfaction and provincial performance start out on the same level but diverge in Waves 3-5, with district government satisfaction trending upwards (improving) and provincial performance trending downwards (worsening).

FIGURE 7.37: TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT CAPACITY SUB-INDICES



Direction of Variance in the Sub-Indices of Government Capacity across Survey Waves

The following hyperbolic curve charts (Figures 7.38-40) illustrate the changing degree and direction of variance in overall responses in Waves 1, 3 and 5 for each of the sub-indices of Government Capacity.

FIGURE 7.38: DISTRICT GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE – VARIATION IN RESPONSES




FIGURE 7.39: DISTRICT GOVERNMENT SATISFACTION – VARIATION IN RESPONSES





FIGURE 7.40: PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE – VARIATION IN RESPONSES



District-Level Trends in the Sub-Indices of Government Capacity

The following pages provide a series of maps and charts that illustrate results for each of the three sub-indices that comprise the Government Capacity component of the SI.

Figures 7.41-43 displays maps of all 107 districts surveyed in Wave 5 for each of the three sub-indices of Government Capacity. The districts in each map are shaded according to quartile based on their sub-index scores in Wave 5.

Figures 7.44-48 is a series of line graphs that display trends in the sub-indices of Government Capacity for each of the 55 districts covered in all five waves of the MISTI Survey.

Figures 7.49-51 is a series of maps of the 64 districts covered in both Waves 1 and 5 of the survey. Each map covers one of the three sub-indices of Government Capacity. Districts are shaded according to their percentage change in the sub-index score between Waves 1 and 5.

Annex 7.2 to this chapter ranks the highest and lowest performing districts (top quartile and lowest quartile) within each region for each of the three sub-indices of Government Capacity.

FIGURE 7.41: DISTRICT GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE MAP, WAVE 5




FIGURE 7.42: DISTRICT GOVERNMENT SATISFACTION MAP, WAVE 5




FIGURE 7.43: PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE MAP, WAVE 5




FIGURE 7.44: EAST REGION – TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT CAPACITY SUB-INDICES (WARDAK, LOGAR, GHAZNI)




FIGURE 7.45: EAST REGION – TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT CAPACITY SUB-INDICES (PAKTIYA, KHOST, KUNAR)




FIGURE 7.46: SOUTH REGION – TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT CAPACITY SUB-INDICES (HELMAND, KANDAHAR, ZABUL)




FIGURE 7.47: WEST REGION – TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT CAPACITY SUB-INDICES (BADGHIS, HERAT, FARAH)




FIGURE 7.48 NORTH REGION – TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT CAPACITY SUB-INDICES (BAGHLAN, KUNDUZ, SAMANGAN)




FIGURE 7.49: PERCENT CHANGE IN DISTRICT GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE, WAVE I TO WAVE 5




FIGURE 7.50: PERCENT CHANGE IN DISTRICT GOVERNMENT SATISFACTION, WAVE I TO WAVE 5





FIGURE 7.51: PERCENT CHANGE IN PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE, WAVE I TO WAVE 5



Local Governance Component

Local leaders such as respected village elders, hereditary tribal dignitaries, religious leaders, and other decision makers have historically played significant roles in the local governance of Afghan villages, especially in areas where formal government institutions have not always been present. These local leaders and traditional institutions of local governance generally hold a stronger sway over everyday life in rural Afghanistan than formal government institutions.

Since the fall of the Taliban, various programs have attempted to connect informal local governance with formal government institutions. The largest of these is the National Solidarity Program (NSP), implemented by the Ministry of MRRD. NSP organizes village elections to form Community Development Councils (CDCs). Traditional leaders are in most cases elected to the CDCs and the District Development Assemblies (DDAs) that are formed at the district level from CDC representatives. In this way, local leaders are given a degree of electoral legitimacy, and CDC-DDAs are established as government-sanctioned, semi-formal institutions.

By delivering village grants to the local population through the CDCs and DDAs, NSP works to connect provincial and district government with Afghan villages. Working with local leaders to implement government programs is an important means of improving the efficacy of these programs for addressing sources of instability and enhancing government legitimacy by creating stronger connections between rural populations and their government. In a larger context, the delivery of development projects and the ongoing consultative process between government and local actors is intended to help integrate informal local governance actors and institutions into formal district and provincial governance structures and processes.

Given the crucial bridging role these local actors play between government officials and citizens, local governance is a shared component of stability and resilience in the MISTI trends analysis. It is the average of two sub-indices: DDA-CDC Performance and Local Leader Performance. These two sub-indices are calculated by aggregating their respective survey measures of confidence, responsiveness to local needs, and ability to deliver services in response to those needs (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2).

Afghans typically perceive local leaders as more legitimate than government actors. Recall that in Figure 7.14 the two local level components of local governance and cohesion were perceived at the highest level, followed by government capacity and quality of life. This can also be seen by comparing the sub-indices of local governance and government capacity, per Figures 7.52 and 53. District performance is the highest sub-index in government capacity, and is at about the same level as DDA-CDC Performance in the local governance component. Local leader performance is significantly higher than any of the Local Governance sub-indices, and is the highest scoring value among all MISTI indicators tracking stability and resilience. Note further that local leader performance does not exhibit any seasonality across waves. Government legitimacy may ebb and flow according to violence, general insecurity, and the ability to deliver services, but perceptions of local leadership remain steady.

This gap between state and non-state measures of stability highlights the need for development programming to both strengthen government structures and engage local leaders and institutions.

FIGURE 7.52: TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT CAPACITY SUB-INDICES




FIGURE 7.53: TRENDS LOCAL GOVERNANCE SUB-INDICES



Degree and Direction of Variance in the Sub-Indices of Local Governance across Survey Waves

The following hyperbolic curve charts (Figures 7.54-56) illustrate the changing degree and direction of variance in overall responses in Waves 1, 3 and 5 for each of the sub-indices of Local Governance.

FIGURE 7.54: LOCAL LEADERS PERFORMANCE – VARIATION IN RESPONSES




FIGURE 7.55: CDC PERFORMANCE – VARIATION IN RESPONSES





FIGURE 7.56: DDA PERFORMANCE – VARIATION IN RESPONSES



District-Level Trends in the Sub-Indices of Local Governance

Figures 7.57-59 display maps of all 107 districts surveyed in Wave 5 for each of the three sub-indices of Local Governance. The districts in each map are shaded according to quartile based on their sub-index scores in Wave 5.

Figures 7.60-64 is a series of line graphs that display trends in the sub-indices of Local Governance for each of the 55 districts covered in all five waves of the MISTI Survey.

Figures 7.65-67 is a series of maps of the 64 districts covered in both Waves 1 and 5 of the survey. Each map covers one of the three sub-indices of Local Governance. Districts are shaded according to their percentage change in the sub-index score between Waves 1 and 5.

Annex 7.3 to this chapter ranks the highest and lowest performing districts (top quartile and lowest quartile) for each of the three sub-indices of Local Governance.

FIGURE 7.58: CDC PERFORMANCE MAP, WAVE 5




FIGURE 7.60: EAST REGION – TRENDS IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE SUB-INDICES (WARDAK, LOGAR, GHAZNI)




FIGURE 7.61: EAST REGION – TRENDS IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE SUB-INDICES (PAKTIYA, KHOST, KUNAR)




FIGURE 7.62: SOUTH REGION – TRENDS IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE SUB-INDICES (HELMAND, KANDAHAR, ZABUL)




FIGURE 7.63: WEST REGION – TRENDS IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE SUB-INDICES (BADGHIS, HERAT, FARAH)




FIGURE 7.64: NORTH REGION – TRENDS IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE SUB-INDICES (BAGHLAN, KUNDUZ, SAMANGAN)




FIGURE 7.65: PERCENT CHANGE IN LOCAL LEADER PERFORMANCE, WAVE I TO WAVE 5




FIGURE 7.66: PERCENT CHANGE IN CDC PERFORMANCE, WAVE I TO WAVE 5





FIGURE 7.67: PERCENT CHANGE IN DDA PERFORMANCE, WAVE I TO WAVE 5



Quality of Life Component

Quality of Life is a shared component of both the stability and resilience indices. The quality of life index is unique in that it is a component of stability and resilience, but does not consist of any sub-indices. Instead, it is the average of six survey questions. The first asks whether the district is moving in the right direction as a barometer of optimism for the future. Two questions measure perceptions of security – one rates the current security situation while the other measures change in security over the past year. Measures of overall life satisfaction, ability to meet basic needs, and the state of household finances make up the other sub-index items. QoL scores fell and rose over the five survey waves in line with “fighting season”²²³ effects. The change in score between Waves 1 and 5 is relatively flat, and is a balance between improvements in people’s perceptions of the country’s direction and reported state of household finances, and declines in the two security indicators, overall life satisfaction, and peoples’ ability to meet basic needs. Figures 7.68-73 illustrate these trends at the overall level as well as at the project level for Waves 1, 3 and 5.

²²³ Afghanistan’s fighting season is generally considered to be during the warmer months and last from April to October. Survey Waves 2 and 4 were conducted during this period while Waves 1, 3 and 5 were conducted during the off-season.

FIGURE 7.68: DISTRICT MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION

Q1. Generally speaking, are things in [name the district] going in the right direction or in the wrong direction?

MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sep - Dec 2012), Wave 3 (Nov 2013 - Jan 2014) & Wave 5 (Sep - Nov 2014)





FIGURE 7.69: SECURITY IN LOCAL AREA

Q2a. Would you say security in your local area is good, fair or poor?

MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sep - Dec 2012), Wave 3 (Nov 2013 - Jan 2014) & Wave 5 (Sep - Nov 2014)



"Overall" includes all districts surveyed in Waves 1, 3 and 5
 "CCI/SIKA" includes districts surveyed in Waves 1, 3 and 5 for the project

FIGURE 7.70: LOCAL AREA MORE OR LESS SECURE THAN A YEAR AGO

Q2b. Is your local area more secure, just as secure, or less secure than it was a year ago?

MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sep - Dec 2012), Wave 3 (Nov 2013 - Jan 2014) & Wave 5 (Sep - Nov 2014)




FIGURE 7.71: OVERALL SATISFACTION WITH LIFE

Q26. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sep - Dec 2012), Wave 3 (Nov 2013 - Jan 2014) & Wave 5 (Sep - Nov 2014)




FIGURE 7.72: SATISFACTION WITH HOUSEHOLD'S FINANCES

Q27. How satisfied are you with your household's current financial situation?

MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sep - Dec 2012), Wave 3 (Nov 2013 - Jan 2014) & Wave 5 (Sep - Nov 2014)





FIGURE 7.73: ABILITY TO MEET BASIC NEEDS

Q28. Thinking about the past year, would you say overall that your ability to meet your basic needs increased, decreased, or stayed the same?

MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sep - Dec 2012), Wave 3 (Nov 2013 - Jan 2014) & Wave 5 (Sep - Nov 2014)




Community Cohesion Component

Community Cohesion is Component 2.1 of the resilience index (see Table 7.2). It is the average of the Social Capital and the Local Leader Satisfaction sub-indices. Social capital measures the extent citizens and communities work together to solve common problems, while local leader satisfaction gauges whether local leaders represent citizen interests and have influence with local government actors. Cohesion thus contributes to the resilience index through the effectiveness of community structures and capacities, while the local governance component contributes to the resilience index through the relationship between these local structures and local government.

Figure 7.74 shows the trend lines for Local Leader Satisfaction and Social Capital across the 55 districts where data was collected in all five Waves of the MISTI Survey. Note that while local leader satisfaction shows seasonal effects, social capital does not. The seasonality of local leader satisfaction is likely due to its connection to securing funding for local projects, while social capital is a more steady community trait that is not as tied to the external factors such as security that will affect perceptions of local government.

FIGURE 7.74: TRENDS IN THE SUB-INDICES OF COMMUNITY COHESION



Degree and Direction of Variance in the Sub-Indices of Community Cohesion across Survey Waves

The following hyperbolic curve charts (Figures 7.75 and 76) illustrate the changing degree and direction of variance in overall responses in Waves 1, 3 and 5 for each of the sub-indices of Community Cohesion.

FIGURE 7.75: SOCIAL CAPITAL – VARIATION IN RESPONSES





FIGURE 7.76: LOCAL LEADER SATISFACTION – VARIATION IN RESPONSES



District-Level Trends in the Sub-Indices of Community Cohesion

Figures 7.77-78 display maps of all 107 districts surveyed in Wave 5 for each of the two sub-indices of Community Cohesion. The districts in each map are shaded according to quartile based on their sub-index scores in Wave 5.

Figures 7.79-82 is a series of line graphs that display trends in the sub-indices of Community Cohesion for each of the 55 districts covered in all five waves of the MISTI Survey.

Figures 7.83-84 is a series maps of the 64 districts covered in Waves 1 and 5 of the survey. Each map covers one of the two sub-indices of Community Cohesion. Districts are shaded according to their percentage change in the sub-index score between Waves 1 and 5.

Annex 7.4 to this chapter ranks the highest and lowest performing districts (top quartile and lowest quartile) for each of the two sub-indices of Community Cohesion.

FIGURE 7.77: SOCIAL CAPITAL MAP, WAVE 5




FIGURE 7.79: EAST REGION – TRENDS IN COMMUNITY COHESION SUB-INDICES (WARDAK, LOGAR, GHAZNI, PAKTIYA, KHOST, KUNAR)




FIGURE 7.80: SOUTH REGION – TRENDS IN COMMUNITY COHESION SUB-INDICES (HELMAND, KANDAHAR, ZABUL)




FIGURE 7.81: WEST REGION – TRENDS IN COMMUNITY COHESION SUB-INDICES (BADGHIS, HERAT, FARAH)




FIGURE 7.82: NORTH REGION – TRENDS IN COMMUNITY COHESION SUB-INDICES (BAGHLAN, KUNDUZ, SAMANGAN)




FIGURE 7.83: PERCENT CHANGE IN SOCIAL CAPITAL, WAVE I TO WAVE 5





FIGURE 7.84: PERCENT CHANGE IN LOCAL LEADER SATISFACTION, WAVE I TO WAVE 5







Annex 7.1: Stability and Resilience Components – Highest and Lowest Performing Districts

The following charts rank the highest and lowest performing districts within each region for each of the four components of the Stability and Resilience Indices. The highest and lowest performing districts come from the East and South regions.





1.1 Government Capacity Cohesion

Return to [The Components of Stability and Resilience](#)







1.2 Local Governance

Return to [The Components of Stability and Resilience](#)







1.3 Quality of Life

Return to [The Components of Stability and Resilience](#)



2.1 Community Cohesion

Return to [The Components of Stability and Resilience](#)







Annex 7.2: Government Capacity Sub-Indices – Highest and Lowest Performing Districts

The following graphs rank the highest and lowest performing districts within each region for each of the three sub-indices of Government Capacity. Overall declines are largely driven by the South region, although the East and North show the sharpest drops in districts in Andar and Archi, respectively.





1.1.1 District Government Performance

Return to [The Components of Stability and Resilience](#)







1.1.2 District Government Satisfaction

Return to [The Components of Stability and Resilience](#)



1.1.3 Provincial Government Performance

Return to [The Components of Stability and Resilience](#)




Annex 7.3: Local Governance Sub-Indices – Highest and Lowest Performing Districts

The following charts rank the highest and lowest performing districts for each of the two sub-indices of Local Governance.





1.2.1 DDA-CDC Performance

Return to [The Components of Stability and Resilience](#)



1.2.2 Local Leader Performance

Return to [The Components of Stability and Resilience](#)




Annex 7.4: Community Cohesion Sub-Indices – Highest and Lowest Performing Districts

The following charts rank the highest and lowest performing districts for each of the two sub-indices of cohesion.





2.1.1 Social Capital

Return to [The Components of Stability and Resilience](#)



2.1.1 Local Leader Satisfaction

Return to [The Components of Stability and Resilience](#)



Annex 7.5: The 55 Districts in All Five Survey Waves

The following table lists the 55 districts surveyed in all five waves of the MISTI Survey.

PROVINCE	DISTRICT
Badghis	Muqur
Badghis	Qadis
Baghlan	Baghlani Jadid
Baghlan	Pul-e Khumri
Farah	Bala Boluk
Farah	Pusht-e Rod
Ghazni	Andar
Ghazni	Deh Yak
Ghazni	Gelan
Ghazni	Khwajah Omari
Ghazni	Muqer
Ghazni	Qarah Bagh (1)
Helmand	Garmser
Helmand	Kajaki
Helmand	Lashkar Gah
Helmand	Musa Qal'ah
Helmand	Nad 'Ali
Helmand	Nahr-e Saraj
Helmand	Sangin
Herat	Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Herat	Shindand
Kandahar	Arghandab (1)
Kandahar	Daman
Kandahar	Dand
Kandahar	Maiwand
Kandahar	Panjwa'i
Kandahar	Shah Wali Kot
Kandahar	Spin Boldak
Kandahar	Zharay

PROVINCE	DISTRICT
Khost	Bak
Khost	Gurbuz
Khost	Shamul (Dzadran)
Khost	Tanai
Khost	Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Kunar	Khas Kunar
Kunar	Marawarah
Kunar	Sar Kani
Kunduz	Aliabad
Kunduz	Chahar Darah
Kunduz	Imam Sahib
Kunduz	Khanabad
Kunduz	Kunduz
Logar	Baraki Barak
Logar	Muhammad Aghah
Paktiya	Dzadran
Paktiya	Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Paktiya	Lajah-Mangal
Paktiya	Zurmat
Samangan	Aybak
Wardak	Chak-e Wardak
Wardak	Nerkh
Wardak	Sayyidabad
Zabul	Qalat
Zabul	Shah Joy
Zabul	Tarnak wa Jaldak

Annex 7.6: The 64 Districts Common to Survey Waves 1 and 5

The following table lists the 64 districts common to Waves 1 and 5 of the MISTI Survey.

PROVINCE	DISTRICT
Badghis	Muqur
Badghis	Qadis
Baghlan	Baghlani Jadid
Baghlan	Pul-e Khumri
Farah	Bala Boluk
Farah	Farah
Farah	Pusht-e Rod
Ghazni	Andar
Ghazni	Deh Yak
Ghazni	Gelan
Ghazni	Khwajah Omari
Ghazni	Muqer
Ghazni	Qarah Bagh (1)
Helmand	Garmser
Helmand	Kajaki
Helmand	Lashkar Gah
Helmand	Musa Qal'ah
Helmand	Nad 'Ali
Helmand	Nahr-e Saraj
Helmand	Sangin
Herat	Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)
Herat	Shindand
Kandahar	Arghandab (1)
Kandahar	Daman
Kandahar	Dand
Kandahar	Maiwand
Kandahar	Panjwa'i
Kandahar	Shah Wali Kot
Kandahar	Spin Boldak
Kandahar	Zharay
Khost	Bak
Khost	Gurbuz

PROVINCE	DISTRICT
Khost	Nadir Shah Kot
Khost	Shamul (Dzadran)
Khost	Tanai
Khost	Terayzai ('Ali Sher)
Kunar	Khas Kunar
Kunar	Marawarah
Kunar	Sar Kani
Kunduz	Aliabad
Kunduz	Chahar Darah
Kunduz	Imam Sahib
Kunduz	Khanabad
Kunduz	Kunduz
Logar	Baraki Barak
Logar	Muhammad Aghah
Paktika	Sharan
Paktika	Yosuf Khel
Paktiya	Dzadran
Paktiya	Jaji
Paktiya	Lajah-Ahmad Khel
Paktiya	Lajah-Mangal
Paktiya	Sayyid Karam
Paktiya	Shwak (Garda Serai)
Paktiya	Zurmat
Samangan	Aybak
Uruzgan	Khas Uruzgan
Uruzgan	Shahid-e Hasas
Wardak	Chak-e Wardak
Wardak	Nerkh
Wardak	Sayyidabad
Zabul	Qalat
Zabul	Shah Joy
Zabul	Tarnak wa Jaldak

8. IMPACT EVALUATION, LEARNING AGENDA & ENDORSEMENT EXPERIMENT

Introduction

MISTI completed the largest impact evaluation of stabilization interventions that the U.S. Government has ever undertaken. To determine whether USAID project activities caused changes in stability, key indicators were measured repeatedly by five iterations or “waves” of the MISTI survey. A total of 190,264 individual interviews were completed in 5,093 different villages across 130 districts in 23 provinces of Afghanistan where stabilization programming is implemented. Data was collected for the baseline round of the MISTI survey (Wave 1) in September-December 2012. Four successor survey iterations were completed biannually through the Wave 5 end-line survey in November 2014.²²⁴ Villages were surveyed to measure stability indicators before and after the implementation of stabilization project activities, which MISTI closely tracked and verified. This time-series of survey and project data allowed for evaluating impact by quantifying changes in stability between survey waves in intervention villages compared to non-intervention villages.

The evaluation findings reported in this chapter fully meet the standards for impact evaluations set out in USAID’s Automated Directives System (ADS) Chapter 203.3.1.1. The ADS defines impact evaluations as follows:

Impact evaluations measure the change in a development outcome that is attributable to a defined intervention. Impact evaluations are based on models of cause and effect and require a credible and rigorously defined counterfactual to control for factors other than the intervention that might account for the observed change.

Stabilization interventions are defined as an activity implemented by one of the SIKa, CCI or KFZ projects over a finite time period in a defined geographic area that included one or more villages. MISTI used quantitative methods to define the counterfactual case of what would have happened in the absence of an intervention by matching key characteristics of intervention villages (the treatment group) with the characteristics of non-intervention villages (the control group). Villages for which no match could be identified were excluded from the impact evaluation. Matching is a quasi-experimental method that allowed for rigorous measurement of impact while affording project managers with the necessary flexibility for short-term planning and targeting of stabilization activities in response to changing local conditions. Carefully matching the villages in the treatment and control groups allowed for rigorous attribution of cause and effect relationships between changes in stability indicators and the project activities that took place between baseline and end line rounds of data collection.

The Wave 5 end-line survey measured stability indicators using 41,013 interviews with individual Afghans living in a total of 2,578 different rural villages across 107 districts in 21 provinces. At least one stabilization activity took place in 860 of the villages surveyed in Wave 5. That is, at total of 860

²²⁴ Wave 2 data collection took place in May-August 2013, Wave 3 was completed over November 2013 – January 2014, Wave 4 was completed over April-June 2014, and Wave 5 was completed over September-November 2014.

surveyed villages were “treated” by USAID stabilization programming over 2012-2014. The other 1,718 villages surveyed in Wave 5 were “controls” where no stabilization activities took place. The Waves 4-5 treatment group is a subset of the total, consisting of 149 villages where interventions took place after baseline stability indicators were measured in Wave 4. This half-year measurement is complemented by the full-year evaluation of impacts in 297 treated villages where Wave 3 was the baseline and Wave 5 was the end line. The findings presented here are the result of analyzing changes in 55 stability indicators over Waves 4-5 and 3-5. For comparison, the findings from Waves 3-4 and 2-4 that were presented previously in the MISTI Wave 4 report are also referenced.

Unlike previous years in Afghanistan, the autumn months when Wave 5 survey data was collected saw little change in the rate of violent incidents perpetrated by the Taliban and other armed opposition groups against the government and the civilian population. This extension of the annual “fighting season” through the end of 2014 is an important reason why the overall stability index showed no seasonal uptick in Wave 5. Overall stability rather continued the downtrend from Wave 4 after the “off season” measurement in Wave 3 (see the Stability and Resilience Trends chapter in this report for a more detailed discussion). Stability programming in 2014 (Waves 3-5 roughly span the calendar year) thus took place in a particularly fraught period for the rural districts most prone to contestation by the insurgency. Stability programming was effectively working against the tide of violence begetting instability, and the results were mixed.


The extended fighting season was a tactical effort by the Taliban to disrupt the consolidation of President Ashraf Ghani’s regime after the protracted presidential election crisis and the long period of uncertainty around the composition of the government. The Wave 4 survey took place during and after the presidential run-off election and the start of Wave 5 data collection coincided with the start of the Ghani Presidency. Thus, the Waves 4-5 period in the second half of 2014 was marked by political instability at all levels from the presidency to the provincial and district governments. Confidence in government decreased over the months that Afghans waited for news of who would be the new president, and speculated about who would be appointed as their next provincial and district governors. The political crisis was vividly illustrated by negative changes in the Stability Index because most of its components measure various aspects of government capacity and governance that stabilization programming seeks to improve.

Stabilization activities had a negative impact on Stability Index scores in this context of unseasonal violence and deep political uncertainty. That is, from Waves 4-5 overall stability decreased in both the treatment and control groups, but stability decreased more among villages in the treatment group. Negative impact on overall stability was significant but limited to villages where project activities were started between survey waves four and five. Waves 3-5 models showed no statistically significant effect on stability. The downward-sloping trend lines in Figure 8.1 illustrate this negative impact in stability scores for both the treatment and control groups.

The shallower downtrend shown by the red line in Figure 8.1 illustrates the counterfactual case of how the average Stability Index score in the treatment group would have changed if no intervention had

taken place after Wave 4. Treatment caused an average decrease of 0.24 points on the Stability Index, which is equivalent to -3.9 percent of the Wave 4 baseline value.²²⁵ The distance between the Wave 5 endpoints of the two trend lines in Figure 8.1 represents the negative effect of the average stabilization intervention.²²⁶

FIGURE 8.1: CHANGE IN STABILITY INDEX SCORES, WAVES 4-5



It is important to note the relatively high level of the matched treatment and control group baseline scores on the Stability Index in Waves 4-5. The Wave 4 baseline score of 3.78 (out of a maximum of 5 points) on the Stability Index was higher than the average 3.59 score for the survey sample as a whole. The difference may reflect raised expectations in the treatment group as a result of the SOI workshop process. The negative impact on stability observed subsequently was driven by an erosion of confidence, responsiveness, and perceived ability to get things done across district and provincial governments, as well as the local governance institutions of Community Development Councils (CDCs) and District Development Assemblies (DDAs) supported by government programs. Negative impacts were observed across all of the stability sub-index components of Government Capacity, District Government Performance, Provincial Government Performance, and Local Governance.

These negative impacts are the reverse of the positive impacts that were observed in Waves 3-4 and 2-4 for the government capacity and governance components of the Stability Index (see the Wave 4 Report). This reversal is partially the effect of the political crisis, which involved the threatened or actual withholding of project funds from the USG and other international donors. The usual threats to project

²²⁵ The treatment group in Figure 8.1 includes villages where projects were completed or ongoing, and located within 250 meters of linear project features, such as canals or roads. Alternative definitions of the treatment group included villages within 500 meters or one kilometer of linear features, and villages where projects within these proximities were ongoing only.

²²⁶ The statistics reported in the impact visualizations are as follows: The treatment effect is the difference between the average baseline and end line indicator scores in the treatment group, minus the same difference in the control group, after matching established the counterfactual. The percent change is the treatment effect divided by the treatment group baseline value. The p-value is an estimate of the statistical significance of the mean difference. Following scientific convention, p-values of less than 0.1 indicate that the treatment effect is large enough to be considered statistically different from zero.


success from corruption, the Taliban and other anti-government actors was compounded by heightened uncertainty surrounding whether funding would be available to complete village projects according to plan, and whether provincial and district governments and DDAs and CDCs would be able to fulfill their promises and obligations.

Also, performance problems with the SIKA programming surrounding vetting delays and poor execution of monitoring requirements for verifying the achievement of project milestones contributed to negative impacts, particularly delays in the implementation of project activities and delayed grant disbursements to communities. Budget cuts forced the cancellation of some interventions that were prioritized against SOIs through community consultation, which amounted to broken promises that negatively impacted stability indicators. The effort to avoid delays from external vetting by remaining under the \$25,000 threshold also led the SIKAs to implement projects that were not prioritized through the SOI community consultation process. This departure from the stabilization theory of change is important for explaining why interventions had negative effects.

Additionally, while MISTI could not obtain data on violent incidents from the Wave 5 period in time for inclusion in this report, it is likely that project activities attracted a higher rate of violent incidents to treated villages relative to control villages. Such a finding is expected given the pattern of violence observed previously, which dampens the impact of stabilization programming (see the learning agenda section on project activities and violence below).

While projects had a negative impact on overall stability because of the erosion of government legitimacy, not all indicators showed negative impacts in Waves 4-5. Stabilization activities had a positive impact on the Local Leader Performance Sub-Index, which is part of both the Stability and Resilience Indices. Of the six sub-indices that make up the overall Stability Index, Local Leader Performance was the only one to show a positive impact in the base models of programmatic effects.

FIGURE 8.2: CHANGE IN LOCAL LEADER PERFORMANCE SCORES, WAVES 4-5



The Waves 4-5 impact on Local Leaders Performance is visualized in Figure 8.2. The divergence between the treatment and control group trend lines shows that the average Local Leader Performance score would have followed the red line downward if not for stabilization interventions. The treatment effect is equivalent to 4.5 percent of the treatment group score at the Wave 4 baseline.

Much like the negative impact on overall stability and its Government Capacity sub-component, the positive impact on Local Leader Performance in Waves 4-5 was a reversal of the finding on this indicator in Waves 2-4. The best explanation for this pattern is a weak state/strong society dynamic in which local Afghans turn to informal, traditional modes of village governance when formal state institutions fail to provide stability. This zero-sum polarity between formal government and informal governance – a gain for one is a loss for the other – suggests that in Waves 4-5 the population of the treatment group credited their traditional local leaders with the positive effects of the project activities, while blaming negative effects on government institutions undergoing a crisis of legitimacy.

The opposite held true during Waves 2-4 and 3-4 – before the election crisis government institutions and DDAs/CDCs were credited with project benefits instead of local leaders. This dynamic indicates that the gap between government and traditional governance in rural Afghanistan remains wide. Bridging the gap requires further effort to strengthen local governance and linkages between local informal governance and state institutions.

The zero-sum relationship between governance and government was also observed in the yearlong impact measurements from Waves 3-5. Over this period the largest positive impacts of stabilization interventions were on the Resilience Index indicators of Community Cohesion and its sub-components of Social Capital and Local Leader Satisfaction.

FIGURE 8.3: CHANGE SOCIAL CAPITAL SCORES, WAVES 4-5





Figure 8.3 visualizes the positive impact of stabilization activities on the Social Capital sub-index, which combines data from survey questions on the ability of local communities to work together internally,

and with other communities to solve problems. Here a substantial decrease in the average Social Capital sub-index score in the control group was offset by a slight increase in the treatment group.

The relatively large treatment effect on Social Capital is equal to 7.4 percent of the baseline Wave 4 value. This effect demonstrates the value of stability programming for increasing the resources available to communities for working together to solve local problems. The impact evaluation shows that without stabilization interventions, Social Capital would have declined in the treatment group following the red line in Figure 8.3.

The positive impact on Social Capital in Waves 4-5 was accompanied by a positive effect on Local Leader Satisfaction. In combination these sub-indices form the Community Cohesion Sub-index, which is unique to the Resilience Index. The positive impact on Local Leader Performance described above also contributed to increased resilience, but most models showed zero impact on Resilience Index scores. An important exception was found when villages in SIKA project areas were analyzed separately from CCI areas. Positive impact on resilience was found in villages where SIKA intervened, particularly those villages located within 500 meters of hard infrastructure activities such as roads and canals. Figure 8.4 visualizes this impact of SIKA programming on resilience, which amounted to 4.2 percent of the Wave 4 baseline score on the Resilience Index.

FIGURE 8.4: SIKA CHANGE IN RESILIENCE INDEX SCORES, WAVES 4-5




The negative impacts of project activities on DDA-CDC Performance discussed above limited gains in Resilience as well as Stability because DDA-CDC Performance is a component of both indices. Waves 3-5 interventions had a positive impact on Resilience only in villages where more than one stabilization activity took place during the year (see the discussion of “dosage-response” modeling below).

The pattern of positive and negative impacts in Waves 3-5 and 4-5 reaffirms the importance of measuring stability and resilience separately, which was an important innovation undertaken in Wave 4

using the method of factor analysis.²²⁷ The creation of distinct, yet partially overlapping Resilience and Stability Indices was instrumental for showing how stabilization activities may enhance stability at times when the state is relatively strong (Waves 2-4), or enhancing community cohesion and resilience at times when the state is weak (Waves 3-5).

During the difficult year of transition between Waves three and five, USAID stabilization programming showed positive impacts on overall Stability Index scores only when interventions took place in the same villages as the National Solidarity Program (NSP). This positive impact was an interaction between NSP and USAID stabilization programming. That is, neither NSP nor USAID had this impact alone. As discussed further below, NSP is a community development program implemented by the Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) – the government counterpart to SIKA. NSP project activities, including the establishment of CDCs and DDAs via village elections, took place with increasing frequency in 2013 and 2014 in the same districts and villages as USAID stabilization programming. Figure 8.5 shows the positive impact on stability that resulted when stabilization interventions took place in villages where NSP also implemented project activities.



The trend lines in Figure 8.5 show that while stability scores declined slightly in the treatment group, the decrease was significantly less than in the control group. The counterfactual red line signifies that this steeper decline would have been the case for all villages if not for the combined intervention of both USAID and NSP. The effect of combined NSP and USAID treatment on stability is equivalent to 5.1 percent of the Wave 3 baseline.

The remaining sections in this chapter describe in more detail the impact evaluation methodology, data, indicators, and findings. The focus of the analysis is on the causal effects of stabilization programming measured from pre-intervention data from Survey Wave 3 (Fall/Winter 2013) and Wave 4

²²⁷ A paper outlining the factor analysis run to review the SI and RI components is included in Appendix 1 to this report.

(Spring/Summer 2014), to post-intervention measurements taken in Survey Wave 5 (Fall/Winter 2014). Further, the chapter addresses a series of learning agenda questions. Firstly the findings on the overall impacts of stabilization programming are disaggregated by project to learn whether SIKA and CCI activities have different effects. The chapter further addresses questions surrounding what impacts NSP has on stability indicators, as well as what impacts result from NSP and stabilization programming taking place in tandem in the same villages. Additionally, the learning agenda section addresses questions about different impacts created by “hard” infrastructure activities versus “soft” activities such as capacity building and communications. The effect of stabilization interventions on violence is also addressed. Finally, several questions surrounding project impacts on relative support for the Taliban and GIRoA are answered in detail. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the enormous set of rich data generated by MISTI can be mined for additional insights to inform better programming in Afghanistan and beyond.

Evaluation Methodology

The impact evaluation utilized statistical modeling techniques to control for factors other than the intervention that might account for the observed change. The models incorporated data from the villages in the areas where stabilization programs are implementing activities. These data were collected by the MISTI Survey, stabilization project implementers, and other sources. The counterfactual case of what would have happened with no intervention – the control group – was identified by matching villages where interventions did not take place with equivalent ones where interventions did take place – the treatment group. As described in further detail below, a leading-edge statistical technique called “coarsened exact matching” (CEM) was used to determine the best matches between treatment and control villages. Treatment villages were excluded from the impact evaluation where no matching control village could be identified. These procedures ensured that a credible and rigorously defined counterfactual was used to establish the cause and effect relationship from a project activity to an increase in stability.

Matching villages in the control group with those in the treatment group is a quasi-experimental design for impact evaluation. Quasi-experimental matching techniques are able to control only for “observed” variables for which measurements have been taken. In contrast, a fully experimental design involving random selection of both treatment and control villages would have also controlled for “unobserved” variables for which no measurements are available. Such a randomized control trial was however not viable or appropriate for MISTI because random assignment to treatment is contrary to stabilization programming theory and practice, which requires purposeful selection of villages for activities that are targeted to counteract local sources of instability (SOIs). Therefore, the best option was a quasi-experimental impact evaluation with flexibility for building the counterfactual case by matching control villages with the treatment villages selected by SIKA and CCI.

After identifying comparable sets of treatment and control villages, MISTI used the “difference in differences” (DID) design to estimate the impact of stabilization activities. DID is a common method for evaluating impact by measuring the change caused by an intervention over time in the treatment group, relative to the control group. The first step was surveying all villages to record baseline scores for

stability indicators before project activities took place. Then, SIKA and CCI implemented activities in the treatment group of villages, but not the control group. Next, all villages were re-surveyed to obtain updated scores for the same stability indicators measured at the baseline. Then the baseline scores were subtracted from the end-line scores to yield “change scores” for the control and treatment groups. Finally, the control group change score was subtracted from the treatment group change score to yield the change in stability resulting from treatment. This process is summarized as follows:

$$\text{DID} = \text{Treatment} * (\text{Endline} - \text{Baseline}) - \text{Control} * (\text{Endline} - \text{Baseline})$$

Where the change score is equal to the Endline minus the Baseline score, and Treatment and Control indicate the group of villages for which each change score is calculated. The change score for each group is the first set of differences. The effect of the stabilization project activity is the difference between the treatment and control change scores (the difference in differences).

The DID approach has the advantage of eliminating observed or unobserved biases that are a feature of simple comparisons of trends, for example the influence of seasonality (see the discussion of the fighting season in Chapter 7 on Stability and Resilience Trends). The DID design eliminates these sources of bias because the magnitude of change in the treatment and control groups is being compared over the same time period, not the absolute values of the indicators. Thus, if both treatment and control villages show decreasing stability, but stability decreases less in the treatment group than in the control group, the DID method will show positive impact.

It is important to note however that the validity of the DID estimator rests on the strong assumption that both treatment and control groups exhibit the same trends over time, or would do so if not for treatment. That is, the DID method assumes that any difference between the slope of the lines that link the baseline and end line data points for the treatment and control groups, as in Figures 8.1-5 above, are the result of treatment, and not other factors. Similarly, the validity of statistical matching of the treatment and control groups rests on the assumption that such matching (and pruning unmatched observations from each group) removes unobserved heterogeneity that is related to treatment, in addition to quantitatively balancing the groups on observed characteristics. MISTI made every effort to ensure the greatest possible quality and comprehensiveness in the data used to evaluate impact.

Data and Sampling

Survey Wave 5 included a total of 41,013 individual interviews in 2,578 villages in 107 districts. Sixteen individuals were interviewed in each village using two sampling points (8 interviews per sampling point). These 16 individual answers to each survey question were averaged together to yield the village-level dataset that was used to quantify the impact of stabilization activities implemented prior to the Wave 5 Survey. At least one stabilization activity took place in a total of 860 villages that were surveyed in Wave 5 – the treatment group. Table 8.1 displays the total number of villages surveyed in each wave, and the number of villages in the treatment and control groups.


TABLE 8.1: SURVEYED VILLAGES ACROSS ALL WAVES, CUMULATIVE

VILLAGE STATUS	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3	WAVE 4	WAVE 5
Treatment	7	79	309	572	860
Control	2,221	2294	2,250	1,798	1,718
Total	2,228	2,373	2,559	2,370	2,578

It is important to note that all villages and districts were not re-surveyed in each Survey Wave. The selection of villages surveyed in each wave was subject to programming decisions made by the SIKA, CCI, and KFZ programs. The substitution of different villages from wave to wave resulted in different sets of eligible villages for the impact evaluation, depending on which survey waves provide the indicator data for each village before and after an intervention. For example, the Wave 4 to Wave 5 treatment group includes 149 villages that were first surveyed in Wave 4, after which point a project activity was implemented, and then were resurveyed in Wave 5. The Waves 4-5 control group that did not receive activities includes 1,249 villages, for a total sample of 1,398 villages eligible for impact evaluation across Waves 4-5. Similarly, a total of 1,443 villages were eligible for impact evaluation in Waves 3 and 5, including 1,146 villages in the control group and 297 villages in the treatment group. The map in Figure 8.6 shows the number of treated villages surveyed by district in Wave 5.

Stabilization activities are designed for implementation over 3-6 months, though in practice the duration of some activities is extended by several more months. Given this programming cycle, MISTI's focus is on evaluating impacts over six-months and one-year time periods (eg. Waves 4-5 and 3-5). Impact evaluations over longer time periods, for example Waves 1-5 and Waves 2-5, are less valid because of attrition in the treatment and control groups due to the substitution of different villages and districts in subsequent survey waves. Further, the risk of diverging trends between the treatment and control groups grows as more time elapses between baseline and end line measurements. The critical assumption of parallel trends (see the discussion of DID methodology above) will be violated if events have different effects on the treatment and control villages before and after interventions take place in the time between the baseline and the end line. For example, a Waves 1-5 impact evaluation would risk violating the parallel trends assumption by including villages treated at many different points in time over more than two years. One-year and six-months are the appropriate evaluation periods because the methodology cannot control statistically for all the events on longer timelines that could create divergences within and between the treatment and control groups.

FIGURE 8.6: NUMBER OF TREATED VILLAGES SURVEYED BY DISTRICT



Indicators

The indicators used to score the surveyed villages, and quantify the impact of interventions, are the same indicators described in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 in the Stability and Resiliency Trends chapter. The one major difference is that the index indicator of overall stability used in the impact evaluation includes only survey data, while the indicator used to measure overall stability trends at the district level includes 75 percent survey data and 25 percent observational data on actor control, accessibility, and violence.

As detailed above, the indices of stability and resilience, and their component sub-indices, are aggregated using data from various survey questions that measure the same underlying phenomena. The set of survey indicators that compose each index and sub-index was identified using a factor analysis of correlations between the survey data, as described in the Stability and Resilience Trends chapter of the MISTI Wave 4 report.²²⁸ The index indicators are grouped into three levels of measurement shown in Table 8.2.

TABLE 8.2: STABILITY AND RESILIENCE INDICATORS

IMPACT INDICATOR
1. Stability
1.1 Government Capacity
1.1.1 Provincial Government Performance
1.1.2 District Government Performance
1.1.3 District Government Satisfaction
1.2 Local Governance
1.2.1 DDA-CDC Performance
1.2.2 Local Leaders' Performance
1.3 Quality of Life
2 Resilience
2.1 Community Cohesion
2.1.1 Social Capital
2.1.2 Local Leader Satisfaction

Each indicator listed in Table 8.2 was used as a separate measure of impact. At the highest level, the Stability and Resilience indicators are composites of the lower-level indicators. The level-two indicators - Quality of Life, Government Capacity, Local Governance, and Community Cohesion -- are composites of the seven level-three indicators. The Stability Index is calculated by taking the simple average of five level-three indicators – Provincial Government Performance, District Government Performance, District Government Satisfaction, DDA-CDC Performance, and Local Leaders' Performance, plus the Quality of

²²⁸ A paper outlining the factor analysis run to review the SI and RI components is included in Appendix 1 to this report.

Life indicator. The Resilience Index is the simple average of Social Capital and Local Leader Satisfaction plus Quality of Life, DDA-CDC Performance and Local Leaders' Performance.

Thus, both the Stability and Resilience Indices include Quality of Life and Local Governance, but Government Capacity is not part of the Resilience Index, and Community Cohesion is not part of the Stability Index. Other impact metrics include variants of the Stability and Resilience Indices – “Stability2” and “Resilience2” – that do not include DDA-CDC performance and Social Capital because their inclusion restricts the sample only to villages where survey respondents recognized the existence of a DDA or CDC, or respondents said that village life was disrupted by problems that required resolution by the community. The larger sample sizes afforded by the Stability2 and Resilience2 indicators provide more robust measures of impact.

Collectively the indicators in Table 8.2 capture change over time in 30 different survey indicators. The discussion of impact findings reports treatment effects on the individual survey questions that make up each index and sub-index. While treatment effects on the summary indicators shown in Table 8.2 create confidence that observed changes are reflected in a wider set of survey data, reliance on the summary indicators may also obscure heterogeneity among the survey items. This report offers valuable insight into the drivers of observed impacts by disaggregating the summary indicators into their component survey questions.

Matching Villages to Construct the Counterfactual


Quasi-experimental impact evaluation requires constructing the counterfactual case by identifying at least one control village that matches each treatment village on a set of baseline characteristics. Most crucially, control and treatment villages must have the same or nearly the same pre-treatment score on the impact indicator being evaluated. Close parallels between treatment and control villages on other key indicators are also important; ideally the treatment and control groups will show no significant differences on any variables. Whether the treatment and comparison groups are sufficiently alike is investigated empirically based on observable characteristics. [Annex A](#) presents density plots of the differences between values of the treatment and control groups for Waves 3-5 based on village characteristics and pre-treatment values of the impact indicators.

The villages in the treatment and control groups are nearly identical on many measures, but also show evidence of substantive differences on certain characteristics. MISTI applied the Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) routine in the STATA statistical package to identify comparable groups of treatment and control villages.²²⁹ Figure 8.7 highlights the difference between mean values in the treatment and control groups for key indicators used in the impact models. The blue lines show the percent difference in mean values between the treatment and control groups before matching, and the red lines show the difference after matching. In most cases matching created more balance. In other cases there was no effect on balance, or the direction of the imbalance changed. Matching on the key variables started in

²²⁹ See the CEM [website](#) for further details of this causal effects estimation strategy.

Figure 8.7 reduced the imbalance between the groups to acceptable levels, which enabled the generation of unbiased impact measurements.

FIGURE 8.7: WAVE 3 TREATMENT AND CONTROL BALANCE BEFORE AND AFTER MATCHING



It was impractical to eliminate certain imbalances because doing so caused the exclusion of too many unmatched villages from the sample to allow enough statistical power for testing impact.²³⁰ For example, matching on corruption perceptions significantly helped balance treatment and control villages, but overly restricted sample sizes in the process. In other cases similarity (colinearity) between conditioning variables such as levels of prior violence and levels of local control by armed actors prevented their inclusion together in matching and estimation of treatment effects. In one instance (distance to district center) the matching severely restricted sample size without providing any improvement in balance.

The impact findings reported below used matching to reduce threats to the validity of the impact estimates while maintaining a sufficient sample size for statistical power. The treatment and control villages are matched on elevation, population, whether or not the village was majority Pashto speaking,

²³⁰ In more technical terminology, some imbalances do not share a sufficient degree of common support (overlap between groups) to enable comparison. Balancing the treatment and control groups for such variables is possible, but reduces the sample size of villages so much that useful impact measurements are not considered feasible.

the number of National Solidarity Program (NSP) projects implemented in the village, and the number of violent incidents within one kilometer of the villages up to 30 days before the baseline survey. These matching variables were drawn from various sources, each of which predated the baseline survey to ensure that the measurements were not affected by treatment.²³¹ This set of matching variables was included in each of the “base model” estimates of impact reported below.

A further methodological advance in Wave 5 involved the multiple imputation of data on village population and majority language spoken that was missing from available data sources.²³² The multiple imputation of these village characteristics resulted in improved balance between treatment and control groups and increased statistical power for estimating impact. Missing survey data was missing at random and not imputed; individual cases with missing values were deleted listwise in the calculation of the index scores.

Matching on the set of village characteristics starred in Figure 8.7 does not remove all known threats to the validity of the estimates, but it does represent the most rigorous balance with a sufficient sample size. Further, the entire range of balancing models resulted in similar estimates of treatment effects. This consistency across balancing models offers reassurance that the base model results highlighted here are robust to all known threats to validity.

Impact Findings

After using CEM to construct the counterfactual by matching control group villages with equivalent treated ones, regression analysis was used to estimate the DID treatment effect between the baseline and end-line indicator scores of the treatment group versus the counterfactual control group. The statistic used to estimate the treatment effect (program impact) is more technically termed the Sample Average Effect on the Treated (SATT). Regression analysis was used to calculate the SATT for each indicator and test whether it is significantly greater or less than zero.²³³ Each row in each table below displays the results of a separate impact model for each indicator. Indicators are marked with asterisks to indicate the strength of the impact where a model found a statistically significant treatment effect.

The first column in each table lists the impact indicators, the second column lists the treatment effect, and the third column shows the treatment effect as a percentage of the baseline treatment score.²³⁴ The fourth column estimates the probability of replicating such a result in a new experiment simply by

²³¹ Population data was drawn from surveys conducted by the Afghan Central Statistics Office in 2004 and 2005 and augmented by researchers at Yale University. This Yale dataset was also the source of the majority language spoken in each village. Village elevation is from the Military Grid Reference System satellite data cross-referenced with the coordinates of each village. NSP project data was drawn directly from the NSP database. Violence data was drawn from the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) incidents database as well as the declassified version of the NATO SIGACTS database.

²³² Multiple imputation of missing values was accomplished using the R-Statistics Package Amelia II, which can be accessed [here](#). Five alternative values for each missing value were imputed into five different datasets using an imputation model that included the population, elevation, and language variables, as well as the district in which the village is located, and distance to the district’s administrative center. The multiple imputed data were then used in STATA for matching with CEM and for estimating treatment effects using the “mi estimate” command, which combines the five alternative estimates into one global estimate.

²³³ See the full explanation of the methodology and tools by Blackwell et al., “CEM: Coarsened Exact Matching in Stata” online: <http://gking.harvard.edu/files/abs/cemStata-abs.shtml>

²³⁴ Percent change is calculated by dividing the treatment effect by the baseline score for the treatment group.

chance. Therefore, low p -values (less than 0.1) indicate that the observed result is statistically valid. The fifth column indicates the total number of villages in the treatment and control groups after matching for each indicator. Finally, the last column in the tables lists the type of treatment group tested in each model.

The model type is a new effort in Wave 5 to ensure that all likely treatment effects were captured by the impact evaluation. Six alternative types, or definitions of treatment were tested using two different project counts, and three different proximities of villages to linear project features such as roads and canals. The three proximities are one kilometer, 500 meters, and 250 meters. The project counts include the cumulative number of projects completed and ongoing in a village after the pre-treatment survey wave, which is marked by the abbreviation “cu”. The abbreviation “og” counts only ongoing projects at the time of the end-line survey. Thus, the abbreviation “1km cu” in the table indicates that the treatment group includes all villages with completed and/or ongoing projects, and located within one kilometer of linear features. Likewise, “500 og” indicates that the treatment group includes only ongoing projects located within 500 meters of linear features. These different specifications allowed for the Wave 5 analysis to compare and contrast treatment effects for cumulative versus ongoing projects, and to understand how different distances between villages and project features influence treatment effects. The model type with the largest treatment effect is reported in the tables.

TABLE 8.3: WAVES 4-5 IMPACT INDICATORS, BASE MODEL

WAVES 4-5 INDICATOR	TRT EFFECT	% CHANGE	P-VALUE	SAMPLE (CONTROL / TREATED)	TYPE
1. Stability**	-0.147	-3.9%	0.050	194(130/64)	250 cu
1.1 Government Capacity*	-0.132	-3.8%	0.052	243(165/78)	250 cu
1.1.1 District Gov. Performance***	-0.236	-6.9%	0.002	182(123/59)	500 og
1.1.2 District Gov. Satisfaction	0.096	2.7%	0.392	234(156/78)	1km cu
1.1.3 Provincial Gov. Performance**	-0.211	-6.4%	0.024	194(136/58)	500 og
1.2 Local Governance**	-0.134	-3.5%	0.029	224(157/67)	500 cu
1.2.1 DDA-CDC Performance***	-0.235	-6.4%	0.005	208(147/61)	500 cu
1.2.2 Local Leader Performance***	0.179	4.5%	0.008	260(176/84)	1km cu
1.3 Quality of Life	-0.041	-1.2%	0.421	268(181/87)	1km cu
2. Resilience	-0.014	-0.4%	0.846	140(89/51)	1km cu
2.1 Community Cohesion	0.099	2.7%	0.233	163(107/56)	1km cu
2.1.2 Social Capital**	0.005	0.1%	0.050	180(121/59)	1km cu
2.1.3 Local Leader Satisfaction**	0.166	4.6%	0.014	249(179/70)	500 cu
Impact significance levels: * 90% ** 95% *** 99%					

The impact evaluation findings for Waves 4-5 are presented in Table 8.3. Negative impacts from project activities are observed on Stability, Government Capacity, District Government Performance, Provincial Government Performance, Local Governance, and DDA-CDC Performance. The negative treatment effect

on Quality of Life is too small to be statistically significant, like the negative effect on Resilience, and the positive effect on Community Cohesion. No significant impact on the Resilience Index was observed because the negative effects on Local Governance and Quality of Life canceled positive impacts on Social Capital and Local Leader Satisfaction.

As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, the largely negative impacts of stabilization interventions on the Government Capacity indicators in Waves 4-5 reflect the influence of contextual factors outside the control of stabilization programming, namely the presidential election and political crisis. The political crisis that dominated the period between waves four and five created deep uncertainty surrounding the composition of the government from national to provincial and district levels, and the future of internationally supported projects and programs. The loss of government capacity and legitimacy during this period is clearly reflected in the negative impacts observed on the Government Capacity and Local Governance indicators in Table 8.3. In this context, association with the government through stabilization programming had significant destabilizing effects in treated villages. Nevertheless, positive impacts on Local Leader Performance and Social Capital suggest that the population and traditional local leaders in treated villages were able to use project resources to effectively solve local problems.

At the time of writing, preliminary findings from MISTI's final performance evaluation of SIKA show that various factors related to program performance, such as delayed implementation, delayed payments, project cancellations, and the implementation of alternative projects to those prioritized by community consultations, also contributed to negative impacts, particularly on DDA-CDC Performance and Local Governance. The Wave 5 survey captured few villages where CCI-Creative implemented projects in Waves 4-5 (see the SIKA and CCI section below). Qualitative research conducted by MISTI showed that poor implementation of certain soft activities, such as one tailoring training activity by SIKA-West, led to negative impact. The MISTI final performance evaluations of the regional SIKA projects due to be completed in late 2015 should provide more clarity on performance factors that contributed to program impacts.

Insurgent violence targeted at treated villages in the extended fighting season may have also been a factor influencing negative impact. If violence data becomes available for the Waves 4-5 time period in the future from UNDSS and/or NATO it should be used to model the influence of violent incidents on treatment effects.

Table 8.4 displays the impact evaluation findings for the yearlong period from Waves 3-5. In contrast to the Waves 4-5 findings reported above, most treatment effects are too small to be considered statistically significant. The weakness of the Waves 3-5 treatment effects is due to the fact that villages treated in Waves 3-4, which are included in the Waves 3-5 models, showed positive impacts that in many cases were directly reversed by the negative impacts observed in Waves 4-5 (see below and the MISTI Wave 4 Report for reference).

The negative effect on Quality of Life that was insignificant in the Waves 4-5 model became statistically significant in Waves 3-5. This effect was driven by pessimism about the direction of the district and negative impact of projects on security in the local area, as well as negative impact on security in Waves

4-5. Nevertheless, negative impact on these Quality of Life indicators was tempered by positive impact on the ability to meet basic needs indicator, which showed an effect size of eight percent of the Wave 3 baseline value. This finding suggests that stabilization projects are positively impacting the quality of village life in ways that are not compromised by political events outside the control of stabilization programming.

Positive impacts were again observed in W3-5 on the resilience indicators of Community Cohesion, Social Capital and Local Leader Satisfaction. While the treatment effect on the Local Leader Performance sub-index did not reach statistical significance, positive impacts were observed on two of the three survey indicators that form its sub-components – local leader responsiveness and ability to get things done. The positive impacts on resilience indicators in the Waves 3-5 findings reinforce the Waves 4-5 findings that stabilization interventions are most effective for increasing community cohesion and traditional governance institutions as an alternative to an apparently failing state and emboldened insurgency.

The treatment effect on Resilience did not reach statistical significance because of negative impacts on Quality of Life and five of the six survey indicators that make up the DDA-CDC Performance sub-index. The collapse of confidence in DDAs and CDCs appears however to be driven by specific districts (where confidence was undermined most severely) rather than applying equally to all districts. This finding is the result of extending the base models to match villages within the same district, rather than allowing the algorithm to match villages across all districts within the sample.

TABLE 8.4: WAVES 3-5 IMPACT INDICATORS, BASE MODEL

WAVES 3-5 INDICATOR	TRT EFFECT	% CHANGE	P-VALUE	SAMPLE (TREATED / CONTROL)	TYPE
1. Stability	-0.007	-0.2%	0.882	386(255/131)	1km cu
1.1 Government Capacity	0.023	0.7%	0.675	426(291/135)	1km cu
1.1.1 District Gov. Performance	-0.111	-3.1%	0.346	248(171/77)	500 og
1.1.2 District Gov. Satisfaction	0.007	0.2%	0.931	373(238/135)	1km cu
1.1.3 Provincial Gov. Performance	0.018	0.5%	0.781	361(235/126)	1km cu
1.2 Local Governance	0.012	0.3%	0.811	398(256/142)	1km cu
1.2.1 DDA-CDC Performance	-0.057	-1.5%	0.342	401(269/132)	1km cu
1.2.2 Local Leader Performance	0.063	1.5%	0.197	417(269/148)	1km cu
1.3 Quality of Life**	-0.094	-2.7%	0.047	356(252/104)	500 cu
2. Resilience	0.065	1.7%	0.295	183(104/79)	1km cu
2.1 Community Cohesion***	0.212	5.8%	0.003	262(168/94)	1km cu
2.1.2 Social Capital***	0.271	7.4%	0.001	270(183/87)	1km cu
2.1.3 Local Leader Satisfaction*	0.104	2.8%	0.074	314(217/97)	500 cu
Impact significance levels: * 90% ** 95% *** 99%					

A deeper dive into the survey data beneath the indices shows positive impacts on four of the six survey indicators that are combined into the District Government Satisfaction sub-index. These effects show a 6.3 percent change on district governor understanding of local problems, 6.3 percent on caring about the people, 8.2 percent on visiting the area, and 12.2 percent on district officials doing their jobs honestly. Two of these positive impacts – understanding local problems and honesty – were also present in the Wave 4-5 data, but were missing from the Waves 3-4 data. The positive impact on satisfaction may be a longer-term outcome of durable gains made by stabilization programming on increasing the legitimacy of certain district governments. This finding suggests that, despite the loss of confidence in government over Waves 4-5, the new government of President Ghani has a foundation to rebuild confidence through better governance. An additional explanation for the positive impacts on the satisfaction indicators may be that association with President Ashraf Ghani boosted the popularity of certain district governors involved in stabilization project activities as the Afghan nation responded with enthusiasm to his ascension to the presidency around the time of the Wave 5 survey.

For reference and comparison, an updated set of Waves 3-4 impact findings are presented in Table 8.5. This update on the findings reported in the MISTI Wave 4 Report utilizes the more precise project activity data that was verified by MISTI in the second half of 2014, as well as the new treatment definitions of ongoing and cumulative projects and village proximity to linear project features discussed above. NSP project counts prior to Wave 3 were also included in the matching. Multiple imputation of missing values for village characteristics in the Waves 3-4 data improved the balance between the treatment and counterfactual control groups over the models discussed in the Wave 4 Report.


TABLE 8.5: WAVES 3-4 IMPACT INDICATORS, BASE MODEL

WAVES 3-4 INDICATOR	TRT EFFECT	% CHANGE	P-VALUE	SAMPLE (TREATED / CONTROL)	TYPE
1. Stability²	0.010	0.3%	0.852	314(234/80)	1km cu
1.1 Government Capacity*	0.107	3.2%	0.097	297(220/77)	1km og
1.1.1 District Gov. Performance**	0.169	4.6%	0.019	286(213/73)	1km cu
1.1.2 District Gov. Satisfaction	0.023	0.7%	0.220	223(156/67)	1km cu
1.1.3 Provincial Gov. Performance**	0.191	5.6%	0.036	244(179/65)	1km cu
1.2 Local Governance*	0.117	3.1%	0.078	262(188/74)	1km cu
1.2.1 DDA-CDC Performance*	0.130	3.4%	0.069	270(198/72)	1km cu
1.2.2 Local Leader Performance	-0.004	-0.1%	0.952	277(194/83)	1km cu
1.3 Quality of Life	-0.012	-0.3%	0.827	288(204/84)	1km cu
2. Resilience*	0.210	5.6%	0.100	48(34/14)	500 cu
2.1 Community Cohesion**	-0.164	-4.4%	0.047	153(108/45)	1km cu
2.1.2 Social Capital***	-0.348	-9.5%	0.000	172(122/50)	1km cu
2.1.3 Local Leader Satisfaction	0.079	2.2%	0.118	300(221/79)	1km cu
Impact significance levels: * 90% ** 95% *** 99%					

The contrast with the Waves 4-5 findings is stark, showing the reverse set of impacts on the Government Capacity, Local Governance and Resilience indicators. Resilience is barely statistically significant at the 0.1 level with a small sample size. This effect is due mainly to the positive impacts on Local Governance and DDA-CDC Performance that represent a reversal of the Waves 4-5 findings. In an additional reversal from Waves 4-5, stabilization activities negatively impacted Community Cohesion (-4.4 percent change) and Social Capital (-9.5 percent change) in Waves 3-4. The positive treatment effect on Local Leader Satisfaction does not reach statistical significance.

The scarcity of significant impacts in the Waves 3-5 models is not surprising given the fact that these models included most of the villages treated in both Waves 3-4 and 4-5, with their opposing treatment effects. The reversal of these impacts over the two adjoining six-month periods are a major departure from the more uniform set of findings across Waves 3-4 and 2-4 that are described in detail in the Wave 4 report. Figure 8.8 illustrates this reversal of impact on the Provincial Government Performance indicator. The Waves 3-4 treatment effect equals 5.9 percent of the baseline Wave 3 value, compared to a -6.4 percent change over Waves 4-5.

FIGURE 8.8: WAVES 3-4 AND 4-5 CHANGE IN PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE SCORES



It is also important to note in Figure 8.8 that the Wave 4 endpoint for the treatment group in the graph of Waves 3-4 is only slightly higher than the Wave 4 baseline value for the treated and control groups in the Waves 4-5 graph. This difference in baseline values suggests that the presidential election that took place during the Wave 4 survey may have raised popular expectations for improved governance. Thus, the general decline in Provincial Government Performance scores from Waves 4-5 may be explained by popular frustration with the long election crisis. The negative impact of stabilization activities indicates that this general shift in attitudes was intensified by local interventions. Further, the Wave 4-5 reversal of the positive impacts observed in Waves 3-4 and 2-4 strongly suggests that the political crisis of Summer 2014 undermined previous gains in building government capacity and legitimacy. Confidence

must now be rebuilt by improved local governance and redoubled effort to make the state a stabilizing presence in the lives of ordinary Afghans.

The MISTI Learning Agenda

The Performance Management Plan for the USAID/Afghanistan Stabilization Unit established an initial set of questions to be answered through analysis of the MISTI data to inform program planning and performance. This section reviews a selection of those questions, as well as other learning questions that have developed over the course of MISTI.

Does SIKA and CCI programming have different stabilization impacts?

Yes.

SIKA works with the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), which focuses on a participatory process between citizens, citizen committees, and district government actors organized into CDCs and DDAs. SIKA funds are targeted to address local sources of instability in coordination with district and provincial government institutions through the CDCs and DDAs. CCI, meanwhile, has no official government partner, but works with government entities at the district level where cooperation is necessary to address local sources of instability. CCI follows a community development process that places more emphasis on identifying local sources of resilience, which may include traditional governance actors and government officials, and assisting these actors to solve local problems.

This Learning Agenda question was addressed by disaggregating stability programming into separate SIKA and CCI project activities in their mostly separate areas of operation. There are a total of 136 villages treated by SIKA, but only 19 villages treated by CCI in the Waves 4-5 sample. The Waves 3-5 sample includes 234 villages treated by SIKA and 53 treated by CCI. After matching CCI treated and control villages in Waves 4-5, too few of the 19 treated CCI villages remain in the sample to allow for impact evaluation of CCI. The Waves 3-5 CCI sample is not large enough to show statistical significance on most indicators. The relatively small number of villages treated by CCI means that SIKA drove the impacts reported above for stability programming as a whole. The small number of villages treated by CCI may be accounted for by the closedown of the CCI-Creative project.

Table 8.6 displays the impact indicators for SIKA interventions in Waves 4-5. These findings largely parallel the Waves 4-5 findings reported above for stability programming as a whole, which is unsurprising considering the few CCI treatment villages captured by the MISTI surveys.

TABLE 8.6: SIKA WAVES 4-5 IMPACT INDICATORS, BASE MODEL

SIKA WAVES 4-5 INDICATOR	TRT EFFECT	% CHANGE	P-VALUE	SAMPLE (TREATED / CONTROL)	TYPE
1. Stability**	-0.151	-4.0%	0.049	183(129/54)	250 cu
1.1 Government Capacity*	-0.138	-4.0%	0.095	178(123/55)	500 cu
1.1.1 District Gov. Performance***	-0.198	-5.7%	0.010	172(113/59)	500 cu
1.1.2 District Gov. Satisfaction*	-0.223	-6.2%	0.053	149(98/51)	500 cu
1.1.3 Provincial Gov. Performance	-0.020	-0.6%	0.830	198(133/65)	1km cu
1.2 Local Governance	-0.037	-1.0%	0.606	170(107/63)	1km cu
1.2.1 DDA-CDC Performance**	-0.185	-4.9%	0.031	164(110/54)	250 cu
1.2.2 Local Leader Performance	0.074	1.8%	0.311	171(104/67)	1km cu
1.3 Quality of Life	-0.094	-2.8%	0.136	171(108/63)	1km cu
2. Resilience*	0.160	4.2%	0.055	111(77/34)	500 og
2.1 Community Cohesion**	0.237	6.5%	0.020	148(102/46)	250 cu
2.1.2 Social Capital*	0.194	5.2%	0.074	155(105/50)	1km cu
2.1.3 Local Leader Satisfaction	0.108	3.0%	0.137	194(128/66)	1km cu
Impact significance levels: * 90% ** 95% *** 99%					

In line with the program-level findings for Waves 4-5, SIKA activities had negative effects on all stability indicators with the exception of Local Leader Performance (also a component of the Resilience Index). These negative effects reach statistical significance for overall Stability, Government Capacity, District Government Performance, District Government Satisfaction, and DDA-CDC Performance. The negative effects on Local Governance, Quality of Life, and Provincial Government Performance are not large enough for statistical significance. In contrast, SIKA had a positive impact on Resilience and its sub-indices of Community Cohesion and Social Capital. The positive effect on Local Leader Satisfaction was not large enough to reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

TABLE 8.7: SIKA WAVES 3-5 IMPACT INDICATORS, BASE MODEL

SIKA WAVES 3-5 INDICATOR	TRT EFFECT	% CHANGE	P-VALUE	SAMPLE (TREATED / CONTROL)	TYPE
1. Stability2*	-0.119	-3.1%	0.084	194(127/67)	500 cu
1.1 Government Capacity*	-0.153	-4.2%	0.063	161(96/65)	500 og
1.1.1 District Gov. Performance*	-0.120	-3.4%	0.093	190(121/69)	500 og
1.1.2 District Gov. Satisfaction	0.099	2.7%	0.316	227(134/93)	1km cu
1.1.3 Provincial Gov. Performance*	0.130	3.8%	0.085	203(120/83)	1km cu
1.2 Local Governance	-0.008	-0.2%	0.883	229(144/85)	1km cu
1.2.1 DDA-CDC Performance**	-0.164	-4.3%	0.012	260(163/97)	1km cu
1.2.2 Local Leader Performance	0.092	2.2%	0.135	278(165/113)	1km cu
1.3 Quality of Life	-0.101	-2.9%	0.073	241(161/80)	500 cu

SIKA WAVES 3-5 INDICATOR	TRT EFFECT	% CHANGE	P-VALUE	SAMPLE (TREATED / CONTROL)	TYPE
2. Resilience	0.024	0.6%	0.751	133(75/58)	1km cu
2.1 Community Cohesion**	0.214	5.8%	0.012	201(138/63)	250 cu
2.1.2 Social Capital*	0.192	5.2%	0.058	174(109/65)	500 cu
2.1.3 Local Leader Satisfaction**	0.177	4.7%	0.012	190(126/64)	500 og
Impact significance levels: * 90% ** 95% *** 99%					

The Waves 3-5 impact evaluation findings for SIKA are aligned with the Waves 4-5 findings with a few important exceptions. Negative impacts on overall Stability, Government Capacity, District Government Performance, and DDA-CDC Performance were consistent with Waves 4-5, as were the smaller negative effects on Quality of Life and Local Governance, and positive, but insignificant treatment effect on Local Leader Performance. The key differences were the positive impact on Provincial Government Performance and the positive, but statistically insignificant effect on District Government Satisfaction. SIKA interventions showed positive impacts on several underlying indicators of satisfaction with district governments, including understanding local problems, visiting the area, and honesty.

These findings were accompanied by positive impacts on the Resilience indicators of Community Cohesion, Social Capital and Local Leader Satisfaction. In combination these findings over the yearlong Waves 3-5 period suggest that SIKA should be instrumental in rebuilding popular confidence and legitimacy for local government institutions after the political crisis of 2014.

TABLE 8.8: CCI WAVES 3-5 IMPACT INDICATORS, BASE MODEL

CCI WAVES 3-5 INDICATOR	TRT EFFECT	% CHANGE	P-VALUE	SAMPLE (TREATED / CONTROL)	TYPE
1. Stability	-0.029	-0.8%	0.859	33(18/15)	1km cu
1.1 Government Capacity	-0.054	-1.5%	0.691	51(31/20)	1km cu
1.1.1 District Gov. Performance**	0.302	8.3%	0.018	66(41/25)	1km og
1.1.2 District Gov. Satisfaction	-0.123	-3.4%	0.534	36(20/16)	1km cu
1.1.3 Provincial Gov. Performance	0.109	2.9%	0.613	40(27/13)	1km cu
1.2 Local Governance	-0.011	-0.3%	0.954	32(19/13)	1km cu
1.2.1 DDA-CDC Performance	-0.050	-1.4%	0.749	46(28/18)	1km cu
1.2.2 Local Leader Performance	-0.011	-0.3%	0.954	32(19/13)	1km cu
1.3 Quality of Life	0.093	2.6%	0.530	57(32/25)	1km cu
2. Resilience	-0.218	-5.9%	0.713	8(3/5)	1km cu
2.1 Community Cohesion	-0.142	-4.0%	0.444	32(21/11)	1km cu
2.1.2 Social Capital	0.231	6.6%	0.450	21(13/8)	1km cu
2.1.3 Local Leader Satisfaction**	-0.246	-6.9%	0.048	63(38/25)	1km og
Impact significance levels: * 90% ** 95% *** 99%					

The SIKA impacts reported above may be contrasted with the findings in Table 12.6 from separate models of treatment effects in CCI project areas. The treatment effects are all negative and none reach statistical significance, with the exception of the positive impact on District Government Performance, and the negative impact on Local Leader Satisfaction. Sample sizes are very small after matching.

The positive impact on District Government Performance over this yearlong period is encouraging but the small sample size reduces confidence in the generalizability of this finding. Further analysis suggests that this finding is driven by high change scores in villages in a few select districts matched with lower change scores in villages in different districts. The treatment effect becomes insignificant and the sample size is further reduced when the matching is restricted to villages within the same district. The other significant, negative impact in CCI areas was found on Local Leader Satisfaction. This finding coupled with positive effects on District and Provincial Government Performance is indicative of the familiar division between traditional governance and formal government seen elsewhere in Afghanistan.


How do the effects of NSP community development programming compare to USAID stabilization programming?

Largely similar but with important differences.

In comparison to USAID stabilization programming, NSP programming effected change on similar indicators with similar effect sizes and positive or negative impacts. This correspondence between NSP and USAID impacts also extended to Waves 2-4 and 3-4, including the same pattern of reversals described above. Much like the evaluation findings reported above on USAID interventions, NSP projects had negative effects on indicators of Government Capacity and positive effects on Community Cohesion in Waves 3-5 and 4-5. One significant difference was that NSP also had positive impacts on several Quality of Life indicators, including household finances and ability to meet basic needs. Also NSP had positive impact on confidence in DDAs and CDCs over Waves 3-5. These differences from the USAID findings are particularly positive for NSP because the program seeks to organize communities foremost to meet basic developmental needs, with stabilization a secondary objective.

NSP is one of Afghanistan's longest-running community development programs that seeks universal coverage of all villages nationwide. The program organizes villages into CDCs that receive grants to implement projects. CDCs are organized into DDAs to manage development activities at the district level. NSP had historically been relatively less successful at programming in relatively insecure districts. Working in partnership with SIKA since 2012, NSP has apparently grown more successful at expanding its footprint into less-secure areas. Figure 8.9 shows the dramatic increase in the number of NSP project activities (CDCs that received grants) within one kilometer of villages surveyed by MISTI over Waves 1-5.

FIGURE 8.9: NSP PROJECTS WITHIN 1KM OF VILLAGES SURVEYED IN WAVES 1-5



The effect of treatment by NSP was evaluated using the same DID methodology and indicators used to evaluate USAID impacts. This impact evaluation was accomplished using the MISTI survey data and the NSP project data obtained directly from the NSP database. Just as the NSP data was used as a matching variable for the evaluation of USAID impacts to control for other factors that might account for the change caused by an USAID intervention, USAID project data was used in the matching of NSP villages to control for other factors that might account for the change caused by an NSP intervention. Other matching variables remained unchanged – population, elevation, violence, and majority Pashto-speaking. While the findings on USAID versus NSP impacts are roughly comparable, it should however be noted that the precision of the NSP impact estimates is lower than the estimates of USAID impact because NSP records the coordinates of a CDC that received a project, but does not record the actual coordinates of the project site. MISTI counted a village as treated by NSP if it was located within one kilometer of a CDC that had been granted at least one project by NSP. Imprecision would result if a surveyed village were not affected by the NSP project because the actual project site was outside the one-kilometer radius around the CDC. Further, the NSP database is managed by MRRD and therefore the quality of the data is outside the control of MISTI.

The Waves 4-5 impact evaluation of NSP included 25 treated villages and Waves 3-5 included 73 treated villages. The larger sample size makes the Waves 3-5 evaluation more robust. NSP caused negative impacts on several government capacity and satisfaction indicators in both Waves 3-5 and 4-5, including indicators of how much district governments understand local problems and are able to get things done. The consonance between NSP and USAID on these indicators supports the notion that the political crisis was an external driver of negative impacts because both programs experienced similar difficulties at the same time. It is unlikely that both programs experienced different causes of this systematic change. Both NSP and USAID saw positive impacts on Government Capacity in Wave 4 before the switch to negative impacts in Wave 5 after the crisis. Further, the same shift from negative to positive impacts on resilience indicators took place in the Wave 5 NSP and USAID evaluations.

What is the effect when NSP and USAID activities are implemented together?

Success.

SIKA was the first USAID stabilization project in Afghanistan to have an official government partner in the MRRD. This important innovation shaped the character of the SIKA program and its implementation strategy of bolstering the institutions of CDCs and DDAs and the Provincial branches of MRRD. The question of what happens when stabilization and NSP programming takes place in close proximity to the same village in the same time period is therefore important for understanding how well these programs worked together. MISTI answered this question by defining the treatment group as only those villages that received both USAID and NSP interventions, compared to the remaining villages matched on population, elevation, majority Pashto speaking, and violence. There were 63 villages treated by both USAID and NSP in Waves 3-5, but only 28 in the Waves 4-5 treatment group.

The combination of NSP and USAID stabilization programming in the same villages had a positive impact on change in the overall Stability Index in Waves 3-5 (see Figure 8.5 above). In addition to this positive impact on overall stability, the interaction of USAID and NSP programming was the cause of positive impact on the perceived ability of the district government to get things done. Positive impact on Local Governance was also observed, including increased confidence in DDAs and improved CDC performance, as well as improved outlook for the future of the district and improvement in the ability of local leaders to secure funding. All Waves 3-5 impacts were positive, including a statistically significant decrease in support for the Taliban compared to the counterfactual control group, described in further detail below. The largest impacts were observed in cases where both NSP and USAID stabilization activities were ongoing at the time of the Wave 5 survey. Completed projects did not show the same impacts as ongoing ones, suggesting that effects may be relatively short term.

Similar effects were observed in Waves 4-5, though the smaller sample size makes the findings less generalizable. Positive impacts were observed on the Government Capacity, District Government Satisfaction, District Government Performance, and Community Cohesion components and sub-indices. Positive impacts thus stretched across nearly the full range of stability and resilience indicators in a significant and positive departure from the other Waves 4-5 findings reported in this chapter. The Local Leader Satisfaction sub-index was the singular finding of negative impact. This finding falls into the pattern seen in Waves 2-4 and described above where DDAs/CDCs and state institutions are credited for project benefits to the detriment of local traditional leaders.

Do stabilization impacts increase with the number of projects implemented in a community?

Yes.

The findings reported in the last section on NSP and USAID interaction effects are an example of the type of effects that may be observed when more than one activity takes place in or in close proximity to a village. In the case of USAID-NSP, at least two activities took place, one from USAID and one from NSP. To evaluate the effect of more than one USAID stabilization intervention, a type of “dosage-response” estimation was undertaken to estimate the marginal effect of multiple stabilization interventions in a

village. That is, the evaluation was modified to measure the change in indicator scores caused by each additional activity after the first one.

Methodological debate continues over the best method for this type of estimation using observational data.²³⁵ The approach taken here was to first match on the usual set of variables in the base model using the binary treatment/control variable, and balance and prune the observations as usual. In the next step of estimating the treatment effect using regression analysis, the binary treatment variable was replaced with a count variable of the number of stabilization activities that took place in each treated village. The results showed that impact on Government Satisfaction increased 1.8% with each additional activity, and an additional activity after the first one increased Community Cohesion by 1.1%. Smaller, but still statistically significant effects were observed on a total of 21 survey and index indicators.

In conformity with statistical expectations, none of these marginal effects showed a reversal of direction from the main set of effects reported above – no positive impacts became negative or vice versa. In some cases however, treatment effects that were insignificant in the binary models had significant marginal effects in the dosage models. Government Satisfaction and Resilience are examples from Waves 3-5 where significant impacts were observed on several of the survey indicators that compose each sub-index, but the treatment effect on the sub-index itself was not significant in cases where only one activity took place. Impact on the sub-index indicator was observed only when the treatment effect was allowed to grow with additional activities after the first.

These findings on the strengthening of impacts with additional activities suggest that the magnitude and durability of impacts are increased with the clustering of multiple projects together in time and space. These impacts however cut both ways – negative impacts grow more negative with additional interventions just as positive impacts grow more positive. For example in Waves 4-5 District Government Performance decreased with each additional activity across the range of survey indicators that make up the sub-index. Despite this negative impact, the findings in Waves 3-5 and 4-5 on strengthened impact on District Government Satisfaction suggests that a worsening in performance due to factors such as the election crisis may be offset by increases in regard for institutions.

Do “hard” infrastructure activities have different effects than “soft” activities such as capacity building and communications?

Yes, but the small number of soft activities captured by the MISTI survey limits the ability to compare soft and hard impacts. The greatest impact results from a combination of at least one hard and one soft activity in treated villages.

The impacts reported above for stability programming as a whole are overwhelmingly the result of hard activities because a hard activity took place in nearly all of the treated villages surveyed by MISTI. Of the 297 total villages in the Waves 3-5 treatment group, 293 had at least one hard project activity within one kilometer. In Waves 3-5 only 32 villages were treated by soft activities, and all but 4 of these villages also received hard activities over the same timeframe. In Waves 4-5 the soft activity treatment group

²³⁵ See for example the paper by Zhao et al. “Propensity-Score Based Methods for Causal Inference in Observational Studies with Fixed Non-Binary Treatments.” Available at: <http://imai.princeton.edu/research/gpscore.html>

included 25 villages. After matching these sample sizes were further reduced. Small sample sizes limit the generalizability of the findings, and only very large effects are statistically significant.

Nevertheless, the impacts of soft activities were evaluated by comparing the treatment group of only villages that received soft activities with the control group made up of all other villages. This evaluation found positive impacts on overall stability (i.e. the Stability2 Index which omits the DDA-CDC index to increase the sample size), District Government Performance, including the survey indicators of responsiveness and getting things done, and the satisfaction indicator on the extent to which the district government understands local problems. The Waves 4-5 treatment group also showed positive impact on the survey indicator of district government responsiveness, as well as impacts on several indicators of DDA and CDC performance, the Resilience Index, and the Social Capital and Quality of Life sub-indices.

These positive impacts thus represent a reversal in many cases of the negative impacts observed in the evaluation of programmatic effects presented above. The impact of soft activities on reversing negative impacts on the overall Stability, District Government Performance, and DDA and CDC Performance indicators is particularly encouraging, as is the Waves 4-5 effect on strengthening the impacts on Resilience indicators that were observed in the evaluation of stability programming as a whole.

It is important to note that in the findings reported here the treatment group was effectively villages that received both hard and soft activities, compared to the counterfactual control group defined as villages that received hard activities only and villages where no intervention took place. The implication for programming is that a mix of hard and soft activities will achieve maximum positive impact. Stability programming should ideally implement both hard and soft activities in targeted villages around the same time.

Do project activities reduce violence?

No.

The frequency of violent incidents increases as a result of stabilization activities, at least in the short term. Overall the findings suggest that the Taliban and other armed opposition groups target villages where stabilization interventions take place. Higher rates of violence are correlated with decreasing stability and security perceptions.

MISTI analyzed the relationship between violence and stabilization interventions using data on violent incidents from UNDSS and NATO SIGACTS. Violence data could be obtained only through July 2014. Therefore MISTI lacks coverage for much of the period between Waves 4-5 and after. The data was sufficient for matching on violence prior to the Waves 3 and 4 baseline measurements, but not for analyzing whether the rate of violence increased after projects were implemented between Waves 3-5 and 4-5. Therefore the evaluation of stabilization interventions and violence is restricted to villages treated before Wave 4.

The analysis focused on counts of general violent incidents from both the UNDSS and SIGACTS databases. These violence counts were 75% correlated and treatment effects were generally similar on the two count variables. The other violence variables used to test for treatment effects were the

number of deaths resulting from incidents from UNDSS, and the number of enemy actions and (IED) events from SIGACTS. For each surveyed village, the count of the different types of violence that took place within one kilometer was tallied for different time periods before and after survey fieldwork – 15, 30, 60, and 90 days before and after the dates of data collection for each survey wave in each village (except Wave 5).

The effect that a stabilization intervention had on each type of violent incident was tested using a modified version of the methodology described above. CEM was used for matching Wave 4 treatment and control villages using the variables from the base model – population, elevation, majority Pashto-speaking or not, NSP activities, and prior violence. In addition to the base model variable of the UNDSS violence count 30 days before the pre-treatment survey wave, violence counts of both SIGACTS and UNDSS from 90 days before Survey Wave 1 (the earliest available measurement) were also included in the matching. Matching on three different counts of violence prior to treatment makes the impact estimates robust for controlling how past violence predicts future violence, which otherwise could act as a confounding factor that might account for the change in violence instead of stabilization interventions. A range of other variables related to the frequency of violence, such as proximity to military bases, police stations, troop levels and military manoeuvres would ideally also be included in the matching to more precisely measure the effect of project activities separately from other causes of violence, but these data were not shared with MISTI.

After matching, two different types of regression models were used to test for treatment effects on violence in Waves 2-4, 3-4, 1-3 and 2-3. Logit regression (for binary outcomes) was used to test whether stabilization interventions had a causal effect on whether or not a violent incident took place. Poisson regressions on the raw violence counts were used to test whether interventions created a higher frequency of violent incidents in the treatment group compared to the counterfactual control group. Standard errors were adjusted for district clustering to control for bias that would arise from comparing villages in more violent districts with ones in less violent districts.

Treatment caused an increase in the frequency of general violent incidents counted by both UNDSS and SIGACTS across Survey Waves 1-4. Compared to violent incidents in general, deaths were relatively rare events and only the models of villages treated in Waves 1-3 showed significant effects. IED events were similarly rare, though the Poisson models suggested significant decreases in IED events in Waves 1-3 and 2-3 only. A particularly important finding showed that villages in the Waves 2-4 treatment group experienced a significantly higher rate of enemy actions (attacks) in the 15, 30, 60, and 90-day time periods after the Wave 4 survey compared to the counterfactual control group. This finding provides clear evidence that the Taliban and other armed opposition groups target villages because of stabilization interventions. This violence was an effective strategy for reducing the impact of stabilization interventions.

FIGURE 8.10: WAVE 2-4 IMPACT: INCREASE IN VIOLENT ENEMY ACTIONS PER VILLAGE 1KM PROXIMITY TO ONGOING PROJECT ACTIVITIES




Figure 8.10 visualizes the increase in enemy attacks in the treatment group compared to the counterfactual control group in Waves 2-4. The treatment effect reported in the figure was calculated using a Poisson regression on the count of enemy actions in the 30 days after the Wave 4 survey in villages where stabilization interventions were ongoing compared to the counterfactual control group. These findings have the policy implication that program implementers should carefully weigh the risk to local beneficiaries before intervening with a project activity. Projects should engage security forces in the project where feasible.

Endorsement Experiment: Relative Support for the Taliban and GIROA

Do stabilization activities have an impact on support for the Taliban? What is the relative support for the Taliban (versus GIROA)? And which factors other than project activities affect that support?


Yes, stabilization programming has a negative impact on support for the Taliban, which has been consistently weaker than support for GIROA across all survey waves. Taliban support tends to decrease among relatively literate respondents. Female respondents also tend to be less supportive of the Taliban than the population as a whole. Income and age have no significant effect on Taliban support, though certain higher income groups may be slightly more supportive of the Taliban than average.

A particularly innovative aspect of the MISTI survey is the set of experimental survey questions that are used to measure relative support for the Taliban and GIROA. In combination these questions give us a relative support score that ranges above and below zero from +5 to -5. Relative support for the Taliban is calculated by subtracting support for GIROA from support for the Taliban. Positive scores signify more support for GIROA than the Taliban, and negative scores signify more support for the Taliban than GIROA. The zero point on the scale signifies equal levels of support for the Taliban and GIROA (or indifference to both sides). The dashed red line marking the zero point on each of the graphs in Figure 8.10 indicates equal levels of support for both the Taliban and GIROA, or a lack of preference for either

side. The graph in the top-left panel of Figure 8.10 displays the trend in the average level of Taliban-GIRoA relative support for the 505 villages surveyed in all five survey waves. The other graphs show the distribution of Taliban-GIRoA relative support across all villages surveyed in Waves 1-5. The general skew towards the negative end of the scale in the graphs shows that the population supports the Taliban consistently less than GIRoA.

The trend line graph in the top left panel of Figure 8.11 shows that Taliban-GIRoA relative support was consistently negative in Survey Waves 1-5, which means that support for GIRoA was greater than support for the Taliban in all waves. The trend line is essentially flat showing little variation from wave to wave.

FIGURE 8.11: TALIBAN-GIROA RELATIVE SUPPORT



A key finding of the endorsement experiment is that the largest groups within the population represented by the MISTI survey are “on the fence” between the Taliban and GIRoA such that they have approximately equal support for, or indifference to both sides. Further, relative support has not shifted significantly towards one side or the other over the five survey waves. The relative support metric shows that the average Afghan survey respondent is somewhat supportive of both GIRoA and the Taliban – support for one party does not necessarily preclude support for the other party.


Similar to the stability indicators discussed in the Stability and Resilience Trends chapter, the relative support trend shows some seasonal variation. In this case relative support for the Taliban increased with the fighting season (Waves 2 and 4), and increased again slightly in Wave 5 when the Taliban extended the fighting season through the first 100 days of the Ghani presidency. The increase in support during

the fighting season suggests that a show of force against the government tends to sway the population slightly towards the Taliban compared to more peaceful periods. The metric could also be reversed to show a small increase in support for GIROA during the off-season, and decrease during the fighting season, in parallel to the trends in the Government Capacity indicators discussed in the Stability and resilience Trends chapter.

The bar graphs in Figure 8.11 show that in all waves the largest groups of surveyed villages were “on the fence” between GIROA and the Taliban. The “fence sitters” are shown by the tall bars near the zero point (dashed red line) on each graph, which indicates equal support for, or indifference to both sides. Nevertheless, in all waves support was skewed towards the negative side of the scale, away from the Taliban and towards GIROA.


Overall relative support for the Taliban in Wave 5 is represented in the map in Figure 8.12 for each of the 55 districts surveyed in all five waves of the MISTI Survey. The map shows that the average village in most districts is more supportive of GIROA than the Taliban (shown in green). With the exception of Lashkar Gah, all of the districts surveyed in Helmand Province are relatively more supportive of The Taliban, along with Shindand District in Farah Province, and Zurmat district in Paktiya Province.

FIGURE 8.12: WAVE 5 TALIBAN-GIROA RELATIVE SUPPORT BY DISTRICT



The map in Figure 8.13 shows how the 55 districts surveyed in all 5 survey waves changed in their levels of support between the wave one baseline and wave five end-line surveys. Seven different categories are used on the map to represent directions of change from Waves 1-5. The single largest category is “no change” including 27 districts. In all of these districts the average village supported GIROA more than the Taliban, with the exception of Zurmat, which supported the Taliban throughout. The average village in eleven districts shifted from weak to strong support for GIROA, and nine districts shifted from strong to weak support for GIROA. A total of seven districts – six in Helmand plus Shindand in Farah – shifted to supporting the Taliban instead of GIROA. Nahr-e Saraj district in Helmand Province was the only district to shift from strong GIROA support in Wave 1 to Taliban support in Wave 5. Helmand is likely to remain an area with relatively strong Taliban support for the foreseeable future. The findings described below from the analysis of the endorsement experiment data suggest that education and literacy programs may be the best long-term option for undermining the popular appeal of the Taliban in Helmand.


FIGURE 8.13: CHANGE IN TALIBAN-GIROA RELATIVE SUPPORT BY DISTRICT, WAVES I-5



Stabilization projects also played a role in reducing support for the Taliban, though the effects observed in Wave 5 were less significant than those measured in previous waves. Indeed the only significant impacts on reducing Taliban support were observed with the interaction of stabilization and NSP programming. Figure 8.14 shows the decrease in support for the Taliban caused by the combination of


NSP and USAID programming in Waves 4-5. The downward slope of the blue trend line for the treatment group in this graph is positive because support for the Taliban decreased from pre-treatment to post-treatment survey waves. The positive impact is visualized by the steep drop in Taliban support in the treatment group compared to the flat trend in the counterfactual control group. While both groups of villages started out in Wave 2 as less supportive of the Taliban than GIROA overall, the treatment group in Wave 4 was slightly more supportive, given that Wave 2 pre-treatment value was slightly higher than the control group value. After the implementation of NSP and USAID programming the average level of support for the Taliban dropped significantly in the treatment group compared to the control group.

FIGURE 8.14: IMPACT ON TALIBAN-GIROA RELATIVE SUPPORT, WAVES 4-5



For the purpose of comparison, Figure 8.15 displays the impact on Taliban support observed in Waves 2-4. Here the positive impact is visualized by the greater decrease in Taliban support in the treatment group compared to the counterfactual control group. Unlike Wave 5, stabilization interventions were seen to have a wider range of impacts on decreasing Taliban support in Wave 4 (see the Wave 4 report). The fact that these findings were not observed again in Wave 5 indicates the depth of the political crisis and the extent to which it undermined support for the government.

FIGURE 8.15: USAID IMPACT ON TALIBAN-GIROA RELATIVE SUPPORT, WAVES 2-4



Indeed, one impact model that defined the treatment group as villages within 250 meters of the linear features of ongoing project activities showed that stabilization interventions effected an increase in Taliban support rather than a decrease. This model matched villages within districts, ensuring that each treatment village was matched to a control village in the same district rather than finding matches from other districts. Further specification of this model showed that along with stabilization interventions, violent incidents were also a positive predictor of increased support for the Taliban. In fact, the incidence of violence strengthened the impact of interventions on increasing Taliban support. This positive impact for the Taliban however became statistically insignificant when the villages were matched on whether the Taliban had control of the village with no government presence.

This set of findings shows that stabilization interventions can have perverse, Taliban-supporting effects when they are implemented in areas where the Taliban has control, as opposed to areas that are contested or under government control. In areas under Taliban control they are likely to take credit for allowing projects to take place, and use violence to ensure that interventions do not lead to increased government control of the area. Deeper exploration is likely to uncover that the observed relationship between interventions and increased Taliban support was driven by a specific set of projects taking place in the districts shown on the above map with high levels of Taliban support and little NSP programming and few effective CDCs or DDAs. The policy implication is that projects should not be implemented in such areas.

The relative support metric is a valuable complement to other survey findings, such as the nationwide Survey of the Afghan People (SAP) implemented annually by the Asia Foundation. The most recent SAP found that 32% of Afghans said they have some sympathy with the Taliban and other armed opposition groups (AOGs), with higher levels observed among the rural population in the relatively less stable districts surveyed by MISTI.²³⁶ Further, a large majority of the population expresses support for reconciliation between GIRoA and AOGs. As an indirect method of measuring support for the Taliban, MISTI's experimental questions provide more reliable estimates of relative support for the Taliban and GIRoA than the direct questions included in other surveys. These findings provide further evidence that the hearts and minds of the population have not yet been decisively won by GIRoA. Further, sustainable increases in stability and government legitimacy may require successful reconciliation with the Taliban.


Determinants of Support for the Taliban

The impact evaluation focused on village-level data analysis. There are however also valuable insights to be gathered from analysis of individual drivers of support for the Taliban relative to GIRoA. Figure 8.15 shows marginal effects of four key demographic variables – income, literacy, age, and gender – on relative support for the Taliban in Survey Waves 1-5. The marginal effect plots show the magnitude of the shift for or against a particular policy or actor created by a unit change in one of the demographic variables. For example, the dot and line labeled “female” on each plot in Figure 8.16 shows the effect on support for the Taliban of a change in the value of the gender variable from male to female. In Waves 2-5 female respondents showed less support for the Taliban on average, because the dot for female is

²³⁶ The Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2014: A Survey of the Afghan People, Pages 45-46. Accessible at: <http://asiafoundation.org/country/afghanistan/2014-poll.php>

located on the negative end of the x-axis. The length of the line on either side of the dot is dictated by a 95% confidence interval; we are 95% confident that the “true” estimate of the magnitude of the shift is located somewhere along that line. In Wave 3 the length of the line for female is entirely in the negative region, indicating a robustly negative effect on support for the Taliban. The length of the line for each variable is dictated by the sample size. Smaller sample sizes have wider 95 percent confidence intervals, and thus longer lines. Larger confidence intervals require stronger effects to gain statistical significance. Statistically significant effects do not cross the zero center point on the x-axis.

FIGURE 8.16: THE MARGINAL EFFECTS OF SELECTED VARIABLES ON RELATIVE SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBAN, WAVES 1-5



It is important to note from the plots above show that age is not a significant driver of Taliban support; neither relative youth nor seniority has an effect on support. Income has a slightly positive relationship to Taliban support in Waves 1-2, no effect in Wave 3, and slightly negative effect in Waves 4-5. This inconsistency and crossing of zero by the confidence interval shows that the effect of income on support is not significant. The Female and Literacy variables have a generally negative relationship to support across the five waves. This is an important finding that suggests an emphasis on female empowerment, literacy and education programming would be an important investment in reducing support for the Taliban over the long term.

Concluding Remarks on Additional Insights to be gained from MISTI

The USAID’s largest-ever evaluation program on stabilization initiative has yielded an enormous set of data. This report and its predecessors have focused on analyzing these data to achieve a narrow set of evaluation objectives to inform ongoing and future programming. While the analysis of programmatic

impacts and answers to the learning agenda questions presented here have met the immediate evaluation objectives, the learning agenda should be extended and the data mined extensively for the wide range of insights that it has to offer on the situation in Afghanistan, and on the effects of interventions in complex and conflict-affected environments elsewhere.

The following is a brief and non-comprehensive extension to the agenda for transforming the raw information collected by MISTI into more valuable knowledge:

- Territorial control: The MISTI findings provide credence to the “logic of violence in civil war” by Stathis Kalyvas.²³⁷ Deeper exploration of the drivers of changes in stability and the effects of interventions should be accomplished through a deeper analysis of the MISTI data on which actors have local territorial control, and how various outcomes are influenced by the presence of the Afghan national army, police, and local police, as well as the Taliban. The perception data should be combined with observational data on force presence as it becomes available.
- Violent events: Stabilization interventions effect increased violence in the short term, as described in this report. Additional analysis and additional violence data is required to analyze the longer-term effects of interventions on violence. If interventions are successful at winning hearts and minds to GIRoA, then violence should decrease over the longer term as GIRoA establishes deeper control of territory and elides the basis of popular Taliban support. Very important policy implications for future programming in unstable areas are entailed in this analysis, in combination with the first bullet point above, on what type of security intervention should accompany community development activities.
- Spatial analysis: Tools and techniques such as point process modeling, spatially-weighted regression, and other forms of spatial analysis should be applied to the MISTI data to analyze the extensity of stabilization impacts in space as well as time. The different effects on villages in different proximities to project features yielded some preliminary findings in this vein. More analysis should be done to identify clustered interventions in space and time to identify the impacts of these clusters, and their optimum size, duration, and project activity composition in comparison to other activity clusters and non-clustered activities.
- Summative time series analysis: The MISTI program was tasked with providing wave-by-wave data analysis. A summative analysis would incorporate data from all waves into a unified set of impact models to evaluate the average effects of interventions over time. Outcomes over Waves 1-3, 2-4, and 3-5 should be flattened into unified models of annual effects. Similarly, outcomes over Waves 1-2, 2-3, 3-4, and 4-5 should be combined into unified models of six-month effects.²³⁸ The findings from this analysis would provide policy makers and practitioners with the maximum certainty that is obtainable from the MISTI data about stabilization program impacts.
- Multi-level analysis: Multi-level or hierarchical modeling is the best practice option for analysis of data that is clustered into nested units, such as the data from individual MISTI survey

²³⁷ Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. 1st ed. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

²³⁸ This analysis can be accomplished using the methods outline above with the addition of an index variable in CEM for the wave pairing.

respondents who are clustered into villages, which are clustered into districts. Innovative combinations of multilevel modeling with evaluation methodology have promise for mobilizing all of the information captured at the individual level for evaluation using the village level time series as the unit of analysis. Additional data about the district context should also be incorporated into the models to yield more robust and nuanced impact findings.

- Further disaggregation of treatment effects: The analysis of “hard” and “soft” activities described above is only a first, small step towards mining the project activity data for policy-relevant impacts. Additional project variables, such as irrigation, education, transportation, in-kind, budget, etc. are ready to be incorporated into additional models of program impacts.

Annex 8.1: Endorsement Experiment Methodology

Relative levels of support for the Taliban and GIRoA were measured using a battery of four endorsement survey experiments that are embedded within the broader MISTI Stabilization Survey. The mechanics of a survey endorsement experiment are straightforward. Randomly selected respondents are assigned to a treatment group and asked to express their opinion toward a policy endorsed by specific actors whose support levels we wish to measure (here, the Taliban). These responses are then contrasted with those from a control group of respondents that answered an identical question with a different endorsement (that of GIRoA). Higher levels of enthusiasm for a policy with an endorsement relative to those without it are viewed as evidence of support for the endorsing actor. Since each respondent is assigned only one condition for any endorsement experiment, it is impossible for enumerators or others to compare support levels across different conditions for any individual respondent. Half of the sample thus receives questions with the Taliban “treatment;” the other half, with a GIRoA endorsement (the “control”) embedded in the questions.

The robustness of our estimates is increased by the use of four different questions to measure support. These four questions are then pooled together to produce a single estimate for relative support. When pooling together, these questions are weighted by their ability to discriminate support for the combatants. That is, questions where we observe a marked shift toward one actor are weighted more highly than questions where less clear separation between GIRoA and the Taliban is observed. Rather than imposing arbitrary weightings to these questions, the statistical process of pooling allows the data themselves to speak.

The strength of this approach is two-fold: it avoids reliance on a single question or measurement that could become biased, dated, or simply ineffective over the 2+ year life span of these MISTI surveys; and each individual question, along with the composite index, can be analyzed for the discriminatory power over each survey wave. That is, the strength of each question can rise and fall in line with developments in Afghanistan, providing a more flexible approach than standard single-question approaches.

Drawing on electronic and print media, four policies with the properties desired for an endorsement experiment were identified: prison reform, direct election of district councils, a reform of the Independent Election Committee, and the strengthening of anti-corruption policies.

Successful endorsement experiments share four properties. First, selected initiatives should be in the same policy space so that they can be combined for statistical analysis. Domestic policies were emphasized here. Second, these initiatives should be well known by individuals to minimize “Don't Know” responses and to differentiate support for an endorser from learning about a policy from the endorsement itself. In the survey, few respondents replied “Don't Know,” while refusal rates were low in all provinces. Third, the particular actors in question should actually endorse these initiatives so that the questions are realistic and respondents take them seriously. Finally, the general public holds a wide range of views about these initiatives, enabling us to detect support for endorsers without suffering from ceiling and floor effects.

One of the endorsement experiments used to measure support is reproduced below to provide a sense of the survey's mechanics:

Q-51A. It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government [Taliban] that people be allowed to vote in elections to select the members of their district council. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

Respondents were presented with a five-fold range of possible responses from “I strongly oppose this policy” to “I strongly support this policy.” Respondents could also refuse to answer or could reply “Don’t Know.” Once again, half of the respondents received the question with a Taliban endorsement; the other half, with a GIRoA endorsement. No respondent was asked both questions. It is therefore the difference in the aggregate between all answers to the Taliban- and GIRoA-endorsed questions where we measure support levels.

Endorsement experiments possess several advantages over direct questioning techniques. First, the method avoids triggering social desirability bias, the well-known problem that arises when asking a direct question about a sensitive topic. This is especially likely to occur if the respondent believes that the continued receipt of goods or security is conditional on providing answers that the enumerator wishes to hear. Second, each of the two modules draws on four questions to measure support. As a result, estimates of support are pooled across four questions, increasing the reliability of the estimate.


The Figure below presents the “discrimination” values for each question and for each Wave of the MISTI Stabilization Survey. Higher values suggest that the question is stronger at “discriminating” between Taliban and GIRoA supporters. While there is no accepted standard for a “good” discrimination value, we suggest that anything over .5 is considered a “strong” question. All of our questions remain above that mark.

When we construct the pooled estimate of the support for Taliban/GIRoA, we weight by discrimination value. Questions that are doing the best job at sorting Taliban from GIRoA supporters are therefore privileged in the estimation strategy. This avoids imposing arbitrary values on the cut points for support; we let the data speak for itself.

As the summary plots below reveal, the endorsement experiments retain a high degree of discriminatory power across all five waves of the MISTI survey. The first graph on the left in each row displays the mean response for the group of respondents asked the question with the government endorsement. The center graph shows the mean for the question asked with a Taliban endorsement. The graph on the right in each row shows the difference between the mean responses to the question with the Taliban endorsement subtracted from the responses with GIRoA endorsement.







More generally, the discriminatory power of these questions remained consistent across Waves 1-5. This alleviates concerns about the possibility that these questions have a short shelf life owing to the choice of issues that the endorsements are embedded within. In fact, MISTI’s use of endorsement experiments in a panel (time-series) setting breaks new methodological ground, as no endorsement experiment has been repeated across multiple survey waves before. As a result, MISTI is gathering







important new data about the utility of indirect questioning methods such as endorsement experiments that could be embedded in other large-scale surveys where trends over time on sensitive issues are important.












Annex 8.2: Treatment and Control Balance on Key Variables

The graphs below display the distribution of the values of key variables between treatment and control villages before the balance was increased via matching.









APPENDIX 1: REVIEW OF STABILITY INDICES

**APPENDIX 2: STABILITY INDEX COMPONENTS,
VARIABLES AND RESCALING**

**APPENDIX 3: RESILIENCE INDEX COMPONENTS,
VARIABLES AND RESCALING**

APPENDIX 4: STABILITY INDEX SCORES (WAVE 5)

APPENDIX 5: RESILIENCE INDEX SCORES (WAVE 5)

APPENDIX 6: WAVE 5 QUESTIONNAIRE

**APPENDIX 7: KFZ ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURAL
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APPENDIX 1: REVIEW OF STABILITY INDICES

Approach

Management Systems International (MSI) commissioned the RAND Corporation to conduct an independent methodology review of the Measuring Impact of Stability Initiatives (MISTI). One challenge the RAND review identified was in identifying stability trends and impacts across disparate programming and measured by a wide variety of survey items. RAND recommended a review of the stability indices that included a principal component or factor analysis of the current survey items, the use of “data-driven” weights generated by factor scores, stronger delineation of programmatic constructs within the overarching construct of stability, and triangulation and validation of index constructs and scores with existing data sources such as previous polling data and ISAF tracking data.

This brief responds to RAND’s recommendations by conducting a factor analysis of the survey items making up the index and re-assessing the programmatic theory and constructs that constitute the broad objective of stability. The review concludes that the current index items are largely validated but would benefit from a more careful delineation and disaggregation of underlying programmatic constructs, and that the construct of community resilience may exhibit dynamics sufficiently unique to stability as to merit separate treatment in evaluating stability trends and program impacts. The revised indices are largely unchanged, but do have sharper programmatic divisions and offer a greater modularity in isolating potential program effects and higher order changes in Afghan communities.

Analysis

The MISTI indices were originally developed around eight dimensions of measurement, with some dimensions captured as single questions on the MISTI survey and other dimensions consisting of multiple survey items. A summary of the measurement levels and their constituent items is as follows:

Indicator	Items	Response scale(s)
Security in local area	1	1-5
Direction of district	1	1-4
Government confidence	17	0-1, 1-4, 1-5
Quality of life	6	0-1, 1-3, 1-4, 1-5
Community resilience	14	0-1, 1-4
Service delivery	1	1-5
Corruption	1	0-1
Armed Opposition Groups	1	1-3

Annex 1 lists all survey items used in computing the index.

Note that the dimensions of the stability index vary widely in terms of the number of items, and that dimensions span different response scales. In addition to the collection of respondent survey items, the

stability index includes observed measures of local control, community accessibility, and levels of violence.

In response to recommendations from the RAND report, the MISTI team tested the existing dimensions of stability, and also examined all survey items without any pre-defined structure. From these analyses, the MISTI team posited potential theories of change that could be tested against Wave 4 and 5 survey data.

Review of existing dimensions

Factor analyses were conducted in the “psych” package in R using the polychoric correlation matrix, as is recommended for binary or ordinal data.¹ Parallel analysis was used to determine the number of factors to extract. Extracted factors were rotated using the “oblimin” method in which factors were allowed to be correlated.

Parallel analysis of the government confidence index, consisting of 17 survey items, suggested three separate measurement factors.

Table 1 Government confidence factor analysis

Survey item	#	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
The Afghan government is well regarded in this area	8	.07	.42	.22
Confidence - district government	9b	.01	.00	.81
Responsiveness - district government	10b	-.01	-.01	.83
Get things done - district government	11b	.04	.04	.69
Confidence in DDA	12b	.64	.01	.10
Responsiveness of DDA	12c	.64	.03	.11
DDA get things done	12d	.67	.04	.07
Confidence in CDC	13b	.73	-.02	-.03
Responsiveness of CDC	13c	.76	-.01	-.06
CDC get things done	13d	.75	.00	-.06
The district government officials in this district are from this district	14a	-.02	.34	.13
The district government understands the problems of people in this area	14b	.11	.60	.01
The district government cares about people in this area	14c	-.01	.81	.00
District government officials in this district abuse their authority	14d	.09	-.40	-.12
District government officials visit this area	14e	-.01	.73	.01
District government officials are doing their jobs honestly	14f	.00	.78	-.01
The district government delivers services to this area in a fair manner	14g	-.01	.81	-.04

Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3

In the table of factor loadings above, each shading corresponds to an extracted factor. The first factor consists of performance measures for District Development Assemblies (DDA) and Community

¹ Polychoric correlation supposes that binary or ordinal response values approximate a latent continuous distribution.

Development Councils (CDCs), in what might be labeled a DDA-CDC Performance factor. The second factor consists of a series of binary questions relating to the overall satisfaction with district government, or a District Government Satisfaction factor. The final factor consists of performance measures for district government, or a District Government Performance factor.

Two items were excluded from any factor: District officials being from the district had a moderate loading on factor 2 (.34), however this item does not have a strong attributional link to stability programming. District officials abusing their authority for private gain had either a zero or negative loading on the three factors.

Parallel analysis of the quality of life index, consisting of six survey items, successfully loads on a single factor:

Table 2 Quality of life factor analysis

Survey item	Question #	Loading
Local area more or less secure	2b	.63
Life satisfaction	26	.72
Household finances	27	.72
Ability to meet basic needs	28	.61
Ability to meet basic needs next year	29	-.65
Future too uncertain	30	-.58

The negative loadings on the final two items represent a reversed polarity in the response coding.

Parallel analysis of the resilience index, consisting of 14 items, suggested three separate measurement factors.

Table 3 Community resilience factor analysis

Survey item	Question #	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Able to solve problems from outside the village	34c	-.02	.04	.46
Able to solve problems from inside the village	35c	.03	-.03	.54
How often villages work together to solve common problems	36	-.02	-.03	.62
How often citizen interests considered by local leaders	37a	.01	-.02	.55
How effective local leaders in securing funding	38	.06	.22	.34
Belong to voluntary group?	39a	.08	.00	.17
Confidence - district governor	9a	-.09	.85	.01
Confidence - district government	9b	-.01	.79	.02
Confidence - local leaders	9c	.56	.16	.11
Confidence - provincial governor	9d	-.01	.63	.05
Responsiveness - district governor	10a	.03	.81	-.04
Responsiveness - district government	10b	.08	.76	-.02
Responsiveness - local leaders	10c	1.01	-.02	-.01

Survey item	Question #	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Responsiveness - provincial government	10d	.11	.59	.01
		Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3

The first factor relates to local level performance, or a Local Leader Performance factor. The second factor relates to district and provincial level performance reminiscent of the District Government Performance factor from the previous analysis of the government confidence index. The third factor relates to villages mobilizing to solve problems and local level leadership, in what may be called a Community Cohesion factor. Membership in voluntary groups does not load on any factor and is excluded. It is also debatable whether government performance measures are appropriate for measures of community resilience, which often develops in the absence of strong local government support.

In summary, a review of MISTI's original multi-item dimensions of stability establishes that two of the three dimensions measure discrete constructs. In the case of the government confidence index, the constructs are programmatically suitable but would benefit from sharper delineation as disaggregates of higher order constructs. In the case of community resilience, it may not be suitable to mix community and government level measures that seek to measure constructs of community mobilization and collective action.

Review of items without pre-defined structure

The next step in the analysis was to enter all survey items in the stability index into a factor analysis without a pre-defined structure. The MISTI team took the opportunity to enter additional survey items for possible inclusion in revised indices. The analysis extracted nine factors, two of which were discarded as not sufficiently capturing any substantive programmatic construct. And while the extracted factors largely validate the pre-defined dimensions, there are also some findings that do not. Findings from the analysis of all survey items are as follows:

- The previously identified factors of DDA-CDC Performance, District Government Satisfaction, District Government Performance, Local Leader Performance, and Community Cohesion were also identified in the factor analysis without any pre-defined structure.
- In addition to the District Government Performance factor, there is also a Provincial Government Performance factor.
- Perceptions of safety and security loaded highly on quality of life indices such as life satisfaction and overall direction of district, but did not load highly on any other factor.
- Presence of armed opposition groups and corruption perceptions did not load highly on any factor.
- However, in one of the two discarded factors, there is an intriguing combination of high loading on the incidence of problems affecting the village, and low to moderate loadings on corruption and presence of armed opposition groups.

- The other discarded factor consisted of moderate loadings on any level of government getting things done, while the stronger retained factors consisted of perceptions of confidence, responsiveness, and getting things done disaggregated across levels of governance.
- With one exception, new measurement items that were introduced for possible relevance to stability constructs were validated. These new items consisted of security and corruption trends (in addition to levels), adding performance measures for the district governor in addition to district government, and whether local leaders represented women's interests. Neither the level nor trend questions for corruption loaded on any factor.



See Annex 2 for the master table of factor loadings.

Conclusions

Based on the results of the factor analyses as well as a review of the programmatic suitability of items and their associated constructs, the MISTI team formulated new indices that have clearly identified constructs making up the overall stability index. The most substantive changes were to remove district government performance from measures of community resilience, but replace it with measures of DDA-CDC performance. In recognition of the hybrid roles these citizen committees play in both local governance and community development, DDA-CDC performance enter into both local governance and community resilience constructs.

Another substantive change was to remove the resilience index from stability altogether. While reflecting desirable traits in the abstract, resilience also threatens to be a measurement confound given that it might reflect both a nurturing relationship with local government structures and a struggle to cope in the absence of government support and possibly requiring accommodative relationships with armed opposition groups. Resilience, and its accompanying construct of cohesion, will be evaluated separately for program impacts and trends, but will also be tested in subsequent data rounds to see how well it relates to stability constructs.

With removal of community mobilization constructs, stability becomes almost entirely an aggregate measure of support for government, with support disaggregated by constructs of government capacity, local non-state or hybrid governance, and quality of life. Community resilience remains an aggregate measure of citizen committees interacting with district government, local leaders representing their villages to outsiders and soothing tensions within villages, and capacity for collective action to solve problems external and internal to the village. The reformulated indices with their associated constructs are diagrammed as follows:



The correlation matrix for the extracted factors is as follows:

	District govt. performance	Local leader performance	DDA-CDC performance	District govt. satisfaction	Provincial performance	Quality of life
Local leader performance	0.35	1				
DDA-CDC performance	0.51	0.41	1			
District govt. satisfaction	0.45	0.21	0.45	1		
Provincial performance	0.58	0.37	0.45	0.42	1	
Quality of life	0.54	0.23	0.53	0.56	0.48	1
Cohesion	0.11	0.23	0.30	0.14	0.12	0.24

Note that while the factor rotation method permitted factors to be correlated, the Cohesion index remains weakly to moderately correlated with the other factors, consistent with the possibility that this index exhibits unique dynamics. The local leader performance index also shows weaker correlations with more government-centric measures.

The RAND report further recommended that “data-driven” weights be used in applying stability measures. The MISTI team rather prefers to keep measures as intuitive as possible for an audience of development practitioners, so that constructs are continuous measures from 1-5. However, MISTI will also compute new variables based on factor scores and run separate analyses on these measures for robustness checks.

Annex 1

The breakdown of survey items across each dimension is as follows:

Indicator	Survey item(s)	Response scale
Security in local area (1 item)	Q-2b. Is your local area more secure, about the same, or less secure than it was a year ago?	1-5
Direction of district (1 item)	Q1 Generally speaking, are things in your district going in the right direction or in the wrong direction?	1-4
Government confidence (17 items)	Q-8 The Afghan government is well regarded in this area	0-1
	Q9b Confidence - district government	1-4
	Q10b Responsiveness - district government	1-4
	Q11b Get things done - district government	1-5
	Q12b Confidence in DDA	1-4
	Q12c Responsiveness of DDA	1-4
	Q12d DDA get things done	1-5
	Q13b Confidence in CDC	1-4
	Q13c Responsiveness of CDC	1-4
	Q13d CDC get things done	1-5
	Q-14a.The District Government officials in this district are from this district.	0-1
	Q-14b.The District Government understands the problems of people in this area.	0-1
	Q-14c.The District Government cares about the people in this area.	0-1
	Q-14d.District Government officials in this district abuse their authority to make money for themselves.	0-1
	Q-14e.District Government officials visit this area.	0-1
Q-14f.In general, the District Government officials are doing their jobs honestly.	0-1	
Q-14g.The District Government delivers basic services to this area in a fair manner.	0-1	
Quality of life (6 items)	Q-26. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?	1-4
	Q-27. How satisfied are you with your household's current financial situation?	1-4
	Q-28. Thinking about the past year, would you say overall that your ability to meet your basic needs increased, decreased, or stayed the same?	1-5
	Q-29. How worried are you about being able to meet your basic needs over the next year?	1-3
	Q-30 The situation in this area is certain enough for me to make plans for my future.	0-1
Resilience (14 items)	Q-34c. How often are the people here able to solve problems that come from outside the village?	1-4
	Q-35c. How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from inside the village?	1-4
	Q-36. When there is a problem in this area, how often do the villages/neighborhoods in this area work together to solve the problem?	1-4
	Q-37a. When decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by	1-4

Indicator	Survey item(s)	Response scale
	local leaders, how often are the interests of ordinary people in the village/neighborhood considered?	
	Q-38. How effective or ineffective are your local leaders at securing funds for your village/neighborhood's needs from the district and/or provincial government?	1-4
	Q-39a. Do you belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss issues of common interest or to do certain activities together?	0-1
	Q9a-d Confidence: District governor, district government, Local leaders, provincial governor	1-4
	Q10a-d Responsiveness: District governor, district government, Local leaders, provincial governor	1-4
Service delivery (1 item)	Q-15. Overall, do you think that services from the government in this area have improved, worsened, or not changed in the past year?	1-5
Corruption (1 item)	Q-23. Is corruption a problem in this area, or not?	0-1
Presence of Armed Opposition Groups (1 item)	Q-6d. How would you rate the presence of Armed Opposition Groups in your area?	1-3

Annex 2

Survey item	#	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7	Factor 8	Factor 9
Direction of district	q1	0.04	0.03	0.02	0	0.01	0.01	0.7	-0.05	0.02
Security in local area	q2a	0	-0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.04	0.75	-0.02	-0.02
Area more or less secure	q2b	-0.01	0.04	0	-0.03	0	0	0.76	-0.02	-0.02
Presence of AOG	q6_1d	-0.01	0.04	-0.06	0.04	-0.08	0.21	-0.25	0.08	-0.01
GIRoA well regarded	q8	0.1	0.03	0	0.37	0.05	-0.05	0.2	-0.08	0.09
Confidence - district governor	q9a	0.76	0	0.04	0.02	0.02	-0.05	0.04	-0.11	0.05
Confidence - district government	q9b	0.54	0.12	0.05	0.06	0.09	-0.03	0.09	-0.13	0
Confidence - local leaders	q9c	0.04	0.74	0.03	0	0.01	-0.02	0	-0.14	0.07
Confidence - provincial governor	q9d	0.04	0.01	0	0.02	0.78	-0.03	0.02	-0.14	0.04
Responsiveness - district governor	q10a	0.77	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.01	-0.09	0
Responsiveness - district government	q10b	0.56	0.14	0.05	0.07	0.1	0.03	0.06	-0.11	-0.04
Responsiveness - local leaders	q10c	0.02	0.77	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.03	0	-0.09	0
Responsiveness - provincial governor	q10d	0.05	0.02	0	0.02	0.81	0.02	0	-0.1	-0.01
Get things done - district governor	q11a	0.71	-0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.04	0.35	0.02
Get things done - district government	q11b	0.49	0.1	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.01	0.09	0.33	-0.02
Get things done - local leaders	q11c	0	0.7	0.02	0.02	0.03	0	0.04	0.35	-0.01
Get things done - provincial governor	q11d	-0.03	0	0.05	0.01	0.78	0	0.03	0.26	0
Confidence - DDA	q12b	0.12	-0.03	0.63	-0.01	0	-0.04	0.05	-0.02	0.02

Survey item	#	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7	Factor 8	Factor 9
Responsive - DDA	q12c	0.08	-0.01	0.66	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.02	-0.05
Get things done - DDA	q12d	0.02	0	0.68	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.07	-0.07
Confidence - CDC	q13b	-0.01	0.04	0.67	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04	-0.01	-0.04	0.12
Responsive - CDC	q13c	-0.04	0.02	0.74	0	0	0	-0.03	-0.06	0.04
Get things done - CDC	q13d	-0.06	0.01	0.75	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.06	-0.01
The district understands local problems	q14b	0.01	0.04	0.1	0.62	0.01	0	-0.02	-0.08	0.01
The district cares about people in this area	q14c	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.79	0	-0.01	0.01	0	0
District officials visit this area	q14e	0	0.03	-0.02	0.73	-0.01	-0.01	0	0.02	0.02
District officials are doing their jobs honestly	q14f	0	-0.02	0	0.78	0.01	0	0	-0.01	0
The district government delivers services fairly	q14g	-0.03	-0.01	0	0.81	0	0.01	-0.01	0.02	-0.02
Provision of government services	q15	0.04	-0.06	0.11	0.17	0.03	0.07	0.39	0.11	-0.03
Corruption a problem	q23	-0.01	0.11	-0.03	-0.01	-0.07	0.16	-0.1	0.02	0.09
Corruption trend	q25	-0.08	0.02	0.01	-0.17	-0.04	0.13	0.03	0	0.09
Life satisfaction	q26	0.01	-0.04	0.05	0.03	0.01	-0.03	0.52	0.03	0.11
Household finances	q27	0	0.02	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.47	0.02	0.07
Ability to meet basic needs	q28	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.08	0	0.07	0.46	0.1	-0.01
How often external problems	q34a	-0.02	0	0.02	0	-0.01	0.73	0.01	0	-0.03
Ability to solve external problems	q34c	0.02	0.01	-0.04	0.02	0.01	0.08	0.1	0.06	0.41
How often internal problems	q35a	0.03	0	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.69	-0.01	-0.03	0.08

Survey item	#	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7	Factor 8	Factor 9
Ability to solve internal problems	q35c	-0.01	0.05	0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0	0.02	0.52
How often villages work together	q36	0	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.04	0.06	-0.01	0	0.58
Local leaders represent citizen interests	q37a	0	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.05	-0.03	0.02	0.53
Local leaders represent women's interests	q37b	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.04	-0.05	-0.04	0.06	0.05	0.38
Local leaders secure funding	q38	0.02	0.07	0.13	0.05	0.01	0	0.18	0.02	0.27

APPENDIX 2: STABILITY INDEX COMPONENTS, VARIABLES AND RESCALING

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
1. Stability Index	0.75 * Survey Index + 0.10 * Level of Control (M36) + 0.10 * ACSOR Accessibility Tracker + 0.05 * Security Incidents Score			
Survey Index	MEAN of 1.1.1. District Government Performance, 1.1.2. District Government Satisfaction, 1.1.3. Provincial Government Performance, 1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance, 1.2.2. Local Leaders' Performance, 1.3. Quality of Life			
1.1. Government Capacity	MEAN of 1.1.1. District Government Performance, 1.1.2. District Government Satisfaction, 1.1.3. Provincial Government Performance			
1.1.1. District Government Performance	MEAN of survey items 1.1.1.1., 1.1.1.2., 1.1.1.3., 1.1.1.4., 1.1.1.5., 1.1.1.6.			
		1.1.1.1. Confidence - District Governor Q9a. How much confidence do you have in your [Insert Position/Organization]? District Governor	1. A lot of confidence	5
			2. Some confidence	4
			3. Not much confidence	2
			4. No confidence at all	1
		1.1.1.2. Confidence - District Government Q9b. How much confidence do you have in your [Insert Position/Organization]? District Government	1. A lot of confidence	5
			2. Some confidence	4
			3. Not much confidence	2
			4. No confidence at all	1

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
		1.1.1.3. Responsive - District Governor Q10a. How responsive do you think your [Insert Item] is/are to the needs of the local people in this area? District Governor	1. Very responsive	5
			2. Somewhat responsive	4
			3. Somewhat unresponsive	2
			4. Very unresponsive	1
		1.1.1.4. Responsive - District Government Q10b. How responsive do you think your [Insert Item] is/are to the needs of the local people in this area? District Government	1. Very responsive	5
			2. Somewhat responsive	4
			3. Somewhat unresponsive	2
			4. Very unresponsive	1
		1.1.1.5. Get things done - District Governor Q11a.Over the past year, has the [Insert Item] ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? - District Governor's	1. Improved a lot	5
			2. Improved a little	4
			3. No change	3
			4. Worsened a little	2
			5. Worsened a lot	1
		1.1.1.6. Get things done - District Government Q11b.Over the past year, has the [Insert Item] ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? - District Government's	1. Improved a lot	5
			2. Improved a little	4

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			3. No change	3
			4. Worsened a little	2
			5. Worsened a lot	1
1.1.2. District Government Satisfaction	MEAN of survey items 1.1.2.1., 1.1.2.2., 1.1.2.3., 1.1.2.4., 1.1.2.5., 1.1.2.6		0.00 - 0.20	1
			0.21 - 0.40	2
			0.41 - 0.60	3
			0.61 - 0.80	4
			0.81 - 1.00	5
		1.1.2.1. District government understands local problems Q14b. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.	1. The District Government understands the problems of people in this area.	1
			2. The District Government does not understand the problems of people in this area.	0
		1.1.2.2. District government cares about the people Q14c. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.	1. The District Government cares about the people in this area.	1
			2. The District Government does not care about the people in this area.	0
		1.1.2.3. District officials visit the area Q14e. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.	1. District Government officials visit this area.	1
			2. District Government officials do not visit this area.	0

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
		1.1.2.4. District officials do their jobs honestly Q14f. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.	1. In general, the District Government officials are doing their jobs honestly.	1
			2. In general, the District Government officials are not doing their jobs honestly.	0
		1.1.2.5. District government delivers services fairly Q14g. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.	1. The District Government delivers basic services to this area in a fair manner.	1
			2. The District Government does not deliver basic services to this area in a fair manner.	0
		1.1.2.6. GIROA well regarded Q8. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.	1. The Afghan government is well regarded in this area.	1
			2. The Afghan government is not well regarded in this area.	0
1.1.3. Provincial Government Performance	MEAN of survey items 1.1.3.1., 1.1.3.2., 1.1.3.3.			
		1.1.3.1. Confidence - Provincial Governor Q9d. How much confidence do you have in your [Insert Position/Organization]? Provincial Governor	1. A lot of confidence	5
			2. Some confidence	4
			3. Not much confidence	2
			4. No confidence at all	1

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
		1.1.3.2. Responsive - Provincial Governor Q10d. How responsive do you think your [Insert Item] is/are to the needs of the local people in this area? Provincial Governor	1. Very responsive	5
			2. Somewhat responsive	4
			3. Somewhat unresponsive	2
			4. Very unresponsive	1
		1.1.3.3. Get things done - Provincial Governor Q11d. Over the past year, has the [Insert Item] ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? - Provincial Governor's	1. Improved a lot	5
			2. Improved a little	4
			3. No change	3
			4. Worsened a little	2
			5. Worsened a lot	1
1.2. Local Governance	MEAN of 1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance, 1.2.2. Local Leaders' Performance			
1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance	MEAN of survey items 1.2.1.1., 1.2.1.2., 1.2.1.3., 1.2.1.4., 1.2.1.5., 1.2.1.6.			
		1.2.1.1. Confidence - DDA Q12b. How much confidence do you have in your District Development Assembly?	1. A lot of confidence	5
			2. Some confidence	4
			3. Not much confidence	2
			4. No confidence at all	1

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
		1.2.1.2. Responsive - DDA Q12c. How responsive do you think your District Development Assembly is to the needs of the local people in this area?	1. Very responsive	5
			2. Somewhat responsive	4
			3. Somewhat unresponsive	2
			4. Very unresponsive	1
		1.2.1.3. Get things done - DDA Q12d. And over the past year, has the District Development Assembly's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change?	1. Improved a lot	5
			2. Improved a little	4
			3. No change	3
			4. Worsened a little	2
			5. Worsened a lot	1
		1.2.1.4. Confidence - CDC Q13b. How much confidence do you have in your Community Development Council?	1. A lot of confidence	5
			2. Some confidence	4
			3. Not much confidence	2
			4. No confidence at all	1
		1.2.1.5. Responsive - CDC Q13c. How responsive do you think your Community Development Council is to the needs of the local people in this area?	1. Very responsive	5
			2. Somewhat responsive	4

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			3. Somewhat unresponsive	2
			4. Very unresponsive	1
		1.2.1.6. Get things done - CDC Q13d. And over the past year, has the Community Development Council's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change?	1. Improved a lot	5
			2. Improved a little	4
			3. No change	3
			4. Worsened a little	2
			5. Worsened a lot	1
1.2.2. Local Leaders Performance	MEAN of survey items 1.2.2.1., 1.2.2.2., 1.2.2.3			
		1.2.2.1. Confidence - Local Leaders Q9c. How much confidence do you have in your [Insert Position/Organization]? Local village/neighborhood leaders	1. A lot of confidence	5
			2. Some confidence	4
			3. Not much confidence	2
			4. No confidence at all	1
		1.2.2.2. Responsive - Local Leaders Q10c. How responsive do you think your [Insert Item] is/are to the needs of the local people in this area? Local village/neighborhood leaders	1. Very responsive	5
			2. Somewhat responsive	4
			3. Somewhat unresponsive	2
			4. Very unresponsive	1

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
		1.2.2.3. Get things done - Local Leaders Q11c.Over the past year, has the [Insert Item] ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? - Local village/neighborhood leaders'	1. Improved a lot	5
			2. Improved a little	4
			3. No change	3
			4. Worsened a little	2
			5. Worsened a lot	1
1.3. Quality of Life	MEAN of survey items 1.3.0.1., 1.3.0.2., 1.3.0.3., 1.3.0.4., 1.3.0.5., 1.3.0.6.			
		1.3.0.1. Direction of district Q1. Generally speaking, are things in [name the district] going in the right direction or in the wrong direction?	1. Right direction (a lot)	5
			2. Right direction (a little)	4
			3. Wrong direction (a little)	2
			4. Wrong direction (a lot)	1
			97. Neither right nor wrong direction (vol.)	missing
		1.3.0.2. Security in local area Q2a. Would you say security in your local area is good, fair or poor?	1. Very good	5
			2. Good	4
			3. Fair	3
			4. Poor	2
			5. Very poor	1

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
		1.3.0.3. Area more or less secure Q2b. Is your local area more secure, about the same, or less secure than it was a year ago?	1. Much more secure	5
			2. Somewhat more secure	4
			3. About the same	3
			4. Somewhat less secure	2
			5. Much less secure	1
		1.3.0.4. Life satisfaction Q26. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?	1. Very satisfied	5
			2. Somewhat satisfied	4
			3. Somewhat dissatisfied	2
			4. Very dissatisfied	1
		1.3.0.5. Household finances Q27. How satisfied are you with your household's current financial situation?	1. Very satisfied	5
			2. Somewhat satisfied	4
			3. Somewhat dissatisfied	2
			4. Very dissatisfied	1
		1.3.0.6. Ability to meet basic needs Q28. Thinking about the past year, would you say overall that your ability to meet your basic needs increased, decreased, or stayed the same?	1. Increased a lot	5
			2. Increased a little	4

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			3. Stayed the same	3
			4. Decreased a little	2
			5. Decreased a lot	1
Level of Control		M-36. INTERVIEWER: Please judge which situation best describes this village	1. ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby; no Taliban activity or presence has been reported	5
			2. ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby; some Taliban activity or presence has been reported, especially at night	4
			3. ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby but do not move freely at night; village administrators usually do not sleep in their homes, and Taliban activity takes place regularly	2
			4. Taliban forces are permanently based in this village or nearby and operate freely; ISAF or Afghan security forces may visit the village on occasion but do not stay	1
			5. Taliban forces are permanently based in this village or nearby and operate freely; no ISAF or Afghan security force presence or activity at all	1

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			6. Local arbaki control this village; minimal Taliban, ISAF, or Afghan security force presence at all	4
			7. There are no ISAF, Taliban, Afghan security forces, or arbaki controlling this village	5
Security Incidents Score		Number of Security incidents (Fieldwork Period)	0-10	5
			11-25	4
			26-50	3
			51-100	2
			101-150	1
ACSOR Accessibility Tracker		ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (Fieldwork Period)	1. Completely Safe	5
			2. Safe	4
			3. Somewhat safe, but there are some problems - most are dangerous, but women can still work there	3
			4. No women - only men can work there	2
			5. Totally inaccessible	1

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APPENDIX 3: RESILIENCE INDEX COMPONENTS, VARIABLES AND RESCALING

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
2. Resilience Index	MEAN of 2.1.1. Social Capital, 2.1.2. Local Leader Satisfaction, 1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance, 1.2.2. Local Leaders' Performance, 1.3. Quality of Life			
2.1. Community Cohesion	MEAN of 2.1.1. Social Capital, 2.1.2. Local Leader Satisfaction			
2.1.1. Social Capital	MEAN of survey items 2.1.1.1, 2.1.1.2., 2.1.1.3.			
		2.1.1.1. Ability to solve external problems Q34c. [If answered '1', '2' or '3' to Q34a] How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from outside the village? Is it often, sometimes, rarely, or never?	1. Often	5
			2. Sometimes	4
			3. Rarely	2
			4. Never	1
		2.1.1.2. Ability to solve internal problems Q35c. [If answered '1', '2' or '3' to Q35a] How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from inside the village?	1. Often	5
			2. Sometimes	4
			3. Rarely	2
			4. Never	1

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
		2.1.1.3. How often villages work together Q36. When there is a problem in this area, how often do the villages/neighborhoods in this area work together to solve the problem? Is that often, sometimes, rarely or never?	1. Often	5
			2. Sometimes	4
			3. Rarely	2
			4. Never	1
2.1.2. Local Leader Satisfaction	MEAN of survey items 2.1.2.1., 2.1.2.2., .2.1.2.3.			
		2.1.2.1. Local leaders represent citizen interests Q37a. When decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of ordinary people in the village/neighborhood considered?	1. Often	5
			2. Sometimes	4
			3. Rarely	2
			4. Never	1
		2.1.2.2. Local leaders represent women's interests Q37b. [If answered '1', '2' or '3' in Q37a] In your opinion, when decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of women considered?	1. Often	5
			2. Sometimes	4
			3. Rarely	2

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			4. Never	1
		2.1.2.3. Local leaders secure funding Q38. How effective or ineffective are your local leaders at securing funds for your village/neighborhood's needs from the district and/or provincial government?	1. Very effective	5
			2. Somewhat effective	4
			3. Somewhat ineffective	2
			4. Very ineffective	1
1.2. Local Governance	MEAN of 1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance, 1.2.2. Local Leaders' Performance			
1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance	MEAN of survey items 1.2.1.1., 1.2.1.2., 1.2.1.3., 1.2.1.4., 1.2.1.5., 1.2.1.6.			
		1.2.1.1. Confidence - DDA Q12b. How much confidence do you have in your District Development Assembly?	1. A lot of confidence	5
			2. Some confidence	4
			3. Not much confidence	2
			4. No confidence at all	1
		1.2.1.2. Responsive - DDA Q12c. How responsive do you think your District Development Assembly is to the needs of the local people in this area?	1. Very responsive	5
			2. Somewhat responsive	4

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			3. Somewhat unresponsive	2
			4. Very unresponsive	1
		1.2.1.3. Get things done - DDA Q12d. And over the past year, has the District Development Assembly's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change?	1. Improved a lot	5
			2. Improved a little	4
			3. No change	3
			4. Worsened a little	2
			5. Worsened a lot	1
		1.2.1.4. Confidence - CDC Q13b. How much confidence do you have in your Community Development Council?	1. A lot of confidence	5
			2. Some confidence	4
			3. Not much confidence	2
			4. No confidence at all	1
		1.2.1.5. Responsive - CDC Q13c. How responsive do you think your Community Development Council is to the needs of the local people in this area?	1. Very responsive	5
			2. Somewhat responsive	4
			3. Somewhat	2

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			unresponsive	
			4. Very unresponsive	1
		1.2.1.6. Get things done - CDC Q13d. And over the past year, has the Community Development Council's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change?	1. Improved a lot	5
			2. Improved a little	4
			3. No change	3
			4. Worsened a little	2
			5. Worsened a lot	1
1.2.2. Local Leaders Performance	MEAN of survey items 1.2.2.1., 1.2.2.2., 1.2.2.3			
		1.2.2.1. Confidence - Local Leaders Q9c. How much confidence do you have in your [Insert Position/Organization]? Local village/neighborhood leaders	1. A lot of confidence	5
			2. Some confidence	4
			3. Not much confidence	2
			4. No confidence at all	1
		1.2.2.2. Responsive - Local Leaders Q10c. How responsive do you think your [Insert Item] is/are to the needs of the local people in this area? Local village/neighborhood leaders	1. Very responsive	5

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			2. Somewhat responsive	4
			3. Somewhat unresponsive	2
			4. Very unresponsive	1
		1.2.2.3. Get things done - Local Leaders Q11c.Over the past year, has the [Insert Item] ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? - Local village/neighborhood leaders'	1. Improved a lot	5
			2. Improved a little	4
			3. No change	3
			4. Worsened a little	2
			5. Worsened a lot	1
1.3. Quality of Life	MEAN of survey items 1.3.0.1., 1.3.0.2., 1.3.0.3., 1.3.0.4., 1.3.0.5., 1.3.0.6.			
		1.3.0.1. Direction of district Q1. Generally speaking, are things in [name the district] going in the right direction or in the wrong direction?	1. Right direction (a lot)	5
			2. Right direction (a little)	4
			3. Wrong direction (a little)	2
			4. Wrong direction (a lot)	1

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			97. Neither right nor wrong direction (vol.)	missing
		1.3.0.2. Security in local area Q2a. Would you say security in your local area is good, fair or poor?	1. Very good	5
			2. Good	4
			3. Fair	3
			4. Poor	2
			5. Very poor	1
		1.3.0.3. Area more or less secure Q2b. Is your local area more secure, about the same, or less secure than it was a year ago?	1. Much more secure	5
			2. Somewhat more secure	4
			3. About the same	3
			4. Somewhat less secure	2
			5. Much less secure	1
		1.3.0.4. Life satisfaction Q26. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?	1. Very satisfied	5
			2. Somewhat satisfied	4
			3. Somewhat dissatisfied	2

Index/Sub-Index	Formula	Survey Item/Variable	Original scale	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			4. Very dissatisfied	1
		1.3.0.5. Household finances Q27. How satisfied are you with your household's current financial situation?	1. Very satisfied	5
			2. Somewhat satisfied	4
			3. Somewhat dissatisfied	2
			4. Very dissatisfied	1
		1.3.0.6. Ability to meet basic needs Q28. Thinking about the past year, would you say overall that your ability to meet your basic needs increased, decreased, or stayed the same?	1. Increased a lot	5
			2. Increased a little	4
			3. Stayed the same	3
			4. Decreased a little	2

APPENDIX 4: STABILITY INDEX SCORES (WAVE 5)

1 = very negative 5 = very positive	1. Stability Index	1.1. Government Capacity	1.1.1. District Government Performance	1.1.2. District Government Satisfaction	1.1.3. Provincial Government Performance	1.2. Local Governance	1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance	1.2.2. Local Leaders' Performance	1.3. Quality of Life Index		Survey Index	Level Of Control (M36)	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker	Security Incidents
District										Weights				
Adraskan	3.11	2.94	3.18	2.68	2.98	3.39	3.35	3.48	2.98		3.11	2.81	3.00	4.00
Ahmadabad	3.67	3.50	3.58	3.69	3.24	3.72	3.66	3.84	3.29		3.55	3.60	4.00	5.00
Aliabad	3.46	3.27	3.65	3.27	2.90	3.59	3.64	3.49	3.49		3.41	3.61	3.00	5.00
Andar	2.49	2.33	2.65	2.39	1.96	3.05	3.13	2.87	2.83		2.64	3.06	1.00	2.00
Aqcha	3.76	3.27	3.65	3.08	3.08	3.77	3.76	3.79	3.35		3.45	4.20	5.00	5.00
Archi	2.63	2.52	2.55	2.71	2.30	3.68	3.65	3.73	2.74		2.95	1.23	1.00	4.00
Arghandab (I)	3.46	3.50	3.60	3.49	3.40	3.49	3.36	3.76	3.56		3.53	2.16	4.00	4.00
Arghistan	2.89	3.36	3.47	3.64	2.96	2.65	2.18	3.58	2.87		3.12	1.00	3.00	3.00
Aybak	4.31	4.10	4.21	4.22	3.86	4.30	4.30	4.28	3.92		4.13	4.64	5.00	5.00
Baghlani Jadid	3.18	3.30	3.68	2.79	3.41	3.68	3.61	3.81	3.15		3.41	2.75	2.00	3.00
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghātu)	3.68	3.46	3.78	3.54	3.07	3.71	3.65	3.83	3.61		3.58	4.47	3.00	5.00
Bak	3.37	3.26	3.47	3.08	3.22	3.56	3.43	3.83	3.14		3.36	3.45	3.00	4.00
Bala Boluk	3.01	3.27	3.48	3.37	2.95	3.35	3.45	3.15	3.31		3.29	1.99	2.00	3.00
Balkh	3.68	3.33	3.55	3.04	3.40	3.65	3.55	3.85	3.45		3.48	4.27	4.00	5.00
Baraki Barak	2.86	2.81	3.38	2.18	2.87	3.89	3.70	4.28	2.64		3.17	1.80	1.00	4.00
Chaghcharan	3.59	3.27	3.20	3.39	3.22	3.23	3.23	3.25	3.33		3.27	4.38	5.00	4.00
Chahar Bolak	3.39	3.25	3.37	2.92	3.47	3.44	3.36	3.59	3.26		3.33	3.40	3.00	5.00

1 = very negative 5 = very positive														
District	1. Stability Index	1.1. Government Capacity	1.1.1. District Government Performance	1.1.2. District Government Satisfaction	1.1.3. Provincial Government Performance	1.2. Local Governance	1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance	1.2.2. Local Leaders' Performance	1.3. Quality of Life Index		Survey Index	Level Of Control (M36)	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker	Security Incidents
Chahar Darah	3.19	3.25	3.27	3.55	2.92	3.75	3.66	3.92	3.09		3.40	1.87	3.00	3.00
Chak-e Wardak	3.15	3.41	3.63	3.04	3.56	3.37	3.29	3.53	3.61		3.44	1.67	2.00	4.00
Chimtal	3.37	3.37	3.51	3.02	3.59	3.47	3.39	3.63	3.29		3.40	3.17	3.00	4.00
Chorah	3.69	3.87	3.82	4.12	3.66	3.67	3.62	3.76	3.54		3.75	3.77	3.00	4.00
Daman	3.52	3.62	3.81	3.74	3.30	3.51	3.39	3.76	3.60		3.60	1.74	4.00	5.00
Dand	3.34	3.43	3.67	3.55	3.07	3.43	3.37	3.54	3.51		3.45	2.49	4.00	2.00
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in	3.97	3.95	4.20	4.08	3.57	4.30	4.25	4.39	3.95		4.07	4.67	2.00	5.00
Deh Rawud	3.35	3.57	3.78	3.87	3.08	3.73	3.44	4.30	3.23		3.62	1.43	3.00	4.00
Deh Yak	3.40	3.39	3.48	3.38	3.31	3.68	3.55	3.96	3.29		3.49	3.32	3.00	3.00
Do Lainah	3.28	3.32	3.34	3.33	3.31	3.43	3.38	3.52	3.28		3.36	3.14	2.00	5.00
Dzadran	2.73	2.64	3.01	2.18	2.73	3.65	3.57	3.82	2.91		3.04	1.00	1.00	5.00
Faizabad (2)	3.93	4.02	4.16	4.03	3.86	4.23	4.20	4.29	3.65		4.03	3.60	3.00	5.00
Farah	3.98	3.77	3.75	3.90	3.66	3.76	3.82	3.64	3.67		3.74	4.76	5.00	4.00
Fayroz Nakhchir	4.34	3.99	4.28	4.16	3.55	4.39	4.40	4.36	4.02		4.13	4.97	5.00	5.00
Garmser	3.28	3.31	3.24	3.78	2.90	3.56	3.14	4.38	3.27		3.45	1.93	3.00	4.00
Gelan	3.29	3.28	3.49	3.15	3.21	3.49	3.38	3.72	3.41		3.39	3.50	2.00	4.00
Gurbuz	3.65	3.39	3.63	3.39	3.17	3.80	3.74	3.92	3.44		3.55	3.90	4.00	4.00
Hazrat-e Sultan	4.33	4.03	4.24	4.32	3.53	4.38	4.39	4.36	4.03		4.14	4.75	5.00	5.00
Imam Sahib	3.59	3.37	3.70	3.31	3.10	3.97	3.96	4.00	3.55		3.60	3.39	3.00	5.00
Injil	3.71	3.18	3.49	2.80	3.24	3.66	3.63	3.73	3.21		3.35	4.94	5.00	4.00
Jaji	3.21	3.23	3.35	3.31	3.05	3.51	3.46	3.62	3.14		3.32	2.69	2.00	5.00

1 = very negative 5 = very positive														
District	1. Stability Index	1.1. Government Capacity	1.1.1. District Government Performance	1.1.2. District Government Satisfaction	1.1.3. Provincial Government Performance	1.2. Local Governance	1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance	1.2.2. Local Leaders' Performance	1.3. Quality of Life Index		Survey Index	Level Of Control (M36)	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker	Security Incidents
Jaji Maidan	3.82	3.49	3.58	3.62	3.27	3.72	3.64	3.89	3.40		3.57	3.95	5.00	5.00
Jalrayz	3.35	3.51	3.74	3.23	3.57	3.41	3.28	3.69	3.69		3.53	2.03	3.00	4.00
Kajaki	2.84	2.84	2.82	2.82	2.87	3.62	3.45	3.97	2.60		3.09	1.24	2.00	4.00
Kang	4.10	4.03	3.71	3.87	4.51	3.92	3.81	4.14	3.57		3.93	4.96	4.00	5.00
Khak-e-Safayd	3.05	3.13	3.51	3.04	2.85	3.73	4.00	3.20	3.11		3.28	1.40	2.00	5.00
Khanabad	3.43	3.35	3.67	3.32	3.06	3.72	3.66	3.85	3.51		3.51	2.99	3.00	4.00
Khas Kunar	3.65	3.74	3.63	3.64	3.94	3.74	3.72	3.79	3.73		3.74	3.43	3.00	4.00
Khas Uruzgan	3.27	3.05	3.36	2.86	2.93	3.42	3.42	3.42	3.22		3.20	4.67	2.00	4.00
Khoshi	2.93	2.60	3.18	1.89	2.73	3.59	3.48	3.81	2.77		2.98	1.47	3.00	5.00
Khvajah Do Koh	4.07	3.72	3.97	3.58	3.61	4.11	4.14	4.04	3.69		3.84	4.40	5.00	5.00
Khvajah Omari	3.69	3.33	3.68	3.05	3.25	3.65	3.55	3.84	3.28		3.44	3.55	5.00	5.00
Kohsan	3.82	3.45	3.70	3.34	3.30	3.98	3.92	4.09	3.28		3.61	4.67	4.00	5.00
Kunduz	3.33	3.16	3.60	2.79	3.10	3.81	3.77	3.90	3.49		3.44	3.02	3.00	3.00
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	3.51	3.22	3.51	3.12	3.04	3.73	3.73	3.72	3.25		3.40	4.14	3.00	5.00
Lajah-Ahmad Khel	3.15	3.05	3.14	3.17	2.86	3.68	3.68	3.68	3.20		3.29	2.34	2.00	5.00
Lajah-Mangal	3.24	3.21	3.38	3.29	2.96	3.77	3.71	3.90	3.33		3.43	2.16	2.00	5.00
Lash-e Juwayn	3.58	3.52	3.92	3.89	2.75	3.87	4.13	3.36	3.43		3.58	4.44	2.00	5.00
Lashkar Gah	3.59	3.69	3.58	4.02	3.48	3.78	3.55	4.23	3.40		3.71	3.55	3.00	3.00
Maidan Shahr	3.32	3.44	3.64	3.08	3.59	3.37	3.29	3.55	3.58		3.45	1.27	4.00	4.00
Maiwand	2.63	3.22	3.13	3.64	2.90	2.66	2.29	3.41	3.10		3.08	1.27	1.00	2.00
Malistan	3.84	3.32	3.79	2.94	3.24	3.61	3.48	3.85	3.61		3.48	4.80	5.00	5.00

1 = very negative 5 = very positive														
District	1. Stability Index	1.1. Government Capacity	1.1.1. District Government Performance	1.1.2. District Government Satisfaction	1.1.3. Provincial Government Performance	1.2. Local Governance	1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance	1.2.2. Local Leaders' Performance	1.3. Quality of Life Index		Survey Index	Level Of Control (M36)	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker	Security Incidents
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)	3.76	3.43	3.61	3.39	3.29	3.75	3.71	3.83	3.40		3.54	4.03	5.00	4.00
Marawarah	3.60	3.86	3.57	3.82	4.17	3.82	3.77	3.93	3.75		3.84	3.70	2.00	3.00
Mazar-e Sharif	4.07	3.88	3.78	3.59	4.28	3.72	3.65	3.86	3.81		3.83	5.00	5.00	4.00
Mirzaka	3.35	3.11	3.27	3.30	2.78	3.68	3.64	3.76	3.17		3.32	2.07	4.00	5.00
Muhammad Aghah	3.33	3.33	3.60	3.04	3.33	3.55	3.70	3.25	3.19		3.35	2.11	4.00	4.00
Muqer	3.28	3.27	3.42	3.28	3.10	3.61	3.58	3.69	3.39		3.41	3.25	2.00	4.00
Muqur	3.82	3.75	3.93	3.66	3.65	4.12	4.23	3.89	3.60		3.83	4.04	3.00	5.00
Musa Qal'ah	2.48	2.37	2.44	2.30	2.35	3.07	2.68	3.87	2.45		2.68	1.16	2.00	3.00
Nad 'Ali	3.37	3.52	3.51	3.80	3.23	3.78	3.53	4.29	3.40		3.63	2.00	3.00	3.00
Nadir Shah Kot	3.54	3.44	3.59	3.49	3.25	3.84	3.76	4.01	3.38		3.58	3.56	3.00	4.00
Nahr-e Saraj	3.33	3.55	3.45	3.89	3.32	3.76	3.39	4.51	3.32		3.65	2.00	3.00	2.00
Nerkh	3.01	3.40	3.62	3.04	3.53	3.35	3.24	3.55	3.68		3.44	1.26	1.00	4.00
Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)	3.64	3.42	3.51	3.39	3.35	3.76	3.74	3.79	3.26		3.51	4.14	4.00	4.00
Panjwa'i	3.30	3.60	3.80	3.87	3.14	3.21	3.03	3.58	3.40		3.47	2.99	3.00	2.00
Pashtun Zarghun	3.43	3.19	3.42	3.00	3.13	3.53	3.52	3.57	3.05		3.28	4.14	3.00	5.00
Pul-e Khumri	3.70	3.43	3.66	3.23	3.42	3.76	3.77	3.75	3.29		3.52	3.66	5.00	4.00
Pusht-e Rod	3.15	3.34	3.61	3.26	3.15	3.85	4.04	3.48	3.04		3.43	1.76	2.00	4.00
Qadis	3.80	3.68	3.77	3.84	3.42	4.03	4.06	3.95	3.66		3.78	3.59	4.00	4.00
Qal'ah-ye Now	3.85	3.52	3.74	3.27	3.55	3.72	3.69	3.79	3.74		3.63	3.79	5.00	5.00
Qal'ah-ye Zal	3.99	3.73	4.09	3.87	3.22	4.20	4.12	4.35	4.11		3.96	3.74	4.00	5.00
Qalat	3.27	2.95	2.96	3.09	2.81	3.76	3.79	3.72	3.14		3.25	3.33	3.00	4.00

1 = very negative 5 = very positive														
District	1. Stability Index	1.1. Government Capacity	1.1.1. District Government Performance	1.1.2. District Government Satisfaction	1.1.3. Provincial Government Performance	1.2. Local Governance	1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance	1.2.2. Local Leaders' Performance	1.3. Quality of Life Index		Survey Index	Level Of Control (M36)	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker	Security Incidents
Qarah Bagh (I)	3.43	3.41	3.60	3.26	3.37	3.56	3.44	3.81	3.45		3.49	3.61	3.00	3.00
Qush Tepah	2.87	3.01	3.70	2.10	3.21	3.69	3.64	3.80	2.79		3.21	1.17	1.00	5.00
Ruy Do Ab	4.12	3.80	4.21	3.82	3.37	4.26	4.19	4.40	3.87		3.98	4.83	4.00	5.00
Sangin	2.44	2.38	2.38	2.43	2.32	3.08	2.55	4.14	2.41		2.70	1.13	2.00	2.00
Sar Kani	3.68	4.00	3.96	3.83	4.20	3.91	3.77	4.19	3.75		3.95	3.70	2.00	3.00
Sayyid Karam	3.36	3.02	3.15	2.82	3.08	3.70	3.65	3.78	3.31		3.30	2.33	4.00	5.00
Sayyidabad	3.11	3.37	3.54	2.99	3.57	3.42	3.29	3.68	3.50		3.43	1.41	3.00	2.00
Shah Joy	3.22	2.76	2.79	2.78	2.71	3.98	3.84	4.26	2.98		3.23	2.99	3.00	4.00
Shah Wali Kot	3.41	3.89	4.25	3.97	3.46	3.92	3.91	3.95	3.96		3.92	2.21	1.00	3.00
Shahid-e Hasas	3.07	3.30	3.40	3.26	3.23	3.52	3.30	3.95	3.00		3.36	1.53	2.00	4.00
Shahrak	3.28	3.23	3.29	3.37	3.04	3.49	3.53	3.41	3.29		3.32	3.43	2.00	5.00
Shamul (Dzadran)	3.57	3.46	3.64	3.42	3.33	3.73	3.64	3.90	3.40		3.56	3.50	3.00	5.00
Sharan	3.46	3.49	3.57	3.51	3.38	3.79	3.84	3.70	3.66		3.61	2.53	3.00	4.00
Shibirghan	4.29	4.07	3.98	4.14	4.10	4.21	4.15	4.33	3.76		4.08	4.80	5.00	5.00
Shindand	3.16	3.14	3.30	3.20	2.92	3.62	3.63	3.59	3.23		3.31	2.30	3.00	3.00
Sholgarah	3.68	3.29	3.57	2.83	3.47	3.71	3.65	3.83	3.43		3.46	4.33	4.00	5.00
Shwak (Garda Serai)	3.20	3.14	3.78	2.56	3.10	4.01	3.93	4.16	2.94		3.41	1.97	2.00	5.00
Spin Boldak	3.68	3.76	4.05	3.59	3.66	3.56	3.31	4.05	3.67		3.72	2.41	4.00	5.00
Takhtapol	3.26	3.29	3.46	3.43	2.98	2.98	2.85	3.24	3.35		3.22	2.93	3.00	5.00
Tanai	3.66	3.46	3.75	3.28	3.35	3.73	3.62	3.94	3.46		3.57	3.88	4.00	4.00
Tarin Kot	3.64	3.59	3.66	3.53	3.59	3.71	3.69	3.75	3.40		3.60	3.92	4.00	3.00

1 = very negative 5 = very positive														
District	1. Stability Index	1.1. Government Capacity	1.1.1. District Government Performance	1.1.2. District Government Satisfaction	1.1.3. Provincial Government Performance	1.2. Local Governance	1.2.1. DDA-CDC Performance	1.2.2. Local Leaders' Performance	1.3. Quality of Life Index		Survey Index	Level Of Control (M36)	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker	Security Incidents
Tarnak wa Jaldak	3.38	3.23	3.46	3.53	2.70	3.37	3.35	3.41	3.47		3.32	3.44	3.00	5.00
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)	3.53	3.42	3.53	3.50	3.22	3.69	3.62	3.83	3.38		3.51	3.46	4.00	3.00
Yosuf Khel	3.65	3.49	3.43	3.69	3.34	3.86	3.95	3.68	3.56		3.61	3.41	4.00	4.00
Zaranj	4.18	4.06	3.73	4.09	4.35	3.90	3.75	4.20	3.68		3.97	5.00	5.00	4.00
Zharay	3.17	3.35	3.67	3.20	3.17	3.26	3.16	3.47	3.48		3.36	1.99	3.00	3.00
Zurmat	3.03	2.84	2.96	3.96	1.60	4.21	4.08	4.47	3.97		3.51	1.00	1.00	4.00

APPENDIX 5: RESILIENCE INDEX SCORES (WAVE 5)

1 = very negative 5 = very positive				
District	2. Resilience	2.1. Community Cohesion	2.1.1. Social Capital	2.1.2. Local Leader Satisfaction
Adraskan	3.26	3.25	3.44	3.06
Ahmadabad	3.54	3.45	3.49	3.41
Aliabad	3.43	3.27	3.28	3.26
Andar	3.05	3.22	2.98	3.45
Aqcha	3.32	2.85	2.34	3.35
Archi	3.29	3.17	3.12	3.23
Arghandab (I)	3.49	3.39	3.43	3.35
Arghistan	2.98	3.14	3.01	3.26
Aybak	4.07	3.93	3.92	3.94
Baghlani Jadid	3.46	3.37	3.38	3.36
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghathu)	3.55	3.33	3.15	3.52
Bak	3.45	3.43	3.50	3.35
Bala Boluk	3.20	3.04	3.07	3.02
Balkh	3.52	3.37	3.39	3.35
Baraki Barak	3.45	3.32	3.29	3.36
Chaghcharan	3.18	3.05	3.01	3.10
Chahar Bolak	3.32	3.19	3.24	3.14
Chahar Darah	3.41	3.19	3.13	3.24
Chak-e Wardak	3.50	3.53	3.78	3.28
Chimtal	3.38	3.29	3.50	3.09
Chorah	3.55	3.41	3.31	3.51
Daman	3.53	3.44	3.43	3.45

1 = very negative 5 = very positive				
District	2. Resilience	2.1. Community Cohesion	2.1.1. Social Capital	2.1.2. Local Leader Satisfaction
Dand	3.40	3.30	3.29	3.31
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in	4.08	3.90	3.91	3.88
Deh Rawud	3.55	3.38	3.41	3.35
Deh Yak	3.48	3.29	3.26	3.32
Do Lainah	3.25	3.03	2.97	3.10
Dzadran	3.62	3.91	4.11	3.72
Faizabad (2)	3.88	3.64	3.43	3.85
Farah	3.62	3.49	3.70	3.28
Fayroz Nakhchir	4.08	3.81	3.81	3.80
Garmser	3.59	3.58	3.84	3.31
Gelan	3.39	3.22	3.19	3.24
Gurbuz	3.66	3.60	3.64	3.55
Hazrat-e Sultan	4.06	3.76	3.73	3.79
Imam Sahib	3.60	3.25	3.10	3.41
Injil	3.49	3.43	3.42	3.44
Jaji	3.37	3.32	3.23	3.42
Jaji Maidan	3.57	3.46	3.48	3.44
Jalrayz	3.48	3.37	3.56	3.18
Kajaki	3.41	3.51	3.56	3.45
Kang	3.63	3.31	3.25	3.36
Khak-e-Safayd	3.26	3.00	2.91	3.08
Khanabad	3.50	3.24	3.21	3.26
Khas Kunar	3.56	3.28	3.22	3.34
Khas Uruzgan	3.35	3.34	3.24	3.43
Khoshi	3.35	3.35	3.54	3.17

1 = very negative 5 = very positive				
District	2. Resilience	2.1. Community Cohesion	2.1.1. Social Capital	2.1.2. Local Leader Satisfaction
Khwajah Do Koh	3.65	3.18	2.99	3.37
Khwajah Omari	3.47	3.34	3.44	3.25
Kohsan	3.66	3.50	3.59	3.42
Kunduz	3.57	3.36	3.31	3.40
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	3.45	3.27	3.35	3.19
Lajah-Ahmad Khel	3.51	3.49	3.49	3.48
Lajah-Mangal	3.61	3.55	3.59	3.51
Lash-e Juwayn	3.58	3.50	3.36	3.63
Lashkar Gah	3.70	3.65	3.71	3.60
Maidan Shahr	3.47	3.47	3.63	3.30
Maiwand	2.95	2.97	2.83	3.10
Malistan	3.51	3.31	3.30	3.32
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)	3.57	3.45	3.50	3.39
Marawarah	3.67	3.46	3.40	3.51
Mazar-e Sharif	3.63	3.41	3.56	3.25
Mirzaka	3.55	3.60	3.64	3.55
Muhammad Aghah	3.43	3.51	3.62	3.40
Muqer	3.45	3.29	3.43	3.15
Muqur	3.70	3.39	3.38	3.40
Musa Qal'ah	2.98	2.94	3.10	2.79
Nad 'Ali	3.69	3.61	3.66	3.57
Nadir Shah Kot	3.57	3.34	3.39	3.29
Nahr-e Saraj	3.69	3.62	3.79	3.45
Nerkh	3.44	3.35	3.61	3.09
Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)	3.54	3.46	3.54	3.39

1 = very negative 5 = very positive				
District	2. Resilience	2.1. Community Cohesion	2.1.1. Social Capital	2.1.2. Local Leader Satisfaction
Panjwa'i	3.34	3.34	3.42	3.26
Pashtun Zarghun	3.45	3.55	3.64	3.47
Pul-e Khumri	3.58	3.55	3.76	3.34
Pusht-e Rod	3.36	3.12	3.01	3.23
Qadis	3.68	3.37	3.27	3.47
Qal'ah-ye Now	3.54	3.23	3.20	3.26
Qal'ah-ye Zal	3.92	3.51	3.40	3.62
Qalat	3.47	3.36	3.29	3.43
Qarah Bagh (I)	3.45	3.28	3.28	3.28
Qush Tepah	3.19	2.86	2.84	2.87
Ruy Do Ab	3.95	3.64	3.69	3.59
Sangin	3.08	3.16	3.47	2.84
Sar Kani	3.68	3.34	3.37	3.32
Sayyid Karam	3.59	3.62	3.67	3.56
Sayyidabad	3.44	3.37	3.53	3.21
Shah Joy	3.60	3.47	3.48	3.45
Shah Wali Kot	3.95	3.96	3.92	4.00
Shahid-e Hasas	3.29	3.09	3.07	3.11
Shahrak	3.39	3.36	3.33	3.40
Shamul (Dzadran)	3.55	3.40	3.39	3.41
Sharan	3.70	3.64	3.73	3.55
Shibirghan	3.88	3.57	3.40	3.73
Shindand	3.46	3.42	3.43	3.40
Sholgarah	3.56	3.44	3.56	3.31
Shwak (Garda Serai)	3.76	3.88	3.87	3.89

1 = very negative 5 = very positive				
District	2. Resilience	2.1. Community Cohesion	2.1.1. Social Capital	2.1.2. Local Leader Satisfaction
Spin Boldak	3.59	3.46	3.50	3.42
Takhtapol	3.22	3.33	3.32	3.33
Tanai	3.64	3.60	3.64	3.56
Tarin Kot	3.54	3.45	3.35	3.55
Tarnak wa Jaldak	3.43	3.45	3.38	3.52
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)	3.53	3.41	3.43	3.39
Yosuf Khel	3.64	3.50	3.53	3.47
Zaranj	3.65	3.31	3.13	3.48
Zharay	3.31	3.21	3.26	3.15
Zurmat	4.10	3.98	3.97	4.00

APPENDIX 6: WAVE 5 QUESTIONNAIRE

MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey Wave 5 -- MASTER VERSION

M-1. Respondent Identification Number _____

M-2. Wave Number 04

M-2a. Sample

1. Sample A
2. Sample B

M-3. Region

- | | | |
|------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Central/Kabul | 4. South Western | 7. Central/Hazarjat |
| 2. Eastern | 5. Western | |
| 3. South Central | 6. Northern | |

M-4. Sampling Point/District Where the Interview Was Completed: _____

M-5. Geographic Code

- | | | | |
|-------------|----------|---------|-------------------|
| 1. Villages | 2. Towns | 3. City | 4. Metros (Kabul) |
|-------------|----------|---------|-------------------|

M-6. Province

- | | | | |
|------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|
| 1. Kabul | 10. Nangarhar | 19. Samangan | 27. Helmand |
| 2. Kapisa | 11. Laghman | 20. Juzjan | 28. Kandahar |
| 3. Parwan | 12. Kunar | 21. Sar-I-Pul | 29. Zabul |
| 4. Wardak | 13. Nooristan | 22. Faryab | 30. Uruzgan |
| 5. Logar | 14. Badakhshan | 23. Badghis | 31. Ghor |
| 6. Ghazni | 15. Takhar | 24. Herat | 32. Bamyan |
| 7. Paktia | 16. Baghlan | 25. Farah | 33. Panjshir |
| 8. Paktika | 17. Kunduz | 26. Nimroz | 34. Dehkondi |
| 9. Khost | 18. Balkh | | |

M-7. Year of Interview: 2014

M-8. Month of Interview

- | | | | |
|-------------|----------|--------------|--------------|
| 1. January | 4. April | 7. July | 10. October |
| 2. February | 5. May | 8. August | 11. November |
| 3. March | 6. June | 9. September | 12. December |

M-9. Date of Interview: ____ ____ ____

M-10. Day of Week of Interview

- | | | |
|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| 1. Friday | 4. Monday | 7. Thursday |
| 2. Saturday | 5. Tuesday | |
| 3. Sunday | 6. Wednesday | |

M-11. Interviewer Code: ____ ____ ____ ____

M-12. Interview Completed on the ...

- | | | |
|------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| 1. First Contact | 2. Second Contact | 3. Third Contact |
|------------------|-------------------|------------------|

M-13. Supervisor Code: ____ ____ ____

M-14. Record Time (using 24 hour clock) Interview Began: ____: ____

(Record Time Began Starting With Q-1)

M-15. Record Time (using 24 hour clock) Interview Ended: ____: ____

(Fill in all four data positions)

M-16. Record Length of Interview in Minutes: ____ ____

M-17. Date Formatted Field: **APR 2014**

M-18. Keypuncher Code ____ ____

M-19. Language of Interview

1. Pashto
2. Dari
3. Other
4. Uzbek

M-20. Coder Code __ __

M-21. District Code __ __ __

M-22. Language of the questionnaire

1. Pashto
2. Dari

M-23. Village name: _____

M-24. Sampling Point coordinates: _____

M-25. Field Provider

1. ACSOR
2. Afghan Youth Consulting

Informed Consent

INTERVIEWER READ: *Much work is being done in Afghanistan to create an environment where better government and development can flourish. The purpose of this survey is to ask people like yourself about how this might be better achieved in your local area.*

We would like your views on this issue.

We will not ask for your name and the answers you and others provide will be held in strict confidence. Your responses to the survey questions are strictly voluntary. If we come to a question you do not wish to answer, please tell me and we'll move on. However your answers can be beneficial by providing information which may help to improve stability and minimize conflict in your area, so please answer as truthfully as you can.

Do you give your consent for me to proceed?"

M-25b. Informed Consent _____ (tick)

RECORD THE TIME THE ACTUAL INTERVIEW BEGAN (M-14)
AND USE A 24 HOUR CLOCK (14:24, for 2:24 pm)

[ASK ALL]

Q-1. Generally speaking, are things in [*name the district*] going in the right direction or in the wrong direction? Is that a lot or a little?

1. Right direction (a lot)
2. Right direction (a little)
3. Wrong direction (a little)
4. Wrong direction (a lot)

97. Neither right nor wrong direction (vol.)

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

MODULE 1: SECURITY & CRIME

Q-2a. Would you say security in your local area is good, fair or poor?
Is that 'very good/poor'?

1. Very good
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
5. Very Poor

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-2b. Is your local area more secure, about the same, or less secure than it was a year ago? Is that 'much more/less secure' or 'somewhat more/less secure'?

1. Much more secure
2. Somewhat more secure
3. About the same
4. Somewhat less secure
5. Much less secure

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't know (vol.)

Q-3a. I would like to know about security on the roads you use in this area. Overall, would you say that security on the roads you use in this area is very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad?

1. Very good
2. Somewhat good
3. Somewhat bad
4. Very bad

 98. Refused (vol.)
 99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-3b. Would you say that security on the roads you use in this area has improved, worsened, or stayed the same in the past year? Is that 'improved/worsened a little or a lot'?

1. Improved a lot
2. Improved a little
3. Stayed the same
4. Worsened a little
5. Worsened a lot

 98. Refused (vol.)
 99. Don't know (vol.)

Q-4a-d. Please tell me how secure do you feel when you are ... [*insert situation*]? Is that very secure, somewhat secure, somewhat insecure, or very insecure?

	Very secure	Somewhat secure	Somewhat insecure	Very insecure	Ref. (vol.)	Don't Know (vol.)
a) ...in your home during the day?	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) ...in your home during the night?	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) ...traveling to a neighboring village?	1	2	3	4	98	99
d) ... traveling to the district or provincial capital?	1	2	3	4	98	99

Q5.1a-c. How would you rate the level of...[insert item] in your area? Is there a lot, a little, or none at all?

	A lot	A little	None at all	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) ...petty crime and offenses (theft of food or goods worth less than a few thousand afs)	1	2	3	98	99
b) ...serious, non-violent crimes (theft of goods worth more than 5,000 afs)	1	2	3	98	99
c) ...serious violent crimes (murder, assault or kidnapping)	1	2	3	98	99

Q-5.2a-c. Compared to last year, how would you rate the level of ...[Insert Item] in your area? Is it much less, a little less, the same, a little more or much more?

	Much less	A little less	The same	A little more	Much more	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) ...petty crime and offenses (theft of food or goods worth less than a few thousand afs)	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
b) ...serious, non-violent crimes (theft of goods worth more than 5,000 afs)	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
c) ...serious violent crimes (murder, assault or kidnapping)	1	2	3	4	5	98	99

Q-6.1a-f. How would you rate the presence of [Insert item] in your area?

	A lot	Some	None	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Afghan National Army	1	2	3	98	99
b) Arbaki	1	2	3	98	99
c) Afghan National Police	1	2	3	98	99
d) Armed Opposition Groups	1	2	3	98	99
e) Afghan Local Police	1	2	3	98	99
f) ISAF	1	2	3	98	99

Q-6.2a-b. Overall, how much confidence do you have in ...*[Insert Item]* to make your area safe? Would you say you have a lot of confidence, some confidence, a little confidence or no confidence at all? (If respondent answered 3 “None” to an item in Q-6.1, please record the corresponding item in Q-6.2 as 97 “Not Applicable”)

	A lot of Confidence	Some confidence	A Little confidence	No confidence at all	Not Asked /Not Applicable (vol.)	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) ...the Afghan National Army	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
b) ...the Afghan National Police	1	2	3	4	97	98	99

Q-7a-b. Overall, has the ability of the *[Insert Item]* to provide security in your area improved, worsened, or stayed the same in the past year? Is that ‘improved/worsened a little or a lot’?

	Improved a lot	Improved a little	Stayed the same	Worsened a little	Worsened a lot	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Afghan National Army	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
b) Afghan National Police	1	2	3	4	5	98	99

MODULE 2: GOVERNANCE

Q-8. [INTERVIEWER: Please read the following introduction followed by the statement pair] I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.

1. The Afghan government is well regarded in this area.
2. The Afghan government is **not** well regarded in this area.

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-9a-d. How much confidence do you have in your [*Insert Position/Organization*]? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all?

	A lot of conf.	Some conf.	Not much conf.	No conf.	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) District Governor	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) District Government	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Local village/neighborhood leaders	1	2	3	4	98	99
d) Provincial Governor	1	2	3	4	98	99

Q-10a-d. How responsive do you think your [*Insert Item*] is/are to the needs of the local people in this area? Is [*insert item*] very responsive, somewhat responsive, somewhat unresponsive, or very unresponsive?

	Very responsive	Somewhat responsive	Somewhat unresponsive	Very unresponsive	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) District Governor	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) District Government	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Local village/neighborhood leaders	1	2	3	4	98	99
d) Provincial Governor	1	2	3	4	98	99

Q-11a-d. Over the past year, has the [Insert Item] ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? Is that 'improved/worsened a little or a lot'?

	Improved a lot	Improved a little	No change	Worsened a little	Worsened a lot	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) District Governor's	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
b) District Government's	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
c) Local village/neighborhood leaders'	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
d) Provincial Governor's	1	2	3	4	5	98	99

Q-12a. Please, tell me, do you know of/have you heard of District Development Assembly in your district?

- 1. Yes **(Go to Q-12b)**
- 2. No **(Skip to Q-13a)**

98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-13a)**

99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-13a)**

Q-12b. [Filtered, if 'yes' to Q12a] How much confidence do you have in your District Development Assembly? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all?

	A lot of conf.	Some conf.	Not much conf.	No conf.	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
District Development Assembly	1	2	3	4	7	98	99

Q-12c. [Filtered, if 'yes' to Q12a] How responsive do you think your District Development Assembly is to the needs of the local people in this area? Is it very responsive, somewhat responsive, somewhat unresponsive, or very unresponsive?

	Very responsive	Somewhat responsive	Somewhat unresponsive	Very unresponsive	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
District Development Assembly	1	2	3	4	7	98	99

Q-12d. [Filtered, if 'yes' to Q12a] And over the past year, has the District Development Assembly's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? Is that 'improved/worsened a little or a lot'?

	Improved a lot	Improved a little	No change	Worsened a little	Worsened a lot	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
District Development Assembly	1	2	3	4	5	7	98	99

Q-13a. (ASK ALL) Please, tell me, do you have Community Development Council established in your area?

1. Yes **(Go to Q-13b)**

2. No **(Skip to Q-14)**

98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-14)**

99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-14)**

Q-13b. [Filtered, if 'yes' to Q13a] How much confidence do you have in your Community Development Council? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all?

	A lot of conf.	Some conf.	Not much conf.	No conf.	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
Community Development Council	1	2	3	4	7	98	99

Q-13c. [Filtered, if 'yes' to Q13a] How responsive do you think your Community Development Council is to the needs of the local people in this area? Is it very responsive, somewhat responsive, somewhat unresponsive, or very unresponsive?

	Very responsive	Somewhat responsive	Somewhat unresponsive	Very unresponsive	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
Community Development Council	1	2	3	4	7	98	99

Q-13d. [Filtered, if 'yes' to Q13a] And over the past year, has the Community Development Council's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? Is that 'improved/worsened a little or a lot'?

	Improved a lot	Improved a little	No change	Worsened a little	Worsened a lot	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
Community Development Council	1	2	3	4	5	7	98	99

Q-14a-h. [ASK ALL] [INTERVIEWER: For each of 14a-h, please read the following introduction followed by the statement pair] I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.

Q-14a.

1. The District Government officials in this district are from this district.
2. The District Government officials in this district are **not** from this district.

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14b.

1. The District Government understands the problems of people in this area.
2. The District Government **does not** understand the problems of people in this area.

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14c.

1. The District Government cares about the people in this area.
2. The District Government **does not** care about the people in this area.

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14d.

1. District Government officials in this district abuse their authority to make money for themselves.
2. District Government officials in this district **do not** abuse their authority to make money for themselves.

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14e.

1. District Government officials visit this area.
2. District Government officials **do not** visit this area.

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14f.

1. In general, the District Government officials are doing their jobs honestly.
2. In general, the District Government officials are **not** doing their jobs honestly.

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14g.

1. The District Government delivers basic services to this area in a fair manner.
2. The District Government **does not** deliver basic services to this area in a fair manner.

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q14h.

1. It is acceptable for people to publicly criticize the Afghan government.
2. It is **not** acceptable for people to publicly criticize the Afghan government.

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

MODULE 3: SERVICE PROVISION & DEVELOPMENT

Q-15. Overall, do you think that services from the government in this area have improved, worsened, or not changed in the past year? Is that ‘improved/worsened a lot or a little’?

1. Improved a lot
2. Improved a little
3. Not changed
4. Worsened a little
5. Worsened a lot

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don’t Know (vol.)

Q-16a-i. Generally speaking, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the district government’s provision of [*Insert Item*]? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

	Very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	Service not provided (vol.)	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Clean Drinking Water	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
b) Water for irrigation and uses other than drinking	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
c) Agricultural assistance (<i>seed fertilizer, equipment</i>)	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
d) Retaining and flood walls	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
e) Roads and bridges	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
f) Medical Care	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
g) Schooling for girls	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
h) Schooling for boys	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
i) Electricity	1	2	3	4	97	98	99

Q-17a. In the last year, have you seen or heard about any development projects in your local area, or not?

- 1. Yes **(Go to Q-17b)**
- 2. No **(Skip to Q-18)**

- 98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-18)**
- 99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-18)**

Q-17b. (Ask respondent if answered code 1 "Yes" in Q-17a). What development projects have you seen or heard about in your local area?

(INTERVIEWER: READ OUT PRECODES. Circle each response mentioned.)

Q-17c. (Ask if respondent answered code 1 "Yes" in Q17b. If item is not circled in Q-17b, circle '97') Did the project improve life for people in this local area?

Q-17b. What development projects have you seen or heard about in this area?				Q-17c. If project type is mentioned in Q-17b, ask Did the project/s improve life for people in this local area? If project type is not mentioned in Q-17b, circle '97'.		
	Not asked	Yes	No	Yes	No	Not Men'd
a) Drinking Water	97	1	2	1	2	97
b) Irrigation/water maintenance systems	97	1	2	1	2	97
c) Agricultural assistance (<i>seed fertilizer, equipment</i>)	97	1	2	1	2	97
d) Farm produce processing or storage facilities	97	1	2	1	2	97
e) Retaining and flood walls	97	1	2	1	2	97
f) Roads and Bridges	97	1	2	1	2	97
g) Medical Facilities	97	1	2	1	2	97
h) Schools	97	1	2	1	2	97
i) Electricity	97	1	2	1	2	97

Q-17b. What development projects have you seen or heard about in this area?			Q-17c. If project type is mentioned in Q-17b, ask Did the project/s improve life for people in this local area? If project type is not mentioned in Q-17b, circle '97'.			
j) Other (Specify)	97	1	2	1	2	97

Q-18a-b. (ASK ALL) Looking forward to the next year, what type of development projects are most needed in this area? You can mention two. Please start with the most needed, then the next most needed. **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down two responses)**

Q-18a. (most needed): _____

Q-18b. (next most needed): _____

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-19-a-b. (ASK ALL) Which of the following are the two biggest obstacles to your obtaining health care or medicine? **(INTERVIEWER: READ OUT RESPONSES. Record up to two starting with the biggest and then second biggest obstacle)**
(NEW in Wave 2)

Q-19a. (biggest obstacle): _____

Q-19b. (second biggest obstacle): _____

1. Lack of clinics/hospitals
2. Distance to facilities, lack of transportation and/or good roads
3. Cost of health care or medicine
4. Corruption or need to pay bribes to receive treatment
5. Lack of professional doctors
6. No services for women or a lack of female healthcare workers
7. Lack of medicines
8. Lack of medical equipment
9. Poor security
96. Other
98. Refused
99. Don't Know

MODULE 4: RULE OF LAW

Q-20a-c. If you or a family member was involved in a dispute concerning [*Insert Item*], please tell me who or where you would go to get justice? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED]**

	Govt. Court	Local/Tribal Elder/s	Armed Opposition Groups	Other (<i>write in</i>)	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Land or water	1	2	3	96 _____	98	99
b) Assault, murder, or kidnapping	1	2	3	96 _____	98	99
c) Theft	1	2	3	96 _____	98	99

Q-21a-c. How much confidence do you have in [*Insert Item*] to fairly resolve disputes? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all?

	A lot of conf.	Some conf.	Not much conf.	No conf.	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Local/tribal elders	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) Government courts	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Armed opposition groups	1	2	3	4	98	99

Q-22a-c. Do you think that people in your village/neighborhood always, mostly, sometimes or never respect the decisions made by [*Insert Item*]?

	Always	Mostly	Sometimes	Never	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Local/tribal elders	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) Government courts	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Armed opposition groups	1	2	3	4	98	99

MODULE 5: CORRUPTION

Q-23. Is corruption a problem in this area, or not?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-24. From what you know or have heard about, which department or sector of the local government do people most complain about corruption? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down one response)**

Write Response: _____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-25. In the last year has the level of corruption in this area increased, decreased, or stayed about the same? Is that increased/decreased a little or a lot?

- 1. Increased a lot
- 2. Increased a little
- 3. Stayed about the same
- 4. Decreased a little
- 5. Decreased a lot

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

MODULE 6: QUALITY OF LIFE (WELL-BEING & STANDARD OF LIVING)

Q-26. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Would you say you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

1. Very satisfied
2. Somewhat satisfied
3. Somewhat dissatisfied
4. Very dissatisfied

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-27. How satisfied are you with your household's current financial situation? Would you say you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

1. Very satisfied
2. Somewhat satisfied
3. Somewhat dissatisfied
4. Very dissatisfied

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-28. Thinking about the past year, would you say overall that your ability to meet your basic needs increased, decreased, or stayed the same? Is that 'increased/decreased a little or a lot'?

1. Increased a lot
2. Increased a little
3. Stayed the same
4. Decreased a little
5. Decreased a lot

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-29. How worried are you about being able to meet your basic needs over the next year? Are you not worried, a little worried, or very worried?

1. Not worried
2. A little worried
3. Very worried

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-30. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.

1. The situation in this area is certain enough for me to make plans for my future.
2. The situation in this area is **too uncertain** for me to make plans for my future.

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

MODULE 7: ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Q-31. Compared to a year ago, how would you describe your ability to get to your local markets? Is it much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse, or much worse?

1. Much better
2. A little better
3. About the same
4. A little worse
5. Much worse

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-32. Compared to a year ago, how have prices for basic goods changed in your local markets? Have they increased a lot, increased a little, stayed about the same, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?

1. Increased a lot
2. Increased a little
3. Stayed about the same
4. Decreased a little
5. Decreased a lot

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-33. Compared to a year ago, how would you describe the availability of paid jobs in your local area? Are there a lot more, a little more, about the same, a few less, or a lot less paid jobs available in your local area?

1. A lot more
2. A little more
3. About the same
4. A little less
5. A lot less

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

MODULE 8: COMMUNITY COHESION & RESILIENCE

Q-34a. How often do things from outside your village/neighborhood create problems in this area to disrupt normal life? Is that often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

- | | |
|--------------|------------------------|
| 1. Often | (Go to Q-34b) |
| 2. Sometimes | (Go to Q-34b) |
| 3. Rarely | (Go to Q-34b) |
| 4. Never | (Skip to Q-35a) |

- _____
98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-35a)**
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-35a)**

Q-34b. (Ask those who answered 1, 2 or 3 to Q-34a) What is the most common type of interference from outside the village/neighborhood that creates problems in this area? What is the next most common type of interference? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down two responses)**

Q-34b_1. Write Response: _____

Q-34b_2. Write Response: _____

- _____
97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-34c. (Ask those who answered 1, 2 or 3 to Q-34a) How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from outside the village? Is it often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely
4. Never

- _____
97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-35a. (ASK ALL) How often do things from inside your village/neighborhood create problems in this area to disrupt normal life? Is that often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

- 1. Often (Go to Q-35b)
- 2. Sometimes (Go to Q-35b)
- 3. Rarely (Go to Q-35b)
- 4. Never (Skip to Q-36)

-
- 98. Refused (vol.) (Skip to Q-36)
 - 99. Don't Know (vol.) (Skip to Q-36)

Q-35b. (Ask those who answered 1, 2 or 3 to Q-35a) What is the most common type of interference from inside the village/neighborhood that creates problems in this area? What is the next most common type of interference? [INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down two responses)

Q-35b_1. Write Response: _____

Q-35b_2. Write Response: _____

- 97. Not Asked
- 98. Refused (vol.)
- 99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-35c. (Ask those who answered 1, 2 or 3 to Q-35a) How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from inside the village? Is it often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

- 1. Often
- 2. Sometimes
- 3. Rarely
- 4. Never

-
- 97. Not Asked
 - 98. Refused (vol.)
 - 99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-36. (ASK ALL) When there is a problem in this area, how often do the villages/neighborhoods in this area work together to solve the problem? Is that often, sometimes, rarely or never?

1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely
4. Never

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-37a. When decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of ordinary people in the village/neighborhood considered? Are they considered often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often **(Go to Q-37b)**
2. Sometimes **(Go to Q-37b)**
3. Rarely **(Go to Q-37b)**
4. Never **(Skip to Q-38)**

98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-38)**
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-38)**

Q-37b. (Ask if answered codes 1, 2 or 3 in Q-37a) In your opinion, when decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of women considered? Are they considered often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely
4. Never

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-38. (ASK ALL) How effective or ineffective are your local leaders at securing funds for your village/neighborhood's needs from the district and/or provincial government? Are they very effective, somewhat effective, somewhat ineffective, or very ineffective?

1. Very effective
2. Somewhat effective
3. Somewhat ineffective
4. Very ineffective

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-39a-b. Do you belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss issues of common interest or to do certain activities together? Examples may include sports clubs, women's groups, business associations, trade unions, farmers' associations, development councils, religious welfare organizations, or charities, etc.

Q-39a.

1. Yes **(Please list below in Q-39b)**
2. No **(Skip to Q-40)**

98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-40)**

99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-40)**

Q-39b. (Ask if answered code 1 "Yes" to Q-39a) [INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down up to two responses) What type of group/s do you belong to?

Q-39b_1. Write Response: _____

Q-39b_2. Write Response: _____

97. Not Asked

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

MODULE 9: GRIEVANCES

Q-40a-b. (ASK ALL) Thinking about the different problems that people in this area talk about, what are the two biggest problems that create stress or tension in this area? Please try to be specific, starting with the biggest problem. **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down two responses)**

Q-40a. Biggest problem: _____

Q-40b. Next biggest problem: _____

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

MODULE 10: MEDIA

Q-41a-i. Do you use any of the following to communicate with others and/or get news and information?

	Yes	No	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Television	1	2	98	99
b) Radio	1	2	98	99
c) Mosque/mullah	1	2	98	99
d) Friends and family	1	2	98	99
e) Elders	1	2	98	99
f) Cell phone	1	2	98	99
g) Posters & billboards	1	2	98	99
h) Newspapers	1	2	98	99
i) Internet/email	1	2	98	99

Q-42a-b. From where do you get most of your information about government services? From where do you next get your information about government services? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down two responses)**

Write Response/s:

Q-42a. _____

Q-42b. _____

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

MODULE 11: INDIRECT QUESTIONS

Q-43a. It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government that people be allowed to vote in elections to select the members of their district council. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-43b. It has recently been suggested by the Taliban that people be allowed to vote in elections to select the members of their district council. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-44a. It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government that expensive new prisons be constructed in every district to help alleviate overcrowding in existing prisons. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support with this policy

98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-44b. It has recently been suggested by the Taliban that expensive new prisons be constructed in every district to help alleviate overcrowding in existing prisons. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

98. Refused

99. Don't know

Q-45a. It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government that the weak Independent Election Commission (IEC) be strengthened to prevent election fraud. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose with this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

98. Refused

99. Don't know

Q-45b. It has recently been suggested by the Taliban that the weak Independent Election Commission (IEC) be strengthened to prevent election fraud. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

98. Refused

99. Don't know

Q-46a. It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government that the weak Office of Oversight for Anti-Corruption be strengthened by allowing it to collect information about government officials suspected of wrong-doing. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-46b. It has recently been suggested by the Taliban that the weak Office of Oversight for Anti-Corruption be strengthened by allowing it to collect information about government officials suspected of wrong-doing. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-47a. Despite the possible risks, the democratically-elected government of Afghanistan wants the full transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces to happen sooner than is now planned. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-47b. Despite the possible risks, the Karzai administration wants the full transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces to happen sooner than is now planned. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

98. Refused

99. Don't know

Q-48a. Despite the poor results of past anti-corruption campaigns, the democratically-elected government of Afghanistan wants to do a new campaign to eliminate corruption. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

98. Refused

99. Don't know

Q-48b. Despite the poor results of past anti-corruption campaigns, the Karzai administration wants to do a new campaign to eliminate corruption. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

98. Refused

99. Don't know

Q-49a. The democratically-elected government of Afghanistan wants to make a new law that makes it a crime for Mullahs to preach anti-government messages or to incite violence during their Friday sermons. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-49b. The Karzai administration wants to make a new law that makes it a crime for Mullahs to preach anti-government messages or to incite violence during their Friday sermons. Do you oppose or support with such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-50a. The democratically-elected government of Afghanistan has called for improved access to education for women and girls. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

98. Refused
99. Don't know

Q-50b. The Karzai administration has called for improved access to education for women and girls. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

98. Refused

99. Don't know

DEMOGRAPHICS

INTERVIEWER READ: “Now I would like to ask you some questions for statistical purposes.”

D-1. Gender (INTERVIEWER, Do Not Ask: code based on your observation of the person’s gender)

- 1. Male
- 2. Female

D-2a. (Ask All) How old were you on your last birthday? (Record actual age; if respondent refuses, please estimate)

D-2b. In the previous question (D-2a) is this:

- 1. An estimated age
- 2. An actual age

D-3. How many years of formal education from primary school through university education have you completed?

Years (write in): _____

- 98. Refused (vol.)
- 99. Don’t Know (vol.)

D-4. And, apologies to be asking this, but regardless of your attained level of education, can you fluently perform each of the following in your native language?

	Yes	No	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a. Read a letter	1	2	8	9
b. Write a letter	1	2	8	9
c. Read a book	1	2	8	9

D-5a. What is your job status now? Are you...

1. Full-time farmer
2. Working full-time
3. Working part-time
4. Unemployed-Looking For Work
5. Unemployed-Not Looking For Work
6. Housewife (not working outside of the home)
7. Student/Apprentice
8. Retired/ Disabled

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-5b. **(ASK IF RESPONDENT IS WORKING, UNEMPLOYED, OR RETIRED in D-5a codes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 8):** What is/was your primary occupation? **(INTERVIEWER: FOR THOSE WHO ANSWERED UNEMPLOYED OR RETIRED/DISABLED, ASK THE RESPONDENT WHAT THEIR OCCUPATION WAS WHEN THEY WERE WORKING. RECORD BELOW AND CODE).**

INTERVIEWER WRITE

OCCUPATION: _____

1. Government Employee Support Staff
2. Government Employee Mid-Level (Supervisory)
3. Government Employee Senior Level Officer
4. Agricultural Laborer
5. Farming On Own Farm
6. Farm Owner Employing Laborers
7. Unskilled Worker
8. Semi-Skilled Worker
9. Skilled Worker
10. Private Employee Support Staff
11. Private Employee Mid-Level (Supervisory)
12. Private Employee Senior Officer
13. Private Business Sole Proprietor
14. Private Business Employing 1-5 Workers
15. Private Business Employing More Than 5 Workers
16. Military/Police
96. Other

97. Not Asked

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-5c. (Ask if respondent answered code 5 "Farming on own land" in D-5b) What is the main crop that you grow? (CODE ONE RESPONSE)

Write Response: _____

97. Not Asked

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-6. Are you the head of household?

1. Yes

2. No

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-7. How many people live in your household?

Interviewer: (code response) ____ ____

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-8. What is your marital status now? Are you currently...

1. Married?

2. Widowed or Divorced?

3. Single?

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-9. What is your household's total monthly income in Afghanis from all sources, that is, all types of income for all the people living at this address?

1. 1,000 Afghanis or less,
2. From 1,001 to 1,600
3. From 1,601 to 2,400
4. From 2,401 to 4,000
5. From 4,001 to 6,000
6. From 6,001 to 8,000
7. From 8,001 to 12,000
8. From 12,001 to 16,000
9. From 16,001 to 20,000
10. From 20,001 to 24,000
11. From 24,001 to 40,000
12. Greater than 40,000 Afghanis?

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-10. When asked 'Who are you?' some people answer first by indicating their occupation, others state their nationality, others tell their ethnicity, others their Qawm, others religion, others the region/province they are from, etc. If asked this question, what would you indicate about yourself in the first place?

1. Occupation
2. Nationality
3. Ethnicity/Qawm
4. Religion
5. Province/region

96. Other (specify) _____

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-11. Do you consider yourself to be...

1. Pashtun
2. Tajik
3. Uzbek
4. Turkmen
5. Hazara
6. Baloch
7. Kirghiz
8. Nuristani

- 9. Aimak
- 10. Arab
- 11. Kuchi
- 12. Other

-
- 98. Refused (vol.)
 - 99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-12. What is your religious affiliation? **(If Respondent Says Muslim Ask):** Do you consider yourself to be Shia or Sunni?

- 1. Shia Muslim
- 2. Sunni Muslim
- 3. Other

-
- 98. Refused (vol.)
 - 99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-13. What is your qawm?

Qawm: _____ (write in)

-
- 98. Refused (vol.)
 - 99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-14. Were you born in this district, or not?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No

-
- 98. Refused (vol.)
 - 99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-15a. Have you or has any other member/s of this household been injured or killed as a result of the fighting since the Taliban was removed from power?

- 1. Yes **(Go to D-15b)**
- 2. No **(Skip to M-26)**

-
- 98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to M-26)**
 - 99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to M-26)**

D-15b. (Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” at D-15a) Which group/s was/were responsible for the injury/s or death/s? (Do not read PRECODES, code up to two responses)

D-15b_1. Write Response: _____

D-15b_2. Write Response: _____

Precodes:

1. Taliban
2. ISAF
3. ANSF
4. Haqqani
5. [intentional blank]
6. Armed people
7. Foreign forces
8. Thieves
9. Local disputes
10. Warlords
11. Criminals
12. Karzai's men
13. Jamyat-e-Islami
14. Pakistanis
15. AGE
16. Soviet Union
17. None
18. Hizb-e Islami
19. Wahdat political party
20. Arbakies
21. Suicide attacks
22. Personal enmity
96. Other (Specify:_____)
97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

M-26. Have you previously participated in a public opinion survey?

1. Yes **(Go to M-27)**
 2. No **(Skip to M-28)**
-
8. Refused (Vol.) **(Skip to M-28)**
 9. Don't Know (Vol.) **(Skip to M-28)**

M-27. (Ask if answered 'yes' to M-26) How long ago did you participate in the survey?

1. Less than 1 month
 2. 1-3 months ago
 3. 4-6 months ago
 4. 7-9 months ago
 5. 10-12 months ago
 6. More than 1 year ago
-
7. Not Asked
 8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

M-28. (Ask All) Would you be willing to participate in another of our surveys next year?

1. Yes
 2. No
-
8. Refused (Vol.)
 9. Don't Know (Vol.)

RECORD THE TIME (USING 24 HOUR CLOCK) INTERVIEW WAS COMPLETED AND THE LENGTH OF THE INTERVIEW (M-15 AND M-16)

Read Closing Statement to the Respondent:

“Thank you for participating in our survey. Do you have any questions? In the next few hours or days my supervisor may contact you to evaluate the quality of my work and answer any other questions you may have. To help him/her do that, could I have your telephone number?”

Telephone number: _____

“If my supervisor calls you by telephone, he/she will begin by asking if you were surveyed in the last few hours/days. He/she will **not ask** you for your name or address. If someone you don’t know contacts you by telephone and asks for your name and/or address you should end the call and not talk to them.”

Interviewer Certification: “I certify that I have completed this interview according to the instructions provided me by _____.

Signed

Date

Interviewer Code

M-29. Interviewer: How many people were present for the interview? ____

M-30. Interviewer: Which of the following statements do you think best describes the level of comprehension of the survey questionnaire by the respondent?

1. The respondent understood all of the questions
2. The respondent understood most of the questions
3. The respondent understood most of the questions but with some help.
4. The respondent had difficulty understanding most of the questions, even with help from me

M-31. Interviewer: Which of the following statements best describes the level of comfort or unease that the respondent had with the survey questionnaire?

1. The respondent was comfortable (at ease) with the entire questionnaire
2. The respondent was comfortable with most of the questions
3. The respondent was comfortable with only some of the questions
4. The respondent was generally uncomfortable with the survey questionnaire

M-32. Interviewer: Please indicate which, if any, of the questions caused this respondent any uneasiness or decreased cooperation during the interview. **(Write down the number of the question numbers, in order of mention).**

- a. First Mention _____
- b. Second Mention _____
- c. Third Mention _____

M-33. SES Level: INTERVIEWER: Try to ask participant about access to water and electric (for electric it can be either municipal electric or a generator). Make your own decision about quality of the road. Select the code that is closest to the appearance and situation of the household. Code 1 represents the highest household economic situation and Code 5 the lowest household economic situation.

- 1. A/B [High quality road, access to water and electric 6 to 7 days]
- 2. C+ [Good road, access to water and electric 4 to 5 days per]
- 3. C, C- [Fair road, access to water and electric only a 1 to 3 days per week]
- 4. D [Poor road, access to water and electric 1 day a week, or less]
- 5. E [Poor or no road, no or very infrequent access to water and electric]

M34a- Was the interview controlled or back checked by MISTI?

- 1. It was back checked by MISTI
- 2. It was not back checked by MISTI

To Be Completed By The Supervisor:

M-34b. Was the interview subject to quality control/back-check?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No

M-35. Method of quality control/back-check

- 1. Direct supervision during interview
- 2. Back-check in person by supervisor
- 3. Back-check from the central office
- 4. Not applicable

MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey
M-36 Supplemental Question

INTERVIEWER Instructions: The supplemental question (M-36) is to be completed by the interviewer after completing his/her interviews in the sampling point. Interview is to fill out one for each sampling point completed.

M-2. Wave Number 01

M-4. Sampling Point/District Where the Interview Was Completed: _____

M-11. Interviewer Code: _____

M-36. INTERVIEWER: Please judge which situation best describes this village:

1. ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby; no Taliban activity or presence has been reported
2. ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby; some Taliban activity or presence has been reported, especially at night
3. ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby but do not move freely at night; village administrators usually do not sleep in their homes, and Taliban activity takes place regularly
4. Taliban forces are permanently based in this village or nearby and operate freely; ISAF or Afghan security forces may visit the village on occasion but do not stay
5. Taliban forces are permanently based in this village or nearby and operate freely; no ISAF or Afghan security force presence or activity at all
6. Local arbaki control this village; minimal Taliban, ISAF, or Afghan security force presence at all
7. There are no ISAF, Taliban, Afghan security forces, or arbaki controlling this village

APPENDIX 7: KFZ ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURAL LIVELIHOODS SURVEY

M-1. Respondent Identification Number _____

I-1. Interview Number.

M-2. Wave Number 05

I-2. Kish grid number.

M-3. Region

- | | | |
|------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Central/Kabul | 4. South Western | 7. Central/Hazarjat |
| 2. Eastern | 5. Western | |
| 3. South Central | 6. Northern | |

M-4. Sampling Point/District Where the Interview Was Completed: _____

M-5. Geographic Code

- | | | | |
|-------------|----------|---------|-------------------|
| 1. Villages | 2. Towns | 3. City | 4. Metros (Kabul) |
|-------------|----------|---------|-------------------|

M-6. Province

- | | | | | |
|------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|
| 1. Kabul | 9. Khost | 17. Kunduz | 25. Farah | 33. Panjshir |
| 2. Kapisa | 10. Ningarhar | 18. Balkh | 26. Nimroz | 34. Dehkondi |
| 3. Parwan | 11. Laghman | 19. Samangan | 27. Helmand | |
| 4. Wardak | 12. Kunar | 20. Juzjan | 28. Kandahar | |
| 5. Logar | 13. Nooristan | 21. Sar-I-Pul | 29. Zabul | |
| 6. Ghazni | 14. Badakhshan | 22. Faryab | 30. Uruzghan | |
| 7. Paktia | 15. Takhar | 23. Badghis | 31. Ghor | |
| 8. Paktika | 16. Baghlan | 24. Herat | 32. Bamyan | |

M-7. Year of Interview: 2014

M-8. Month of Interview

- | | | | |
|-------------|----------|--------------|--------------|
| 1. January | 4. April | 7. July | 10. October |
| 2. February | 5. May | 8. August | 11. November |
| 3. March | 6. June | 9. September | 12. December |

M-9. Date of Interview: _____

M-10. Day of Week of Interview

- | | | |
|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| 1. Friday | 4. Monday | 7. Thursday |
| 2. Saturday | 5. Tuesday | |
| 3. Sunday | 6. Wednesday | |

M-11. Interviewer Code: ___ ___ ___ ___ ___

M-12. Interview Completed on the ...

1. First Contact 2. Second Contact 3. Third Contact

M-13. Supervisor Code: ___ ___ ___

M-14. Record Time (using 24 hour clock) Interview Began: ___ __: ___ __
(Record Time Began Starting With Q-1)

M-15. Record Time (using 24 hour clock) Interview Ended: ___ __: ___ __
(Fill in all four data positions)

M-16. Record Length of Interview in Minutes: ___ ___

M-17. Date Formatted Field: OCT 2014

M-18. Keypuncher Code ___ __

M-19. Language of Interview

1. Pashto 2. Dari 3. Other 4. Uzbek

M-20. Coder Code ___ __

M-21. District Code ___ ___ ___

M-22. Language of the questionnaire

1. Pashto
2. Dari

M-23. Village name: _____

M-24. Sampling Point coordinates: _____

M-25a. Field Provider

1. ACSOR
2. Afghan Youth Consulting

Informed Consent

INTERVIEWER READ: *Much work is being done in Afghanistan to improve agricultural livelihoods. The purpose of this survey is to ask people like yourself about how this might be better achieved in your local area.*

We would like your views on this issue.

We will not ask for your name and the answers you and others provide will be held in strict confidence. Your responses to the survey questions are strictly voluntary. If we come to a question you do not wish to answer, please tell me and we'll move on. However your answers can be beneficial by providing information which may help to improve agricultural livelihoods in your area, so please answer as truthfully as you can.

Do you give your consent for me to proceed?"

M-25b. Informed Consent _____ (tick)

RECORD THE TIME THE ACTUAL INTERVIEW BEGAN (M-14)
AND USE A 24 HOUR CLOCK (14:24, for 2:24 pm)

KFZ SURVEY

I am going to ask you some questions about farming, the types of assistance available to farms in this area, and how this household earns its livelihood. May I please speak with the head of the household on issues of farming?

K-1. Does this household farm any land?

[NEW IN WAVE 5]

- 1. Yes **(Go to K-2)**
- 2. No **(End Survey)**

98. Refused (vol.) **(End Survey)**

99. Don't Know (vol.) **(End Survey)**

K-2. Compared to a year ago, would you say that the financial situation of people in the area has become better, remained the same, or worsened?

[NEW IN WAVE 5]

- 1. Better
- 2. The same
- 3. Worsened

98. Refused

99. Don't Know

K-3a-d. Do you own, lease/rent (Ijara), sharecrop (Bazgari), or have access to the land you farm through some other arrangement? **(Interviewer: Ask and code for each)**

K-4a-d. (Filtered, if 'yes' in K-3a-d) How many jeribs do you ... ? **(Interviewer: Ask for each answered with 'yes' at K-3 and write down number) (INTERVIEWER: if it is half a jeribs (1/2) round up to 1)**

[NEW IN WAVE 5]

	K-3		K-4
a. Own	1. Yes	2. No	_____
b. Lease/rent (Ijara)	1. Yes	2. No	_____
c. Sharecrop (Bazgari)	1. Yes	2. No	_____
d. Other (specify)	1. Yes	2. No	_____

K-5. (Ask only those who own land at K-3a) How did your household acquire this land that you own?

[WAS K3 IN WAVE 4]

1. Inherited
2. Purchased
3. Given by village
4. Firmams – decree of kings

96. Other: (*please specify*) _____

- _____
97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-6. (Ask only those who lease, rent or sharecrop land at K-3b or K-3c or K-3d) How much money if any do you pay to the owner to use the land for one year?

[WAS K4 IN WAVE 4]

Write Response Amount in Afghanis: _____

0. Do not make any money payments to owner

- _____
97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-7. (Ask only those who lease, rent or sharecrop land) How much of your crop if any do you give to the owner to use the land for one year?

[WAS K5 IN WAVE 4]

0. Do not share any of my crop with owner

1. A little (1-30%)
2. Just under a half (31-40%)
3. About half (41-60%)
4. Just over a half (61-70%)
5. Most (71-95%)
6. All (96+%)

- _____
97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-8. (Ask All) What kind of written or recorded agreement, legal title, or ownership rights do you have for this plot of land? **(Interviewer: Allow multiple responses, select all that apply)**
[WAS K6 IN WAVE 4]

1. Title document
2. Sales agreement
3. Lease agreement
4. Sharecropping agreement
5. Firmams – decree of kings
6. Village ownership
7. Do not have a written or recorded agreement

96. Other: *(please specify)* _____

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-9. Is the land irrigated?
[WAS K8 IN WAVE 4]

1. Yes **(Go to K-10)**
2. No **(Skip to K-11)**

98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to K-11)**
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to K-11)**

K-10a-b. (Ask only those who answered "Yes - irrigated" to K-9) What is the main source of irrigation in use on the land? What is the next most used source of irrigation on the land?

[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down up to two sources)
[WAS K9a/b IN WAVE 4]

K-10a. Main Source: _____
K-10b. Next most used source: _____

1. Rain
 2. River
 3. Dam
 4. Canal
 5. Karez
 6. Bore-well
 96. Other: _____
- [ACSOR: Add codes as needed]**

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-11. (Ask All) On the whole, would you say that people in the area farm crops and rear livestock for their own consumption, or to sell the products in the market? Which of the two is more common?

[NEW IN WAVE 5]

1. For consumption
2. For the market

—
98. Refused
99. Don't Know

K-12. What three kinds of crops or livestock are people in the area farming mostly for their own consumption, to use themselves rather than to sell on the market?

[NEW IN WAVE 5]

- a) _____ 98. Refused 99. Don't Know
b) _____ 98. Refused 99. Don't Know
c) _____ 98. Refused 99. Don't Know

K-13. And what three kinds of crops or livestock are people in the area farming mostly to sell on the market rather to use for their own consumption?

[NEW IN WAVE 5]

- a) _____ 98. Refused 99. Don't Know
b) _____ 98. Refused 99. Don't Know
c) _____ 98. Refused 99. Don't Know

K-14. Now, let's go back a year ago. Thinking of you and your household, what three kinds of crops or livestock did you and your family farm mostly for your own consumption last year?

[NEW IN WAVE 5]

- a) _____ 98. Refused 99. Don't Know
b) _____ 98. Refused 99. Don't Know
c) _____ 98. Refused 99. Don't Know

K-15. And what three kinds of crops, livestock or farm products did you and your family produce last year mostly to sell on the market? (**Interviewer: Write down crop or livestock in the table below**)

[NEW IN WAVE 5]

K-16. (Ask for each in K-15a-d) To the best of your recollection, how much in total in Afghani did you receive selling ... [insert item from K-15] ... on the market last year?

[NEW IN WAVE 5]

K-15		K-16	
a) _____	98. Ref. 99. DK	_____	98. Ref. 99. DK
b) _____	98. Ref. 99. DK	_____	98. Ref. 99. DK
c) _____	98. Ref. 99. DK	_____	98. Ref. 99. DK

K-16d. Thinking again about these crops, products, or animals that you sold in the past year, would say you received a very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad price.

[NEW IN WAVE 5]

1. Very good
2. Somewhat good
3. Somewhat bad
4. Very Bad

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-17a. Based on what you know, what is the average price in Afghani of the following crops and animals in the area at present?

K-17b. Is this current price of [...item...] higher, the same or lower than that last year?

[NEW IN WAVE 5]

Crop/Livestock	K-17a. Price in Afs: Per kilogram (crop) or per animal	K-17b. Current price compared to last year
1. Wheat		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
2. Rice		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
3. Feed Corn		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
4. Sweet Corn		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
6. Barley		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
7. Poppy		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
10. Potato		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
11. Onion		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
12. Cumin		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
17. Cannabis		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
18. Alfalfa		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
20. Melon		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
21. Water melon		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
22. Pomegranates		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
23. Grapes		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
29. Cows (Cattle)		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
35. Sheep		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
36. Goats		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
37. Fig		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK

K-18a. Looking a year from now, how likely or unlikely are the people in the area to farm and raise the following crops and animals? Please, use this scale from '1' to '10'; where '1' means Very Unlikely and '10' means Very Likely. (Interviewer: Show Card. Ask for each and write down response in column Q18-a of the table below) **[NEW IN WAVE 5]**

Very Unlikely	Very Likely
1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 ----- 8 ----- 9 ----- 10	

K-18ba. Looking a year from now, what will be the average price in Afghani of the following crops and animals?

K-18bb. And speaking of next year, do you think that the price of [... item...] will be higher, the same, or lower than now? **[NEW IN WAVE 5]**

Crop/Livestock	Q-18ba. Price in Afs: Per kilogram (crop) or per animal	Q-18bb. Current price compared to next year
1. Wheat		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
2. Rice		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
3. Feed Corn		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
4. Sweet Corn		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
6. Barley		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
7. Poppy		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
10. Potato		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
11. Onion		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
12. Cumin		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
17. Cannabis		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
18. Alfalfa		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
20. Melon		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
21. Water melon		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
22. Pomegranates		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
23. Grapes		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
29. Cows (Cattle)		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
35. Sheep		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
36. Goats		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK
37. Fig		1. Higher 2. Same 3. Lower 9. R/DK

K-19. Please tell me if you grow any of the crops or raise any of the animals on your land from the list I will read out. **(READ OUT and mark all that apply) [NEW IN WAVE 5]**

K-20a. And, of all the items we discussed, which is the most important for you and the economic status of your household, which is to say, which one do you make the most money from? **(MARK ONLY ONE)**

K-20b. Which is the next most important for you and the economic status of your household, which is to say which one do you make the next most money from? **(MARK ONLY ONE)**

K-20c. And which is the third most important you make money from? **(MARK ONLY ONE)**

Crop/Livestock	K-19. Grown, produced, or raised (read down the table and circle all that apply)	K-20a. Most important (circle only one)	K-20b. Next most important (circle only one)	K-20c. Third most important (circle only one)
1. Wheat	1	1	1	1
2. Rice	2	2	2	2
3. Feed Corn	3	3	3	3
4. Sweet Corn	4	4	4	4
6. Barley	6	6	6	6
7. Poppy	7	7	7	7
10. Potato	10	10	10	10
11. Onion	11	11	11	11
12. Cumin	12	12	12	12
17. Cannabis	17	17	17	17
18. Alfalfa	18	18	18	18
20. Melon	20	20	20	20
21. Water melon	21	21	21	21
22. Pomegranates	22	22	22	22
23. Grapes	23	23	23	23
29. Cows (Cattle)	29	29	29	29
35. Sheep	35	35	35	35
36. Goats	36	36	36	36
37. Fig	37	37	37	37
Other (specify)	97	97	97	97
Refused		98	98	98
Don't Know		99	99	99

K-21. [ASK ONLY IF GROW ANY CROPS in K-19] Thinking about the crops you grow, do you store the harvested crop/s or do you sell it/them within a few days?
[WAS K13 IN WAVE 4 – Language changed]

- 1. Store (Go to K-22)
- 2. Sell within a few days (Skip to K-23)

-
- 97. Not Asked
 - 98. Refused (vol.) (Skip to K-23)
 - 99. Don't Know (vol.) (Skip to K-23)

K-22a-c. (Ask those who answered “Store”, code 1 in K-21) In what type of storage facility did you store the harvested crop/s?
[WAS K11a-c IN WAVE 4]

	Yes	No	Not Asked	Ref. (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a. Farm bin, shelter or other temporary storage facility on the farm	1	2	97	98	99
b. Cold storage facility	1	2	97	98	99
c. Other (specify):	1	2	97	98	99

K-23. (Ask those who “Sell”, code 2 in K-21) What is the main location where you sell most of your crops/livestock/products? **(Single response, mark only main location)**
[WAS K17 IN WAVE 4]

- 1. At the farm
- 2. Alongside the road
- 3. At a local market in my village
- 4. At a local market in the Howsa
- 5. At a market in the district center
- 6. At a market in the provincial center
- 7. To a cooperative

96. Other: *(please specify)* _____

-
- 97. Not Asked
 - 98. Refused (vol.)
 - 99. Don't Know (vol.)

**K-24. (Ask those who “Sell”, code 2 in K-21) How do you transport your goods to the market?
(Single Response)**

[WAS K18 IN WAVE 4]

1. Walk with cart or baskets
2. Donkey/horse/mule/camel with cart or baskets
3. Tractor and cart
4. Bicycle
5. Motorcycle
6. Zaranj / Rickshaw
7. Passenger Car
8. Van
9. Truck
96. Other: (*please specify*) _____

97. Not Asked

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-25. (Ask All) Did you use any fertilizers, pesticides, seeds, feed or paid labor on your farm during the last year?

[WAS K19 IN WAVE 4]

1. Yes **(Go to K-26a)**

2. No **(Skip to K-28)**

98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to K-28)**

99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to K-28)**

K-26a-e. [ASK IF code 1, “YES” IN K-25] How much does your economic success depend on the following? Does [insert item] play a very large role, a medium size role, a small role, or no roll at all in the economic success of the activities on your land?

[WAS K20 a-e IN WAVE 4]

	Very large role	Medium size role	Small role	No role at all	Not Asked	Refused (vol.)	DK (vol.)
K-26a. Fertilizers	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
K-26b. Pesticides	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
K-26c. Seeds	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
K-26d. Feed	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
K-26e. Paid labor	1	2	3	4	97	98	99

K-27a-e. [ASK IF CODE 1, “YES” IN K-25] For the following items, please tell me if you are able to access the item. Do you have access to all you need, access to some of what you need, insufficient access, no access at all or do you not need these to be successful?

[WAS K21 a-e IN WAVE 4]

	Access to all you need	Access to some of what you need	Insufficient access to what you need	No access at all	Do not need to be successful	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a. Fertilizers	1	2	3	4	5	97	98	99
b. Pesticides	1	2	3	4	5	97	98	99
c. Seeds	1	2	3	4	5	97	98	99
d. Feed	1	2	3	4	5	97	98	99
e. Paid labor	1	2	3	4	5	97	98	99

K-28. (Ask All) Have you received any assistance from outside of your household for the farming activities you conducted on your land over the past year?

[WAS K22 IN WAVE 4]

- 1. Yes **(Go to K-29)**
- 2. No **(Skip to K-31)**

- 98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to K-31)**
- 99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to K-31)**

K-29a-c. (Ask only those who answered CODE 1 “Yes” to K-28) From where did you receive this assistance? Did you receive assistance from...
[WAS K23 a-c IN WAVE 4]

	Yes	No	Not Asked	Refused (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a. The Afghan Government	1	2	97	98	99
b. International Organization / NGO	1	2	97	98	99
c. Another source (specify):	1	2	97	98	99

K-30a-f (Ask only those who answered Code 1 “Yes” to K-28) What type of assistance did you receive? Did you receive assistance with...
[WAS K24 a-f IN WAVE 4]

	Yes	No	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a. Fertilizers	1	2	97	98	99
b. Pesticides	1	2	97	98	99
c. Seeds	1	2	97	98	99
d. Feed	1	2	97	98	99
e. Storage of crops	1	2	97	98	99
f. Other: _____	1	2	97	98	99

K-31. (Ask All) In the past year, did you try to obtain credit or a loan from any source outside of your household?
[WAS K25 IN WAVE 4]

1. Yes **(Go to K-32)**
2. No **(Skip to K-38)**

98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to K-38)**
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to K-38)**

K-32. (Ask only those who responded code 1 “Yes” to K-31) Were you successful in obtaining credit or a loan? [WAS K26 IN WAVE 4]

- 1. Yes (Go to K-33)
- 2. No (Skip to K-37)

-
- 97. Not Asked
 - 98. Refused (vol.) (Skip to K-38)
 - 99. Don’t Know (vol.) (Skip to K-38)

K-33. (Ask only those who responded code 1 “Yes” to K-32) From what source/s did you obtain the credit/loan? Did you obtain a loan from... [WAS K27 a-h IN WAVE 4]

	Yes	No	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a. Family and/or friends	1	2	97	98	99
b. Landlord	1	2	97	98	99
c. Wealthy lender	1	2	97	98	99
d. Bank	1	2	97	98	99
e. Afghan Government	1	2	97	98	99
f. International Organization / NGO	1	2	97	98	99
g. Lending group	1	2	97	98	99
h. Other: _____	1	2	97	98	99

K-34. (Ask only those who responded code 1 “Yes” to K-32) What was the total amount of credit or loans that you obtained in the past year? [INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down one response in Afghanis) [WAS K28 IN WAVE 4]

Write Response: _____ Afs

-
- 97. Not Asked
 - 98. Refused (vol.)
 - 99. Don’t Know (vol.)

**K-35. (Ask only those who responded code 1 “Yes” to K-32) Did you have to offer collateral (an item you would lose if you did not repay the loan) to obtain the credit/loans?
[WAS K29 IN WAVE 4]**

- 1. Yes (Go to K-36)
- 2. No (Skip to K-38)

-
- 97. Not Asked
 - 98. Refused (vol.) (Skip to K-38)
 - 99. Don’t Know (vol.) (Skip to K-38)

**K-36. (Ask only those who responded “Yes” to K-35) What collateral did you have to offer?
[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down one response)
[WAS K30 IN WAVE 4]**

- 1. Land
- 96. Other (specify) _____

[ACSOR: Add codes as needed]

-
- 97. Not Asked
 - 98. Refused (vol.)
 - 99. Don’t Know (vol.)

**K-37. (Ask only those who responded code 2 “No” to K-32) Why did you not receive credit or a loan? [INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down one response)
[WAS K31 IN WAVE 4]**

Write Response: _____

-
- 97. Not Asked
 - 98. Refused (vol.)
 - 99. Don’t Know (vol.)

K-38a-c. (Ask All) What types of assistance would be most useful in helping you farm in the coming year?

[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down top three responses)

[WAS K32 a-c IN WAVE 4]

K-38a. First Response: _____

K-38b. Second Response: _____

K-38c. Third Response: _____

1. Seed
2. Fertilizer
3. Herbicide
4. Pesticide
5. Feed

96. Other (specify) _____

[ACSOR: Add codes as needed]

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-39. What types of facilities would be most useful in helping you prepare your crops/animals/products for market in the coming year? Please tell me for each of the following if it would be very helpful, somewhat helpful, not very helpful, or not at all helpful:

[WAS K33 a-i IN WAVE 4]

Facility	Very helpful	Somewhat helpful	Not very helpful	Not at all helpful	Not Asked	Ref. (vol.)	DK (vol.)
Cold storage	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
Grading facility	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
Canning factory	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
Drying facility	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
Packaging factory	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
Flour mill	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
Feed mill	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
Spinning mill	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
Other (please specify) _____	1	2	3	4	97	98	99

K-40a-b. In terms of earning a livelihood, in order of priority, what are the two biggest problems facing this household in terms of earning a livelihood? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED]**
(Write down two responses)
[WAS K37 a-b IN WAVE 4]

Write Responses:

a. (Biggest problem) _____

b. (Next biggest problem) _____

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

K-41. In order of priority, what kind of agricultural activities, be it farming specific crops, or rearing particular animals of livestock, or something else, in your opinion, would be help most to improve the well-being of people in the area? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED]** **(Write down up to three responses)**
[NEW IN WAVE 5]

a) _____ 98. Refused 99. Don't Know

b) _____ 98. Refused 99. Don't Know

c) _____ 98. Refused 99. Don't Know

Q-42. And if it were depending on you, and you had the resources, what would you personally do to make these agricultural activities happen? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED]** **(Write down up to three responses)**
[NEW IN WAVE 5]

a) _____ 98. Refused 99. Don't Know

b) _____ 98. Refused 99. Don't Know

c) _____ 98. Refused 99. Don't Know

DEMOGRAPHICS

INTERVIEWER READ: *“Now I would like to ask you some questions for statistical purposes.”*

D-1. Gender (INTERVIEWER, Do Not Ask: code based on your observation of the person’s gender)

- 1. Male
- 2. Female

D-2a. (Ask All) How old were you on your last birthday? (Record actual age; if respondent refuses, please estimate)

___ ___

D-2b. In the previous question (D-2a) is this:

- 1. An estimated age
- 2. An actual age

D-3. How many years of formal education from primary school through university education have you completed?

Years (write in): _____

- 98. Refused (vol.)
- 99. Don’t Know (vol.)

D-4. And, apologies to be asking this, but regardless of your attained level of education, can you fluently perform each of the following in your native language?

	Yes	No	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a. Read a letter	1	2	8	9
b. Write a letter	1	2	8	9
c. Read a book	1	2	8	9

D-6. How many people live in your household?

Interviewer: (code response) ___ ___

- 98. Refused (vol.)
- 99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-7. What is your household's total monthly income in Afghanis from all sources, that is, all types of income for all the people living at this address?

1. 1,000 Afghanis or less,
2. From 1,001 to 1,600
3. From 1,601 to 2,400
4. From 2,401 to 4,000
5. From 4,001 to 6,000
6. From 6,001 to 8,000
7. From 8,001 to 12,000
8. From 12,001 to 16,000
9. From 16,001 to 20,000
10. From 20,001 to 24,000
11. From 24,001 to 40,000
12. Greater than 40,000 Afghanis?

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

M-26. Have you previously participated in a public opinion survey?

1. Yes (Go to M-27)
 2. No (Skip to M-28)
-
8. Refused (Vol.) (Skip to M-28)
 9. Don't Know (Vol.) (Skip to M-28)

M-27. (Ask if answered 'yes' to M-26) How long ago did you participate in the survey?

1. Less than 1 month
 2. 1-3 months ago
 3. 4-6 months ago
 4. 7-9 months ago
 5. 10-12 months ago
 6. More than 1 year ago
-
7. Not Asked
 8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

M-28. (Ask All) Would you be willing to participate in another of our surveys next year?

1. Yes
 2. No
-
8. Refused (Vol.)
 9. Don't Know (Vol.)

**RECORD THE TIME (USING 24 HOUR CLOCK) INTERVIEW WAS COMPLETED
AND THE LENGTH OF THE INTERVIEW (M-15 AND M-16)**

M-33. SES Level: INTERVIEWER: Try to ask participant about access to water and electric (for electric it can be either municipal electric or a generator). Make your own decision about quality of the road. Select the code that is closest to the appearance and situation of the household. Code 1 represents the highest household economic situation and Code 5 the lowest household economic situation.

1. A/B [High quality road, access to water and electric 6 to 7 days]
2. C+ [Good road, access to water and electric 4 to 5 days per]
3. C, C- [Fair road, access to water and electric only a 1 to 3 days per week]
4. D [Poor road, access to water and electric 1 day a week, or less]
5. E [Poor or no road, no or very infrequent access to water and electric]

M34a- Was the interview controlled or back checked by MISTI?

1. It was back checked by MISTI
2. It was not back checked by MISTI

To Be Completed By The Supervisor:

M-34b. Was the interview subject to quality control/back-check?

1. Yes
2. No

M-35. Method of quality control/back-check

1. Direct supervision during interview
2. Back-check in person by supervisor
3. Back-check from the central office
4. Not applicable

D-36. (If 1 'Yes' in D34a) Back-checker ID:

____ _

9996. Not Asked

APPENDIX 8: MISTI QALITATIVE INTERVIEWS FOR THE WAVE 5 SURVEY REPORT: SCOPE OF WORK AND QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Objective: Use individual in-depth interviews with key informants in selected villages to gain in detailed information about the outcomes of project activities.
2. 24 individual interviews (2 per village), 12 villages in 6 districts.
3. Respondent selection: Purposive selection of two persons in each village that have substantial knowledge of project activities that have taken place in the village.
4. Selected villages: Two villages were selected in six districts in four regions. Each village had at least one stabilization activity ongoing at the time of the Wave 4 survey. Once village in each district showed a relatively positive change and the other village showed a relatively negative change in stability from Wave 3 to Wave 4. See the attached spreadsheet for more information about each village listed in the table below.

vill_uid	Village Name	Province	District	Type of Project	Type of Project
KHU-025	KHWAJA UMARI	Ghazni	Khwajah Omari	Hard	Irrigation
KHU-021	QOULA	Ghazni	Khwajah Omari	Soft	Education
LAM-063	WOAM HASSAN KHAIL	Paktiya	Lajah-Ahmad Khel	Hard	Irrigation
LAM-019	DARGE	Paktiya	Lajah-Ahmad Khel	Hard	Irrigation
CBK-090	SABZIKAR	Balkh	Chahar Bolak	Hard	Education
CBK-028	DARGHAN	Balkh	Chahar Bolak	Hard	Education
PJW-107	SALAWAT SUFLA	Kandahar	Panjwa'i	Hard	Transportation
PJW-104	RIGU HULYA	Kandahar	Panjwa'i	Hard	Irrigation & Transportation
LKG-048	HAJI SARDAR	Helmand	Lashkar Gah	Hard	Irrigation
LKG-026	BIST HULYA	Helmand	Lashkar Gah	Hard	Irrigation
QDS-101	KHODAI MADIYAN KHOD AMADA	Badghis	Qadis	Soft	Education
QDS-039	BOYA KALAY HA	Badghis	Qadis	Soft	Education

Interview Questionnaire

M-1 Vill_uid: _____

M-2 Village name: _____

M-3 Province: _____

M-4 District: _____

M-5 Date of interview: _____

M-6 Time interview started: _____

M-7 Time interview ended: _____

M-8 Respondent code: _____


M-9 Respondent occupation: _____

M-10 Description of respondent status in village: _____

1. Please tell me about any projects that have taken place in your village in the past six months. Can you tell me more about the (type of project) project that happened here?
2. What were the results of the project? Did the project create benefits or problems for the people here? Did the project create lasting changes for the people in the village?
3. Please tell me how this particular (type of project) project was chosen for your village? Was it the right project for the village and did it provide what the people really needed?
4. Were any officials from the Afghan government involved in the project? Did the project change the relationship between the people in the village and the government? If so, how did the relationship with the government change?
5. Please tell me about the ways that the different villages in this area might work together to help each other? What effect did the (type of project) project have on the relationship between this village and its neighbors?
6. For projects to be successful they usually need the support of local leaders, and many projects also involve members of the CDC and DDA. How were local leaders and members of the CDC and DDA involved in the (type of project)

project? What influence did their involvement or lack of involvement in the project have on the result of the project?

7. Did the village as a whole participate in making decisions about the project before it started and while it was taking place? Or were all of the decisions about the project made by the local leaders?
8. To what extent did the people in the village work together to make the (type of project) project a success or did the project create new divisions between people in the village? Did the village as a whole benefit from the project or did some people in the village benefit more than other people?
9. Were women in the village involved in the project? If so how were they involved? Did women benefit from the project? If so, then how did they benefit?
10. How did the (type of project) project change the situation of the village? Did the project result in any changes to the security situation in the village or peoples expectations for the future?



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MEASURING IMPACTS OF STABILIZATION INITIATIVES (MISTI) WAVE 5



METHODOLOGY REPORT



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This publication was produced for Management Systems International (MSI). It was prepared by Stephen Hornbeck, D3 Systems, Inc.

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I. Introduction

The Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI) Wave 5 survey was a public opinion study that sought to identify trends in stabilization indicators throughout Afghanistan. It is the final survey in a series of five Waves. The final wave was built upon the Wave 1 survey, conducted between September 13 and December 23, 2012, the Wave 2 survey, conducted between May 18 and August 7, 2013, the Wave 3 survey, conducted between November 16, 2013 and January 30, 2014 and the Wave 4 survey, conducted between April 28 and June 12, 2014. Following validation reports from each wave, the methodology, training protocols and validation protocols were adapted to increase the data accuracy and reliability.

The intent of the project was to inform leaders from six stabilization programs being run across Afghanistan and help identify improvements and declines in stabilization in their areas of responsibility. To achieve this, six stabilization program areas were surveyed in both the Wave 1 and Wave 2 projects: Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI), Community Development Program (CDP) and four Stabilization in Key Areas (SIKA) programs covering the North (SIKA-N), South (SIKA-S), East (SIKA-E) and West (SIKA-W) regions of Afghanistan.

For all waves after Wave 3, the CDP program was dropped and the Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) program was added, so there remain six programs being measured in Waves 3, 4 and 5. For Waves 3 and 4, the KFZ program acted as a module within the larger questionnaire. In wave 5, the KFZ program was given its own questionnaire and the methodology was adapted from the regular household survey.

It should be noted that districts included in CCI-C varied by wave and settlements sampled in Wave 4 were purposefully excluded from selection in Wave 5. This is particularly important to keep in mind when considering wave to wave analysis as changes in the composition of program districts can have a significant impact on trend analysis. The addition or removal of particular districts can shift the overall results within any particular wave of research, so changes from wave to wave may not, in fact, be changes in the trend but may be a factor of which districts were included or excluded from the analysis. A full list of changes in the districts between waves is included within this report.

1.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The sample design, field implementation, quality control, questionnaire design, and overall field experience are summarized in this methodology report. Some highlights are presented below.

1. The target population was Afghan citizens, 18 years of age or older, living in 107 pre-selected districts throughout 21 provinces in Afghanistan. All 107 districts were selected because at least one of the six USAID stabilization programs are in the process of planning or implementation in the district.
2. The target N size for the project was 41,849 interviews. The achieved N size was 41,013 interviews after all quality control measures were employed and unacceptable interviews were rejected. The target n size for each district ranged between 240 and 560 interviews with the average size per district being 370 interviews. However, the sample size for the KFZ section was smaller with 105 interviews conducted with farmers in the KFZ districts.
3. Following the Wave 4 survey, a full validation report was provided to ACSOR Surveys. Based on these results, ACSORS procedures, trainings and protocols were updated to better ensure data quality and fidelity. This included removing the Kunduz supervisory and interviewing teams. During Wave 5, one new interviewer in Kunduz selected respondents using the prescribed methods and invited all respondents to a central location for the interview. As this broke protocol, this interviewer was removed from conducting additional interviews for the Wave 5 study. His interviews were not included in the final data set.
4. Sampling was conducted across 107 districts specified by MISTI. These districts were located in the following 21 provinces: Badghis, Baghlan, Balkh, Farah, Ghazni, Ghor, Helmand, Herat, Jawzjan, Kandahar, Khost, Kunar, Kunduz, Logar, Nimroz, Paktika, Paktiya, Samangan, Uruzgan, Wardak and Zabul. The same provinces that were surveyed in Wave 4 were surveyed in Wave 5 with Parwan and Faryab having been removed from the original provinces and Balkh, Jawzjan and Paktika being added in Waves 3 and 4.
5. Primary sampling units were villages within each district. Each of the villages (also referred to as settlements), like the districts, were selected by MISTI. In some instances, villages were determined to be inaccessible to interviewing teams due to security concerns, travel restrictions (imposed by either insurgent groups, ANSF or NATO forces) or weather. In these instances, a replacement village was selected by MISTI. All replacements are notated in the Achieved Sample Plans for each of the 107 districts surveyed and are summarized in Appendix 1 of this report.

6. The sampling methodology has evolved throughout the lifespan of the project. This was done purposefully because the primary analytical goal of MISTI is to understand the opinions of people living in USAID program intervention areas, but keeping in mind that the budget for sample size has remained relatively consistent overall, there were limitations in purposefully selecting all accessible treatment villages sampled in all waves. As a result, treatment villages previously drawn in all waves were sampled from to retain longitudinal analysis.
7. Furthermore, this report presents aggregated data results and analysis at the district and program level. This requires the assumption that the data collected within each district or program is representative of the population of a district or a program. The reader should keep in mind that:
 - Accessibility of villages differs at the time of each survey. Therefore, target treatment villages sampled in previous waves which were intended to be resampled in Wave 5 may not have had a probability of inclusion.
 - There are no accurate measure of size associated with villages. The assumption that is made is that all villages are of approximately equal size, as any random selection was done by way of simple random sampling.
 - The AYC household level selection is not random; instead it was done through a snowball sampling technique.
8. Assuming a simple random sample with $P=0.5$ and a 95% confidence interval, the margin of sampling error for the main aggregated data set of 41,013 interviews would be +/- 0.48% and +/-3.61% for the KFZ dataset. Although this statistic is presented for reference, we do not recommend analysis of these data at an aggregate level with all cases being analyzed simultaneously as the definition of the target population is difficult to interpret from the 107 districts with USAID activity (which we refer to as treatment areas). The sample was designed to facilitate longitudinal analysis at the district level and longitudinal analysis of aggregated districts comprising the stabilization program areas.
9. Complex margin of error was estimated for each question within each of the stabilization programs. These sampling errors are estimated assuming that a probability-based sample took place at both these levels.
10. The MISTI Wave 5 survey was conducted face-to-face by 913 ACSOR interviewers and 184 AYC interviewers. Some districts are inaccessible to ACSOR interviewers because it is difficult to enter and exit certain areas without attracting the attention of insurgent elements and endangering the safety of the ACSOR interviewers. Certain districts are also accessible only to male interviewers due to cultural and security concerns. ACSOR maintains an accessibility tracker to monitor each district in Afghanistan. This tracker is

updated monthly as the security situation in Afghanistan changes frequently. As a result of ACSOR's inaccessibility assessment, the interviews in 16 districts were conducted completely by AYC and another 12 districts were interviewed using both ACSOR and AYC interviewers during the Wave 5 field work.

11. The ACSOR interviewing teams consisted of male and female interviewers who were local residents of the areas where the interviews were conducted. ACSOR interviewers utilized a random walk methodology to select households and a Kish grid to randomize respondent selection within households. These interviewers were all from the province where they conducted interviews and in most instances they were from the districts where the interviews were conducted. The ACSOR interviewing teams were overseen by a supervisory team from their province. The supervisory team consisted of 21 lead supervisors (one for each province) and one or two assistant supervisors in each province that helped with back checks, field monitoring, and general field logistics throughout the field period. ACSOR's field work began on September 28, 2014 and concluded on November 23, 2014.
12. The AYC interviewing teams consisted of small groups of male interviewers who are from the districts where the interviews were conducted. Due to the poor security situation in the districts where they conducted field work, the AYC interviewing teams selected households through convenience sampling using their local knowledge of the villages and contacts they have within those villages so as to lessen the possibility of encountering insurgent elements that would result from employing a random walk. Since the AYC interviewers were only male and they selected households through convenience sampling, respondents were selected by either asking for the male head of household or interviewing another male member of the household who was available at the time. The AYC interviewers were overseen by a team of 23 supervisors who were responsible for back checking, direct observations and all field logistics. AYC began field work on October 25, 2014 and concluded on November 18, 2014.
13. Contact sheets were completed by both ACSOR and AYC interviewers throughout the field period. ACSOR used standard *American Association for Public Opinion Research* (AAPOR) calculation standards to derive the following field performance and disposition rates:
 - Response Rate 3 = 87.29%
 - Cooperation Rate 3 = 94.70%
 - Refusal Rate 2 = 4.12%
 - Contact Rate 2 = 95.56%
14. AAPOR offers a variety of formulas to calculate disposition rates depending on the circumstances for which they are being used. ACSOR typically uses the rates reported above as they most logically fit the face-to-face field methodology used in Afghanistan.

15. The master questionnaire consisted of 36 management and quality control variables, 91 2/3 substantive questions and 19 demographic questions. The KFZ questionnaire consisted of 98 2/3 substantial questions, 6 demographic questions and 36 management and quality control questions. For the purposes of this count, each item in a battery of questions was counted as 1/3 of a variable.
16. The average length of time it took for an interview to be conducted was 35 minutes with the shortest interview taking 20 minutes and the longest interview taking one hour and 13 minutes.

Table 1: Project Schedule

Project Phases	Main Survey		Comments	KFZ Survey		
	Start Date	End Date		Start Date	End Date	
Questionnaire Design / Translation	August 15, 2014	September 17, 2014		August 23, 2014	September 30, 2014	
Sampling	August 15, 2014	September 23, 2014		September 13, 2014	September 23, 2014	
ACSOR Briefings	September 27, 2014	September 28, 2014		November 1, 2014	November 2, 2014	
AYC Briefings	September 27, 2014	September 28, 2014		November 1, 2014	November 2, 2014	
ACSOR Fieldwork	September 28, 2014	November 23, 2014		November 4, 2014	November 8, 2014	
AYC Fieldwork	October 25, 2014	November 18, 2014		November 6, 2014	November 8, 2014	
Quality Control	September 28, 2014	December 19, 2014		November 4, 2014	December 1, 2014	
Data Processing	October 22 nd , 2014	December 14, 2014		November 14, 2014	December 1, 2014	

II. SAMPLE DESIGN

The following table shows the target and achieved sample for each district in the MISTI Wave 5 project. The target and achieved sample sizes differ due to post-field quality control measures which caused some cases to be removed from the data set. A complete list of reasons individual cases were removed listed by district can be found in section 4.6 of this report.

Table 2: Target and Achieved Sample by District and by Field Provider

District	Province	Program	Target	Achieved
Muqur	Badghis	CCI-IOM; SIKA-West	560	545
Qadis	Badghis	SIKA-West	560	553
Qal'ah-ye Now	Badghis	SIKA-West	240	238
Baghlani Jadid	Baghlan	SIKA-North	560	559
Pul-e Khumri	Baghlan	SIKA-North	560	550
Balkh	Balkh	CCI-IOM	320	319
Chahar Bolak	Balkh	CCI-IOM	240	240
Chimtal	Balkh	CCI-IOM	240	240
Mazar-e Sharif	Balkh	CCI-IOM	240	240
Sholgarah	Balkh	CCI-IOM	240	240
Bala Boluk	Farah	SIKA-West	560	560
Farah	Farah	SIKA-West	240	237
Khak-e-Safayd	Farah	SIKA-West	240	240
Lash-e Juwayn	Farah	SIKA-West	240	230
Pusht-e Rod	Farah	SIKA-West	400	399
Andar	Ghazni	SIKA-East	320	318
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu)	Ghazni	SIKA-East	240	240
Deh Yak	Ghazni	SIKA-East	352	338
Gelan	Ghazni	CCI-Creative	320	319
Khwajah Omari	Ghazni	SIKA-East	320	320
Malistan	Ghazni	SIKA-East	240	240
Muqer	Ghazni	CCI-Creative; SIKA-East	320	320
Qarah Bagh (1)	Ghazni	CCI-Creative; SIKA-East	560	557
Chaghcharan	Ghor	SIKA-West	400	400
Do Lainah	Ghor	SIKA-West	240	239
Shahrak	Ghor	SIKA-West	320	320
Garmser	Helmand	SIKA-South	560	549
Kajaki	Helmand	CCI-Creative	400	400
Lashkar Gah	Helmand	CCI-Creative; SIKA-South	512	497
Musa Qal'ah	Helmand	CCI-Creative	560	560
Nad 'Ali	Helmand	SIKA-South	560	555
Nahr-e Saraj	Helmand	CCI-Creative; SIKA-South	560	559
Sangin	Helmand	CCI-Creative;	560	560

District	Province	Program	Target	Achieved
Adraskan	Herat	CCI-IOM	320	314
Injil	Herat	CCI-IOM	240	234
Kohsan	Herat	SIKA-West	240	239
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	Herat	SIKA-West	560	559
Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)	Herat	CCI-IOM; SIKA-West	560	558
Pashtun Zarghun	Herat	SIKA-West	560	557
Shindand	Herat	SIKA-West	560	559
Aqcha	Jawzjan	CCI-IOM	240	240
Faizabad (2)	Jawzjan	CCI-IOM	240	240
Khwajah Do Koh	Jawzjan	CCI-IOM	240	239
Qush Tepah	Jawzjan	CCI-IOM	240	240
Shibirghan	Jawzjan	CCI-IOM	320	319
Arghandab (1)	Kandahar	SIKA-South	560	547
Arghistan	Kandahar	KFZ	240	239
Arghistan	Kandahar	KFZ	105	105
Daman	Kandahar	SIKA-South	560	560
Dand	Kandahar	CCI-Creative	560	558
Dand	Kandahar	KFZ	105	105
Maiwand	Kandahar	CCI-Creative	240	240
Maiwand KFZ by AYC	Kandahar	KFZ	105	105
Panjwa'i	Kandahar	CCI-Creative	560	554
Panjwa'i KFZ	Kandahar	KFZ	105	105
Shah Wali Kot	Kandahar	KFZ	240	237
Shah Wali Kot KFZ by AYC	Kandahar	KFZ	105	105
Spin Boldak	Kandahar	CCI-Creative	240	237
Takhtapol	Kandahar	SIKA-South	240	240
Takhtapol KFZ	Kandahar	KFZ	105	105
Zharay	Kandahar	CCI-Creative	560	560
Zharay KFZ	Kandahar	KFZ	105	105
Bak	Khost	CCI-Creative	320	316
Gurbuz	Khost	SIKA-East	320	319
Jaji Maidan	Khost	SIKA-East	320	320
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)	Khost	SIKA-East	320	320
Nadir Shah Kot	Khost	SIKA-East	240	239
Shamul (Dzadran)	Khost	CCI-Creative	320	319
Tanai	Khost	SIKA-East	320	320
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)	Khost	CCI-Creative	560	560
Khas Kunar	Kunar	CCI-Creative	560	560
Marawarah	Kunar	CCI-Creative	320	320
Sar Kani	Kunar	CCI-Creative	320	320

District	Province	Program	Target	Achieved
Aliabad	Kunduz	SIKA-North	560	558
Archi	Kunduz	SIKA-North	320	318
Chahar Darah	Kunduz	SIKA-North	560	558
Imam Sahib	Kunduz	SIKA-North	560	552
Khanabad	Kunduz	SIKA-North	560	560
Kunduz	Kunduz	SIKA-North	560	556
Qal'ah-ye Zal	Kunduz	SIKA-North	240	238
Baraki Barak	Logar	SIKA-East	560	560
Khoshi	Logar	SIKA-East	400	395
Muhammad Aghah	Logar	SIKA-East	480	473
Kang	Nimroz	SIKA-South	400	397
Zaranj	Nimroz	SIKA-South	560	544
Sharan	Paktika	SIKA-East	240	240
Yosuf Khel	Paktika	SIKA-East	240	238
Ahmadabad	Paktiya	SIKA-East	240	240
Dzadran	Paktiya	SIKA-East	320	317
Jaji	Paktiya	SIKA-East	240	255
Lajah-Ahmad Khel	Paktiya	SIKA-East	320	318
Lajah-Mangal	Paktiya	SIKA-East	320	318
Mirzaka	Paktiya	SIKA-East	240	239
Sayyid Karam	Paktiya	SIKA-East	240	240
Shwak (Garda Serai)	Paktiya	SIKA-East	240	231
Zurmat	Paktiya	SIKA-East	320	320
Aybak	Samangan	CCI-IOM	240	236
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in	Samangan	CCI-IOM	240	240
Fayroz Nakhchir	Samangan	CCI-IOM	240	237
Hazrat-e Sultan	Samangan	CCI-IOM	320	318
Ruy Do Ab	Samangan	CCI-IOM	240	240
Chorah	Uruzgan	SIKA-South	560	560
Deh Rawud	Uruzgan	SIKA-South	560	556
Khas Uruzgan	Uruzgan	CCI-Creative	240	239
Shahid-e Hasas	Uruzgan	CCI-Creative	240	239
Tarin Kot	Uruzgan	SIKA-South	560	548
Chak-e Wardak	Wardak	SIKA-East	480	480
Jalrayz	Wardak	SIKA-East	560	560
Maidan Shahr	Wardak	SIKA-East	240	240
Nerkh	Wardak	SIKA-East	560	560
Sayyidabad	Wardak	SIKA-East	560	560
Qalat	Zabul	CCI-Creative; SIKA-South	560	560
Shah Joy	Zabul	SIKA-South	560	552

District	Province	Program	Target	Achieved
Tarnak wa Jaldak	Zabul	SIKA-South	560	559
TOTALS			41,439	41,748

* The 16 districts highlighted in blue were conducted entirely by Afghan Youth Consulting and the 12 districts highlighted in grey were partially conducted by Afghan Youth Consulting.

2.1 SAMPLING METHODOLOGY

The Wave 5 sampling was derived from a sample frame provided by MISTI to ACSOR Surveys. The sampling process was divided into four main steps:

Step One: Sampling Allocation by District

Selection of districts for inclusion in the sample frame was driven primarily by stakeholder requests to MISTI. The preceding chart in the Sample Design section lists all districts selected for inclusion in the final sample frame and notes which province they are located in and which program(s) each district falls under. Although SIKA districts are all mutually exclusive and no district can fall under two different SIKA programs, the CCI and KFZ districts are not mutually exclusive. As such, some districts in Kandahar simultaneously fall under both the CCI and KFZ programs while other districts may fall under the CCI program and one of the SIKA programs. See Table Two above for a complete list of programs operating in each district included in the sample.

Sample size for each district was determined by MISTI in order to meet reporting needs for each program in the final, aggregated data set. Of the 107 districts selected for inclusion in the Wave 5 sample frame:

- 38 were assigned 240 respondents
- 22 were assigned 320 respondents
- 1 were assigned 352 respondents
- 5 were assigned 400 respondents
- 2 were assigned 480 respondents
- 1 was assigned 512 respondents
- 31 were assigned 560 respondents

No districts were replaced from the original sample frame. However, some districts were determined to be inaccessible to ACSOR interviewers due to safety concerns. ACSOR maintains an accessibility tracker to monitor the current status of each district in Afghanistan. This tracker is updated monthly as the security situation in Afghanistan changes frequently. As a result of ACSOR's inaccessibility assessment, the interviews in 16 districts were conducted completely by AYC and another 12 districts were interviewed using both ACSOR and AYC interviewers during the Wave 5 field work.

Due to the sampling methodology, not all districts sampled in Wave 5 were sampled in Wave 4. The following districts were added by project area:

- **CCI Creative:** Lashkar Gah and Maiwand were added to Wave 5
- **CCI IOM:** Murqur was added to Wave 5
- **SIKA-East:** Malistan and Shwak were added to Wave 5
- **SIKA-West:** Qal'ah-ye Now, Nizam-e Shahid, Kohsan, Farah district, Lash-e Juwayn and Do Lainah were added to Wave 5

Step Two: Primary Sampling Units (Settlements)

After the districts were selected, MISTI selected the primary sampling units (in this case, settlements within each district) to be sampled within each district. MISTI has created a master list of settlements (villages) in Afghanistan by combining and cleaning six different lists of known settlements: Yale POP_MASTER, CSO AIMS Villages (provided by ACSOR to MISTI), USAID AID Village View, along with lists provided by the CCI field team, SIKA-E field team and the MISTI GIS team. The settlements were selected by MISTI based on which programs were being implemented (or were scheduled to have programs implemented in them in the future) by one or more of the USAID stabilization programs.

The first step in selecting settlements was to automatically include all settlements where USAID reported a stabilization project being implemented. This means that all settlements which have had ongoing projects during previous waves were automatically included in the Wave 5 sample.

However, not all settlements which were sampled in previous waves were able to be included in the sample for Wave 5 due to the changing security and the subsequent accessibility assessment of each settlement. This means there is not an equal probability of selection for all settlements in each district. It is important to note that the consequence of these sample decisions is that there is an unknown probability of selection for some settlements in the final sample frame which can undermine the assumptions of the statistical calculations presented in this report.

To determine the remaining settlements for selection, each district was divided into three strata. The strata were created by:

1. Taking all settlements listed in the district from the MISTI master list of settlements and reordering them by geographic proximity to the district center
2. Calculating the total population in the district by adding the population estimates for each settlement

3. The three strata were then defined by assigning:
 - a. 50% of the district population to Strata 1
 - b. 30% of the district population to Strata 2
 - c. 20% of the district population to Strata 3
4. Either 20 or 30 total settlements (treatment and non-treatment combined) were selected within each district, depending on the reporting needs for each district. This meant that after the treatment settlements were automatically included for each district, additional non-treatment settlements were randomly selected from the each strata to reach a total of 20 or 30 settlements per district.
5. For each district, 70% of the sampled settlements were from Strata 1, 20% were from Strata 2 and 10% were from Strata 3.
 - a. In districts with 20 settlements:
 - i. Strata 1 = 14 settlements
 - ii. Strata 2 = 4 settlements
 - iii. Strata 3 = 2 settlements
 - b. In districts with 30 settlements:
 - i. Strata 1 = 21 settlements
 - ii. Strata 2 = 6 settlements
 - iii. Strata 3 = 3 settlements
6. The non-treatment settlements within each strata were randomly selected from the list of settlements assigned to the strata. After the initial random selection, those settlements were plotted in a mapping program to check for sufficient geographic dispersion among the selected settlements within each strata. An analyst would then manually alter the selected settlements to avoid clustering of settlements into one area within the strata. This process was repeated for each of the three strata for each of the 100 sampled districts.

Replacement of Selected Settlements

In the event that a settlement needed to be replaced, a suitable replacement was selected by MISTI. In Wave 5, there were 161 sample points replaced. As there were two sample points per settlement, this means there were 332 settlements replaced in Wave 5. A complete list of replacements by sample point, province, district and settlement can be found in Appendix 1: Sample Points Replaced.

One notable difference in the replacement process between Waves 1 and 2 and the process in Waves 3, 4 and 5 was that in the first two waves of research, ACSOR was provided a list of acceptable replacement settlements for each district and made replacements accordingly when a particular settlement was reported to be inaccessible. In Waves 3, 4 and 5 ACSOR would start by analyzing the sample for each district and then notified the MISTI team when a particular

settlement from the initial sample draw was determined to be inaccessible. MISTI then provided a specific replacement for each settlement so as to ensure the replacement resembled (by strata, population size and location) the originally selected settlement as closely as possible. This process often took several rounds of review between ACSOR and MISTI to create the final sample plans which were sent to field.

Gender Matching

Each selected settlement was assigned two sample points of 8 interviews each, one for male interviews and one for female interviews. Due to the cultural norms in Afghanistan, it is necessary to assign female interviewers to sample points where they conduct interviews only with female respondents and assign male interviewers to sample points where they conduct interviews only with male respondents.

In some instances, entire districts were determined to be accessible only to male interviewers at the time of the field work. This information is also tracked monthly by ACSOR for every district across the country, and these assessments of gender accessibility change over time. For instances in which a district or settlement was determined to be accessible only to male interviewers, both sample points in the settlement(s) were assigned to male interviewers and no females were sampled in those districts or settlements.

Step Three: Household Selection

For ACSOR: Households were selected for participation in the survey by interviewers conducting a systematized random walk within the settlement to which they were assigned. In order to further randomize household selection within sample points, each sample point was randomly preassigned one of five geographic starting points within the settlement: north, south, east, west and center. This instructed each interviewer to start their random walk at the north, south, east, west or central most location within each settlement in order to ensure that locations directly surrounding common, prevalent landmarks (such as mosques, schools or markets) within settlements were not oversampled.

For AYC: Due to the insecure nature of the areas they were assigned, supervisors instructed the interviewers on where the safest locations were in the selected settlements. The interviewers followed the supervisors' advice to select households.

Step Four: Respondent Selection

For ACSOR (Main Questionnaire): Interviewers used a Kish grid to select individual respondents from households. Male interviewers listed all males 18 years of age or older living in the household on the Kish grid within each questionnaire and female interviewers listed all females 18 years of age or older living in the household. Each questionnaire was pre-assigned a selection number (1-10) on the Kish grid. These numbers were evenly distributed throughout the district to ensure that each column on the Kish grid had an equal probability of selection throughout all interviews conducted within the district.

For ACSOR (KFZ): The same selected villages of the district were visited. Upon arriving at a household, the interviewers employed a screening questionnaire. If the household was involved in agricultural production, the interviewer asked to speak to the head-of-household. If the family was not involved in agriculture or the head-of-household was unwilling or not available to be interviewed, the household was thanked and the interviewer continued on the random walk.

For AYC: Interviewers were allowed to select any member of the household who was willing to participate in order to expedite fieldwork and to more easily abide by the cultural norms in Afghanistan. Heads of the household were most commonly interviewed, as this creates the least amount of tension when interviewers visit households in less secure areas.

2.2 WEIGHTING

Districts were selected for inclusion in the sample based on the evaluation needs of the various programs being implemented and evaluated. The sample was never intended to be a representative sample of all of Afghanistan. Due to this sampling process for the MISTI Wave 5 survey and the lack of reliable demographic and population data available in Afghanistan at the settlement level, there are no weights used on these data.

2.3 MARGIN OF ERROR AND DESIGN EFFECT

For Wave 5, D3 Systems computed the estimated design effect for each question and response within each program. Due to the amount of information, this data has been provided as a separate file. Additionally, D3 Systems calculated the estimated design effect for each district and program which are stated in the tables below.

It must be noted that probability of selection weights were not used in the calculation of these estimates. A simple random sample, equal probability of selection and self-weighting design is all assumed in these estimates. The reported margins of error and design effects for the districts that were sampled or partially sampled using non-probability methods (previously noted in Table 2) are reported as if the sampling was identical to the districts which used a probability method for comparative purposes.

It must also be noted that the limitations inherent to the chosen sampling methodology discussed throughout section 2.1 impact not only the ability to project results to the overall populations sampled but also impacts the ability to calculate statistically meaningful margins of error and design effects for each sample. As such, the following margins of error and design effects presented in Table 3 and Table 4 are for reference only as all of the calculations assume a probability sample. MISTI Wave 5 is not truly a probability sample either at the district or program levels due to the selection process employed.

Table 3: District Design Effect and Margin of Error

District	Design Effect	Standard Error	Sample Size	Margin of Error	Complex Margin of Error
Adraskan	2.080646397	0.033594662	314	6.58%	9.50%
Ahmadabad	1.759768681	0.035930239	240	7.04%	9.34%
Aliabad	3.041937977	0.033076894	558	6.48%	11.31%
Andar	3.306390668	0.040982698	318	8.03%	14.61%
Aqcha	1.738630245	0.035977183	240	7.05%	9.30%
Archi	3.874544659	0.051559749	318	10.11%	19.89%
Arghandab (1)	2.172304041	0.027822045	547	5.45%	8.04%
Argghanistan	2.849880427	0.052092027	239	10.21%	17.24%
Aybak	3.684076107	0.058030917	236	11.37%	21.83%
Baghlani Jadid	1.733208761	0.023084164	559	4.52%	5.96%
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghātu)	1.653531821	0.036089525	240	7.07%	9.10%
Bak	1.575620504	0.029742717	316	5.83%	7.32%
Bala Boluk	2.354225949	0.027920315	560	5.47%	8.40%
Balkh	1.492767104	0.027486579	319	5.39%	6.58%
Baraki Barak	3.544920644	0.036201493	560	7.10%	13.36%
Chaghcharan	1.761800251	0.028132145	400	5.51%	7.32%
Chahar Bolak	2.024691952	0.039103559	240	7.66%	10.91%
Chahar Darah	4.430961974	0.038334615	558	7.51%	15.82%
Chak-e Wardak	0.950129318	0.0206182	480	4.04%	3.94%
Chimtal	1.236049151	0.030971537	240	6.07%	6.75%
Chorah	2.434368728	0.027786202	560	5.45%	8.50%
Daman	2.196530919	0.028120551	560	5.51%	8.17%
Dand	2.217689478	0.028225967	558	5.53%	8.24%
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in	1.790066813	0.035849367	240	7.03%	9.40%
Deh Rawud	1.633402331	0.024085343	556	4.72%	6.03%
Deh Yak	1.552707502	0.03016861	338	5.91%	7.37%
Do Lainah	1.320489045	0.031310669	239	6.14%	7.05%
Dzadran	1.02866569	0.026221645	317	5.14%	5.21%
Faizabad (2)	3.24575027	0.051141243	240	10.02%	18.06%
Farah	2.134475419	0.0429686	237	8.42%	12.30%
Fayroz Nakhchir	2.998904039	0.053305173	237	10.45%	18.09%
Garmser	2.199038287	0.0272888	549	5.35%	7.93%
Gelan	2.18822272	0.036591647	319	7.17%	10.61%
Gurbuz	1.705081471	0.03033953	319	5.95%	7.76%
Hazrat-e Sultan	2.011007621	0.037837572	318	7.42%	10.52%
Imam Sahib	3.471806238	0.034414133	552	6.75%	12.57%

District	Design Effect	Standard Error	Sample Size	Margin of Error	Complex Margin of Error
Injil	0.912747424	0.025868256	234	5.07%	4.84%
Jaji	2.5384007	0.03921012	255	7.69%	12.24%
Jaji Maidan	1.315178201	0.027017739	320	5.30%	6.07%
Jalrayz	1.513601596	0.024056173	560	4.72%	5.80%
Kajaki	1.841620391	0.030231921	400	5.93%	8.04%
Kang	2.495302401	0.033940257	397	6.65%	10.51%
Khak-e-Safayd	1.939809122	0.038758339	240	7.60%	10.58%
Khanabad	4.233218791	0.038517112	560	7.55%	15.53%
Khas Kunar	1.573074177	0.023239526	560	4.55%	5.71%
Khas Uruzgan	2.18747074	0.042843777	239	8.40%	12.42%
Khoshi	2.589278941	0.034091053	395	6.68%	10.75%
Khwajah Do Koh	1.961710585	0.040906159	239	8.02%	11.23%
Khwajah Omari	2.359408619	0.036009624	320	7.06%	10.84%
Kohsan	3.160178249	0.050017277	239	9.80%	17.43%
Kunduz	4.58015046	0.039029182	556	7.65%	16.37%
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	1.763804416	0.022572345	559	4.42%	5.88%
Lajah-Ahmad Khel	1.713336295	0.031220368	318	6.12%	8.01%
Lajah-Mangal	0.990082745	0.023383994	318	4.58%	4.56%
Lash-e Juwayn	3.703710418	0.0572022	230	11.21%	21.58%
Lashkar Gah	2.953574385	0.033458484	497	6.56%	11.27%
Maidan Shahr	0.721341509	0.024875701	240	4.88%	4.14%
Maiwand	1.644601922	0.037192328	240	7.29%	9.35%
Malistan	2.971076662	0.048167108	240	9.44%	16.27%
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)	1.145459484	0.023505458	320	4.61%	4.93%
Marawarah	1.181483877	0.02608954	320	5.11%	5.56%
Mazar-e Sharif	1.168914386	0.03058355	240	5.99%	6.48%
Mirzaka	1.430861067	0.031625471	239	6.20%	7.41%
Muhammad Aghah	2.323715324	0.030378722	473	5.95%	9.08%
Muqer	2.782343299	0.042319338	320	8.29%	13.84%
Muqur	2.273519886	0.028016579	545	5.49%	8.28%
Musa Qal'ah	1.947529373	0.025454551	560	4.99%	6.96%
Nad 'Ali	1.669361554	0.023327968	555	4.57%	5.91%
Nadir Shah Kot	1.332454869	0.03207548	239	6.29%	7.26%
Nahr-e Saraj	1.836046095	0.024603359	559	4.82%	6.53%
Nerkh	0.935388952	0.019357172	560	3.79%	3.67%
Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)	3.032059269	0.030586964	558	6.00%	10.44%
Panjwa'i	3.350207434	0.035184795	554	6.90%	12.62%
Pashtun Zarghun	2.035770544	0.024274448	557	4.76%	6.79%
Pul-e Khumri	1.614564739	0.023459687	550	4.60%	5.84%

District	Design Effect	Standard Error	Sample Size	Margin of Error	Complex Margin of Error
Pusht-e Rod	2.433425144	0.034989205	399	6.86%	10.70%
Qadis	1.65531585	0.023642401	553	4.63%	5.96%
Qal'ah-ye Now	2.18010714	0.041748945	238	8.18%	12.08%
Qal'ah-ye Zal	3.395698166	0.05503791	238	10.79%	19.88%
Qalat	1.858932311	0.024793446	560	4.86%	6.63%
Qarah Bagh (1)	2.178820262	0.027537936	557	5.40%	7.97%
Qush Tepah	2.988373264	0.046018942	240	9.02%	15.59%
Ruy Do Ab	1.890345048	0.041053237	240	8.05%	11.06%
Sangin	0.9500612	0.017638827	560	3.46%	3.37%
Sar Kani	1.946160349	0.036104981	320	7.08%	9.87%
Sayyid Karam	1.583361959	0.033163826	240	6.50%	8.18%
Sayyidabad	1.135169302	0.020436388	560	4.01%	4.27%
Shah Joy	3.090301139	0.032347523	552	6.34%	11.15%
Shah Wali Kot	1.895677024	0.044379792	237	8.70%	11.98%
Shahid-e Hasas	1.880392884	0.038724106	239	7.59%	10.41%
Shahrak	2.17437527	0.033563332	320	6.58%	9.70%
Shamul (Dzadran)	1.225548266	0.026124529	319	5.12%	5.67%
Sharan	0.986259599	0.027814072	240	5.45%	5.41%
Shibirghan	2.926284034	0.043556831	319	8.54%	14.60%
Shindand	1.92743471	0.024329067	559	4.77%	6.62%
Sholgarah	1.628377666	0.036167343	240	7.09%	9.05%
Shwak (Garda Serai)	2.205466592	0.040844761	231	8.01%	11.89%
Spin Boldak	2.818192567	0.049582672	237	9.72%	16.31%
Takhtapol	1.265639732	0.032428345	240	6.36%	7.15%
Tanai	1.828006664	0.031998183	320	6.27%	8.48%
Tarin Kot	2.193793256	0.027245926	548	5.34%	7.91%
Tarnak wa Jaldak	1.381397359	0.021377685	559	4.19%	4.92%
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)	1.495807211	0.021728511	560	4.26%	5.21%
Yosuf Khel	1.830483923	0.038693684	238	7.58%	10.26%
Zaranj	1.688307386	0.024800084	544	4.86%	6.32%
Zharay	3.240678011	0.034661283	560	6.79%	12.23%
Zurmat	0.976338059	0.024689764	320	4.84%	4.78%

Design effect is also estimated by program. Each program was treated as an independent sample, disproportionately stratified by the selected districts, and clustered by settlement. The non-probability districts were included in this estimation as if they were sampled identically to the probability method districts.

Table 4: Program Design Effect and Margin of Error

Program	Design Effect	Standard Error	Sample Size	Margin of Error	Complex Margin of Error
SIKA North	4.05	1.29%	4449	1.47%	2.52%
SIKA South	2.59	0.90%	5927	2.56%	1.75%
SIKA East	2.49	0.67%	9758	2.00%	1.32%
SIKA West	2.50	0.91%	5330	2.70%	1.79%
CCI - Creative	2.90	0.74%	9354	2.04%	1.46%
CCI - IOM	2.67	0.94%	5479	2.66%	1.84%
KFZ	3.10	2.93%	716	7.37%	5.74%

III. FIELD IMPLEMENTATION

3.1 CONTACT PROCEDURES

For those interviews conducted by ACSOR, maps and available information about the settlements were used to identify a pre-assigned starting point (north, south, east, west or center) for random walks where the interviews were conducted. Interview teams used a random route procedure to select households.

In urban areas, from the given starting point, the interviewer headed in the assigned direction and stopped at the 2nd street/lane on the right hand side of his/her route. The first contacted household was pre-assigned as either the 1st, 2nd or 3rd house on the right from the beginning of the street. From then on, the selected household was each 3rd inhabitable house on the right side of the interviewer's route. In blocks-of-flats, the selection routine was every 5th apartment unit. In buildings with more than one household, no more than two households were interviewed.

In rural areas, from the given starting point, the interviewer headed in the assigned direction. If they started in the north, south, east or west end of the village, they began walking toward the center of the village; if they started at the center, they headed in a randomly assigned direction. The first contacted household was pre-assigned as either the 1st, 2nd or 3rd house on the right from the beginning of the street. From then on, the selected household was each 3rd inhabitable house on the right side of the interviewer's route. Compounds containing two or more houses behind a common wall were treated like detached houses, counting them counter-clock-wise from the gate to the compound.

For those interviews done by AYC, due to the insecure nature of the areas they were assigned, supervisors instructed the interviewers on where the safest locations were in the selected sample points. The interviewers followed the supervisors' advice to select households.

For interviews done by ACSOR, after selecting a household, interviewers were instructed to utilize a Kish grid for randomizing the target respondent within the household. Members of the household were listed with their names and ages in descending order. Male interviewers listed all male household members living in the household who were 18 years of age or older, and female interviewers listed all females 18 years of age or older.

Under no circumstances were ACSOR interviewers allowed to substitute an alternate member of a household for the selected respondent. If the respondent refused to participate or was not available after two call-backs, the interviewer then moved on to the next household according to the random walk.

For those interviews done by AYC, interviewers were allowed to select any member of the household who was willing to participate in order to speed the fieldwork up and to more easily abide by the cultural norms in Afghanistan. Heads of the household were most commonly interviewed, as this creates the least amount of tension when interviewers visit households in less secure areas.

Typically interviewers were required to make two call-backs before replacing the designated respondent. These call-backs are made at different times of the same day or on different days of the field period, in order to provide a broader schedule in which to engage the respondent. Due to security-related concerns, the field force has had difficulty meeting the requirement of two call-backs prior to substitution in many rural areas.

In this survey, while interviewers were able to complete some call-backs, the majority of the interviews were completed on the first attempt.*

- First attempt = 97.8%
- Second attempt = 2.0%
- Third attempt = 0.2%

*Due to the high rate of unemployment, the nature of rural life which makes it common that someone is always present in the household, and choosing the appropriate time of day for interviewing, completion on the first attempt is common in Afghanistan.

3.2 SAMPLE DISPOSITION

The following tables contain the sample dispositions (Table 5) and resulting disposition rates (Table 6) for the MISTI Wave 5 survey. These figures combine the sample dispositions reported from the field for both the ACSOR and AYC field teams. As explained in section 2.1, variations

exist in sampling methodologies between these two field teams, however the same disposition codes were used for both teams.

For the purposes of reporting disposition totals and the subsequent rate calculations, the total number of completed interviews includes all interviews received from (N=39,800). In seven cases, interviewers incorrectly recorded the final disposition, resulting in a dispositions for 39,793 households.

There are 247 interviews included in the completed interviews total which were later deleted for quality control purposes (see section 4.6). The final data set used for analysis contains only those 34,180 ACSOR interviews and 6,833 AYC interviews which passed all of the quality control tests.

We use AAPOR's standard reporting rates when calculating the dispositions presented in this report. AAPOR offers a variety of rates to choose from. For face-to-face interviewing in Afghanistan, we have determined that the most logical rates to use are Response Rate 3, Cooperation Rate 1, Refusal Rate 2 and Contact Rate 2. The formulas for each calculation are provided in Table 6.

Table 5: Disposition Totals

MISTI Wave 5 Sample Disposition			
ACSOR Code	AAPOR Code	Description	Count
Completed Interviews			
1	1.0/1.10	Interview was successfully completed	34363
Partial Interviews			
10	1.200	During interview, selected respondent refused (General)	166
11	1.200	During interview, selected respondent was not feeling informed to answer the questions	30
12	1.200	During interview, selected respondent got angry because of a question	34
13	1.200	During interview, selected respondent preferred head of household be interviewed	35
14	1.2	During interview, selected respondent was in a hurry/no time	35
		Total Partial	300
Unknown Eligibility			
20	3.130	No answer at door	527
21	3.200	No adults (18+) after three visits	550
22	3.170	Unable to access building or house	193
23	3.210	Outright refusal at the door	788
		Total Unknown Household	2058
Non-Contacts			
24	2.210	Selected respondent never available for interview	378
25	2.250	Selected respondent long-term absence for the fieldwork period	496
		Total Non-contacts	874
Others			
26	2.300	Selected respondent not allowed to participate in the survey	85
35	2.310	Selected respondent deceased	26
36	2.320	Selected respondent physically or mentally unable to complete the interview	39
37	2.332	Selected respondent unable to complete interview in languages available	4
		Total Others	154
Refusals			
30	2.11	Selected respondent refuses (General)	595
31	2.11	Selected respondent not feeling informed to answer the questions	197
32	2.11	Selected respondent got angry because of the subject matter	89
33	2.11	Selected respondent prefers head of household to be interviewed	297
34	2.11	Selected respondent in a hurry/no time	445
		Total Refusals	1623
Not Eligible			
40	4.7	Does not meet screening criteria/not eligible for interview	0
41	4.500	Non-residential (business)/abandoned home	421
		Total Not Eligible	421
Total		Total Sampled Households	39793

Table 6: Final Disposition Rates

DISPOSITION RATES		
RATE	FORMULA/CALCULATION	PERCENT
Value for e	estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are eligible	0.989
Response Rate 3	$I / (I+P)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO)$	87.29%
Cooperation Rate 1	$I / (I+P+R)$	94.70%
Refusal Rate 2	$R / (I+P)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO)$	4.12%
Contact Rate 2	$(I+P+R+O) / (I)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO)$	95.56%

3.3 FIELD OUTCOMES

Each ACSOR supervisor was asked to report any problems they encountered in the field while implementing the MISTI Wave 5 project to the ACSOR field management team in Kabul. Their reports are summarized here:

Province: Badghis

Training in Badghis took place September 26-27. ACSOR Kabul staff member Habiburiman attended the training. A total of 21 male and 18 female interviewers attended and participated in training. The training followed the protocol of the central training and topics included questionnaire, contact sheets, Kish grids, validation protocols and GPS. No issues were reported during fieldwork

Province: Baghlan

Training in Baghlan took place September 26-27. No major issues were reported during training or fieldwork.

Province: Balkh

Training in Balkh took place September 27-28. No major issues were reported during training or fieldwork.

Province: Farah

Training in Farah took place September 26-27. No major issues were reported during training or fieldwork.

Province: Ghazni

Training in Ghazni took place September 28-29. No major issues were reported during training or fieldwork.

Province: Ghor

Training in Ghor took place September 27-28. No major issues were reported during training or fieldwork.

Province: Helmand

Training in Helmand took place September 26-27. No major issues were reported during training or fieldwork.

Province: Herat

Training in Herat took place September 26-27. No major issues were reported during training or fieldwork.

Province: Jowzjan

Training in Jowzjan took place September 26-27. No major issues were reported during training or fieldwork.

Province: Kandahar

Training in Kandahar took place October 10-11th. No major issues were reported during training or fieldwork.

Province: Khost

Training in Khost took place October 27-28th. ACSOR Kabul staff member Ezatullah Adib was sent to Kabul to act as a third party monitor of the training. In his report he noted that the trainings were implemented correctly and covered:

- Random work
- Sampling Point direction
- Household selection
- Contact sheets
- Demographic Section
- GPS and Photos
- Interview Guide
- Other related forms (such as, sampling point direction

While in Khost he also worked with the supervisor and validators to supervise fourteen sampling points across four districts. No issues were reported from training or during field.

Province: Kunar

Training in Kunar took place September 26-27. No major issues were reported during training or fieldwork.

Province: Kunduz

The training in Kunduz took place October 13-14. As the interviewing and supervising team was completely new to this survey, additional training was and supervision was provided to the team. The training was attended by ACSOR Kabul staff member Azzizullah. He reported that the training was implemented correctly and there were no issues with training.

Following the training, an ACSOR interviewer conducted a sampling point without meeting with the validator. As this broke protocol, field was stopped and an additional training was held on October 22nd and 23rd. Additionally, one interviewer selected respondents using the correct methodology but brought all selected respondents to a central location to conduct the interviews individually. This was discovered by the MISTI validation team and the interviewer was subsequently removed from work on the MISTI project. All data from this interviewer was removed from the final data set.

Violence was also an issue during the Kunduz field period as Taliban attacks and military attacks continued to take place in the Imam Sahib district and field was repeatedly delayed.

Province: Logar

Training in Logar took place September 29-30. No major issues were reported during training or fieldwork.

Province: Nimroz

Training in Nimroz took place October 20-21. No major issues were reported during training or fieldwork.

Province: Paktia

Training in Paktia took place September 28-29. No major issues were reported during training or fieldwork.

Province: Paktika

Training in Paktika took place September 27-28. No major issues were reported during training or fieldwork.

Province: Samangan

Training in Samangan took place September 26-27. No major issues were reported during training or fieldwork.

Province: Uruzgan

Training in Uruzgan took place October 20-21. No major issues were reported during training or fieldwork.

Province: Wardak

Training in Wardak took place September 26-27. No major issues were reported during training or fieldwork.

Province: Zabul

Training in Zabul took place September 29-30. No major issues were reported during training or fieldwork.

IV. QUALITY CONTROL

4.1 FIELD TEAM COMPOSITION

For the MISTI Wave 5 project, ACSOR used 21 supervisors and additional assistant supervisors to oversee field work in 21 provinces. AYC used 25 supervisors to oversee fieldwork in 26 districts where they conducted fieldwork. A description of the field team composition for both ACSOR and AYC is summarized in the following two tables:

Table 7: Description of Field Team (ACSOR)

	Male	Female	Total
Number of female/male interviewers	566	347	913
Number of interviewers previously used in MISTI project	554	343	897
Number of interviewers new to a MISTI project	12	4	16

Table 8: Description of Field Team (AYC)

	Male	Female	Total
Number of female/male interviewers	184	0	184
Number of interviewers previously used in MISTI fieldwork	71	0	71
Number of interviewers new to MISTI fieldwork	113	0	113

4.2 FIELD LEVEL QUALITY CONTROL

The quality of the data is assured during the field period by the following control procedures applied in various stages:

1. After the delivery of the questionnaires from field, the completed questionnaires were checked for proper administration as well as proper household and respondent selection.
2. Supervisors and assistant supervisors observed interviewers' work during field.

- When there was no opportunity for direct supervision, a supervisor and/or assistant supervisor revisited selected houses after the completion of interviews or called the respondent, if there was a working telephone number provided in the questionnaire. The issues verified during in person back-checks were proper household and respondent selection, as well as the correct recording of answers to three randomly selected questions from the main body of the questionnaire.

At the end of the three procedures, 26% of the completed questionnaires were controlled by ACSOR and AYC supervisory staff (n=10,559); using the following methods:

- Direct supervision during interview (14.6%)
- Back-checked in person by supervisor (81.1%)
- Back-check in person or by telephone by supervisory team (4.2%)

Table 9 summarizes the interviews which were quality controlled in the field by district, broken down by the method through which they were back checked:

Table 9: Back Checks by District

District (Code and Name)	Direct supervision during interview	Back-check in person by supervisor	Back-check from the central office	Total Back Checked	Percent Back Checked
Sayyidabad	37	98	0	135	32%
Chak-e Wardak	21	109	0	130	37%
Nerkh	34	106	0	140	33%
Jalrayz	23	80	0	103	23%
Maidan Shahr	20	40	0	60	33%
Baraki Barak	0	305	1	306	120%
Muhammad Aghah	29	76	0	105	29%
Khoshi	9	22	0	31	9%
Qarah Bagh (1)	27	91	0	118	27%
Andar	0	0	0	0	0%
Malistan	12	29	0	41	21%
Gelan	16	48	0	64	25%
Muqer	19	49	0	68	27%
Deh Yak	15	63	0	78	30%
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu)	9	39	0	48	25%
Khwajah Omari	15	42	0	57	22%
Sharan	12	35	0	47	24%
Yosuf Khel	15	39	0	54	29%
Zurmat	0	182	0	182	132%

District (Code and Name)	Direct supervision during interview	Back-check in person by supervisor	Back-check from the central office	Total Back Checked	Percent Back Checked
Sayyid Karam	9	41	0	50	26%
Jaji	6	50	0	56	28%
Lajah-Ahmad Khel	16	53	0	69	28%
Dzadran	0	237	0	237	296%
Ahmadabad	12	43	0	55	30%
Shwak (Garda Serai)	9	81	0	90	64%
Tanai	11	58	0	69	27%
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)	10	61	0	71	29%
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)	24	89	0	113	25%
Nadir Shah Kot	6	45	0	51	27%
Gurbuz	12	51	0	63	25%
Jaji Maidan	15	49	0	64	25%
Bak	15	51	0	66	26%
Shamul (Dzadran)	9	56	0	65	26%
Khas Kunar	21	56	0	77	16%
Sar Kani	19	50	0	69	27%
Marawarah	0	40	0	40	14%
Pul-e Khumri	24	86	0	110	25%
Baghlani Jadid	30	118	0	148	36%
Imam Sahib	12	121	73	206	60%
Kunduz	3	198	0	201	57%
Khanabad	13	165	110	288	106%
Archi	64	62	66	192	152%
Chahar Darah	43	114	73	230	70%
Qal'ah-ye Zal	0	39	0	39	20%
Aliabad	7	64	0	71	15%
Aybak	6	38	0	44	23%
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in	15	34	0	49	26%
Ruy Do Ab	12	29	0	41	21%
Hazrat-e Sultan	18	42	0	60	23%
Fayroz Nakhchir	15	47	0	62	35%
Mazar-e Sharif	3	53	0	56	30%
Balkh	12	52	0	64	25%
Sholgarah	3	48	0	51	27%
Chimtal	0	56	0	56	30%
Chahar Bolak	0	42	0	42	21%
Shibirghan	18	45	0	63	25%
Faizabad (2)	12	53	0	65	37%

District (Code and Name)	Direct supervision during interview	Back-check in person by supervisor	Back-check from the central office	Total Back Checked	Percent Back Checked
Aqcha	15	39	0	54	29%
Khwajah Do Koh	15	40	0	55	30%
Qush Tepah	0	192	0	192	400%
Qadis	9	15	51	75	16%
Qal'ah-ye Now	4	0	23	27	13%
Muqur	20	98	0	118	28%
Injil	6	32	0	38	19%
Shindand	17	175	0	192	52%
Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)	12	70	0	82	17%
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	18	79	0	97	21%
Pashtun Zarghun	21	93	0	114	26%
Kohsan	12	38	0	50	26%
Adraskan	15	45	0	60	24%
Farah	15	34	0	49	26%
Bala Boluk	27	85	0	112	25%
Pusht-e Rod	21	59	0	80	25%
Khak-e-Safayd	12	59	0	71	42%
Lash-e Juwayn	13	31	0	44	24%
Zaranj	11	99	0	110	25%
Kang	0	69	30	99	33%
Nad 'Ali	24	139	0	163	42%
Nahr-e Saraj	24	135	0	159	40%
Garmser	24	119	0	143	35%
Kajaki	3	258	0	261	188%
Lashkar Gah	27	122	0	149	43%
Sangin	0	342	0	342	157%
Musa Qal'ah	0	262	0	262	88%
Spin Boldak	15	45	0	60	34%
Panjwa'i	20	85	0	105	23%
Zharay	18	85	0	103	23%
Arghandab (1)	18	84	0	102	23%
Maiwand	0	117	0	117	95%
Shah Wali Kot	0	121	0	121	104%
Daman	18	95	0	113	25%
Argistan	16	125	0	141	144%
Shah Joy	30	80	0	110	25%
Qalat	40	111	0	151	37%

District (Code and Name)	Direct supervision during interview	Back-check in person by supervisor	Back-check from the central office	Total Back Checked	Percent Back Checked
Tarnak wa Jaldak	0	211	0	211	61%
Tarin Kot	30	82	0	112	26%
Chorah	27	88	0	115	26%
Khas Uruzgan	26	40	0	66	38%
Shahid-e Hasas	9	43	0	52	28%
Deh Rawud	27	88	0	115	26%
Chaghcharan	6	6	20	32	9%
Shahrak	9	30	0	39	14%
Do Lainah	9	14	0	23	11%
Dand	12	83	0	95	21%
Takhtapol	9	50	0	59	33%
Lajah-Mangal	12	44	0	56	21%
Mirzaka	1546	8566	447	10559	35%
Total	1546	8566	447	10559	26%

4.3 INDEPENDENT FIELD VALIDATION

As an additional layer of quality control, in Wave 2 the MISTI client team developed an independent team to validate the field work throughout the field period. This process was similarly repeated throughout the Wave 3, Wave 4 and Wave 5 field periods. This team consisted of independent, third party monitors who randomly selected sample points for validations. The independent field monitors communicated with the ACSOR field supervisors to determine when and where interviews were to take place. Without informing the ACSOR team, the monitor would randomly select a sample point for validation. The interviewer would be notified by 0700 on the day they were planning to visit a location for interviewing that a monitor would be observing their work that day. The monitor and the interviewer would then arrange to meet within that sample point prior to the start of the first household selection. The monitor would validate whether:

- 1) Interviews are being conducted in the correct location
- 2) Random walk procedures were being followed as per the directions given during training
- 3) In some instances, validators were also able to directly observe some interviews to ensure proper interviewing protocols were being followed

Appendix 4 contains the Wave 5 Validation Protocols including a complete a list of differences in the Wave 2, Wave 3, 4 and 5 validation process, the training instructions used to inform the field teams of the process and the validation form used by the monitors in the field.

The following list shows the 724 sample points which were conducted by ACSOR interviewers and successfully validated by the independent validation team:

Table 10: Validated ACSOR Sample Points

ACSOR Sample Points Validated by MISTI			
4003: ADAM KHAIL	7149: PATAK	17205: DAHQAN QESHQAQ	27396: SANGIN
4007: MAKHDOM	7187: KHALILAN	17208: NOW ABAD ASYAB DAHI MULLAH	27397: TOGHI
4011: QOULAK	7197: KELKEN KHOLA	17209: IMAM SAHIB	27399: SAR KAILA KALAY
4013: KODI BAHADOR	7210: ALBIK SHAHI	17211: BAISH KAPA ARABIA	27402: SAR GHAR GAY
4015: GIRDAB	7237: TOOR ACHENA	17213: WARTAGAN TEPA	27403: ABDULLAH KALAY
4029: OMAR ZAI	7241: DOKANHA-I SHABAK	17215: TURANI	27408: NAWI DASHTYAN
4031: TO POUR	7247: GUL KHAN	17219: BANK SARI	27410: SHAKAR SHAILA
4033: BADAM TO	7271: ALI JAN KHAIL	17221: HALQA KOL (1)	27411: CHOUGHAK (1)
4039: ALI SHAH	7275: HAKI KHANWAL	17223: BAZAR BASOS	27413: PAN KALA SHAMALY
4045: LANDA KHAIL	7283: SARY KALA	17225: BUTA KASHAN	27415: PAN KALAY JUNOBI
4047: DAR BAND	7288: KHARSHI	17229: DURMAN UZBEKA	27421: BAZAR SANGIN
4051: ZOYA	7291: NAIKE KHAIL	17231: DURMAN BAHAR	27423: AHMAD ZAI
4053: BAYANAN	7294: MANZE	17234: ORTA BUZ	27428: PAYGHARAKAY
4059: SEWAK	7295: BABAKAR KHAIL KALA	17235: GUL TEPA	27435: JAN KOTE ZAI
4137: ZAMAN KHAIL	7297: BATOR KHAIL	17237: KAILA CHAI	27437: NAKOR ZAI
4147: ZEBULDAGH	7299: SORKAY	17241: QALAM GUZAR NASIRI	27439: KUSHTA MULLA ZAYE
4151: BADEN KHAIL	7301: KHAROTE	17243: SHAL BAFAI QARAWOOL	27441: FAIROZI
4161: SHAH KABUL KALAN	7306: GHABARGAY	17245: NAQELEN CHAR SANGI	27445: NAIM SHAIR
4163: DAHI MUSLIM	7308: BAR KOSH	17248: GUM KOLANJUM CHAL HAJI GHULAM QADER	27447: RAIGI
4173: TATEMOR	7309: MARZAK	17249: HAJI RASUL BAHAI	27449: POTAY
4180: JAR QOUL	8001: ZA WALI	17253: CHAR-SARI	27451: LWAR MALAZI
4191: KHOWJA GAN BALA	8003: KOTOWAL	17257: MULLAH-FATEH	27453: KSHATTA/MALAZAY
4203: DURANI	8005: KHOWJA DOR KHAIL	17259: KHAN ABAD	27455: CHAR DIH
4221: ASANG BALA	8007: NAW ABAD AMBAR KHAIL	17263: NOW ABAD BAND-BARQ	27457: BOSTAN QALA

ACSOR Sample Points Validated by MISTI

4227: PATAL KHAIL	8009: CHAKAN	17265: KHOWJA-PESTA	27459: PANI ZAI
4229: KHWAJA KOTGAY	8011: ALMUNIR KHAIL	17267: NEKPA-I-SUFLA	27461: BANOZA'I
4240: HAIDAR KHAIL	8013: MOHAMMAD KHAIL	17269: NEKPA-I-ULYA	28007: MIYAN JOWI
4259: ZAIN KHAN KHAIL	8015: NIYAZI	17276: NAIK-PAYE-HULYA	28013: LANGAR
4262: AMAN KHAIL	8017: DALWA	17278: NAWABAD	28017: DAHI KHUSHKE
4265: KADI (1)	8021: CHAHAR DIH KUHNA	17290: LAR KHABI	28023: MIR ABKHORAN
4267: HAMZAKHAIL	8023: MADAD KHAIL	17292: KOHNA QAL'A	28025: CHAR QOULBA HULYA
4276: BOLAND KASH	8027: SRA KALA	17293: MAHFELI-CHAR-TOOT	28033: JELAWAR
4293: GOGERD SUFLA	8035: MULLAH KHIL	17295: HUSAYN KHEL	28035: SHAIKH CHALA HULYA
5001: RUSTAMKHEL	8039: MAJBOR KHAIL	17297: SAID-AMIR-JAN	28039: MAZREHA HABAS
5004: JABAR	8045: MULLAH MASAUD KALAY	17300: JANAT-BAGH	28041: CHANGAL
5008: QALA ZAIYAUDIN	8047: MIRZA KHAIL	17304: QARAGHEZ-I-BALA	28047: TABEN
5012: PADKHAB ROGHANI BALA DAH	8049: MARKAZ -I- WALUSWALLY	17309: ESHAN TOB	28059: KHOWJA MALIK HULYA
5019: GUL MOHAMMAD KHAN SARAYAK	8051: GORI KHAIL	17311: LAGHMANI-ZARD KHMAR	28065: MARANJAN
5042: QALA NOOR (1)	8053: MUAF KHAIL	17317: MARKAZ-LALA KI	28088: SANDAR ZAY
5045: QALA ABADULLAH	8055: MIR DAD KHAIL	17319: SHAIKH-ALI	28089: TAHSILDAR KALA
5054: LACHI KHAIL	8057: MISAT	17340: HATMANZAI ALCHAIN	28091: KHESHTA
5061: QAL'EH-YE NAZER	8059: MISAT SAHIB KHAIL	17359: NOW ABAD IMAM BOUKHARI	28094: SAR DARRAH
5063: SANGANAY	9001: BARI KALAY	17361: MIR HAMZA	28095: PAYENDI KALAY
5065: ART	9045: MIR JAN KALAY	17363: QESHLAQ FAIZULLAH BAI ALCHIN	28097: DE BABULI KALAY
5067: AWTAK	9066: KONDE KALAY	17371: OMAR KHAIL KARIM KHAIL	28099: QARYEH-I-KUGHI
5069: BAZAR NOW SHAHR MARKAZ WOLLUSWALY KHUSHI	9074: BORI BAR KALAY	17373: QALACHA ATMANZI	28105: NAWI DAHI (1)
5071: DAHI BALA TAPA	9077: SHAH WALI KHAN	17375: ARAB CHAM TEPA	28115: GHAYBI QALACHA
5073: MEYANA DAHI KHUSHI PAYENDA	9081: JAJI MAYDAN	17377: GHARMA KAMAR	28123: MOHAMMAD'ALI

ACSOR Sample Points Validated by MISTI

KHAIL			KALACHA
5076: QALA RAYESAN	9083: SEWAKAY	17379: MADRASA ARAB-HA	28129: PANGAY
5078: KHOSHI	9085: MENJO KALAY	17381: WAZIRI	28136: HAKIM KALAY
5079: BABA AWLIYA SAHIB	9087: ZHAY KALAY	17383: QALACHAH BAIN SEA AB LARKHABI	28141: ARHAT KALAY
5081: FATEH KHAIL	9089: MUGHOL KHAIL	17385: KOLLABI	28143: SAMUL ZAY
5084: GUL MOHAMMAD KHAIL	9091: ALI SANGI	17387: MADRASA LARKHABI	28145: MALAKHI GHUNDI
5085: KARAIZ AZIZ SULIMAN KHAIL KALAY	9093: GHAZA GHONDI	17389: LARKHABI	28147: QALACHA
5091: QARYA SHAIR AGHA YA SHAIR DAN KHAIL	9095: HATTA KHAIL	17391: TARBOZ GOZAR PAYEN	28150: SAYYIDAN KALAY
5103: PAYENDA KHAIL	9097: SOR KALAY	17393: TARBOZ GUZAR BALA	28262: SALAWAT HULYA
5113: TAJ KHAN QALA	9099: SAMI KALAY	17395: QALA-E-ZAL	28270: LOLARA
5121: KOCHAYANO KALAY	9101: HESSAR KALAY	17397: KHUTAB	28271: ARMADA
5123: NARI KOT	9103: CHANGI (1)	17400: OLAM QESHQAQ	28289: RIGU HULYA
5141: MALIK QA HAR	9105: SHAHIM KALAY	17401: SALEH ABAD BALA	28293: ABDUL RAUF KALACHA
5143: DAHI MOHAMMAD AGHA	9107: SARA PAILA	17403: SALEH ABAD PAYEN	28295: NAKHUNI
5147: MUGHUL KHAIL	9109: STER KALAY	17405: WAKAIL AKHTAR MOHAMMAD	28297: ZANGABAD
5155: NAZIR KALA	9111: SPEN KALAY	17407: WARTA BUZ BALA	28299: ZALA DAHI
5159: SIYA BINI QALA	9113: ABAS KHAIL MARKAZ WOLLUSWALY	17409: WARTA BUZ PAYEN	28301: SAMI ZAYI
5165: DAG QALA	9115: HASSAN KHAIL	17411: ARAB HA	28303: FATTIHULLAH
5171: NOW ABAD POUL RAJAN	9117: SHAMSHAI	17413: CHAR GUL	28305: HAJI RAHMATULLAH
5173: SARDAR KHAIL	9119: LANDA ROGHE	17415: SHOR ARAQ	28307: YARU KALAY
5180: QALA NAZIR BABA	9121: ARSANA	17417: JOI ARSARI	28323: BILANDI
6001: ANDAR	9123: MAQBEL (2)	17419: SAKHSA KOL	28331: MANSOR ABAD
6003: MARKAZ MIRI	9125: SARO KALAY (2)	23012: JAEK HA KHOJA PESTA	28333: LUR KALAY
6005: GANDIR	9127: ALI WAT	23017: JAKNA	28335: MIANZKAL
6007: ABDULRAHIM	9129: DARKOTAE	23041: MIRAN ZAI ZOZANI	28338: SARA AW
6009: KAJERAH	9131: BARAN KHAIL	23062: MUQUR	28339: HAJI QAYOUM KALACHA
6011: GADLY MULLAH MOHAMMAD	9133: CHANDAR KHAIL	23064: AZIZAN	28341: YARDAD KALAY

ACSOR Sample Points Validated by MISTI

6013: KHAIR WAL	9135: DAWOL KALAY	23068: DAHAN BABALAY OMER ZAI	28344: BABA SAHIB KARIZ
6015: ASHTON	9137: MOHAMMAD HASSAN	23071: QADIS	28345: KARIZ QAL'A
6017: CHAR DEWAL	9139: SAMAWAT	23083: KHODAI MADIYAN KHOD AMADA	28422: ACHEKZAI SHARQI
6019: NARMI SUFLA	9141: SETRA KALAY	23085: AWLAD MIRZA	28428: MULLHYAN
6021: MOHASH	9143: SONI SORKH	23087: HAMAI KHAN SUFLA	28429: HAJI NASERULLAH KHAN
6023: JAMAL	9145: DAR NAMI	23089: QAIB ALI	28433: KOTA ZAI
6025: MATEYAN	9147: AR KHAIL	23091: ZAD MURAD	28443: MUSSA KHAN
6027: LA'LIWAL	9149: DEGAN	23093: CHARAYE AB DOUL QAYOM	28459: MAHAJEREN
6029: KANSEF	9151: KOCHAR KHAIL	23095: QOULAR HA	28467: ABDUL HAKIM KALACHA
6031: YARO BABA	9153: DOSARAKA MELAN	23097: KAR KEYA	28470: HAJI NADER KALAY
6033: NOORI	9155: DAROI KHAIL	23099: PAI LOCHA HA	28483: ACHEKZAI GHARBI
6035: SARDI	9157: BOLAND WAKAIL	23101: KHOJA CHAHAROM	28489: ABDURRAHMANKHAN
6037: IBRAHIM KHAIL CHAMBAR	9159: KAPARAY	23105: QAR CHAQE	28492: ZAKRI SHARIF
6039: GADA KHAIL	9161: NADIR SHAH KOT	23107: QARCHAQE YA ZAD PAIWAND	28500: KOBI
6041: DAHI AHYEN	9163: LUMRA	23113: DAHI BERENJ SAR KAMAR	28502: KOCHNI KARAIZ
6043: KOHNA DAHI	9165: MUSHKEN	23131: QARYA DAHI BERENJ ASIA BAD	28503: MUNARA
6045: DAHI DOWLAT	9167: KAPRI NADER SHAH KOTT	23135: QOUL AB SHOWI	28505: PUL QASIM
6047: BAI MOHAMMAD	9169: LOWARA	23137: TABAR	28514: DISTRICT 6 SAMPLE PT 1
6049: BAID QOUL	9171: NAWI KOTT	23141: QALA-E-NAW	28515: KANDAHAR
6051: DAHI KHOSHI	9173: PAKE	23147: AB GARMA	28517: HAJI'AZIZ
6053: HAIDERA	9175: BELANDWAKIL	23149: SARCHASHMA BAGHAK	28522: SUB-DISTRICT 8
6055: GADOL QAZI	9177: NAWAY KOT	23151: TAGAB KHOSH MORGH	28529: MURGHAN
6057: SEYA SANGAK	9179: LATKA	23153: KAKA BACHA	28531: DISTRICT 9 SAMPLE PT 1
6059: JAJA (2)	9181: SHAM BAWAT	23161: CHASHMA SENJED	28538: EJARAB
6061: QAL`A-I-EKHTYAR	9183: PALO SEE	23163: LAMAN	28546: HAJI MOHAMMAD
6063: JAGHATU	9185: MALWAY	23165: SHAMAL DARYA	28551: CHAWNAY
6065: DAHI KHUDA BAKHSH	9187: SOWI	24041: TURKAN SUFLA	28558: MUSHKI ZAY

ACSOR Sample Points Validated by MISTI

6067: DAHI KHOWJA	9189: WAM MEKA	24043: GARDAB	29001: QALAT
6140: WARA	9191: BURGAHATEE	24045: KARTA (3) SUFLA	29003: SINAK
6161: KHWAJA UMARI	9193: ALLAWADIN	24047: KABABYAN	29010: CHAHIL DUKHTARAN
6163: TOR MAI	9195: MALAKOT	24049: SARWESTAN (1)	29011: MOHAMMAD TAHIR
6165: DAHI NEHAL	9197: KOTKAI	24051: QAI ZAN SUFLA	29019: TURA
6167: QABIL DAL	9199: SHAMAL (SHAMUL)	24061: HODRAN	29044: SHIN GHARI
6169: KARAIZ ALI ABAD	9201: RISHKA	24065: KHOSH PASHAN	29046: DAMA
6171: KARAIZ	9203: SOR KANI	24069: PARWANA	29047: DAM KALAY
6173: DAHI QOLI	9205: GANDA KHOLY	24071: KOHSTAN MARKAZ WOLLUSWALIY	29049: KHALA
6175: GODAL QANDAHARI	9207: BOSKAI	24073: KOHSAN	29055: KHALEQDADKHAN
6177: QAL'A-I NAW	9209: ZAKARA	24075: SARDAR	29057: OMARKHEL
6179: AQASI	9211: SAWAYKOT(KHAWIKHEL)	24077: TIR PUL	29061: HAJI ABDUL MOHAMMAD
6181: QALA NOW BALA	9213: SOWY KOTT	24081: SAR KAL	29068: ZHARANDAY KALAY
6183: PAI MAST ALI	9215: CHANDARI	24085: JOWI NOW (2)	29071: QARA BAGHI
6185: NO BURJA	9217: HALWATI KORKAY	24087: QODOS ABAD	29074: MURAD KHAN KALAY
6187: GUZARI GOBI	9219: LAKI KHEL	24089: QAQLA SHAIR	29077: KHWAJAK
6189: KHAKE KHAYR	9221: MALAWI	24093: AHMAD ABAD	29083: HAJI ROZI WA MULLAH NASIR
6191: QOULA	9223: DOWA MENDI MARKAZ WOLLUSWALY	24097: KULATA JAGHTI	29094: KALA KHEL
6193: NAWABADI KAREZAK	9225: SAYID KHAIL	24171: GUL WAFI	29098: MULLAH BAHLUL KHORANA
6195: QALA MULLAH GHAZI	9227: KHOWJA KOTT	24173: KHALICHAN	29119: FIROZ KHAN
6197: QALA AZIZ	9229: RAITE KALAY	24175: NAGAHAN	29129: GAJOY
6199: KARAIZAK	9255: WALAM KALAY	24181: GOWA CHAN	29131: MOHAMMAD ALI KALAY
6271: QARABAGH	16066: AHMADI KHAIL	24183: MAHLA DASHT	29136: SHAH HUSSAIN KHEL
6273: MIRAK	17007: MARKAZ-ALI ABAD	24185: URDO BAGH	29140: LALA SHAHID
6275: LAYEGH	17014: SAID AHMAD	24193: QALA MIR GUL	29149: SHAHI KALAY
6277: CHERGI	17055: MADRASA (3)	24203: BAGH BAN HA	29187: SANGAR QARYA
6279: DAFTANI GAD WAL	17071: HAJI IMAM BANI QARLOGH	24209: SHOKUR KHANI MARKAZ WOLLUSWALY	30026: GHOR JE ZAYE
6281: BAR NOWROZ	17073: SHAHBAK QARLOGH	24213: BOLAND AW	30029: DIL GHANA

ACSOR Sample Points Validated by MISTI

KHAIL			
6283: BUKHCHU	17075: ARCHI	24215: KORD HULYA	30031: JOWI KHUSHK
6285: NOW ABAD (1)	17077: MASJED MULLAH SHAISTA MIR	24217: NASHIN BALA DAHI	30062: BAHRAM ZAZAI
6287: QALA-I-KALBI	17079: DASHT-E-ARCHI	24221: TAL	30079: LANDIYANA HULYA
6289: MAIDANAK	17081: WAKIL QAUM	24235: PEACHGHI	30087: BAGHAL (2)
6291: MALOK PAYEN	17084: ALI KHAN KOOM SULIMAN	24237: CHAKA	30094: TOGHE
6293: KHUNIAN	17085: MUHAMMAD GUL	24349: ALI ABAD	30096: KAKRAK
6295: DOWLAT KHAN	17087: WAKIL MIRZA HAJI JUMA KHAN	24352: ANJERAK	30099: SHAR KOHNNA
6297: PEROGAN	17089: SHAIKH RABAD	24354: BABAK ZAIYE	30105: TOOR NASER
6299: KO JAWAK	17091: DUN QESHLAQ	24355: CHAR QALA	30117: JOWI NOW
6301: DASHTAK	17093: JAMAH AKHONDZADA	24357: DARWAJE BALA	30130: OMRAN ZAI
6303: NOW DAHI (4)	17095: JAMAH KOUL	24359: EMARAT PAYEN	30137: JATAK
6305: BOLAND DAHI JANGALAK	17097: QARLOGH QOCHAIN	24361: HANIFAN TAJEKYA	30141: ANA KALAY
6307: JAHAN BAHDER	17099: JALAM KHOWR DOWM	24363: KALA SHOR HULYA	30143: KHAS URUZGAN
6309: KATA DAHI (2)	17101: DAHAN AQ SAI HAJI MOSSA KAKAR	24365: KARAIZ GARJE	30145: SHPETEH PAKHEH
6313: IBRAHIM KHEL	17103: WAZIR KHAN	24367: KARAIZ ZANJER	30147: GARM AB
6317: MORYANI	17106: ARBAB SHAIR ALI BAJAWRI	24369: KHAM MUZAFAR	30149: SHAIKHA SUFLA
6319: SAR NAKHI	17107: QOUM CHAGHLI MULLAH JAFFAR	24371: KOLA JONOBI YA AKBAR	30151: LOWAR KALAY
6327: BAHRAM	17109: DOWN QESHLAQ	24377: MAHROOF KHAIL	30153: NAWYAN
6329: GHE GHATO PAYEN	17115: TALGUZAR	25222: FARAH ROAD	30155: NAKROZ
6331: KHADOR	17119: DURMAN	25232: KAL KALA	30161: MYANA (2)
6333: BAKRI	17123: NAHAR SUFI	25252: KUSHAK BALA	30171: KUSHTA HOSHI
6335: DOLANA	17125: CHAR DARAH	26061: QADER KHAN	30173: KAKARAK
6337: KHARAIL	17127: DOBANDI	27005: KHAIR MOHAMMAD LAHL	30175: MEYAN TAK
7001: SALAM KHAIL (2)	17129: NAQELIN ALUKUZAI	27007: HAJI ASADULLHA WA DOST M.KHAN	30179: BOUT AB
7004: SHEKH-MASUR	17131: DURABAD HAJI ABDUL GHAFAR KHAZANADAR	27011: HAJI NIHMATULLAH	30183: CHENAR
7005: EISSA KHAIL	17133: MARKAZI WOLLUSWALI	27015: JANGALI HAJI SHARAFUDDIN	30185: KOCHONAI ZANGAL
7007: KAMRAN KHAIL	17140: SAJANI HULYA	27017: NAQELEN WAKIL MASOOM MASJEDAK	30187: BAGHALAK

ACSOR Sample Points Validated by MISTI

7010: MALIK JALALUDDIN	17141: HAI KHANUM	27031: KHARKO	30191: SAKHAR
7011: SOR SANG	17145: QARAH KHANI	27051: HERTE	30197: JANGAL
7013: BAR FEROUZ KHAIL	17147: SAJANI SUFLA	27053: SHAD MIR	30213: QALA SORKH
7015: GOD MANGAL KALA	17149: QOSH TAPA (1)	27055: LAKRAI (1)	30243: ESPEN KECHA
7019: MADO KHAIL	17153: KHARUTI	27059: GHULAM HAIDAR KHAN (3)	30252: SEYA CHAWK KARAIZ
7042: GHORAKAY KHOLA	17155: PALOW KAMAR	27071: KAJAKI HULYA	31003: DAHAN AKHTA KHANA
7071: ALI KHAIL HULYA	17157: PALAW KAMAR	27073: LWAR KAJAKI	31005: SEYA SANG (2)
7073: BARA SHEGA	17161: QARA YATIM (1)	27077: KASHMASH KHAN	31007: MAIYANA BAM
7075: BARAKAT KHAIL	17163: QARA YATIM (2)	27079: ALAKADARI-KADZHAKI	31009: MAIYAN JEE
7077: CHORIYAN	17169: QAZAQ TEPA	27083: SHAHBAZ KHAIL	31011: JAR MATO BALA
7079: GHANZI AHMAD KHAIL	17171: MANG TEPA	27085: KAJAKI YA MAKTAB	31017: AKHTA KHANA
7081: KHOWANZE KHAIL	17173: WARTA BALAQI BALA	27089: TARWAY OWBO	31019: JAR CHOQOUR
7083: KOZ KOTAGI	17176: BASOS PAYEN	27092: ABDAR	31043: MOHAMMAD DOST
7085: KOZA SHEGA	17177: QOSH TAPA (2)	27093: PAI SANGI	31045: JAR DIH SORKH
7087: ALI KHEL (JAJI)	17181: ISMA'IL QESHLAQ	27095: BE BANK	31047: RAKHNA
7089: KHAR SHATAL	17183: TOUGH AHLAM	27099: CHAHARBAGH	31049: QESHLAQ HAJI HAKIM
7091: ZADRANO KALAY	17185: KANDAHARI-HAI-SHAIRKHAN BANDAR	27103: AZAN	31081: SAR CHASHMA
7093: GUL GHONDI	17187: QARA KUTARMA	27105: SHAIR AHMAD	31089: SHORABAK
7095: KOTAKE	17189: MOMEN ABAD	27107: KAJAKI SUFLA YA SHAMALY	31095: FALAZAK
7097: AHMAD KHAIL SPEN GHAR	17191: ESMAIL QESHLAQ	27111: KAREZ DIH BABA	31097: ZAR NOW
7099: MIR KHAIL	17193: DEHQAN QESHLAQ	27113: KAREZE SARCHASHMA	31099: SABSATI
7119: AHMAD KHAIL KALAY	17197: BARZANGI AFGHANI	27115: RAWSHAN ABAD	31105: PALANGAN
7140: SULIMAN KHAIL	17199: AB FOROSHAN BALA	27117: MAMON ZAE	31109: JAAM
7143: INCH	17201: EMAM SAHEB	27245: SHARAGEH	31117: SEYA SANG
7145: MUNTAKA	17203: TOUT MAZAR KAFAR KUNJ	27250: LOWY KOBAR	31119: BAIDAN

4.4 POST FIELD DATA PROCESSING

Each district in the MISTI Wave 5 project was processed as an independent sample; the procedures which follow were replicated for all 107 districts contained in the final, merged data set.

After field work was completed, ACSOR's field management team received the questionnaires from interviews at ACSOR's main office in Kabul. Each sample point was delivered in an envelope containing all questionnaires and the contact sheet for that sample point, commonly referred to as a "pack." Each pack of interviews was sorted by location and the questionnaires were then numbered sequentially.

In order to properly categorize responses from open ended questions, ACSOR employs a trained team of "coders" who are taught how to translate open ended responses to standard codes for data entry. This team of coders, under the supervision of ACSOR project managers, then went through each open ended question and, using a common typology list, assigned each open ended response with a numeric code. When new responses were found within questionnaires, the project manager reviewed the response to ensure it was mutually exclusive to all previous responses and then created a new code for all coders to begin using for all instances of that response.

After all questionnaires were coded, a team of keypunchers entered the data from all questionnaires into a computerized format which can be read by common analytical software such as SPSS. This process is completed on-site at ACSOR's Kabul headquarters to protect the data and closely control the quality of the data entry process. During this process, the keypunching team utilized logic checks and verified any errors inadvertently committed by interviewers. The keypunchers use a proprietary data entry program, written specifically for ACSOR to use in Afghanistan, which simplifies processing, standardizes data formatting and ultimately decreases error rates.

In order to ensure that keypunching is accurate, 10% of the sample packs were re-punched by a different keypuncher and the results of the second effort were compared to the original entries. When differences were found, the original questionnaire was consulted to determine where the error occurred and the appropriate edit was made to the final data set.

4.5 POST PROCESSING QUALITY REVIEWS

After the data set was processed into a usable, computerized format, experienced staff members from ACSOR's IT department began the initial review of the data. The initial review focused primarily on the management section of the survey. The goal of this phase is to ensure that all of the interviews match the anticipated management characteristics found in the achieved sample plan for that district. Throughout this phase, logic tests are enacted on the data to ensure that each interview is categorized as expected within the data set. For example, if a respondent reported at the onset of a survey that they farm land but later did not cite farming

as their primary occupation, the interview was flagged for further review. When discrepancies such as this were found, the original questionnaire was located to determine if the error was a result of a keypunching error and, if so, the error is repaired in the data set.

After ACSOR's IT team completes their review, each data set was sent to an additional reviewer outside of Afghanistan for the next phase of review. Throughout this phase, further logic tests are employed throughout the management, substantive and demographic sections of the data set. When errors were found, the project management team at ACSOR was notified and consulted the original questionnaires to identify and, if appropriate, repair the source of the error in the data set. It is important to note that not all responses which fail a logic test are invalid and many are not changed in the final data set. There are often a number of legitimate reasons why a respondent may give an illogical set of responses and, as a result, not all illogical responses are deemed invalid. Using the farming example provided above, it could be the case that a respondent who says that they farm land may only do so in the summer and may legitimately provide a different primary occupation when asked this question in winter months than they would during summer months.

4.6 HUNTER™ QUALITY TESTS

Following the data cleaning process and logic checks of the dataset, ACSOR-Surveys uses a proprietary program called Hunter that searches for additional patterns and duplicates that may indicate that an interview was not properly conducted by an interviewer.

The Hunter program includes four tests:

1. Time and Date test – compares interviews for overlapping times, grouped by interviewer. Interviews with overlapping times are flagged for review and reported times are compared in the original questionnaires.
2. Equality test – compares interviews for similarities, grouped by interviewer, within sampling point, province, or any other variable.
3. Non-Response test – determines the percentage of 'Don't Knows' for each interviewer's cases.
4. Duplicates test – compares cases across all interviewers and respondents to check for similarity rates. This test will flag any pair of interviews that are suspiciously similar to each other.

Any interview that fails on any of the Hunter quality control tests is pulled out for additional scrutiny. If the interview does not pass subsequent evaluation steps, it is removed from the final database before delivery. Table 11 summarizes the deletions that were made as a result of the aforementioned quality tests:

Table 11: Hunter Removals by District, by Reason for Removal

Province	District	Cases in Original Data Set	Field Provider	Time & Date	Equality	Non-Response	Duplicates	Total Removed	Cases in Final Data Set
Badghis	Muqur	480	ACSOR				3	3	477
Badghis	Qadis	480	ACSOR				29	29	451
Baghlan	Baghlan-e Jadid	352	ACSOR				1	1	351
Baghlan	Baghlan-e Jadid	128	AYC	1		2		3	125
Baghlan	Pul-e Khmri	496	ACSOR				7	7	489
Balkh	Balkh	320	ACSOR					0	320
Balkh	Chahar Bolak	320	ACSOR				6	6	314
Balkh	Chimtal	320	ACSOR				2	2	318
Balkh	Mazar-e Sharif	272	ACSOR					0	272
Balkh	Sholgarah	320	ACSOR				7	7	313
Farah	Bala Boluk	416	ACSOR					0	416
Farah	Khak-e Safayd	240	ACSOR					0	240
Farah	Pusht-e Rod	320	ACSOR					0	320
Ghazni	Andar	480	AYC					0	480
Ghazni	Deh Yak	240	ACSOR				9	9	231
Ghazni	Gelan	352	ACSOR				4	4	348
Ghazni	Jaghata	320	ACSOR				4	4	316
Ghazni	Khwajah Omari	256	ACSOR				3	3	253
Ghazni	Muqer	352	ACSOR					0	352
Ghazni	Qarah Bagh	496	ACSOR				18	18	478
Ghor	Chaghcharan	528	ACSOR				37	37	491
Ghor	Shahrak	528	ACSOR				38	38	490
Helmand	Garm Ser	480	ACSOR				15	15	465
Helmand	Kajaki	480	ACSOR				8	8	472
Helmand	Lashkar Gah	480	ACSOR				12	12	468
Helmand	Musa Qa'lah	272	ACSOR				7	7	265
Helmand	Musa Qa'lah	192	AYC	1				1	191
Helmand	Nad Ali	320	ACSOR				4	4	316
Helmand	Nahr-e Saraj	480	ACSOR				2	2	478
Helmand	Sangin	304	ACSOR				1	1	303
Helmand	Sangin	176	AYC	1				1	175
Herat	Adraskan	400	ACSOR				2	2	398
Herat	Injil	432	ACSOR				1	1	431
Herat	Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	480	ACSOR				4	4	476
Herat	Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)	432	ACSOR				1	1	431
Herat	Pashtun Zarghun	464	ACSOR				3	3	461
Herat	Shindand	320	ACSOR					0	320
Herat	Shindand	160	AYC					0	160
Jowzjan	Aqchah	240	ACSOR					0	240
Jowzjan	Faizabad	240	ACSOR					0	240
Jowzjan	Khwajah Do Koh	272	ACSOR					0	272
Jowzjan	Qush Tepah	256	AYC	5		1		6	250

Province	District	Cases in Original Data Set	Field Provider	Time & Date	Equality	Non-Response	Duplicates	Total Removed	Cases in Final Data Set
Jowzjan	Shibirghan	320	ACSOR				2	2	318
Kandahar	Arghandab	480	ACSOR				1	1	479
Kandahar	Argistan	288	ACSOR			1		1	287
Kandahar	Argistan	191	AYC					0	191
Kandahar	Daman	400	ACSOR				2	2	398
Kandahar	Dand	479	ACSOR				4	4	475
Kandahar	Maiwand	336	ACSOR					0	336
Kandahar	Panjwai	478	ACSOR				2	2	476
Kandahar	Shah Wali Kot	480	AYC	7				7	473
Kandahar	Spin Boldak	480	ACSOR				1	1	479
Kandahar	Takhtapol	320	ACSOR				8	8	312
Kandahar	Zharay	477	ACSOR				12	12	465
Khost	Bak	320	ACSOR		8	1	4	13	307
khost	Gurbuz	320	ACSOR				17	17	303
Khost	Jaji Maidan	240	ACSOR		8		6	14	226
Khost	Manduzai (Ismail Khel)	240	ACSOR				4	4	236
Khost	Nadir Shah Kot	240	ACSOR				1	1	239
Khost	Shamul (Dzadran)	320	ACSOR				9	9	311
Khost	Tanai	320	ACSOR					0	320
Khost	Terayzai (Ali Sher)	400	ACSOR					0	400
Kunar	Khas Kunar	480	ACSOR					0	480
Kunar	Marawarah	320	ACSOR					0	320
Kunar	Sar Kani	320	ACSOR				1	1	319
Kunduz	Aliabad	480	ACSOR				1	1	479
Kunduz	Archi	320	AYC	8		1	1	10	310
Kunduz	Chahar Darah	304	ACSOR				7	7	297
Kunduz	Chahar Darah	176	AYC	19				19	157
Kunduz	Imam Sahib	368	ACSOR					0	368
Kunduz	Imam Sahib	112	AYC				3	3	109
Kunduz	Khanabad	304	ACSOR		8		2	10	294
Kunduz	Khanabad	176	AYC	3				3	173
Kunduz	Kunduz (Gor Tepa)	304	ACSOR		16		6	22	282
Kunduz	Kunduz (Gor Tepa)	176	AYC	2				2	174
Kunduz	Qal'ah-ye Zal	240	ACSOR		16		4	20	220
Logar	Baraki Barak	480	AYC	6				6	474
Logar	Khoshi	240	AYC	28				28	212
Logar	Muhammad Aghah	480	ACSOR					0	480
Nimroz	Kang	320	ACSOR				4	4	316
Nimroz	Zaranj	320	ACSOR				1	1	319
Paktika	Sharan	320	ACSOR				2	2	318

Province	District	Cases in Original Data Set	Field Provider	Time & Date	Equality	Non-Response	Duplicates	Total Removed	Cases in Final Data Set
Paktika	Yosuf Khel	272	ACSOR					0	272
Paktiya	Ahmadabad	240	ACSOR				2	2	238
Paktiya	Dzadran	240	AYC	4				4	236
Paktiya	Jaji	240	ACSOR				2	2	238
Paktiya	Laja Mangel	320	ACSOR					0	320
Paktiya	Lajah Ahmad Khel	256	ACSOR				2	2	254
Paktiya	Mirzaka	240	ACSOR				7	7	233
Paktiya	Sayyid Karam	240	ACSOR				4	4	236
Paktiya	Zurmat	480	AYC	1				1	479
Samangan	Aibak	240	ACSOR					0	240
Samangan	Darah-ye Suf ePain	432	ACSOR				13	13	419
Samangan	Faryroz Nakhchir	272	ACSOR			1	3	4	268
Samangan	Hazrat eSultan	240	ACSOR			2		2	238
Samangan	Ruy Do Ab	320	ACSOR			1	1	2	318
Uruzgan	Chorah	480	ACSOR				1	1	479
Uruzgan	Deh Rawud	400	ACSOR				10	10	390
Uruzgan	Khas Uruzgan	352	ACSOR					0	352
Uruzgan	Shahid eHasas	320	ACSOR				6	6	314
Uruzgan	Tarin Kot	480	ACSOR				5	5	475
Wardak	Chak-e Wardak	480	ACSOR					0	480
Wardak	Jalrayz	320	ACSOR				1	1	319
Wardak	Maidan Shahr	480	ACSOR					0	480
Wardak	Nerkh	368	ACSOR					0	368
Wardak	Nerkh	112	AYC					0	112
Wardak	Sayyidabad	480	ACSOR					0	480
Zabul	Qalat	480	ACSOR				15	15	465
Zabul	Shah Joy	480	ACSOR				51	51	429
Zabul	Tarneek wa Jaldak	480	AYC	2				2	478
Total		38009		88	56	10	456	610	37399

V. QUESTIONNAIRE

The questionnaire was designed by the MISTI team with input from stakeholders within each program area covered by the Wave 4 assessment. Although some questions were developed specifically for a particular program, the goal of the questionnaire is to gain an overall assessment of the stability picture and factors that impact the stability situation within each district covered by the project.

The substantive portion of the questionnaire was broken down into the following modules:

1. Security and Crime (Q2a – Q7b)
2. Governance (Q8 – Q14h)
3. Service Provision and Development (Q15 – Q19b)
4. Rule of Law (Q20a – Q22c)
5. Corruption (Q23 – Q25)
6. Quality of Life (Q26 – Q30)
7. Economic Activity (Q31 – Q33)
8. Community Cohesion and Resilience (Q34a – Q39b)
9. Grievances (Q40a/b)
10. Media (Q41a – Q42b)
11. Indirect Questions (Q43a – Q50b)

The master questionnaire consisted of 36 management and quality control variables, 91 2/3 substantive questions and 19 demographic questions. The KFZ questionnaire consisted of 98 2/3 substantial questions, 6 demographic questions and 36 management and quality control questions. For the purposes of this count, each item in a battery of questions was counted as 1/3 of a variable.

The average length of time it took for an interview to be conducted was 35 minutes with the shortest interview taking 20 minutes and the longest interview taking one hour and 13 minutes.

APPENDIX 1: SAMPLE POINTS REPLACED

The following table lists all sample points which were replaced prior to fielding the project. Each village typically contained two sample points. As a result, a total of 332 individual sample points were replaced in 161 selected villages.

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacement Village
23061	23. Badghis	306	Muqur	LARA AHMAD ZAI	MUQUR
23062	23. Badghis	306	Muqur	LARA AHMAD ZAI	MUQUR
23063	23. Badghis	306	Muqur	MIRAN ZAI KULABI	AZIZAN
23064	23. Badghis	306	Muqur	MIRAN ZAI KULABI	AZIZAN
23065	23. Badghis	306	Muqur	KALARI	KALAN ZAI
23066	23. Badghis	306	Muqur	KALARI	KALAN ZAI
23067	23. Badghis	306	Muqur	BARA KHANA	DAHAN BABALAY OMER ZAI
23068	23. Badghis	306	Muqur	BARA KHANA	DAHAN BABALAY OMER ZAI
23069	23. Badghis	306	Muqur	AJRIM	ZARGAR HA
23070	23. Badghis	306	Muqur	AJRIM	ZARGAR HA
23129	23. Badghis	301	Qadis	KARAIZ HAJI IBRAHIM	TEALAK
23130	23. Badghis	301	Qadis	KARAIZ HAJI IBRAHIM	TEALAK
23131	23. Badghis	301	Qadis	GHALA CHARKH BALA	QARYA DAHI BERENJ ASIA BAD
23132	23. Badghis	301	Qadis	GHALA CHARKH BALA	QARYA DAHI BERENJ ASIA BAD
23133	23. Badghis	301	Qadis	HAGI MOHAMMAD AYOUB	JAR DO DASHT
23134	23. Badghis	301	Qadis	HAGI MOHAMMAD AYOUB	JAR DO DASHT
23135	23. Badghis	301	Qadis	GONBAD JOMA KHAN	QOUL AB SHOWI
23136	23. Badghis	301	Qadis	GONBAD JOMA KHAN	QOUL AB SHOWI
23137	23. Badghis	301	Qadis	SHAHR ARMAN	TABAR
23138	23. Badghis	301	Qadis	SHAHR ARMAN	TABAR
23139	23. Badghis	301	Qadis	GAZAK	JANGALAK YAR HUSSAIN
23140	23. Badghis	301	Qadis	GAZAK	JANGALAK YAR HUSSAIN
23165	23. Badghis	305	Qal'ah-ye Now	ARBAB AKBAR	SHAMAL DARYA
23166	23. Badghis	305	Qal'ah-ye Now	ARBAB AKBAR	SHAMAL DARYA

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacement Village
23167	23. Badghis	305	Qal'ah-ye Now	SADKA ANJERAK	MASNI
23168	23. Badghis	305	Qal'ah-ye Now	SADKA ANJERAK	MASNI
23169	23. Badghis	305	Qal'ah-ye Now	ZAT QANI	TAIMANI LAMAN
23170	23. Badghis	305	Qal'ah-ye Now	ZAT QANI	TAIMANI LAMAN
16075	16. Baghlan	224	Pul-e Khumri	NASIR YA AHMAD ZAI	DAR QAD (1)
16076	16. Baghlan	224	Pul-e Khumri	NASIR YA AHMAD ZAI	DAR QAD (1)
18151	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	FATEMA KHAIL IMAM SAHIB	ARAB MAZARI IRAN
18152	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	FATEMA KHAIL IMAM SAHIB	ARAB MAZARI IRAN
18155	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	CHASHMA GAZA SUFLA	BALOOCH JOWI SHOR
18156	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	CHASHMA GAZA SUFLA	BALOOCH JOWI SHOR
18159	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	SHAMSUDIN HULYA	KAMSANI IMAM SAHIB
18160	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	SHAMSUDIN HULYA	KAMSANI IMAM SAHIB
25263	25. Farah	324	Bala Boluk	DAHI NOW	JAYE NAJARA
25264	25. Farah	324	Bala Boluk	DAHI NOW	JAYE NAJARA
25089	25. Farah	323	Farah	RANJ BALA	KOK HULYA
25090	25. Farah	323	Farah	RANJ BALA	KOK HULYA
25267	25. Farah	324	Bala Boluk	QARYA-I-KAREZ BED	KAL QAL'EH
25268	25. Farah	324	Bala Boluk	QARYA-I-KAREZ BED	KAL QAL'EH
25269	25. Farah	324	Bala Boluk	ZAMAKI	KHWAJAJA
25270	25. Farah	324	Bala Boluk	ZAMAKI	KHWAJAJA
25145	25. Farah	331	Lash-e Juwayn	SABZ GAZI	DAMBOLY SUFLA
25146	25. Farah	331	Lash-e Juwayn	SABZ GAZI	DAMBOLY SUFLA
25149	25. Farah	331	Lash-e Juwayn	JARAK	FAIZ ABAD
25150	25. Farah	331	Lash-e Juwayn	JARAK	FAIZ ABAD
6051	6. Ghazni	78	Jaghatu (Bahram-e Shahid)	SEH QAL'A	DAHI KHOSHI
6052	6. Ghazni	78	Jaghatu (Bahram-e Shahid)	SEH QAL'A	DAHI KHOSHI
6105	6. Ghazni	75	Deh Yak	BALAYE QALA	KOHNA DAH
6106	6. Ghazni	75	Deh Yak	BALAYE QALA	KOHNA DAH

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacement Village
6107	6. Ghazni	75	Deh Yak	KANDOR	QALA BASHIR
6108	6. Ghazni	75	Deh Yak	KANDOR	QALA BASHIR
6109	6. Ghazni	75	Deh Yak	HABAD KALA	QAL'A-I- TUTAK
6110	6. Ghazni	75	Deh Yak	HABAD KALA	QAL'A-I- TUTAK
6111	6. Ghazni	75	Deh Yak	SHAHABUDDIN	QAL'A-I-AKLAY
6112	6. Ghazni	75	Deh Yak	SHAHABUDDIN	QAL'A-I-AKLAY
6113	6. Ghazni	75	Deh Yak	METAR	SAR TASAN
6114	6. Ghazni	75	Deh Yak	METAR	SAR TASAN
6157	6. Ghazni	73	Gelan	NABRO	ZABET KALAY
6158	6. Ghazni	73	Gelan	NABRO	ZABET KALAY
6159	6. Ghazni	73	Gelan	JANGER KALAY	BARA QALA
6160	6. Ghazni	73	Gelan	JANGER KALAY	BARA QALA
6193	6. Ghazni	83	Khwajah Omari	DAHI HAMZA	NAWABADI KAREZAK
6194	6. Ghazni	83	Khwajah Omari	DAHI HAMZA	NAWABADI KAREZAK
6195	6. Ghazni	83	Khwajah Omari	KOHNA QALA	QALA MULLAH GHAZI
6196	6. Ghazni	83	Khwajah Omari	KOHNA QALA	QALA MULLAH GHAZI
6197	6. Ghazni	83	Khwajah Omari	MAICHAK	QALA AZIZ
6198	6. Ghazni	83	Khwajah Omari	MAICHAK	QALA AZIZ
6199	6. Ghazni	83	Khwajah Omari	PAIYADA RA	KARAIZAK
6200	6. Ghazni	83	Khwajah Omari	PAIYADA RA	KARAIZAK
6267	6. Ghazni	74	Muqer	NELI	AHMAD KHAIL
6268	6. Ghazni	74	Muqer	NELI	AHMAD KHAIL
6269	6. Ghazni	74	Muqer	CHAKA LOGA NAI YAK	BABO KALAY
6270	6. Ghazni	74	Muqer	CHAKA LOGA NAI YAK	BABO KALAY
6333	6. Ghazni	68	Qarah Bagh	BAGI KHAIL	BAKRI
6334	6. Ghazni	68	Qarah Bagh	BAGI KHAIL	BAKRI
6335	6. Ghazni	68	Qarah Bagh	JAMAL KHAIL PAYEN	DOLANA
6336	6. Ghazni	68	Qarah Bagh	JAMAL KHAIL PAYEN	DOLANA
6337	6. Ghazni	68	Qarah Bagh	NAKHAIL JONOBI	KHARAIL
6338	6. Ghazni	68	Qarah Bagh	NAKHAIL JONOBI	KHARAIL
6339	6. Ghazni	68	Qarah Bagh	DARYA KHAIL	ASKAR KOT
6340	6. Ghazni	68	Qarah Bagh	DARYA KHAIL	ASKAR KOT

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacement Village
31053	31. Ghor	390	Do Lainah	KARAB	G HAR SAR BALAQ
31054	31. Ghor	390	Do Lainah	KARAB	G HAR SAR BALAQ
31061	31. Ghor	390	Do Lainah	CHASHMA SAFID (2)	SALIMAIN HULYA
31062	31. Ghor	390	Do Lainah	CHASHMA SAFID (2)	SALIMAIN HULYA
31063	31. Ghor	390	Do Lainah	GHAJOLAK	DAHAK
31064	31. Ghor	390	Do Lainah	GHAJOLAK	DAHAK
31071	31. Ghor	390	Do Lainah	SEYA KHAK	QALA NAQSHI
31072	31. Ghor	390	Do Lainah	SEYA KHAK	QALA NAQSHI
31079	31. Ghor	390	Do Lainah	ABOWL	SAR DAHAK MIRI
31080	31. Ghor	390	Do Lainah	ABOWL	SAR DAHAK MIRI
31115	31. Ghor	388	Shahrak	SEYA KHAK (2)	PAI KOHTAL
31116	31. Ghor	388	Shahrak	SEYA KHAK (2)	PAI KOHTAL
31119	31. Ghor	388	Shahrak	GHO HAZAR	BAIDAN
31120	31. Ghor	388	Shahrak	GHO HAZAR	BAIDAN
27067	27. Helmand	342	Garm Ser	MOHAMMAD HALAM KHAN	HAJI ABDULLAH JAN KALAY
27068	27. Helmand	342	Garm Ser	MOHAMMAD HALAM KHAN	HAJI ABDULLAH JAN KALAY
27069	27. Helmand	342	Garm Ser	SAYIDAN FAQERAN	NAQILIN
27070	27. Helmand	342	Garm Ser	SAYIDAN FAQERAN	NAQILIN
27175	27. Helmand	345	Lashkar Gah	ABDUL QOUDOS KHAN	LASHKAR GAH
27176	27. Helmand	345	Lashkar Gah	ABDUL QOUDOS KHAN	LASHKAR GAH
27177	27. Helmand	345	Lashkar Gah	SARKAR SUFLA	HAJI ABDULLAH KHAN BOLAN
27178	27. Helmand	345	Lashkar Gah	SARKAR SUFLA	HAJI ABDULLAH KHAN BOLAN
27179	27. Helmand	345	Lashkar Gah	SOR GODAR	BOLANI HAJI MULLAH BALAN
27180	27. Helmand	345	Lashkar Gah	SOR GODAR	BOLANI HAJI MULLAH BALAN
27181	27. Helmand	345	Lashkar Gah	GOKZARE SURKH	KAREZ
27182	27. Helmand	345	Lashkar Gah	GOKZARE SURKH	KAREZ
27183	27. Helmand	345	Lashkar Gah	SAHEBZADAHKHEL	HAJI NAZAR MOHAMMAD KARAIZ
27184	27. Helmand	345	Lashkar Gah	SAHEBZADAHKHEL	HAJI NAZAR MOHAMMAD

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacement Village
					KARAIZ
27319	27. Helmand	339	Nad Ali	MIR HAMZA	BALUCH HA
27320	27. Helmand	339	Nad Ali	MIR HAMZA	BALUCH HA
27321	27. Helmand	339	Nad Ali	MIR BALAND	BOLAN TOOR JAN KALAY
27322	27. Helmand	339	Nad Ali	MIR BALAND	BOLAN TOOR JAN KALAY
27323	27. Helmand	339	Nad Ali	Haji GHULAM MOHAMMAD	4 KILO METRI GUROP 6
27324	27. Helmand	339	Nad Ali	Haji GHULAM MOHAMMAD	4 KILO METRI GUROP 6
27349	27. Helmand	340	Nahr-e Saraj	KUNJAK (3)	NOW ABAD
27350	27. Helmand	340	Nahr-e Saraj	KUNJAK (3)	NOW ABAD
27353	27. Helmand	340	Nahr-e Saraj	KAKARAN SHAMALY	Haji DADULLAH KALAY
27354	27. Helmand	340	Nahr-e Saraj	KAKARAN SHAMALY	Haji DADULLAH KALAY
27363	27. Helmand	340	Nahr-e Saraj	PAS AW	AB BAZAN
27364	27. Helmand	340	Nahr-e Saraj	PAS AW	AB BAZAN
27393	27. Helmand	340	Nahr-e Saraj	TAMBA	ABDUL RAUF SHELA
27394	27. Helmand	340	Nahr-e Saraj	TAMBA	ABDUL RAUF SHELA
24085	24. Herat	318	Kohsan	KAL SORKH	JOWI NOW (2)
24086	24. Herat	318	Kohsan	KAL SORKH	JOWI NOW (2)
24097	24. Herat	318	Kohsan	KULATA PAR BUZHA	KULATA JAGHTI
24098	24. Herat	318	Kohsan	KULATA PAR BUZHA	KULATA JAGHTI
24167	24. Herat	311	Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	MOHAMMAD KARIM BAIK SUFLA	DO AB HULYA
24168	24. Herat	311	Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	MOHAMMAD KARIM BAIK SUFLA	DO AB HULYA
24169	24. Herat	311	Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	SYAH KAMAR	YAKA DARKHT
24170	24. Herat	311	Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	SYAH KAMAR	YAKA DARKHT
20027	20. Jowzjan	274	Aqchah	QEMARAQ BALA	KOMAK HAKIM
20028	20. Jowzjan	274	Aqchah	QEMARAQ BALA	KOMAK HAKIM

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacement Village
20029	20. Jowzjan	274	Aqchah	QEMARAQ PAYAN	BATE KOT AFGHANIYA
20030	20. Jowzjan	274	Aqchah	QEMARAQ PAYAN	BATE KOT AFGHANIYA
20087	20. Jowzjan	275	Khwajah Do Koh	CHOB BASH-I-NAW	NAZAR ABAD
20088	20. Jowzjan	275	Khwajah Do Koh	CHOB BASH-I-NAW	NAZAR ABAD
20089	20. Jowzjan	275	Khwajah Do Koh	CHOBASH KHORD AFGHANIYA	AYMAQ KOHNA
20090	20. Jowzjan	275	Khwajah Do Koh	CHOBASH KHORD AFGHANIYA	AYMAQ KOHNA
20155	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	MARANJAN	KINARA
20156	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	MARANJAN	KINARA
20157	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	SHOBAI	ISLAM JOY
20158	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	SHOBAI	ISLAM JOY
20159	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	AFGHAN TEPA ARABYA	HASSAN ABAD
20160	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	AFGHAN TEPA ARABYA	HASSAN ABAD
28155	28. Kandahar	359	Daman	HIJRAN KALAY	AKHUND ZADA KALAY
28156	28. Kandahar	359	Daman	HIJRAN KALAY	AKHUND ZADA KALAY
28157	28. Kandahar	359	Daman	GARI KALAY	DAMAN
28158	28. Kandahar	359	Daman	GARI KALAY	DAMAN
28159	28. Kandahar	359	Daman	ALI ABAD	NAJUJI
28160	28. Kandahar	359	Daman	ALI ABAD	NAJUJI
28161	28. Kandahar	359	Daman	SAR JAKAN	DAMAN MARKAZ WOLLUSWALY
28162	28. Kandahar	359	Daman	SAR JAKAN	DAMAN MARKAZ WOLLUSWALY
28163	28. Kandahar	359	Daman	KUCHNI KARAIZ	KHALIQ DAD
28164	28. Kandahar	359	Daman	KUCHNI KARAIZ	KHALIQ DAD
28165	28. Kandahar	359	Daman	BURJ	HUDUD KALACHA
28166	28. Kandahar	359	Daman	BURJ	HUDUD KALACHA
28167	28. Kandahar	359	Daman	ANZIRGAY	PIR DOST
28168	28. Kandahar	359	Daman	ANZIRGAY	PIR DOST
28169	28. Kandahar	359	Daman	MAJNUN KALAY	SAYDAN KALACHA
28170	28. Kandahar	359	Daman	MAJNUN KALAY	SAYDAN KALACHA

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacement Village
28557	28. Kandahar	418	Dand	RAMBASI	MUSHKI ZAY
28558	28. Kandahar	418	Dand	RAMBASI	MUSHKI ZAY
28559	28. Kandahar	418	Dand	MARD QALA	ACHAKZAY
28560	28. Kandahar	418	Dand	MARD QALA	ACHAKZAY
9081	9. Khost	125	Jaji Maidan	SETE WAN	JAJI MAYDAN
9082	9. Khost	125	Jaji Maidan	SETE WAN	JAJI MAYDAN
9113	9. Khost	125	Jaji Maidan	ESKANDARA	ABAS KHAIL MARKAZ WOLLUSWALY
9114	9. Khost	125	Jaji Maidan	ESKANDARA	ABAS KHAIL MARKAZ WOLLUSWALY
9189	9. Khost	122	Nadir Shah Kot	BADAIL	WAM MEKA
9190	9. Khost	122	Nadir Shah Kot	BADAIL	WAM MEKA
9297	9. Khost	120	Terayzai (Ali Sher)	SAOWKI	MATA KHEL
9298	9. Khost	120	Terayzai (Ali Sher)	SAOWKI	MATA KHEL
9313	9. Khost	120	Terayzai (Ali Sher)	ZIRAY GOWAY	SHAKARI
9314	9. Khost	120	Terayzai (Ali Sher)	ZIRAY GOWAY	SHAKARI
9321	9. Khost	120	Terayzai (Ali Sher)	YOURI KALAY	KHUSHBUI
9322	9. Khost	120	Terayzai (Ali Sher)	YOURI KALAY	KHUSHBUI
9331	9. Khost	120	Terayzai (Ali Sher)	JOWNA GHONDI	TERE ZAYI
9332	9. Khost	120	Terayzai (Ali Sher)	JOWNA GHONDI	TERE ZAYI
17013	17. Kunduz	245	Aliabad	QASEM-ALI	SAID AHMAD
17014	17. Kunduz	245	Aliabad	QASEM-ALI	SAID AHMAD
17019	17. Kunduz	245	Aliabad	SHAH WALI KALAY	QADIR-BOY
17020	17. Kunduz	245	Aliabad	SHAH WALI KALAY	QADIR-BOY
17031	17. Kunduz	245	Aliabad	QEZEL-SAY (1)	DASHT-KANDAHAR
17032	17. Kunduz	245	Aliabad	QEZEL-SAY (1)	DASHT-KANDAHAR

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacement Village
17033	17. Kunduz	245	Aliabad	SABZ-ALI	MEHRABUDDIN
17034	17. Kunduz	245	Aliabad	SABZ-ALI	MEHRABUDDIN
17063	17. Kunduz	245	Aliabad	RAHMAT BAY	BAZ MUHAMMAD
17064	17. Kunduz	245	Aliabad	RAHMAT BAY	BAZ MUHAMMAD
17181	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	DIL SHAHD	ISMA'IL QESHLAQ
17182	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	DIL SHAHD	ISMA'IL QESHLAQ
17183	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	KOUL DAMAN	TOUGH AHLAM
17184	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	KOUL DAMAN	TOUGH AHLAM
17185	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	AFTAB LAQ UZBEKA	KANDAHARI-HAI-SHAIRKHAN BANDAR
17186	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	AFTAB LAQ UZBEKA	KANDAHARI-HAI-SHAIRKHAN BANDAR
17195	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	HEACH KALAY HULYA	WARTEEN
17196	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	HEACH KALAY HULYA	WARTEEN
17197	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	KHAROQI	BARZANGI AFGHANI
17198	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	KHAROQI	BARZANGI AFGHANI
17199	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	ARAB HEACHKALAI	AB FOROSHAN BALA
17200	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	ARAB HEACHKALAI	AB FOROSHAN BALA
17231	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	QHARGHAN TEPA AQ MASJED	DURMAN BAHAR
17232	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	QHARGHAN TEPA AQ MASJED	DURMAN BAHAR
17149	17. Kunduz	243	Chahar Darah	KHAYR ABAD	QOSH TAPA (1)
17150	17. Kunduz	243	Chahar Darah	KHAYR ABAD	QOSH TAPA (1)
17021	17. Kunduz	245	Aliabad	SHAH-WAZER-KALAY	SAR-TAPAK
17022	17. Kunduz	245	Aliabad	SHAH-WAZER-KALAY	SAR-TAPAK
17281	17. Kunduz	241	Khanabad	CHOPANI	KHANABAD
17282	17. Kunduz	241	Khanabad	CHOPANI	KHANABAD
17291	17. Kunduz	241	Khanabad	SANG-GOSH	KOHNA QAL'A
17292	17. Kunduz	241	Khanabad	SANG-GOSH	KOHNA QAL'A
17417	17. Kunduz	244	Qal'ah-ye Zal	YANGHARQ	JOI ARSARI

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacement Village
17418	17. Kunduz	244	Qal'ah-ye Zal	YANGHARQ	JOI ARSARI
17335	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz	TEPA BURID DARMAN	KOHNA QESHLAQ
17336	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz	TEPA BURID DARMAN	KOHNA QESHLAQ
17353	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz	GUL TEPA DOWOM	TARNOW
17354	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz	GUL TEPA DOWOM	TARNOW
17355	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz	GUL TEPA AWAL	CHOU QESHLAQ PAYEN
17356	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz	GUL TEPA AWAL	CHOU QESHLAQ PAYEN
17359	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz	KHAN SHEEREN	NOW ABAD IMAM BOUKHARI
17360	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz	KHAN SHEEREN	NOW ABAD IMAM BOUKHARI
17363	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz	WAKEEL QARAH	QESHLAQ FAIZULLAH BAI ALCHIN
17364	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz	WAKEEL QARAH	QESHLAQ FAIZULLAH BAI ALCHIN
12131	12. Kunar	160	Sar Kani	DAM DARA	NOWLY
12132	12. Kunar	160	Sar Kani	DAM DARA	NOWLY
12081	12. Kunar	162	Marawarah	LOYA BACHA	LAR LAHOR
12082	12. Kunar	162	Marawarah	LOYA BACHA	LAR LAHOR
12097	12. Kunar	162	Marawarah	DANAW KORONA	PALKOT
12098	12. Kunar	162	Marawarah	DANAW KORONA	PALKOT
12109	12. Kunar	162	Marawarah	KUMAKI BACHE	SARYEE DAG
12110	12. Kunar	162	Marawarah	KUMAKI BACHE	SARYEE DAG
12067	12. Kunar	153	Khas Kunar	MULLAH GORO	CHEMYARI
12068	12. Kunar	153	Khas Kunar	MULLAH GORO	CHEMYARI
5111	5. Logar	62	Muhammad Aghah	QALEH-YE DAWLAT	MIR KARAIZ
5112	5. Logar	62	Muhammad Aghah	QALEH-YE DAWLAT	MIR KARAIZ
5125	5. Logar	62	Muhammad Aghah	SOR KARAIZ	ZAHID ABAD
5126	5. Logar	62	Muhammad Aghah	SOR KARAIZ	ZAHID ABAD

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacement Village
5167	5. Logar	62	Muhammad Aghah	CHENARI QALA	LOY KALAY
5168	5. Logar	62	Muhammad Aghah	CHENARI QALA	LOY KALAY
17395	17. Kunduz	244	Qal'ah-ye Zal	KASHANI	QALA-E-ZAL
17396	17. Kunduz	244	Qal'ah-ye Zal	KASHANI	QALA-E-ZAL
17419	17. Kunduz	244	Qal'ah-ye Zal	BAGHRAIKOL	SAKHS A KOL
17420	17. Kunduz	244	Qal'ah-ye Zal	BAGHRAIKOL	SAKHS A KOL
26003	26. Nimroz	338	Kang	DEHE AFGHANHA	KANG
26004	26. Nimroz	338	Kang	DEHE AFGHANHA	KANG
26015	26. Nimroz	338	Kang	NOOR AHMAD KHAN	RAYES JUMA KHAN
26016	26. Nimroz	338	Kang	NOOR AHMAD KHAN	RAYES JUMA KHAN
26023	26. Nimroz	338	Kang	ABDUL WAHID	HAJI MIR AHMAD
26024	26. Nimroz	338	Kang	ABDUL WAHID	HAJI MIR AHMAD
26039	26. Nimroz	338	Kang	MOHD-DADI	SAMAD KHAN
26040	26. Nimroz	338	Kang	MOHD-DADI	SAMAD KHAN
26041	26. Nimroz	338	Kang	HAJI AQA JAN	GHULAM MAHEUDIN
26042	26. Nimroz	338	Kang	HAJI AQA JAN	GHULAM MAHEUDIN
7177	7. Paktiya	424	Laja Mangel	MAHRAM KALAY	TARI
7178	7. Paktiya	424	Laja Mangel	MAHRAM KALAY	TARI
7135	7. Paktiya	110	Lajah-Ahmad Khel	KARAIZ	SHAWAT
7136	7. Paktiya	110	Lajah-Ahmad Khel	KARAIZ	SHAWAT
7139	7. Paktiya	110	Lajah-Ahmad Khel	BAKHTE	SULIMAN KHAIL
7140	7. Paktiya	110	Lajah-Ahmad Khel	BAKHTE	SULIMAN KHAIL
7095	7. Paktiya	107	Jaji	MULLAH FATEH KALAY	KOTAKE
7096	7. Paktiya	107	Jaji	MULLAH FATEH KALAY	KOTAKE
7097	7. Paktiya	107	Jaji	DERY KHOLE	AHMAD KHAIL SPEN GHAR
7098	7. Paktiya	107	Jaji	DERY KHOLE	AHMAD KHAIL

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacement Village
					SPEN GHAR
7099	7. Paktiya	107	Jaji	KASKAI	MIR KHAIL
7100	7. Paktiya	107	Jaji	KASKAI	MIR KHAIL
7019	7. Paktiya	113	Ahmadabad	SEWAI KALA	MADO KHAIL
7020	7. Paktiya	113	Ahmadabad	SEWAI KALA	MADO KHAIL
7021	7. Paktiya	113	Ahmadabad	MEWA KHAIL	PASENA KALA
7022	7. Paktiya	113	Ahmadabad	MEWA KHAIL	PASENA KALA
7221	7. Paktiya	106	Sayyid Karam	ZAIR SHAHGOT GAY KAMAR	MAMOZAE
7222	7. Paktiya	106	Sayyid Karam	ZAIR SHAHGOT GAY KAMAR	MAMOZAE
7223	7. Paktiya	106	Sayyid Karam	SHAIKHAN KHAIL	GHONDI KHAIL
7224	7. Paktiya	106	Sayyid Karam	SHAIKHAN KHAIL	GHONDI KHAIL
30003	30. Uruzgan	380	Chorah	BARIGAW	SAYIDAN SANGAR
30004	30. Uruzgan	380	Chorah	BARIGAW	SAYIDAN SANGAR
30013	30. Uruzgan	380	Chorah	KUSHK	CHALBI
30014	30. Uruzgan	380	Chorah	KUSHK	CHALBI
30027	30. Uruzgan	380	Chorah	BAI NAWA KALAY	CHENAR TOO
30028	30. Uruzgan	380	Chorah	BAI NAWA KALAY	CHENAR TOO
30055	30. Uruzgan	380	Chorah	SHANODI	NOORI
30056	30. Uruzgan	380	Chorah	SHANODI	NOORI
30057	30. Uruzgan	380	Chorah	AWRANK	PAI KALAY
30058	30. Uruzgan	380	Chorah	AWRANK	PAI KALAY
30061	30. Uruzgan	380	Chorah	KHUSH KHOY	BAHRAM ZAZAI
30062	30. Uruzgan	380	Chorah	KHUSH KHOY	BAHRAM ZAZAI
30063	30. Uruzgan	380	Chorah	KOTAL	CHORA
30064	30. Uruzgan	380	Chorah	KOTAL	CHORA
30183	30. Uruzgan	382	Shahid-e Hasas	KHALCHAK	CHENAR
30184	30. Uruzgan	382	Shahid-e Hasas	KHALCHAK	CHENAR
30195	30. Uruzgan	382	Shahid-e Hasas	YAW KARYA	DAWAN HULYA
30196	30. Uruzgan	382	Shahid-e Hasas	YAW KARYA	DAWAN HULYA
30199	30. Uruzgan	382	Shahid-e Hasas	SARAW	PAI JANGAL
30200	30. Uruzgan	382	Shahid-e Hasas	SARAW	PAI JANGAL
30159	30. Uruzgan	381	Khas Uruzgan	KAJI KHARBED	BAYRAGH
30160	30. Uruzgan	381	Khas Uruzgan	KAJI KHARBED	BAYRAGH
30161	30. Uruzgan	381	Khas Uruzgan	ADOZI	MYANA (2)
30162	30. Uruzgan	381	Khas Uruzgan	ADOZI	MYANA (2)

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacement Village
30163	30. Uruzgan	381	Khas Uruzgan	PAY JAGHATALA	MARGHUNDAY
30164	30. Uruzgan	381	Khas Uruzgan	PAY JAGHATALA	MARGHUNDAY
30165	30. Uruzgan	381	Khas Uruzgan	NOOR ZAI	ARBASTO
30166	30. Uruzgan	381	Khas Uruzgan	NOOR ZAI	ARBASTO
30167	30. Uruzgan	381	Khas Uruzgan	LANDE SAR TANGI	RAZI
30168	30. Uruzgan	381	Khas Uruzgan	LANDE SAR TANGI	RAZI
30169	30. Uruzgan	381	Khas Uruzgan	RAHM QOULY	GIDAR GO
30170	30. Uruzgan	381	Khas Uruzgan	RAHM QOULY	GIDAR GO
30095	30. Uruzgan	383	Deh Rawud	GORGAK	KAKRAK
30096	30. Uruzgan	383	Deh Rawud	GORGAK	KAKRAK
30097	30. Uruzgan	383	Deh Rawud	GARI	PO TAI
30098	30. Uruzgan	383	Deh Rawud	GARI	PO TAI
30101	30. Uruzgan	383	Deh Rawud	KAJ GHOL	KUNJAK
30102	30. Uruzgan	383	Deh Rawud	KAJ GHOL	KUNJAK
30123	30. Uruzgan	383	Deh Rawud	GORGAN	BOLAGH
30124	30. Uruzgan	383	Deh Rawud	GORGAN	BOLAGH
30129	30. Uruzgan	383	Deh Rawud	JANGAL (2)	OMRAN ZAI
30130	30. Uruzgan	383	Deh Rawud	JANGAL (2)	OMRAN ZAI
30131	30. Uruzgan	383	Deh Rawud	TANDOR	TARAK
30132	30. Uruzgan	383	Deh Rawud	TANDOR	TARAK
30133	30. Uruzgan	383	Deh Rawud	JAGHDAR	SANG SORAKH
30134	30. Uruzgan	383	Deh Rawud	JAGHDAR	SANG SORAKH
30135	30. Uruzgan	383	Deh Rawud	SANGAR	JANGAL JADED
30136	30. Uruzgan	383	Deh Rawud	SANGAR	JANGAL JADED
29097	29. Zabul	368	Shah Joy	LAYKHI KHEL	MULLAH BAHLUL KHORANA
29098	29. Zabul	368	Shah Joy	LAYKHI KHEL	MULLAH BAHLUL KHORANA
29049	29. Zabul	373	Qalat	KAKARAN KALAY (HAJI MURSAL)	KHALA
29050	29. Zabul	373	Qalat	KAKARAN KALAY (HAJI MURSAL)	KHALA
29125	29. Zabul	368	Shah Joy	SAWAT KHEL	SANGINI
29126	29. Zabul	368	Shah Joy	SAWAT KHEL	SANGINI
29133	29. Zabul	368	Shah Joy	SAH BANDI	ASGHARI
29134	29. Zabul	368	Shah Joy	SAH BANDI	ASGHARI

APPENDIX 2: SAMPLE POINTS TRANSFERRED TO AYC

Due to security concerns of the ACSOR staff, some sampling points were transferred to AYC to conduct. A total of nine sampling points originally assigned to ACSOR were transferred in this way.

SP#	Province	District #	District	Village Name	Village UID
27311	27. Helmand	339	Nad Ali	ASEKZAIO BLOCK	NDA-001
27312	27. Helmand	339	Nad Ali	ASEKZAIO BLOCK	NDA-001
27313	27. Helmand	339	Nad Ali	MARJA BLOCK 10-D	NDA-080
27314	27. Helmand	339	Nad Ali	MARJA BLOCK 10-D	NDA-080
27315	27. Helmand	339	Nad Ali	MARJA BLOCK 10-C	NDA-079
27316	27. Helmand	339	Nad Ali	MARJA BLOCK 10-C	NDA-079
27317	27. Helmand	339	Nad Ali	MARJA BLOCK D-11	NDA-116
27318	27. Helmand	339	Nad Ali	MARJA BLOCK D-11	NDA-116
24380	24. Herat	309	Shindand	TAHMIR CHAH JAHAN	SHD-311

APPENDIX 3: NEWSWORTHY EVENTS DURING FIELD

The following is a list of news reports from each of the provinces included in MISTI Wave 5 during the field period of the project. These reports help contextualize the situations in each of the provinces where field work was conducted. While not all of these events directly impacted field work, it is important to understand the events that impacted each of these areas and the types of events that effected day to day life during this period of time.

Baghlan:

Nov 18, 2014

A powerful blast ripped through a crowd watching a buzkashi competition in northern Baghlan province on Tuesday afternoon, injuring 20 people, including three children, police said. The bomb had been planted on the playground in Baghlan-i-Markazi district and it went off in the middle of the sport soon after 4pm, Baghlan police spokesman Javed Basharat said. He said the injured included three children, two policemen and 15 spectators. He said some of the injured taken to the provincial civil hospital were in critical condition. Five of the injured were discharged after treatment at the district hospital, said Bashrat, who blamed the incident on the insurgents. However, there has been no claim of responsibility for the blast that took place two years after a suicide bomber attacked a buzkashi game in the Imam Sahib district of northern Kunduz province, killing 11 people, including father and a brother of Wolesi Jirga speaker.

Farah:

Nov 17, 2014

Taliban militants pulled more than a dozen passengers from a bus and shot dead four of them in western Farah province on Monday, an official said. Jawad Afghan, the governor's spokesman, said the incident took place on the Farah-Herat highway in Shamalgah area near the provincial capital, Farah City. He said the rebels took 13 passengers hostage and shot four of them dead. Most of the hostages were civilians but they included some government officials, he said, gave no further details. A resident of Jawin district, Nisar Ahmad, confirmed the incident, saying his brother was also on the 303 public transport bus when militants stopped it. He said his brother boarded the bus after got injured in a car accident and he had been taken hostage with others by Taliban insurgents. He said his brother was a farmer and was innocent. The Taliban stopped tens of other cars on the highway and have likely taken hostage more people. Provincial police Chief Brig. Gen. Mohammad Razaq Yaqubi said Afghan forces had reached Shamalgah area and had entered a clash with the rebels. He said about 400 militants, who had entered Bala Buluk district, were fighting against Afghan forces. So far eight militants and one policemen had been in the clash, he said.

Nov 20, 2014

Suspected militants torched a girls' school near the capital of western Farah province on Wednesday, destroying the building, an official said. The governor's spokesman, Jawad Afghan, said the incident took place in the Nawbahar area 14 kilometers from Farah City, the provincial capital, in the afternoon. However, a Taliban spokesman denied involvement of the fighters in torching the school. Education Director Mohammad Sabir Farooqi said four motorcyclists forced girls into leaving the school before torching it. The school's only two rooms and four tents were destroyed in the fire and the attackers warned teachers against reopening the school, he added. About 550 girls attend the school. A resident of Nawbahar area, Mohammad Nader, said security forces reached the scene three hours after the incident. Farah education officials say

18 schools in the province have already been shut due to insecurity. A week ago, 23 schools and a teachers' training center were closed by militants in eastern Nangarhar province, but the schools reopened a day earlier. The Ministry of Education says about 300 schools, mostly south, in different parts of the country are closed due to security concerns.

Ghazni:**Nov 12, 2014**

The Taliban shot dead a local police (ALP) member and his parents during an overnight attack on their home in the troubled Andar district of southern Ghazni province, an official said on Wednesday. The insurgents first killed the local policeman and went on to murder his father and mother in the Qadamkhel area on Tuesday night, the governor's spokesman, Shafique Nang, said. The attackers fled the area after killing the three, but police had launched a search operation to arrest them, he said. Mohammad Khalil, a resident of the area, said that armed Taliban men broke into the house of the Afghan Local Police personnel, killing him and his parents inside. He identified the slain ALP personnel as Noor Mohammad, who had joined the force some time ago. But a Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said the fighters ambushed a local policeman and his son, who served his father's bodyguard, killing both. Elsewhere in the district, Taliban insurgents stormed the house of a resident in the Zai area the same night and shot him dead, local residents said. Resident Ahmad Shah said that the slain person was a caretaker of a telecommunication tower in the area. A doctor on duty at the civil hospital in Ghazni City, Noorullah, said they had been delivered a seriously wounded person from Andar, but they referred him to Kabul. He said the man had been shot in the head and chest. The Taliban have so far not commented about the incident.

Helmand:**Oct 18, 2014**

Nine people were killed in a suicide car bombing targeting a security convoy in southern Helmand province on Saturday, an official said. A convoy of the Afghan National Army and Public Order Police came under attack in Greshk district at 1.00pm, the 215th Maiwand Corps deputy commander said. Gen. Farooq Parwani, citing initial reports, said four policemen had been killed and two others wounded. There was no immediate claim of responsibility. Public Order Police officer Brig. Gen. Ghulam Sakhi Ghafoori said the convoy was on its way to Sangin district. He added three civilians and two policemen were among the fatalities. Two policemen were wounded. Helmand deputy police chief Col. Bacha Gul Bakhtiar said two policemen were killed and six ANA soldiers wounded in the bomb attack. According to the Greshk district chief, Fahim Musa, the car-borne suicide bomber struck near an inter-section, damaging a number of light and heavy vehicles.

Herat**Oct 28, 2014 - 15:05**

Armed rebels have launched a coordinated attack on a check-post in Herat City on Tuesday afternoon, killing two policemen and wounding seven civilians. One eyewitness said the incident took place around 2:30 pm in the Lilami Bazaar area of the provincial capital. The attackers were shooting at police from a nearby house they broke into. Abdul Rauf Ahmadi, Spokesman for the provincial police department, said two policemen have lost lives in this attack. He added, among the seven wounded civilians, three were women.

**Kandahar:
Nov 11, 2014**

Unidentified gunmen shot dead a high school principal in southern Kandahar province on Tuesday, an official said. The attackers managed to flee after killing the Mirwais High School principal, Wahidullah Ahmadi, the governor's spokesman said. The incident took place in the 16th police district of Kandahar City at around 8am this morning, Samim Khpalwak said, adding an investigation into the attack had been opened. Also on Tuesday, gunmen shot dead a policeman in a separate attack in the 8th police district, according to Khpalwak. Target killing incidents have recently increased in Kandahar, where the deputy governor, Abdul Qayyum Patyal, was killed in a gun attack about a week ago.

**Khost:
Oct 18, 2014**

The acting police chief for Spera district was killed and four others, including three of his guards, were wounded in a bomb attack in southeastern Khost province on Saturday. The incident took place at around 2:00pm in the Khost City, the provincial capital, Baryalai Rawan, the governor's spokesman, said. He said 2nd Lt. Shabir Ahmad had come to the city for official work. Governor Abdul Jabbar Naeemi condemned the attack as an act against Islam and humanity. Militants have not yet commented on the incident.

Nov 18, 2014

A woman was killed and 13 others injured on Tuesday when a civilian vehicle hit a roadside bomb in southeastern Khost province, an official said. The blast took place on a road between Bak and Zazai Maidan districts, confirmed the Bak district chief, Abdulhai Zazai. He said the wounded were taken to hospital, but had no information about their condition. Khost civil hospital official Dr. Abdul Majid Mangal said they had received nine wounded including a policeman. No any group has so far claimed responsibility for the incident.

**Kunar:
Nov 20, 2014**

A mortar fire blamed on insurgents killed a student and injured six others, including four students, in the capital of eastern Kunar province on Thursday morning, police said. The mortar shell landed on a road in the Yar Gul area, causing the casualties, Kunar police chief Abdul Habib Syedkhel said. He said six civilians injured in the incident had been shifted to the civil hospital in Asadabad. Public Health Director Dr. Fazli said one of the injured people brought to the civil hospital had died of his wounds. Education Director Syed Jamaluddin Hasni said the injured included three students of Asadabad Darul Hafiz and one university student.

**Kunduz
Oct 18, 2014**

Authorities in the northern Kunduz province on Saturday claimed killing 34 armed rebels during a just concluded operation in Imam Sahib district. The 10-day offensive that concluded last evening involved Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Local Police (ALP) and Afghan Border Police (ABP) Col. Muhammad Safar, operational head at the provincial police headquarters, said heavy losses had been inflicted on the militants. Security personnel suffered no casualties during the operation, he said, adding 34 rebels were killed and 47 others injured. Col. Safar vowed to increase the number of security personnel and check-posts in this restive district.

Logar:**Oct 19, 2014**

Authorities in central Logar province on Sunday confirmed the death of four Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers and five rebels in coordinated attacks on security posts. Khalilullah Kamal, the Charkh district chief, said five more soldiers were injured in the militant attacks. Five rebels were also killed in the ensuing fighting, he said, adding Arabs and Pakistanis were among the assailants. He added with the arrival of reinforcements the militants were beaten back. He had no knowledge of civilian casualties as the fighters had snapped telecommunication links in the area. Meanwhile, Gen. Zahir Azimi, spokesman for the Ministry of Defence, said on his twitter handle that scores of militants had been killed. Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban spokesman, said eight soldiers had been killed.

Nov 12, 2014

Monday's suicide attack that killed the Afghan Local Police (ALP) chief for central Logar province, Sabz Ali, was carried out by his nephew, also a member of the force, officials said on Wednesday. The attack inside the provincial police headquarters in Pul-i-Alam also left six policemen and three civilians dead and five ALP personnel injured. Din Mohammad Darwish, the governor's spokesman, said that the suicide attack had been carried out by Usman, the son of Sabz Ali's sister. Usman was a member of the ALP and had been serving in the force for six months. Logar police chief Abdul Hakim Ishaqzai said investigation showed the suicide attack had been carried out by one of Sabz Ali's relatives, but the investigation was still underway. Ishaqzai called Sabz Ali an experienced commander, saying the Taliban were involved in his assassination plot. He said Sabz Ali had previously survived various Taliban attacks on his life, but finally they succeeded in killing him. A resident of the Kamalkhel area of Pul-i-Alam, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the attacker who killed Sabz Ali was his nephew, who was very close to the commander. Commander Sabz Ali Stanikzai was a resident of the Kamalkhel area and he had been general commander of the ALP force in Logar for the last seven years. The Taliban have so far not confirmed if the attacker was Sabz Ali's nephew, but the group's spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, had said the attack was part of their Operation Khyber. He had claimed the attack left a dozen policemen, including Sabz Ali, dead and scores of others wounded.

Nov 17, 2014

Police detained six armed robbers from the house of a failing provincial council candidate during a raid in the Mohammad Agha district of central Logar province on Monday. Logar police chief Brig. Gen. Abdul Hakim Ishaqzai said the raid was conducted in the Kutabkhel area early in the morning. A six-member gang of armed robbers was detained with stolen goods from the house of Haji Shaukat Stanikzai, who contested the April 5 provincial council elections but his name was removed from the final list winners. Stanikzai had fled but one of his sons had been arrested. Ishaqzai said the gang had been involved in stealing commercial goods on highways using military uniforms. They also looted passengers on roads. He said some weapons, 10 military uniforms, daggers, 700 bags of rice and 500 sacks of flour were recovered from the detainees currently being interrogated. Efforts at seeking comments from Stanikzai did not succeed. It was for the first time a gang of robbers has been detained amid increasing incidents of robberies on the Kabul-Gardez highway.

Paktia:
Nov 15, 2014

Two tribal elders have been killed after they were taken hostage by Taliban militants in southern Paktia province, official said Saturday. The tribal elders Malak Rozuddin and Haji Daud were killed in Zurmat district of the province on Friday night, provincial police Chief Maj. Gen. Zalmay Oryakhail said. He said the two elders were residents of Ibrahim Khail area and their bodies were found dead in front of Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) office after weeks later of their abduction by militants. A resident of Ibrahim Khail area Khan Momin said that the elders were invited by militants to discuss some issues about their region. “We hoped the militants discussed with the tribal elders, but we found them dead last night,” he added. Momin said that the elders did not involve in any political activities but only struggling for solving people’s problems. He did not clear when and for what discussions the elders were invited. A month ago, development council director for Syed Karam district and a tribal elder Mirza Mohammad were also killed in a militant attack in Paktia. Taliban militants did not comment on the incident so far.

APPENDIX 4: WAVE 5 SURVEY VALIDATION PROTOCOL

ACSOR/AYC VALIDATION PROTOCOL

Background and Purpose of Validation

MISTI will conduct validations in select provinces for the fifth round of the MISTI survey in order to ensure high quality and adherence to protocol. The survey data will be collected by ACSOR and AYC.

Through validation, MISTI ensures that survey data is reliable and the program methodology is robust. Therefore, MISTI continuously seeks to improve survey data collection quality and validation protocols.

Wave 5 Validation Protocol

1. One female validator will be hired in order to validate female surveyors.
2. MISTI validators will inform ACSOR Supervisors of their arrival in the district 48 hours in advance. They will also tell them the days they will be conducting validations but not where or who they will be validating.
2. ACSOR/AYC supervisors, upon being informed of a validator's arrival, should contact all surveyors to inform them of fieldwork validations. He should also let surveyors know that if they are selected for validation, they will be contacted early on the validation morning by the supervisor and MISTI validator. Surveyors should also be reminded to cooperate fully with the validator and to let him complete his work without interference, especially during back-checks with respondents.
3. The day before each validation, the MISTI validator will review the following day's survey work with the supervisor. He will then select one or more sampling points as appropriate for validation but will not inform the supervisor of the chosen villages until 7:00am the following morning.
4. The supervisor and validator will make every effort to meet in the morning and will travel together to the validator's chosen sampling point. If this meeting does not occur, MISTI and ACSOR/AYC will review the survey results in the entire district for that day and will void them if warranted. Exceptions to this rule will be made on a case-by-case basis. The onus is on the supervisor to meet with the validator. In cases where the validator fails to meet at the agreed time and place with the supervisor, the validator will be replaced.
5. To ensure surveyors go to survey sampling points, survey teams must take GPS coordinate readings upon entering and leaving each village during the survey except in cases of direct threats to field teams or on a case-by-case basis as agreed by ACSOR/AYC and MISTI. GPS devices will be returned to MISTI immediately after district completion. MISTI will consider lack of GPS coordinates for sampling points

as non-performance and no payment will be disbursed (exceptions noted above).

6. Validators will take GPS readings at all sampling points. GPS devices will be returned to MISTI immediately after district completion. Where safe and with permission from respondents, validators will also take photographs depicting survey implementation. Validators will email all photographs to MISTI HQ at the end of each survey day.
7. If validators claim that respondents had complaints about the survey, they must record what those complaints are on the monitoring form.
8. MISTI will observe all Kabul supervisor trainings and provide feedback.
9. ACSOR/AYC should conduct training for at least one (1) full day for supervisors and one (1) full day for surveyors with group-work (e.g., role playing) included.
10. Surveyors and validators should place renewed emphasis on sampling points in zones 2 and 3. At least 10% of validator monitoring forms should be from Zone 3 sampling points.

Methodology

MISTI will hire male and female validators in validation provinces. MISTI will increase the percentage of provinces and districts validated in Wave 5 to ensure higher data quality from past waves. MISTI's M&E department will conduct a full day of validation training to include group and field work. The training will take place in Kabul. The training will cover the following topics:

1. Introduction to MISTI
2. ACSOR/AYC survey objectives
3. Validation objectives
4. Validation methodology
5. Coordination, planning with ACSOR/AYC district teams
6. Communication and introduction to ACSOR/AYC team and MISTI Coordinator
7. Validation forms completion and submission process
8. Daily and final reporting requirements
9. Observation of ACSOR/AYC Surveyors
10. ACSOR survey method: random walk, starting points, household selection, etc.
11. MISTI questionnaire overview
12. Group work exercises
13. GPS cell phone devices
14. Administrative/finance issues

Observation of the ACSOR/AYC training

MISTI M&E and validation staff will attend the ACSOR and AYC Wave 5 survey training in Kabul and several provinces. In order to facilitate travel, ACSOR and AYC should notify MISTI of their training schedule as soon as possible; at a minimum, 3 days is required to plan for staff to observe the training.

ACSOR will provide the training topics that they will cover in their training.

Validation Planning

ACSOR and AYC Kabul offices will provide a survey schedule including the dates of fieldwork in each district and the contact details of their Supervisors and Surveyors (by district). MISTI will use this information to schedule district visits. MISTI's Validation Coordinator will inform ACSOR/AYC and the district supervisor of a validator's arrival at least 48 hours prior to survey start. AYC and ACSOR will update the Validation Coordinator regarding any changes in scheduling fieldwork.

The afternoon/evening before validation the MISTI Validator and ACSOR/AYC Supervisor will meet to go over the following day's survey work. The MISTI Validator will select at least one village for validation but will not tell the ACSOR Supervisor until ca. 07:00 the following morning – the morning of the validation.

Coordination and Daily Reporting

Validators will provide a daily report of progress and major problems to the MISTI Validation Coordinator. The Validation Coordinator will share all major problems with ACSOR/AYC Survey Manager at the end of each day. Major problems include issues such as:

1. Validator unable to locate surveyor.
2. Surveyors filling in forms fraudulently.
3. Surveyors who take an abnormally short amount of time to complete interviews.
4. Surveyors who do not understand how to pick a starting point, how to do the random walk, or how to do the Kish Grid.
5. Surveyors who do not follow any other major guidelines.

In addition, ACSOR's and AYC's Survey Manager will share all problems or suggestions with the Validation Coordinator at the end of each day.

ACSOR and AYC are also required to send daily updates about the survey in the form of an excel spreadsheet. The spreadsheet should have all details concerning survey start and end dates, sampling points surveyed, security issues, and other important details as required and requested by MISTI.

AYC/ACSOR must also provide details of survey start dates at least 72 hours prior to the actual start date. Any survey work completed without MISTI's prior knowledge (72 hours minimum) will be redone at the surveyor's expense.

ANNEX A

MONITORING FORM for ACSOR Survey

Validator Name		Surveyor Name	
District			
Village			
Sampling point #		Direct observation <input type="checkbox"/> Both <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	Back check <input type="checkbox"/>
No. of interviews observed		House #	
Date			

1. Was this sampling point scheduled? **Yes** **No**

If no, how was it chosen?

2. Was the starting point chosen according to protocol? **Yes** **No**

3. Was the random walk done according to protocol? **Yes** **No**

4. Was the household selected according to protocol? **Yes** **No**

If no, explain:

5. Was the respondent chosen using the Kish Grid? **Yes** **No**

If no, explain:

6. Was the interviewee read the disclosure statement? **Yes** **No**

If no, explain (and go to next section):

7. Were both versions of the questionnaire administered in equal numbers in the village? (*Eight of each version*) **Yes** **No**

If no, explain:

8. Were you able to conduct a check with the respondent? **Yes** **No**

IF YES:

g. Did the Surveyor complete the questionnaire form? **Yes** **No**

h. Were the topics discussed survey topics? **Yes** **No**

i. Did the respondent have any complaints? **Yes** **No**

If yes, explain:

9. Did the Supervisor receive the questionnaires from the interviewers? **Yes** **No**


If no, explain:

10. Did the Supervisor check the questionnaires for completeness/quality? **Yes** **No**

If no, explain:



WAVE 5 SURVEY VALIDATION REPORT



Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI)
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL 18 December 2014

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Wave 5 Validation Report analyzes inconsistencies in survey delivery among a cross-section of surveyors in order to improve the reliability of survey results in future waves. The report also codifies survey and validation best practices. In Wave 5, sixteen validators conducted 1,830 validations in 212 working days across 40 districts in fourteen provinces. The validation covered 67% of all provinces and 37% of all districts surveyed.

Overall, MISTI doubled the percentage of surveys reviewed from 2% to 4% (1,830 validations for 41,013 useable surveys). In addition, MISTI reduced the instances of survey fraud in Wave 5 by approximately 40% compared to Wave 4.¹ Wave 5 validation results demonstrate an overall improvement compared to previous survey waves. Incidences improper execution of the survey methodology drastically decreased in difficult provinces like Kunduz and Logar and remained low in most other provinces with the exception of Kandahar and Khost. More than double the number of validation monitoring forms were completed in this wave compared to Wave 4, and three more provinces and ten more districts were validated this wave. Finally, nearly all district survey teams recorded GPS coordinates when entering and leaving sampled villages.

Wave 5 survey validation improvements also include:

1. Women validator hired.
2. Survey speed decreased and multiple validators hired for Kunduz and Logar provinces.
3. In the two districts where no GPS devices were allowed, validators visited approximately 2/3 of sampling points.
4. Mandatory validator-supervisor meetings.
5. Validation emphasized in zones 2 and 3.
6. Additional surveyor training days in Kunduz and Logar provinces.

Recommendations for future survey waves:

1. Renewed focus on surveyor training in Khost and Kandahar and improve supervisor management.

Surveyors require better training in order to cope with the long hours required for survey delivery and the precise methodological steps that need to be followed. Surveyors must be better trained – and retrained if necessary – in order to reinforce good surveying practices. Particular emphasis must again be placed on the Kish Grid and household selection. Supervisors must also play a more active role in the day-to-day execution of the survey. Kabul-based supervisors should also travel to these provinces to oversee provincial supervisors.

¹ Hunter Deletions decreased from 610 rejected surveys in Wave 4 to 247 rejected surveys in Wave 5.

2. Maintain multiple validators in Kunduz and Logar provinces and add additional validators in Kandahar and Khost provinces.

Kandahar and Khost require at least two validators per district. In addition, the survey should be slowed down in these districts to allow more time for validation and oversight.

INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF VALIDATION

MISTI validated the Wave 5 survey performance in order to:

1. Maintain a robust, consistent, and statistically significant survey methodology;
2. Improve future surveyor and subcontractor performance;
3. Reinforce high quality fieldwork and adherence to established protocol;
4. Improve survey protocol by codifying best practices.

In total, surveyors conducted 41,013 useable surveys across 107 districts in 21 provinces. Sixteen validators conducted 1,830 validations (4.46% of total survey) in 212 working days across 40 districts in fourteen provinces.

The Wave 5 validation is intended to enforce the rigorous MISTI survey methodology and ensure that proper social science standards are followed. The MISTI M&E team validated the extent to which the survey was correctly administered by observing individual surveyor interviews with respondents, observing whether teams followed survey protocol, asking respondents follow-up questions, reviewing survey forms for completeness, and monitoring if surveyors took GPS points at all sampling points.

SURVEY METHODOLOGY²

The Wave 5 survey methodology replicated Wave 4 in its criteria for target population, district, and sub-contractor selection. A summarized version of the survey methodology is below:

1. The target population was Afghan citizens, 18 years of age or older, living in 107 pre-selected districts throughout 21 provinces in Afghanistan. The achieved sample size was 41,013 interviews after all quality control measures were employed and unacceptable interviews were rejected. 247 interviews were rejected for various reasons, including duplication and time/date discrepancies.
2. Primary sampling units were MISTI-selected villages within each district. In some instances, villages were determined to be inaccessible to interviewing teams due to security concerns, travel restrictions (imposed by either insurgent groups or NATO forces) or weather. In these instances, a replacement village was selected from a list of allowable replacement villages provided by MISTI to the data collection companies. Where possible, these replacements were made so that the new village was from the same Community Development Council (CDC) area in order to maintain geographic continuity among the replacement location.
3. Due to the purposive nature of the district selection (non-probability, non-stratified, selected by MISTI to meet programmatic needs), an accurate margin of error and design effect cannot be calculated for the aggregated data set as each district was launched using a unique sample plan. Sampling was approached as though each

² For complete information regarding survey methodology, please see Appendix B of the Wave 2 Survey Report.

district was a standalone sample design. Assuming a simple random sample with $P=0.5$ and a 95% confidence interval, the margin of sampling error for the aggregated data set of 41,013 interviews would be +/- 0.5%.³

4. The Afghan Centre for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) and Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC) collected all survey data. The ACSOR interviewing teams consisted of male and female interviewers who were local residents of the areas where the interviews were conducted. The ACSOR interviewers utilized a random walk methodology to select households and a Kish grid to randomize respondent selection within households.
5. The AYC interviewing teams consisted of small groups of male interviewers who were from the districts where the interviews were conducted. Due to the poor security situation in the districts where they conducted field work, the AYC interviewing teams selected households through convenience sampling using their local knowledge of the villages and contacts they have within those villages to lessen the possibility of encountering insurgent elements that would result from employing a random walk. Since all AYC interviewers were male and they selected households through convenience sampling, respondents were nearly always male heads of household or other male household members.

VALIDATION METHODOLOGY⁴

A version of the validation methodology is summarized below:

District Randomized Selection⁵

MISTI randomly selected all districts for validation. Randomized selection followed the following methodology:

1. Surveyed districts were randomized and 37% were selected for validation.
2. Randomly selected districts were replaced with pre-selected districts based on Wave 4 validation results, including:
 - a. Poor anecdotal feedback from validators about adherence to survey protocol.
 - b. Poor quantitative results from Validation Monitoring Forms.
 - c. High percentages of poor data quality (Hunter Deletions).
 - d. High cost of travel and low population density (Samangan and Ghor provinces).
 - e. Security concerns on a case-by-case basis.

³ This statistic is primarily for reference; analysis for these data is seldom done in aggregate with all cases being analyzed simultaneously. The more useful statistics for practical analysis are the design effects and the resulting margin of error and complex margin of error calculations that were generated for each individual district.

⁴For more detailed information on validation selection, please see Appendix A: Validation Protocol.

⁵ MISTI used the excel function =rand() to generate a random permutation of numbers between 0 and 1 in the district dataset. The =rand() function column was sorted from largest to smallest, effectively “randomizing” the dataset. MISTI selected the highest 30% from the dataset.

Validation Team Hiring and Training

MISTI M&E directly hired the validation team, consisting of sixteen validators covering fourteen provinces. The validation team attended the MISTI Wave 5 survey training on 21 September 2014 in Kabul. Survey validation was conducted between 28 September 2014 and 24 November 2014.⁶

Training topics covered included:

1. Introduction to MISTI
2. ACSOR's survey role
3. Introduction to validation
4. Validation methodology
5. Coordination with ACSOR managers and surveyors
 - a. Communication and introduction with community, ACSOR team, and MISTI
 - b. Understanding and completing validation forms
 - c. Daily and final reporting protocols
 - d. Observation of ACSOR surveyors
 - e. ACSOR survey methods: random walk, starting points, household selection, Kish Grid, etc.
 - f. ACSOR survey questionnaire overview
6. Validators fieldwork – monitoring forms and GPS time/date stamped photos
7. Administrative issues

Field Validation and Reporting

Validation fieldwork adhered to the following methodology:

1. 24 hours prior to the survey, validators scheduled the surveyor rendezvous time and place with the ACSOR/AYC provincial coordinator.
2. Validators waited up to 30 minutes for ACSOR/AYC surveyors to arrive at agreed location. Problems were coordinated by MISTI Verification Team and ACSOR/AYC provincial coordinator.
3. After the initial meeting the surveyor and validator travelled to the selected village(s) to begin survey/validation. The ACSOR/AYC supervisor sometimes accompanied the validator to the sampling point.
4. Validators conducted at least eight survey validations per day. Wave 5 validators completed, on average, 32 monitoring forms each day.
5. Validators conducted random follow-ups with 10-20 survey respondents per day.
6. Validators reported data and observations at the end of the validation day to the MISTI Verification Team.
7. MISTI Verification Team compiled the observations and data and analyzed for problems and trends.

⁶ There was a gap of 12 days from 8-19 November 2014 because of a delay in Khost surveys.

WAVE 5 IMPROVEMENTS OVER WAVE 4

1. Women validators hired.

ACSOR hired 347 women in its Wave 5 survey group in all 21 survey provinces. MISTI hired one female validator to validate female surveyors in Kunduz province.

2. Survey speed decreased and multiple validators hired for difficult provinces.

MISTI requested that ACSOR slow the rate of survey completion by spreading surveys over a greater number of days. Specifically, MISTI asked that no districts be completed in less than three days. This allowed MISTI to collect more validation data and correct methodological problems before surveys were completed. In addition, MISTI surged to hire more than one validator in problematic districts or districts that are surveyed quickly. MISTI hired three validators in Kunduz province and two validators in Logar province in order to address concerns with survey implementation from the previous survey wave. Wave 5 survey results show improved outcomes for both Kunduz and Logar provinces compared to Wave 4.

3. Survey teams took GPS readings when entering and leaving villages.

In Wave 5, survey teams took GPS coordinate readings when entering and leaving each village during the survey. Questions were added to the validation monitoring form asking whether surveyors used a GPS device while entering and leaving the sampling point. The exceptions to this rule were Kajaki and Sangin districts in Helmand province.⁷ AYC agreed to slow down the survey in order to validate survey field teams at a rate of approximately three sampling points per day. In the two districts where no GPS devices were allowed, the MISTI validator visited approximately 2/3 of scheduled sampling points.

4. Mandatory validator-supervisor meetings.

For Wave 5, supervisors met with validators every morning that validation took place. While there were some exceptions, MISTI and ACSOR/AYC field teams largely complied with this request. These meetings encouraged planning and cooperation that helped to improve validation results.

5. Validation emphasized in zones 2 and 3.

Wave 5 validation focused on zones farther away from the district center. Validators monitor all zones, but in this wave greater emphasis was placed on

⁷ The police forces in Kajaki and Sangin districts did not allow AYC surveyors to travel into these districts with smart phones. Thus, a MISTI validator oversaw the survey for approximately 70% of sampled villages.

zones 2 and 3. Among validated sampling points, approximately 20% were in zone 2 and 10% were in zone 3.

6. Additional surveyor training in Kunduz and Logar provinces.

AYC retrained the Khoshi and Chahar Darah district survey teams, including the district supervisors. In addition, all provincial supervisors were given an exam created by the MISTI team to ensure they understood the survey methodology prior to surveyor training.

7. Supervision increased for nearly all ACSOR and AYC district teams.

Overall, supervisors managed surveyors more effectively in Wave 5 than Wave 4, leading to improved surveyor performance. In particular, Kabul-based AYC management travelled to Khoshi district to oversee daily surveying.

VALIDATION FINDINGS

Sixteen validators conducted 1,830 validations in 212 working days across 40 districts in 14 provinces. MISTI validated 67% of all surveyed provinces and 37% of all surveyed districts. Several logistical problems between surveyors and supervisors required intervention by the AYC and MISTI Kabul-based teams.⁸

The below table summarizes the provinces and districts validated:

No	Province	Number of Districts	District Names
1	Badghis	2	Qadis, Qala-e Naw
2	Ghor	2	Chaghcharan, Shahrak
3	Ghazni	4	Jaghatu (ACSOR + AYC), Khoja Omari, Qara Bagh, Andar (AYC)
4	Helmand	4	Garmser, Kajaki (AYC), Kishmish Khana (AYC), Sangin (AYC)
5	Kandahar	2	Arghandab, Zheri
6	Khost	4	Jaji Maidan, Manduzai, Nadir Shah Kot, Shamul (Dzadran)
7	Logar	3	Khoshi (ACSOR + AYC), Muhammad Aghah, Baraki Barak (AYC)

⁸ A spreadsheet of general survey issues is available by emailing dnowicki@msi-afghan.com.

8	Herat	3	Guzara, Injil, Kohsan
9	Kunduz	5	Chahar Darah (ACSOR + AYC), Imam Sahib (ACSOR + AYC), Kunduz, Qalai Zal, Archi (AYC)
10	Paktika	2	Sharan, Yousof Khil,
11	Paktiya	2	Ali Khil Zazai, Zurmat (AYC)
12	Uruzgan	3	Khas Uruzgan, Deh Rawud, Charchino
13	Wardak	2	Chak-e Wardak, Nerkh
14	Zabul	2	Shah Joy, Tarnak Wa Jaldak (AYC)
Total	14	40	

ACSOR survey methodology validation results include:

1. 97% of validated ACSOR surveyors chose the starting point according to protocol.
2. 99% of validated ACSOR surveyors took GPS readings when entering villages.
3. 100% of validated ACSOR surveyors visited scheduled sampling points.
4. 90% of validated ACSOR surveyors performed random walk according to protocol.
5. 93% of validated ACSOR surveyors performed household selection according to protocol.
6. 87% of validated ACSOR surveyors performed Kish Grid according to protocol.
7. Surveyors in Kandahar, Khost and Kunduz provinces had high levels of incorrect sampling methodology, including random walk and household selection. Surveyors in Kandahar province never selected the starting points correctly. Chak-e Wardak district (Wardak province) Injil district (Herat province), Kandahar province and Kunduz province survey teams incorrectly used the Kish Grid.
8. 93% of validated ACSOR surveyors read the disclosure statement according to protocol. Khost survey teams did not read the disclosure statement in half of validated surveys.
9. 98% of validated ACSOR surveyors administered questionnaire in equal numbers.
10. Of those validators who back-checked with respondents, 100% of respondents said that the topics discussed were survey topics with 18 individual complaints about survey delivery.
11. 94% of validated ACSOR surveys were checked for completeness and quality by the validator.

12. 94% of validated ACSOR surveyors took GPS reading when leaving villages. Kandahar, Herat and Khost province survey teams did not uniformly take GPS readings when leaving villages.

AYC survey methodology validation results include:

1. 99% of validated AYC surveyors visited scheduled sampling points.
2. 100% of validated AYC surveyors took GPS readings when entering villages except for Kajaki and Sangin teams.
3. 96% of validated AYC surveyors read disclosure statement according to protocol. Surveyors in Kishmish Khana and Sangin districts in Helmand province did not uniformly read the disclosure statement.
4. 100% of validated AYC surveyors administered questionnaire in equal numbers.
5. Of those validators who back-checked with respondents, 100% of respondents said that the topics discussed were survey topics and there were no recorded complaints about survey delivery.
6. 98% of validated AYC surveys were checked for completeness and quality by the validator. Kunduz province validators were frequently unable to check surveys prior to submission to AYC supervisor.
7. 51% of validated AYC surveyors took GPS reading when leaving villages. Kajaki, Sangin, Kishmish Khana and Archi district teams did not take GPS readings at all when leaving villages.

ACSOR Sampling Methodology and Kish Grid

District Province	Sampling Point Scheduled % No	Starting Point % No	Random Walk % No	Household Selection % No	Kish Grid % No
Zheri		100%	100%	100%	100%
Arghandab		100%	100%	100%	46%
Kandahar		100%	100%	100%	67%
Nadir Shah Kot		17%	47%	30%	
Jaji Maidan			53%	10%	
Manduzai			39%	28%	
Shamul			31%	23%	
Khost		5%	42%	22%	
Qalai Zal		10%	14%	14%	19%
Imam Sahib			18%	11%	35%
Chahar Darah					29%

District Province	Sampling Point Scheduled % No	Starting Point % No	Random Walk % No	Household Selection % No	Kish Grid % No
Kunduz		5%		11%	32%
Shahrak				11%	
Ghor				5%	
Injil					13%
Herat					7%
Chak-e Wardak					21%
Wardak					9%

ACSOR Ethics (Disclosure Statement) and Questionnaire Distribution

District Province	Read Disclosure Statement % No	Questionnaire Equally Administered % No
Garmser	10%	
Helmand	10%	
Qalai Zal	19%	
Kunduz	3%	
Jaji Maidan	50%	10%
Manduzai	50%	17%
Nadir Shali Kot	63%	
Shamul	51%	
Khost	50%	10%
Zheri		100%
Kandahar		43%

ACSOR Completeness/Quality Check and GPS Readings

District, Province	Check for Completeness/ Quality % No	GPS Reading Entering Village % No	GPS When Leaving Village % No
Guzara	18%		18%
Injil	26%		26%
Kohsan	13%		13%
Herat	19%		19%
Zheri		15%	100%
Arghandab		100%	100%
Kandahar		48%	100%
Jaji Maidan			23%
Manduzai	19%		14%
Nadir Shah Kot	20%		17%
Shamul	38%		
Khost	19%		14%

AYC Sampling Point Scheduled

District Province	Sampling Point Scheduled % No
Zurmat	9%
Paktiya	9%

AYC Ethics (Disclosure Statement) and Questionnaire Distribution

District Province	Read Disclosure Statement % No	Questionnaire Equally Administered % No
Kishmish Khana	100%	
Sangin	15%	
Helmand	9%	

AYC Completeness/Quality Check and GPS Readings

District Province	Check for Completeness/ Quality	% No	GPS Reading Entering Village	% No	GPS When Leaving Village	% No
Kajaki			100%		100%	
Sangin			100%		100%	
Kishmish Khana					100%	
Helmand			100%		100%	
Archi	100%				100%	
Chahar Darah	8%				8%	
Imam Sahib	13%					
Kunduz	18%				15%	

HUNTER DELETIONS

The four types of Hunter deletions are as follows:

1. Overlapping times of interviews -- tracks all interviews by interviewer, date, start and end of interview, and flags all interviews that overlap.
2. Equality – compares cases for similarity grouped by interviewer, within a sampling point, or any other variable, in this case from among all respondents of an interviewer. Flag and manually review any interviewer with an average of 90% or more similarities.
3. Don't know/Non-response – determines the percentage of Don't Knows and Refused for each interviewer's cases. Flag and manually review any case with an average of 40% or more.
4. Duplicates - compares cases across all interviewers and respondents for similarity rates. This test flags any pair of interviews that are similar to each other. Flag and manually review any pair of cases with 95% or more similarity.

Hunter Deletions due to duplication, time/date overlap, and other errors decreased by 40% from Wave 4 to Wave 5. However, deletion problems appeared in the following districts:

1. Shwak (Paktiya) – 8.04%
2. Jaji (Paktiya) – 6.25%
3. Herat (Adraskan) – 4.69%

4. Lash-e Juwayn (Farah) – 4.17%
5. Deh Yak (Ghazni) – 3.98%

AREAS OF CONCERN

1. ACSOR districts in Khost and Kandahar provinces generally lacked adherence to survey protocol.

Zheri and Arghandab districts in Kandahar province and Nadir Shah Kot, Jaji Maidan, Manduzai, and Shamul districts in Khost province did not adequately follow survey methodology for choosing the starting point, the random walk, household selection, and Kish Grid. Questionable survey practices decrease confidence in the results in these districts. In addition, validators were unable to check the surveys for completeness and quality prior to submission to the provincial supervisors.

2. GPS coordinates were not reported from several districts.

Validators reported that district teams in Kandahar, Herat and Khost and Helmand provinces did not uniformly take GPS readings when leaving villages. MISTI will check this assertion against the raw data from the ACSOR and AYC field GPS phones. Sampling points not given explicit permission to enter villages without taking GPS coordinates may be required to resurvey, as GPS coordinates are a USAID requirement.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Renewed focus on surveyor training in Khost and Kandahar provinces and improve supervisor management.

Khost and Kandahar surveyors require better training in order to cope with the long hours required for survey delivery and the precise methodological steps that need to be followed. Surveyors must be better trained – and retrained if necessary – in order to reinforce good surveying practices. Particular emphasis must again be placed on the Kish Grid and household selection. Supervisors must also play a more active role in the day-to-day execution of the survey. Kabul-based supervisors should also travel to these provinces to oversee provincial supervisors.

2. Maintain multiple validators in Kunduz and Logar provinces and add additional validators in Kandahar and Khost provinces.

Kandahar and Khost survey teams require at least two validators per province. In addition, the survey should be slowed down in these provinces to allow more time for validation and oversight.

APPENDIX A: ACSOR/AYC VALIDATION PROTOCOL

Background and Purpose of Validation

MISTI will conduct validations in select provinces for the fifth round of the MISTI survey in order to ensure high quality and adherence to protocol. The survey data will be collected by ACSOR and AYC.

Through validation, MISTI ensures that survey data is reliable and the program methodology is robust. Therefore, MISTI continuously seeks to improve survey data collection quality and validation protocols.

Wave 5 Validation Protocol

1. One female validator will be hired in order to validate female surveyors.
2. MISTI validators will inform ACSOR Supervisors of their arrival in the district 48 hours in advance. They will also tell them the days they will be conducting validations but not where or who they will be validating.
3. ACSOR/AYC supervisors, upon being informed of a validator's arrival, should contact all surveyors to inform them of fieldwork validations. He should also let surveyors know that if they are selected for validation, they will be contacted early on the validation morning by the supervisor and MISTI validator. Surveyors should also be reminded to cooperate fully with the validator and to let him complete his work without interference, especially during back-checks with respondents.
4. The day before each validation, the MISTI validator will review the following day's survey work with the supervisor. He will then select one or more sampling points as appropriate for validation but will not inform the supervisor of the chosen villages until 7:00am the following morning.
5. The supervisor and validator will make every effort to meet in the morning and will travel together to the validator's chosen sampling point. If this meeting does not occur, MISTI and ACSOR/AYC will review the survey results in the entire district for that day and will void them if warranted. Exceptions to this rule will be made on a case-by-case basis. The onus is on the supervisor to meet with the validator. In cases where the validator fails to meet at the agreed time and place with the supervisor, the validator will be replaced.
6. To ensure surveyors go to survey sampling points, survey teams must take GPS coordinate readings upon entering and leaving each village during the survey except in cases of direct threats to field teams or on a case-by-case basis as agreed by ACSOR/AYC and MISTI. GPS devices will be returned to MISTI immediately after district completion. MISTI will consider lack of GPS coordinates for sampling points as non-performance and no payment will be disbursed (exceptions noted above).
7. Validators will take GPS readings at all sampling points. GPS devices will be returned to MISTI immediately after district completion. Where safe and with permission from respondents, validators will also take photographs depicting survey implementation. Validators will email all photographs to MISTI HQ at the end of each survey day.
8. If validators claim that respondents had complaints about the survey, they must record what those complaints are on the monitoring form.

9. MISTI will observe all Kabul supervisor trainings and provide feedback.
10. ACSOR/AYC should conduct training for at least one (1) full day for supervisors and one (1) full day for surveyors with group-work (e.g., role playing) included.
11. Surveyors and validators should place renewed emphasis on sampling points in zones 2 and 3. At least 10% of validator monitoring forms should be from Zone 3 sampling points.

Methodology

MISTI will hire male and female validators in validation provinces. MISTI will increase the percentage of provinces and districts validated in Wave 5 to ensure higher data quality from past waves. MISTI's M&E department will conduct a full day of validation training to include group and field work. The training will take place in Kabul. The training will cover the following topics:

1. Introduction to MISTI
2. ACSOR/AYC survey objectives
3. Validation objectives
4. Validation methodology
5. Coordination, planning with ACSOR/AYC district teams
6. Communication and introduction to ACSOR/AYC team and MISTI Coordinator
7. Validation forms completion and submission process
8. Daily and final reporting requirements
9. Observation of ACSOR/AYC surveyors
10. ACSOR survey method: random walk, starting points, household selection, etc.
11. MISTI questionnaire overview
12. Group work exercises
13. GPS cell phone devices
14. Administrative/finance issues

Observation of the ACSOR/AYC training

MISTI M&E and validation staff will attend the ACSOR and AYC Wave 5 survey training in Kabul and several provinces. In order to facilitate travel, ACSOR and AYC should notify MISTI of their training schedule as soon as possible; at a minimum, 3 days is required to plan for staff to observe the training.

ACSOR will provide the training topics that they will cover in their training.

Validation Planning

ACSOR and AYC Kabul offices will provide a survey schedule including the dates of fieldwork in each district and the contact details of their supervisors and surveyors (by district). MISTI will use this information to schedule district visits. MISTI's Validation Coordinator will inform ACSOR/AYC and the district supervisor of a validator's arrival at least 48 hours prior to survey start. AYC and ACSOR will update the Validation Coordinator regarding any changes in scheduling fieldwork.

The afternoon/evening before validation the MISTI Validator and ACSOR/AYC Supervisor will meet to go over the following day's survey work. The MISTI Validator will select at least one village for validation but will not tell the ACSOR Supervisor until ca. 07:00 the following morning – the morning of the validation.

Coordination and Daily Reporting

Validators will provide a daily report of progress and major problems to the MISTI Validation Coordinator. The Validation Coordinator will share all major problems with ACSOR/AYC Survey Manager at the end of each day. Major problems include issues such as:

1. Validator unable to locate surveyor.
2. Surveyors filling in forms fraudulently.
3. Surveyors who take an abnormally short amount of time to complete interviews.
4. Surveyors who do not understand how to pick a starting point, how to do the random walk, or how to do the Kish Grid.
5. Surveyors who do not follow any other major guidelines.

In addition, ACSOR's and AYC's Survey Manager will share all problems or suggestions with the Validation Coordinator at the end of each day.

ACSOR and AYC are also required to send daily updates about the survey in the form of an excel spreadsheet. The spreadsheet should have all details concerning survey start and end dates, sampling points surveyed, security issues, and other important details as required and requested by MISTI.

AYC/ACSOR must also provide details of survey start dates at least 72 hours prior to the actual start date. Any survey work completed without MISTI's prior knowledge (72 hours minimum) will be redone at the surveyor's expense.

APPENDIX B: WAVE 5 MONITORING FORM

Validator Name		Surveyor Name	
District		ACSOR <input type="checkbox"/>	AYC <input type="checkbox"/>
Village			
Sampling Point #		Direct Observation <input type="checkbox"/>	Back Check <input type="checkbox"/>
Date		Both <input type="checkbox"/>	

1. Was this sampling point scheduled? Yes No

If no, how was it chosen?

2. Did the surveyor take a GPS reading when entering the village? Yes No

If no, explain:

ACSOR teams - answer questions 3-6 and skip question 7.

AYC teams – skip questions 3-6 and answer question 7.

3. ACSOR: Was the starting point chosen according to protocol? Yes No

If no, explain:

4. ACSOR: Was the random walk done according to protocol? **Yes** **No**

If no, explain:

5. ACSOR: Was the household selected according to protocol? **Yes** **No**

If no, explain:

6. ACSOR: Was the respondent chosen using the Kish Grid? **Yes** **No**

If no, explain:

7. AYC: How did the survey team select the household and respondent?

Please explain:

8. Was the interviewee read the disclosure statement? **Yes** **No**

If no, explain (and go to next section):

9. Were both versions of the questionnaire administered in equal numbers in the village?

(Eight of each version)

Yes **No**

If no, explain:

10. Were you able to conduct a back-check with the respondent? **Yes** **No**

IF YES:

a. Were the topics discussed survey topics? **Yes** **No**

b. Did the respondent have any complaints about the conduct of the interview?

Yes **No**

If yes, you must explain:

11. Did you (the validator) check questionnaires for completeness/quality? **Yes** **No**

If no, explain:

12. Did the surveyor take a GPS reading when leaving the village? **Yes** **No**

If no, explain:

APPENDIX C: RESULTS OF DATA QUALITY CHECKS, TRENDS WAVE 5

Results of Data Quality Checks, Trends Wave 5, v2

Province	District	Number of Cases in the Original Data Set	Field Provider	Time&Date	Equality	Non-response	Duplicates	Total Removed	Number of Cases in the Final Data Set	Percentage Unreliable Data
Badghis	Muqur	560	ACSOR				15	15	545	2.68
Badghis	Qadis	560	ACSOR				7	7	553	1.25
Badghis	Qal'ah-ye Now	240	ACSOR			1	1	2	238	0.83
Baghlan	Baghlan-e Jadid	383	ACSOR					0	383	0.00
Baghlan	Baghlan-e Jadid	176	AYC					0	176	0.00
Baghlan	Pul-e Khmri	560	ACSOR				10	10	550	1.79
Balkh	Balkh	320	ACSOR				1	1	319	0.31
Balkh	Chahar Bolak	240	ACSOR					0	240	0.00
Balkh	Chimtal	240	ACSOR					0	240	0.00
Balkh	Mazar-e Sharif	240	ACSOR					0	240	0.00
Balkh	Sholgarah	240	ACSOR					0	240	0.00
Farah	Bala Boluk	560	ACSOR					0	560	0.00
Farah	Farah	240	ACSOR				3	3	237	1.25
Farah	Khak-e Safayd	240	ACSOR					0	240	0.00
Farah	Lash-e Juwayn	240	ACSOR				10	10	230	4.17
Farah	Pusht-e Rod	399	ACSOR					0	399	0.00
Ghazni	Andar	320	AYC				2	2	318	0.63
Ghazni	Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghata)	176	ACSOR					0	176	0.00
Ghazni	Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghata)	64	AYC					0	64	0.00
Ghazni	Deh Yak	352	ACSOR				14	14	338	3.98
Ghazni	Gelan	320	ACSOR				1	1	319	0.31
Ghazni	Khwajah Omari	320	ACSOR					0	320	0.00
Ghazni	Malistan	240	ACSOR					0	240	0.00
Ghazni	Muqer	320	ACSOR					0	320	0.00
Ghazni	Qarah Bagh	560	ACSOR				3	3	557	0.54
Ghor	Chaghcharan	400	ACSOR					0	400	0.00
Ghor	Do Lainah	239	ACSOR					0	239	0.00

Ghor	Shahrak	320	ACSOR				0	320	0.00
Helmand	Garm Ser	560	ACSOR			11	11	549	1.96
Helmand	Kajaki	400	AYC				0	400	0.00
Helmand	Lashkar Gah	512	ACSOR			15	15	497	2.93
Helmand	Musa Qa'lah	560	AYC				0	560	0.00
Helmand	Nad Ali	560	ACSOR			5	5	555	0.89
Helmand	Nahr-e Saraj	560	ACSOR			1	1	559	0.18
Helmand	Sangin	560	AYC				0	560	0.00
Herat	Adraskan	192	ACSOR				0	192	0.00
Herat	Adraskan	128	AYC			6	6	122	4.69
Herat	Injil	240	ACSOR			6	6	234	2.50
Herat	Kohsan	240	ACSOR			1	1	239	0.42
Herat	Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	560	ACSOR			1	1	559	0.18
Herat	Nizam-e Shahid (Guzarah)	560	ACSOR			2	2	558	0.36
Herat	Pashtun Zarghun	400	ACSOR			1	1	399	0.25
Herat	Pashtun Zarghun	160	AYC			2	2	158	1.25
Herat	Shindand	304	ACSOR			1	1	303	0.33
Herat	Shindand	256	AYC				0	256	0.00
Jowzjan	Aqchah	240	ACSOR				0	240	0.00
Jowzjan	Faizabad	208	ACSOR				0	208	0.00
Jowzjan	Faizabad	32	AYC				0	32	0.00
Jowzjan	Khwajah Do Koh	240	ACSOR			1	1	239	0.42
Jowzjan	Qush Tepah	240	AYC				0	240	0.00
Jowzjan	Shibirghan	320	ACSOR			1	1	319	0.31
Kandahar	Arghandab	560	ACSOR			13	13	547	2.32
Kandahar	Arghistan	239	AYC				0	239	0.00
Kandahar	Daman	560	ACSOR				0	560	0.00
Kandahar	Dand	560	ACSOR			2	2	558	0.36
Kandahar	Maiwand	240	AYC				0	240	0.00
Kandahar	Panjwai	560	ACSOR			6	6	554	1.07
Kandahar	Shah Wali Kot	237	AYC				0	237	0.00
Kandahar	Spin Boldak	240	ACSOR			3	3	237	1.25
Kandahar	Takhtapol	240	ACSOR				0	240	0.00
Kandahar	Zharay	560	ACSOR				0	560	0.00
Khost	Bak	320	ACSOR			4	4	316	1.25
khost	Gurbuz	320	ACSOR			1	1	319	0.31

Khost	Jaji Maidan	320	ACSOR					0	320	0.00
Khost	Manduzai (Ismail Khel)	320	ACSOR					0	320	0.00
Khost	Nadir Shah Khost	240	ACSOR				1	1	239	0.42
Khost	Shamul (Dzadran)	320	ACSOR				1	1	319	0.31
Khost	Tanai	320	ACSOR					0	320	0.00
Khost	Terayzai (Ali Sher)	560	ACSOR					0	560	0.00
Kunar	Khas Kunar	560	ACSOR					0	560	0.00
Kunar	Marawarah	320	ACSOR					0	320	0.00
Kunar	Sar Kani	320	ACSOR					0	320	0.00
Kunduz	Aliabad	560	ACSOR				2	2	558	0.36
Kunduz	Archi	318	AYC					0	318	0.00
Kunduz	Chahar Darah	319	ACSOR				1	1	318	0.31
Kunduz	Chahar Darah	240	AYC					0	240	0.00
Kunduz	Imam Sahib	432	ACSOR				8	8	424	1.85
Kunduz	Imam Sahib	128	AYC					0	128	0.00
Kunduz	Khanabad	336	ACSOR					0	336	0.00
Kunduz	Khanabad	224	AYC					0	224	0.00
Kunduz	Kunduz (Gor Tepa)	368	ACSOR				4	4	364	1.09
Kunduz	Kunduz (Gor Tepa)	192	AYC					0	192	0.00
Kunduz	Qal'ah-ye Zal	240	ACSOR				2	2	238	0.83
Logar	Baraki Barak	560	AYC					0	560	0.00
Logar	Khoshi	144	ACSOR				4	4	140	2.78
Logar	Khoshi	256	AYC				1	1	255	0.39
Logar	Muhammad Aghah	480	ACSOR				7	7	473	1.46
Nimroz	Kang	400	ACSOR				3	3	397	0.75
Nimroz	Zaranj	560	ACSOR				16	16	544	2.86
Paktika	Sharan	240	ACSOR					0	240	0.00
Paktika	Yosuf Khel	240	ACSOR				2	2	238	0.83
Paktiya	Ahmadabad	240	ACSOR					0	240	0.00
Paktiya	Dzadran	320	AYC				3	3	317	0.94
Paktiya	Jaji	240	ACSOR					0	240	0.00
Paktiya	Jaji	16	AYC				1	1	15	6.25
Paktiya	Laja Mangel	320	ACSOR				2	2	318	0.63
Paktiya	Lajah Ahmad Khel	320	ACSOR				2	2	318	0.63
Paktiya	Mirzaka	240	ACSOR				1	1	239	0.42
Paktiya	Sayyid Karam	240	ACSOR					0	240	0.00
Paktiya	Shwak (Garda Serai)	128	ACSOR					0	128	0.00

Paktiya	Shwak (Garda Serai)	112	AYC				9	9	103	8.04
Paktiya	Zurmat	320	AYC					0	320	0.00
Samangan	Aibak	240	ACSOR			1	3	4	236	1.67
Samangan	Darah-ye Suf-e Pain	240	ACSOR					0	240	0.00
Samangan	Faryroz Nakhchir	240	ACSOR				3	3	237	1.25
Samangan	Hazrat-e Sultan	320	ACSOR			1	1	2	318	0.63
Samangan	Ruy Do Ab	240	ACSOR					0	240	0.00
Uruzgan	Chorah	560	ACSOR					0	560	0.00
Uruzgan	Deh Rawud	559	ACSOR				3	3	556	0.54
Uruzgan	Tarin Kot	560	ACSOR			11	1	12	548	2.14
Uruzgan	Khas Uruzgan	240	ACSOR				1	1	239	0.42
Uruzgan	Shahid eHasas	240	ACSOR				1	1	239	0.42
Wardak	Chak-e Wardak	480	ACSOR					0	480	0.00
Wardak	Jalrayz	560	ACSOR					0	560	0.00
Wardak	Maidan Shahr	240	ACSOR					0	240	0.00
Wardak	Nerkh	560	ACSOR					0	560	0.00
Wardak	Sayyidabad	560	ACSOR					0	560	0.00
Zabul	Qalat	560	ACSOR					0	560	0.00
Zabul	Shah Joy	552	ACSOR					0	552	0.00
Zabul	Tarneq wa Jaldak	559	AYC					0	559	0.00
Total		41260		0	0	14	233	247	41013	